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ABSTRACT
The linkage between the political dynamics at the state level and actual implementation of land
use regulations at the local level is the focus of this dissertation. This focus is explored through
the genesis and efficacy of cash proffers, a land use regulatory tool in Virginia. Using a mixed
methods approach, I answer research questions on how and why cash proffers came into
existence; are implemented; and affect housing development.
The importance of this dissertation topic stems from the uniqueness of the case. Virginia is the
only state in the United States using cash proffers on such a large-scale as a growth management
tool. It is important to understand whether this tool has applicability beyond Virginia. Further,
the "politics of land use" are complicated with important consequences for society. We need to
understand the role of state level interest groups in the efficacy of local land use regulations, as
well as, how the dynamics underlying these regulations at the local level feedback into the
statewide debate on growth management and land use. Finally, the costs of servicing new
development with public infrastructure have rapidly increased over time. Localities are in search
of new revenue sources to cover these infrastructure costs. This dissertation addresses whether
cash proffers can be considered as one such source.
Through historical analysis of archival materials as well as interviews, I find that cash proffers
were an unintended practice resulting from the implementation of state-approved conditional
zoning at the local level political process. Data collected through a self-conducted statewide
survey of Virginia counties plus state mandated revenue reports shows counties trying to add
more certainty to their implementation of cash proffers in the face of the tool's high revenue
variability. Multivariate regression results for a short panel of counties suggest that a county's
cash proffer activity is negatively associated with new housing construction.
Thesis Supervisor: Frank S. Levy
Title: Daniel Rose Professor of Urban Economics
3
4
Land Use Politics Southern Style: The Case of Cash Proffers in Virginia
by
Shannon Ashley McKay
Dissertation Committee:
Frank S. Levy, Daniel Rose Professor of Urban Economics
Department of Urban Studies and Planning, MIT
Eran Ben-Joseph, Professor of Landscape Architecture and Urban Planning
Department of Urban Studies and Planning, MIT
Lynn M. Fisher, Associate Professor
Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
5
6
TABLE OF CONTENTS
C HAPTER 1 ..........................................................................- -. . -------... ---------. --.....................--- --- --- 9
H ISTORICAL O VERVIEW .....................................................-..........................................--- ... -. 10
IMPLEMENTING CASH PROFFERS..................................................................................... I I
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM AND JUSTIFICATION FOR INVESTIGATING IT .......................... 12
M ETH O D S ...................................................................................................-------.. ----- . 14
DISSERTATION STRUCTURE .............................................................................. . ......... 15
C HAPTER 2........................................................................................--------. ----------------.................... 19
LAND USE REGULATIONS .................................................................................... 20
INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCING........................................................................... . 30
POLITICAL ECONOMY .........................................................- . ----------.. ------.--......................... 43
CHAPTER 3 .................................................................-------.. . ----------------.------------........................... 53
ZONING WITHOUT A PLAN ....................................................................... ....... 54
TRYING TO CREATE A MASTER PLAN ......................................................................... 55
ATTRACTION OF SEWER SYSTEMS ................................................................................... 56
INFLUENCE OF THE BLACK ROBES .................................................................................. .... 59
DEVELOPMENT FORCES AT WORK .............................................................. ................... 61
TRYING TO BUY COUNTY CERTAINTY ................................................................................. 63
THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS TO FIX A STRESSED SYSTEM .................................................... 65
GAINING ZONING FLEXIBILITY AND DEVELOPMENT CERTAINTY........................................... 66
FORESHADOWING THE EVOLUTION TO CASH PROFFERS .......................................................... 68
SEEKING STATE APPROVAL ........................................................................................ 69
C HAPTER 4................................................................................--.. . --------------------------..................... 73
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS ............................................................... ................ . .......... 73
H YPOTHESES ........................................................................................ . ------------................. 77
M ETHODOLOGY .................................................................--- ....- . --.......................... 77
D ATA AND EVIDENCE ..................................................................- -... --.... -... - - - -- - ---.................... 80
H ISTORICAL OVERVIEW .......................................................................... ---.......................... 81
C ONCLUSION ...................................................................... . ------------.. ---------.......................... 83
C HAPTER 5.......................................................................................------...--... ... - - -- - ---..................... 91
ISSUE CONTEXT AND EMERGENCE ..................................................................................... 91
AGENDA SETTING/ ALTERNATIVE SELECTION/ ENACTMENT .................................................. 97
IM PLEM ENTATION ......................................................................................--. . -..... ............. 114
C ONCLUSION ..............................................................................----------------....................... 118
7
CHAPTER 6...... ................................................................................................................. 119
ISSUE CONTEXT AND EMERGENCE........................................................................................... 119
AGENDA SETTING/ ALTERNATIVE SELECTION/ ENACTMENT ................................................... 125
IMPLEMENTATION.................................................................................................................... 147
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................ 156
CHAPTER 7................................................................................................................................... 157
ISSUE CONTEXT AND EMERGENCE........................................................................................... 157
AGENDA SETTING/ ALTERNATIVE SELECTION/ ENACTMENT ................................................... 162
IM PLEMENTATION .................................................................................................................... 183
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 191
CHAPTER 8.......................................................---......................................................................... 193
ISSUE CONTEXT AND EMERGENCE........................................................................................... 193
AGENDA SETTING/ ALTERNATIVE SELECTION/ ENACTMENT ................................................... 198
IMPLEMENTATION ............................................................................ 
.. ............ 244
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................ 249
CHAPTER 9................................................................................................................................... 251
M ETHODOLOGY AND D ATA COLLECTION ................................................................................ 252
W HO Is A CCEPTING CASH PROFFERS....................................................................................... 254
H ow CASH PROFFERS ARE A DMINISTERED ............................................................................. 262
How CASH PROFFERS ARE USED ............................................................................................ 267
CONCLUSION............................................-..................... 
..................................................... 275
CHAPTER 10 ......... ....................................................................................................... 277
LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................................ 278
M ODEL.......... ........................................................................................................... 281
DATASET ................................................---........................................................................ 285
REGRESSION RESULTS ..................... ...................................................................................... 292
A LTERNATE LEVEL OF ANALYSIS............................................................................................ 297
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................ 299
CHAPTER 11.................................. . ---................................................................................... 301
POLICY IMPLICATIONS ............................................................................................................. 303
FUTURE RESEARCH.................................................................................................................. 306
REFERENCES............................----------------...... 
---.................................................................. 311
A PPENDIX ................................-. .. ---.... -----.......................................................................... 329
ACKNOW LEDGEMENTS...... ............---------.... .. ------....................................................................... 353
8
CHAPTER 1
This dissertation is about the development, implementation, and influence of cash proffers. Cash
proffer is "a voluntary offer of money, submitted as part of rezoning application to offset the
impact of a particular development."' The concept of a cash proffer is universally accepted. The
right for local governments to actually collect them, however, has been a source of great debate.
It has been hailed as "one of the most significant growth management tools" in Virginia, as well
as, "the greatest legal fix in Virginia history." 2 Growth management is a balance between the
market's economic power (industry, trade associations, land development, designers, and
financial institutions) and the state's government power (local government, regional government,
state government, federal government, and executive, legislative and judicial branches)
(Randolph 2004). Civil society's people power (the community, citizens, neighborhood groups,
environmental organizations, land trusts) monitors the balance between the two sides (Randolph
2004).
Cash proffers are part of the land use regulatory framework. Land use regulations have far-
reaching impacts. For example, the decision to zone part of a community as large-lot residential
rather than high-density residential has ramifications on the environment and its natural
resources, public infrastructure and services, traffic flow patterns, community demographics, and
economic growth. The impacts extend well beyond the borders of that single jurisdiction because
labor and capital can be footloose. A land use regulation like zoning is characterized as "the
product of a political process, and it serves the interests of those who control that process"
(Fischel 2000: 404). A potential cost of regulation may be to restrict housing supply and supply
elasticity which may translate into higher housing prices and more volatile housing markets
(Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks 2005). This cost is balanced against the benefit of coordinated
development and growth. It is important to understand what or who determines the nature of land
use regulations with their vast reach and positive and negative implications.
The power to impose land use regulations is rooted in the police power granted to a locality by
the state where they are given the responsibility "to guard the health, safety, morals, and general
welfare of the public" (Johnson 1997: 35). For the planning field, the implementation of land use
regulations is justified for three major reasons: "maintaining residential property values, shaping
a compact urban form, and promoting efficient public service provision" (Carruthers 2002: 396).
When former U.S. House Speaker "Tip" O'Neill coined the phrase, "All politics are local," he
could have been describing the dominant approach taken to modeling the politics of land use
1 Virginia Chapter of the American Planning Association. 1999. Virginia's Growth Management Tools. June.
(Updated January 2002), p. 19. http://www.vaplanning.org/pdfs/growthtools.pdf.
2 Martz, Michael. 1989. "Zoning, Pipeline Fights Likely to Move to Senate Floor." Richmond Times Dispatch.
February 15.; Williams, Terri. 1996. "Suffolk Council Looking at Ways to Pay for Growth." The Virginian-Pilot.
October 14.
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regulation. The "politics of land use" literature has typically focused on the local level political
models of land use regulations ignoring the state level dynamic.3
This dissertation takes the step of examining the linkage between the political dynamics at the
state level and actual implementation of land use regulations at the local level. I trace the
evolution of state statutes authorizing land use regulations and the actions of interest groups at
the state level over time. I focus on the interplay between local government decision makers,
other interest groups like the homebuilding industry, and state legislators. I look at how the state
level debate impacts the ways in which a locality implements land use regulations because the
"politics of land use" are complicated with important societal consequences.
My dissertation is built around three major research questions. First, how and why did the cash
proffer tool come into existence? This question fits into the politics of land use regulations
component of this dissertation. Second, how are cash proffers implemented by localities?
Finally, how do cash proffers affect housing development in localities? The last two research
questions present different aspects of the implementation investigation. Together, these questions
contribute to our understanding of the role of state level interest groups in the efficacy of local
land use regulations, as well as, how the dynamics underlying these regulations at the local level
feedback into the statewide debate on growth management and land use.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
In 1973, the General Assembly of Virginia passed a statute authorizing conditional zoning for
counties with an urban executive form of government. At that time and still today, there is only
one county that has this governmental form -- Fairfax County. Under a conditional zoning
system, a developer or landowner makes an application for a zoning change to a parcel
(rezoning) and may volunteer conditions (proffers) to the locality that they believe will lessen the
impact of the zoning change. These conditions can consist of property, off-site and/or on-site
improvements (roads, aesthetics, libraries, parks), as well as, cash payments. Developers
supported the legislation because they "saw this new zoning as a way to make county leaders
'offers they couldn't refuse"' and thereby facilitate new development.4 The original intent of the
statute was a desire to increase the flexibility in the zoning system with the focus on design
elements as opposed to financial concerns. However, the legislation only stated that the
conditions needed to be "reasonable" rather than providing a specific list of what was considered
an acceptable condition to be volunteered by rezoning applicants. Absent clearly defined
3 See Abbott et al (1994) and Walker and Hurley (2011) [Oregon], Catlin (1997) [Florida], Frece (2008) [Maryland]
and Peters (1994) [Pennsylvania] for literature that incorporates state level dynamics into the politics of land use
discussion.
4 Snyder, Roger. 1992. "Growth Management Through Negotiations." Planning in Virginia: 11.
http://www.vaplanning.org/pubs/1989/PIVA%2089.pdf
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boundaries on what could be proffered, proffers evolved from the traditional on-site
improvements, to off-site improvements, and then to cash payments.
The passage of the 1973 legislation was a joint effort between localities and the development
community. The introduction of cash proffers, however, started a pitched debate between the two
sides over the eventual expansion of conditional zoning system and cash proffers. As a result,
Virginia has three different statutes enabling cash proffers. Each has its own eligibility
requirements and conditions of use. Plus, there is one statewide statute allowing conditional
zoning without cash proffers. This 1978 statute grants the power of conditional zoning to the
entire state of Virginia, but does not allow localities to accept cash proffers as part of the
rezoning application (localities authorized under the 1973 legislation and its amendments are not
affected). Further, it imposes additional constraints on the conditions such as they need to be
aligned with the comprehensive plan.
In 1989, the General Assembly authorized conditional zoning with the acceptance of cash
proffers, but only to those localities with a certain rate of population change and the localities
adjacent to them. Thus, the legislation officially tied the use of cash proffers to growth rates. It
also imposed the requirement that the project being funded by cash proffers must be part of a
locality's capital improvement plan and that the rezoning must directly give rise for the need of
cash proffers. Despite their differences, the multiple statutes are all based around the same
principle - a cash proffer must be voluntarily offered by the developer. Over time, the
development community has become less supportive of cash proffers as their use has expanded
and the proposed amounts have increased. Despite their initial backing of cash proffers, the home
building industry in 2008 lobbied state legislators to abolish the whole system of cash proffers.
A key question is whether fiscal concerns about growth are ideally linked to rezonings.
For example, why not separate financial concerns completely from conditional zoning, i.e.
eliminate cash proffers, and authorize the use of a different growth management tool whose
focus is the raising of revenue like impact fees. The resulting system would allow conditional
zoning to return to its origins. Conditional zoning would bring flexibility to a locality's zoning
code to accommodate growth. At the same time, it could shape the growth to fit the community's
vision. Meanwhile, a different tool would be used to generate revenues to pay for the public
infrastructure needs of that growth.
IMPLEMENTING CASH PROFFERS
Cash proffers can be used to fund a variety of purposes including law enforcement and traffic
control; fire and rescue services; highways, streets, bridges, and sidewalks; education; parks and
recreation; library; housing; transit; and mental health services. Cash proffers are generated as
part of a conditional zoning system. Under a conditional zoning system, a developer or
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landowner makes an application for a zoning change to a parcel (rezoning) and may volunteer
conditions to the locality that they believe will lessen the impact of the zoning change. The
proffers are made under the belief that the offering of these conditions will make a rezoning
application more palatable for approval by a local governing body and their constituents. The
conditions address or alleviate particular impacts of the rezoning.
Localities can set a maximum cash proffer level per building permit based on the net cost of
development per public facility. This amount gives developers an idea of how much to volunteer
as payment and more certainty in their share of the costs. At the other end of the spectrum,
localities can negotiate on a case-by-case basis given what the developer originally proffers as
the cash payment amount. It is important to stress that the offered conditions must be voluntary
and that approval of the rezoning application cannot hinge on the proffers alone for legal reasons
to be explored. From the beginning of its history, a question over the revenue raising
effectiveness of cash proffers has existed. This questioning stems from its limited applicability to
only rezonings.
The Virginia Chapter of the American Planning Association (VAPA) in its revised 2007
publication Managing Growth and Development in Virginia: A Review of Tools Available to
Localities lists cash proffers in the section entitled, "Tools for Managing the Financial Impacts of
Growth." This categorization reinforces the idea that cash proffers in Virginia are a growth
management tool. A widely-accepted definition of growth management is "those policies, plans,
investments, incentives, and regulations to guide the type, amount, location, timing, and the cost
of development to achieve a responsible balance between the protection of the natural
environment and the development to support growth, a responsible fit between development and
necessary infrastructure, and quality of life" (Randolph 2004: 39). The history of cash proffers
illustrates the two-sided nature of growth management: regulation and financing.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM AND JUSTIFICATION FOR INVESTIGATING IT
Cash proffers are one of the few tools given to Virginia localities to manage growth-related
issues. This tool has become highly politicized and yet there has not been an official study of its
effects. The Virginia General Assembly, the state's legislative body, has for the past couple of
years convened meetings on the status of cash proffers in the state, particularly whether they are
being abused. Although no official report has been released on the issue, the abuse complaints
arise from developers who see the cash proffer system as becoming one of extortion by local
governments rather than voluntary offerings by developers. Yet at the same time, it continues to
expand the number of localities that can qualify to accept cash proffers. So this study may help
end the mixed messages. Furthermore, local governments in Virginia have fought for years about
being able to use a variety of impact fees instead of cash proffers, but have been continually
rebuffed. Lastly, the exploration of how cash proffers came to exist and implemented may offer
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insight to other governments on how they can achieve successful passage of growth management
tool legislation.
This case is particularly interesting because no other place has adopted such a tool - although
cash proffers can be considered analogous to impact fees, they are nonetheless different. Cash
proffers can only arise from a rezoning application rather than by-right development. Virginia is
the only state with an explicit use of conditional zoning and cash proffers. A question to be
answered is why other states have not followed Virginia's lead. Is this a sign that Virginia is
lagging behind the rest of the nation on the growth management movement or has it developed a
unique solution that others need to be made aware of more? Second, the world is not static and
one suspects that interest group politics might shift over time, so it is equally interesting to ask
how or why the use of this tool has persisted. In addition, the implementation and effectiveness
of regulatory tools is expected to change over time and in different contexts so that the
corresponding impacts on growth, for example, may also change. The early history of proffers
suggests that cash proffers were not initially intended to be a growth management tool at all
(despite the claims to the contrary), but a tool designed to help developers win the ability to do
new development.
In cases of the delegation of authority to local governments, Virginia follows the narrow
construct of Dillon's Rule as well as a corollary to it. The implication for localities is that they
can only pass land use regulations that are expressly authorized by the passage of legislation by
the Virginia General Assembly. Further, they face a reduction in the "flexibility with which local
government can exercise its land use control powers, even though the societal context in which
these powers are applied is in a state of a flux" (BeVier and Brion 1981: 22). Fischel (2007)
contends that Dillon's Rule is a moot point in today's era of land use regulations. His argument
is if a state court does strike down a locality's land use regulation on the basis of Dillon's Rule,
the locality will turn around and lobby their state legislators for the passage of a bill granting
them the power to impose such a regulation. This dissertation will provide the opportunity to
examine Fischel's conclusion on the current relevance of Dillon's Rule, as well as, the ability of
local governments to overcome the power and influence of other interest groups in their pursuit
of the authority to use specific land use regulatory tools.
The demand for public services is not declining yet sources of revenue for localities are limited.
Local governments need to know the full consequences of choosing certain growth management
tools as an additional revenue source. Variations of development exaction models have been
implemented across the United States without a solid research foundation (theoretically or
empirically) behind them to support their effectiveness. The academic literature does not include
a study that focuses on the use of cash proffers. Most studies have focused on impact fees. So the
completion of this dissertation would fill a gap in the growth management literature. This
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dissertation makes empirical contributions in its modeling of the effect of cash proffer activity on
housing development.
The concept of cash proffers in the case under study is also linked to the topic of conditional
zoning which is a tool that has been largely ignored in the planning literature. It was popular in
law journals from the mid- 1 960s to the early 1980s. This dissertation provides the opportunity to
update the planning field on conditional zoning and what it offers the field. Authors have tended
either to focus on the process to get a certain piece of legislation passed or the implementation of
that newly passed law. In this dissertation, I show the complete political process from conception
to implementation. Furthermore, the work will be of interest to those studying
negotiation/bargaining because of the examination of the strategic behavior of those parties
involved in the process of the development of the tool and then its implementation, particularly
the interactions between developers and localities.
This research will contribute to the 'politics of land use' literature and inform the practice of
policymakers and planners. By carefully documenting the life cycle of cash proffers, this
investigation addresses the concern of Quigley and Rosenthal that the literature on land use
regulations and its effects "tends not to recognize the complexity of local policymaking and
regulatory behavior" (Quigley and Rosenthal 2005: 69-70). In addition, researchers like Fischel
(2007) have typically focused on the local level political models of land use regulation ignoring
the state level dynamic because of the inherent nature of land use planning as a local decision.
Recently, as state governments have taken a bigger role in planning matters through state-wide
growth management programs or state-level departments of planning, there has been a growing
recognition that the state level is an important place where interest groups may impact the
"politics of land use." States like Massachusetts and New Jersey are just two example places
where important laws with major impacts on land use, Chapter 40B (1969) and the Fair Housing
Act (1985), respectively, were the outcomes of similar state level politics with important and
dynamic ramifications for localities.
METHODS
The three major research questions of my dissertation are examined through a mix of qualitative
and quantitative methods. I answer the question of how did the current system of cash proffers
come to exist by qualitatively establishing a history of the political process behind the creation
and authorization of conditional zoning and thereby, cash proffers. I create this history through
the use of archival and present day research materials including newspaper articles, legislative
session journals, government reports, videotaped legislative sessions, legislation drafts, and
signed legislation. My investigation is broken up chronologically into ten year increments
representing each decade beginning with the 1970s and ending with the 2008 legislative session,
so four time periods overall. For each time period, I look at the stages of policymaking - issue
14
context and emergence; agenda setting/ alternative selection/ enactment; and implementation. I
focus upon the agents involved at each stage and ask a series of questions about these agents. For
example, how did the agents influence the outcomes? Agents can range from local governments
and the development community to state legislators and the judicial system. Each piece of
legislation related to the conditional zoning statutes is examined regardless of whether the
legislation was signed into law.
In regard to the question of how are cash proffers implemented, I use a more data-driven
approach. Before looking at implementation, I need to know who was actually in a position to
accept cash proffers. This data was not available, so I conducted a survey of all counties in the
state to obtain the information. I take my survey data and supplement it with data collected
annually by the state on cash proffer revenue collections and expenditures, as well as, other
sources like the U.S. Census Bureau. I then perform statistical analysis tests (i.e. difference of
means tests) comparing "Accepting" counties to "Non-Accepting" counties to determine what
factors explain acceptance status. I use the same methods to look at different implementation
approaches among "Accepting" counties.
A multivariate regression approach is used to analyze the question of how do cash proffers affect
housing development. I model the natural log of the number of single-family building permits in
a year as a function of the cash proffer revenue collected in a community in the prior year, the
change in housing price index for the community in the prior year growth rate, and a
community's year of eligibility to accept cash proffers. I make specification changes to the basic
model to take into account issues with endogeneity, omitted variable bias, and spatial
dependence. I run the different specifications using a panel dataset of 82 counties for the 2001 to
2008 time period which is treated as a pooled cross-sectional dataset. The software package,
STATA, is used to estimate these models.
DISSERTATION STRUCTURE
This dissertation has three major structural divisions with nine chapters split among them.
The first division lays the foundation upon which this dissertation is built. Chapter 2 reviews the
major themes in the literature on land use regulation and infrastructure finance essential to
understanding the cash proffer and the factors that have influenced its design. There are three
major sections to the literature review. The first section focuses on land use regulations from
their origins in the United States to the development of conditional zoning. Cash proffers are
linked to land use regulations since the ability to accept cash proffers is authorized through a
locality's zoning ordinance. Further, cash proffers can only be accepted through a rezoning
application that is done via conditional zoning. Section 2 explores the topic of fiscal
responsibility with regards to public works. A discussion of the growth management literature is
found within this section. Cash proffers are a revenue raising tool through which unplanned
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growth contributes to the cost of providing public infrastructure to the new development. The
final section focuses on the political economy landscape in which land use regulations and
infrastructure finance operate. This literature points out the importance of actors, context,
language, and implementation. As Chapter 2 laid the literature foundation, Chapter 3 illustrates
many of the tensions discussed in the literature as I lay out how Fairfax County, Virginia came to
be in a position where it saw conditional zoning as a potential solution to its growth problems.
The Fairfax County story is the foundation for the historical analysis presented in the
dissertation's second division. Together, Chapters 2 and 3 lay the groundwork for the
investigation of the legislative history of conditional zoning and cash proffers with an emphasis
on the importance of actors, context, language, and implementation of land use regulations.
The goal of the second division is to understand how and why Virginia arrived at its unique
practice of allowing cash proffers in conjunction with conditional zoning. To answer these
questions, I focus on the impact of interest groups on the conception and fruition of the law
enabling cash proffers. This division consists of Chapters 4 through 8. Chapter 4 provides the
theoretical framework and methodology behind this analysis, as well as, an executive summary
of findings from the historical analysis. Each decade of historical analysis is discussed in a
separate chapter, so the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000-2008 are covered in Chapters 5, 6, 7, and
8, respectively. I find that conditional zoning was never envisioned as a growth management tool
or a source of revenues. Second, the multiplicity of conditional zoning authorization statutes is a
sign of power by both the development community and local governments. Third, cash proffers
at the state level were an unintended practice resulting from implementation at the local level
political process.
The third structural division in the dissertation is focused on an investigation of the
implementation of cash proffers by local governments, as well as, any impact of cash proffers on
growth in a locality. In Chapter 9, I look at which counties in Virginia are accepting cash
proffers and whether there are any differences in how they implement their cash proffer systems.
I find that "Accepting" counties are statistically different from "Non-Accepting" counties in
terms of socioeconomic measures, building activity, geography and eligibility timing. Further,
administrative hurdles do not explain the lack of acceptance among "Non-Accepting" counties.
Over the years, counties have transitioned from a "case-by-case" approach to a more
standardized policy approach. Regardless of the implementation approach, the annual revenue
stream from cash proffer collections is highly variable. The impact of cash proffers on growth is
investigated empirically in Chapter 10. Through multivariate regression analysis, I find that
increases in cash proffer revenue collection per building permit are more likely negatively
associated with new housing development activity. In addition, development activity in a given
county is negatively affected by the new housing construction in its border counties.
16
In Chapter 11, I discuss the overall findings from this dissertation, as well as, potential future
research questions in this arena. In addition, I present my thoughts on what a cash proffer system
could look like if politics at any level was not a factor. Bibliography and Appendix sections can
be found at the end of the dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2
This chapter offers a review of the literature relevant to understanding the general cash proffer
concept. Cash proffers are an innovation in infrastructure finance that arose from problems on
the ground in Virginia's localities. Innovation in municipal infrastructure financing has been
aimed at shifting financial responsibility for new development from the sole responsibility of
local governments. However, a cash proffer can only result from a change in the regulation of a
property's land use. This change is an attempt to increase flexibility in a locality's zoning
ordinance in the face of growth. I argue then that cash proffers are a hybrid of infrastructure
finance and land use regulation. Thus any discussion of the tool needs to involve both the land
use regulation and infrastructure finance literatures in order to see where cash proffers fit into
them. Further, land use regulation and infrastructure finance decisions are made in a political
environment. The political economy literature can help to understand how politics may have
shaped the cash proffer tool.
The first section of this chapter reviews land use regulations. It begins with a brief history of land
use regulations in the United States followed by a critical perspective on their impacts. The focus
then shifts to the dominant land use regulation in operation - zoning. Euclidean zoning, another
name for traditional zoning in the United States, has not developed without its own faults,
particularly, a lack of flexibility. Conditional zoning is introduced in this section for two reasons.
First, it represents an evolutionary attempt to inject flexibility into zoning. Second, conditional
zoning is the foundation for the concept of proffers.
The next section is an exploration of the topic of fiscal responsibility with regards to public
works. I begin with a history of the financing of urban infrastructure in the United States with a
particular focus on the tools that have been developed to generate revenues from the private
sector, in particular, impact fees. I then discuss the legal perspective on shifting of costs from the
public to the private sector. An exploration of the connection between land use planning and
issues of fiscal responsibility ends this section through the topic of growth management which
generally represents an attempt to combine two (or more) separate problems into a more
comprehensive whole.
The last section of this chapter focuses on the political economy landscape in which land use
regulations and infrastructure finance operate. The first subsection is a discussion of Dillon's
Rule, the 1911 legal opinion of Iowa Supreme Court Justice John F. Dillon. Justice Dillon
concluded that local government powers are only those expressly granted by the state. A state
government's level of adherence to Dillon's Rule may restrict the ability of local governments to
self-legislate. This means that the type of land use regulations and financing tools available to
localities may be limited. The last subsection explores the importance of land use politics for
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understanding the legislative process through which regulation occurs. Typically, the focus is on
how regulations are developed at the local level. I will demonstrate that the state level process is
just as important. Given the influence of Dillon's Rule in a state, as well as, efforts to think more
broadly about growth issues, the potential exists for its importance to grow larger. Land use
issues are likely to be controversial and the power to decide them resides in the political process.
While the political process, itself, matters, there are other contextual factors that play a role, too.
LAND USE REGULATIONS
Introduction
Land use regulations are principally an attempt to control nuisance and ensure compatibility
between land uses. In trying to accomplish these aims, they have far-reaching impacts. For
example, the decision to zone part of a community as large-lot residential rather than high-
density residential has ramifications on the environment and its natural resources, public
infrastructure and services, traffic flow patterns, community demographics, as well as, economic
growth. The impacts extend well beyond the borders of that single jurisdiction because labor and
capital can be footloose. A potential cost of regulation may be to restrict housing supply and
supply elasticity which may translate into higher housing prices and more volatile housing
markets (Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks 2005). Given the vastness of their reach with the
possibility of positive and negative implications, it is important to understand who or what
determines the nature of land use regulations. Typically, in their regulation of land, public
entities have focused on the type, density, and aesthetics of a use, as well as, how it relates to a
community's cultural and social values (Salsich 1998). Over time, however, striking a balance
between flexibility and rigidity; uniformity and individualism; certainty and risk are the
evolutionary hallmarks of American land use regulations. In this section, I explore the
development of land use regulations in the United States.
While many presume that government land use regulations are a product of the twentieth
century, they have existed in the United States since the colonial times. The primary change over
time has been the comprehensiveness of their scope in terms of the level and extent of
regulations. Originally, regulations focused on protecting a person's property from others such as
building codes detailing the materials that a structure could be built with in order to prevent a
city-wide fire that might occur if every building were still made of wood instead of brick and
stone. The protection of private property was grounded in the concept of nuisance from the
United States' English common law heritage.
A "nuisance" is what we would today call a negative externality. The nuisance doctrine forced
private property owners to more carefully consider how their property could be used. Nolon and
Salkin conclude, "[h]istorically, the powerful right of individuals to use their land under the
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common law was balanced to a degree by the doctrine of nuisance, which established that private
landowners may not use their property in a way that is injurious to property held by others"
(Nolon and Salkin 2006: 14-15). Nuisances included "the effects of smoke, dust, noise, odors,
heat, or other discernable effects that interfered with or diminished the normal uses of nearby
property" (Nolon et al 2006: 15). These disputes were handled privately, between the property
owners themselves, without government regulatory interference. Property owners could
voluntarily choose to take their dispute to the court system. Cases would result in injunctions or
damage awards if substantial harm could be clearly demonstrated (Nolon et al 2006). Over time,
local governments, anticipated well-known problems and established nuisance rules to separate
uses that would typically become injurious to other parties. The public hand that in 1672
regulated building materials in Boston grew into a series of 1908 ordinances in Los Angeles
which established seven industrial districts where mills and factories were allowed and three
districts for the sole purpose of being home to residences (Garvin 2002).
Within the common law heritage, individuals also enacted preemptive private controls over land
use. They did not have to wait for a nuisance to develop before taking action. Individuals, as well
as, developers could engage in private land use planning (and can still today). Property law has
four recognized types of private land use controls - easements, real covenants, equitable
servitude, and common interest communities like condominiums or home owner associations
(Sprankling 2007). These tools are applicable and or used most frequently with residential
development.
Real covenants and its modem successor, equitable servitude, are the most widely recognized
forms of private land use control and were conceived to reconcile "individual liberty and the
efficient use of land" (Sprankling 2007: 576). Real covenants bind the original parties and future
owners to a set of conditions on the use of land whereby damages may be sought for any
violation of the promises (Sprankling 2007). In a covenant, the injured party is entitled solely to
financial compensation. An equitable servitude, by contrast, goes a step further with the ability to
seek an injunction against the offensive use. This distinction means that with equitable servitude
the action that violates the promise can be legally stopped with an injunction while a covenant
would allow the offending use to remain after damages are paid (Sprankling 2007).
Real covenants are also known as restrictive covenants because they are typically employed in
land deeds to restrict one's use of his or her property. Originally, restrictive covenants were not
held in high regard in the United States because of "deep-seated beliefs in property rights,
homeownership, and suburbia" (Fogelson 2005: 55). The issue was why someone would want to
buy a lot to build a house on it when the lot came with a series of restrictions tied to its use,
particularly if there were unrestricted lots in the community. The whole idea seemed to go
against one's right to do whatever they wanted with their private property. The attitude towards
these private land use controls changed towards the end of the 19th century. Individuals became
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concerned about maintaining the architecture and design integrity as well as the general
appearance of their community. To allay the worries of potential or future clients, subdividers, as
residential developers were known then, resorted to the placement of restrictive covenants on the
undeveloped lots in their new subdivisions. The appeal of covenants was their "supposed" ability
to maintain a sense of permanency in a surrounding neighborhood, as well as, stabilization of
property values. One author concludes, "[w]ith restrictions in place, . . . , Americans no longer
need[ed to] fear that an attractive subdivision would soon 'give way to something less desirable
and perhaps hideous" (Fogelson 2005: 111).
As much as subdividers at the time thought that restrictive covenants could maintain a level of
standardization in land use, privately enforced covenants have limitations. Although their use is
easy to achieve in a new subdivision, covenants run into difficulties in existing built-up
communities where property owners are reluctant to lose existing rights. Secondly, enforcement
is the key to making covenants work and if there is no one enforcing the agreement, then it is
worthless. Often times, enforcement involves the legal system which generates a financial cost to
individuals. In addition, Fogelson points out that "[o]nce the restrictions expired, . . . , the courts
would not enforce them. Nor would they enforce them if the plaintiff had ignored the violations
for an unreasonably long time or if the neighborhood had changed so much that an injunction
would do damage to the defendant without giving relief to the plaintiff' (Fogelson 2005: 113).
Finally, there is the "border" issue which revolves around the fact that a covenant's restrictions
are only applicable within the subdivision or particular area under the same deed. So one cannot
control what happens on the property across the street or next to it if its deed is not bound by the
same covenant. For all of these reasons, Garvin concludes that, "[m]ost localities stopped
regulating land use solely by private agreement because the time, cost, and complexity of
separately and individually making, amending, and rescinding these agreements proved to be too
great. It seemed better to prescribe actions by legislation rather than by written agreement among
the property owners affected, to make decisions by majority vote rather than by unanimous
consent, and to have them enforced by administrative agencies rather than by the courts" (Garvin
2002: 429).
Despite the drawbacks, covenants have not disappeared completely as a form of land use control.
In fact, the champions of zoning at the beginning of the 2 0 th century, envisioned a cooperative
relationship between the public and private land use controls because of the level of detail to
which a covenant could go. The focus in zoning as detailed in the next subsection was on the
compatibility of uses not architectural styles or minimum housing costs which could be outlined
in a deed's covenants. This led Fogelson to conclude that, "' [zioning and private restrictions do
not interfere with each other,' ... 'both may exist hand in hand. Prudent developers will still use
private restrictions to supplement zoning regulations"' (Fogelson 2005: 115). For example,
Houston, Texas is known for using deed restrictions city-wide to control the use of land as
opposed to a comprehensive zoning ordinance. In addition, gated communities and neighborhood
associations still rely on deed restrictions to a degree to invoke a sense of community
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responsibility and sameness within their bounds, but they are still subject to a local government's
land use regulations.
Prior to the 2 0 * century, government involvement in land use controls was driven by concerns
over nuisance. While nuisance is still relevant, governments no longer rely upon the concept to
justify their intervention in the land use arena. Modern land use regulations are rooted in the
concept of police power whereby a government is given the responsibility "to guard the health,
safety, morals, and general welfare of the public" within the boundaries of the U.S. Constitution
(Johnson 1997: 35). A constitutional limitation was imposed presumably on the power to
regulate land in the 1922 U.S. Supreme Court case - Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon - where
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote in the majority opinion that "while a property maybe
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking" and thus
the property owner would be entitled to compensation from the government for the reduction in
the value of their property caused by the land use regulation (Garvin 2002: 430).
"Police power" is a concept applicable to the states, but its scope is restricted by the U.S.
Constitution, specifically the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Constitutional amendments are
not the only way that the federal government is involved in the regulation of land use. The
federal government has responsibility for regulating navigable waterways, so they are involved
in the construction of bridges, dams, and other structures that go into these waters, as well as,
controlling what is discharged into them. In fact, federal monies may be the federal
government's most direct method of influencing land use because with any appropriation of
federal dollars, Congress may specify certain requirements that must be met in order to receive
the money. The authority to regulate land use at the local level is delegated to local governments
by their state government. Garvin points out, "City, county, and regional governments are
considered to be 'creatures' created by the states and are entitled to carry out only state-
authorized functions" (Garvin 2002: 430). This relationship between local and state governments
is explored later in the chapter around the topic of Dillon's Rule.
Zoning
Comprehensive zoning came to the United States in 1916 with New York City's Zoning
Resolution Act. This was the first time that a city had an ordinance that specified at the same
time, "the permitted land use, building height, and building placement for the entire city" in a
series of "zoning maps, which designated the regulations that applied to every block and lot
within the city limits, and a zoning text that explained them" (Garvin 2002: 432). After the
adoption in New York City, municipalities around the United Stated rushed to adopt similar
measures. The number of cities with zoning ordinances increased from eight at the end of 1916
to almost eight hundred by the end of the 1920s (Toll 1969). Roughly 37 million people were
now subject to zoning controls (Toll 1969). What exactly was the zoning bandwagon that
municipalities were so quick to join? A standard definition of zoning is that
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"Zoning consists of dividing a community into districts or zones and regulating
within such districts the use of land and the use, heights, and area of buildings for
the purpose of conserving and promoting the health, safety, morals, convenience,
and general welfare of the people of the community. Zoning is the instrument
for giving effect to that part of the comprehensive city plan or master plan which
is concerned with the private uses of and the private developments on, privately
owned land-as distinguished from that part which is concerned with public uses
and facilities. The zoning map or zoning plan along with the regulations pertaining
thereto are thus a part of the master plan-in essence the comprehensive land-use
plan of the community-while the enactment of the zoning ordinance and its
administration are the legislative and administrative acts or processes for giving
effect to or carrying out this part of the comprehensive plan" (Smith 1983: 30-31).
One might conclude from the above passage that zoning was used to supplement a locality's
comprehensive plan and bring about the plan's goals. However, the evidence is that early
adopters enacted zoning ordinances without the prior consideration of a comprehensive plan
(Kaiser and Godschalk 1995). Zoning supplanted comprehensive planning. When planning did
occur, it was done to justify the decisions made in the zoning ordinance. This disconnect is
exemplified by the Federal government first publishing the Standard Zoning Enabling Act in
1924 followed by its revision in 1926. It then takes two more years before publishing Standard
City Planning Enabling Act in 1928. Thus the Federal government is signaling that zoning
should take place before comprehensive planning.
As a result of the Federal government's action to publish zoning statutory language before
planning statutory language, by 1930, there were thirty-five states who had adopted in some form
the Zoning act while only ten states for the Planning act. In addition, the boiler plate nature of
these federal publications resulted in states having very similar statutes. Lack of master planning
prior to the adoption of a zoning ordinance may lead to two possible outcomes for a community.
The first is a zoning ordinance with unnecessary as well as inappropriate regulations for the
community's level of development. This situation arises when localities copy each other on their
ordinance's elements. Second, interest groups have the power to shape regulations to fit their
needs rather than the overall welfare of the community. For example, localities and developers
negotiated the exchange of the amount of land zoned for commercial and residential uses for
political support (Toll 1969).
The rapid adoption of zoning ordinances in the 1920s was aided by the 1926 U.S. Supreme Court
case - Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926). In its ruling, the court decided
that Euclid's zoning ordinance was constitutional even though it did result in the diminution of
value for Amber Realty's property. At the heart of the case, Ambler Realty owned a piece of
property prior to the passage of Euclid's comprehensive zoning ordinance that it thought was
best suited for industrial uses. With the zoning ordinance, the property was zoned into three
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different uses that escalated in permissible uses. Escalation of uses, which is at the heart of
Euclidean zoning, is typically represented by a triangle where the bottom layer of the triangle has
the most allowed uses and as you progress up the layers of the triangle, the number of
permissible uses decreases. Usually, the top of the triangle is composed of single-family
dwellings only while the next layer down would allow single-family dwellings, but also two-
family houses, and so it would proceed to the bottom of the triangle which would allow all the
uses above it along with industrial uses. Ambler argued that the ordinance exemplified a taking
by the government because two out of the three zoning categories assigned to the property did
not allow for industrial development and thus reduced the usable value of the property. But
because Euclid designed their staggering of uses in the village's districts as way to separate uses
that would be nuisances from each other, so that single-family homes were buffered from
industrial uses by apartment buildings and commercial buildings, its actions could be interpreted
as the exercise of police power. Justice George Sutherland in the majority's opinion supported
this notion by writing,
"the segregation of residential, business, and industrial buildings will make it easier
to provide fire apparatus suitable for the character and intensity of development in
each section; that it will increase the safety and security of home life; greatly tend
to prevent street accidents, especially to children, by reducing the traffic and
resulting confusion in residential sections; decrease noise and other conditions
which produce or intensify nervous disorders; preserve a more favorable
environment in which to rear children, etc." (Garvin 2002: 442).
Traditional zoning in the United States is thus known as "Euclidean" zoning because of the court
case which declared a zoning ordinance of hierarchical uses as constitutional.
While its use by local governments has lasted for more than ninety years, Euclidean zoning's
relevance to modem land use regulations has become strained over time. The initial assumptions
that formed the structure of zoning ordinances in the 1920s were appropriate for a low growth
environment. Today, however, these assumptions are viewed as flaws that need to be revamped.
Elliott (2008) has described seven of them. The first deals with simplicity in that the assumption
was that "only a few simple rules would be needed" (Elliott 2008: 40). Building on simplicity,
there was the belief that one could just continue to add permissible uses to land use categories as
they developed (Elliott 2008). The next four assumptions all shared a common element around
how responsive zoning needed to be to the changes in a community which was not much. First,
there was the assumption that "a single set of development standards can apply in both old and
new areas of the city"; secondly, "exceptions to the rules would be infrequent"; third,
"nonconformities will go away over time"; and finally that "zoning could be 'static' - that once
the city had adopted its picture of the future (i.e., its plan), zoning could be made to match that
picture and would guide future development to achieve it" (Elliott 2008: 45-55). The static
nature of Euclidean zoning was a fear held by Newton D. Baker, the attorney for Amber Realty
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Co. and former mayor of Cleveland, Ohio. He said, "To subdivide a municipality, to classify it
and crystallize restrictions into laws, it to embed a fly in amber." The last assumption was that
"zoning could be made into a technical exercise," so that it was free from any outside influences
(Elliott 2008: 58). This assumption runs completely counter to Fischel's observation that zoning
is "the product of a political process, and it serves the interests of those who control that process"
(Fischel 2000: 404).
There have been attempts over the years to introduce new tools to get around the rigidity of
Euclidean zoning and introduce some flexibility into land use regulations in order to better deal
with growth and its ramifications. Of course, flexibility, too, has its good and bad points as
concluded by Salsich that "[fllexibility produces uncertainty, which makes it difficult for
developers to plan financial and construction commitments. Flexibility can prove tempting to
officials disposed to exercise power in inappropriate ways or to achieve inappropriate ends"
(Salsich 1998: 176). Certainty and standardization coupled with a slower growth environment
provide explanations for why Euclidean zoning remained the dominant player in land use
regulations through the majority of the twentieth century.
Conditional Zoning
The pursuit of flexibility in reaction to the rigidity of Euclidean zoning suggests that local
governments place a higher value today on flexibility and innovation over standardization and
certainty in land use regulations. Attempts to break the Euclidean rigidity fall into two camps -
'natural' atoms of flexible zoning" and "synthesized methods of achieving flexibility" (Freilich
et al 1979: 210). The "natural" tools of flexibility are variances, special use permits, floating
zones, overlay zones, and conditional techniques while planned unit development (PUD) and
transfer of development rights (TDR) are examples of "synthesized" tools (Freilich and Quinn
1979; Brown and Shilling 1981). The distinction between the two groups is that "natural" tools
still operate within the existing zoning ordinance and inject a level of discretion with conditions.
While the "synthesized" tools are adopted in the zoning ordinance, their application does not
follow the existing ordinance's rules on density, uses, design. They make their own rules for
what falls within their selected boundaries. Brown and Shilling found that "[a]lthough variances
and special exceptions provide some relief to the strictures of Euclidean zoning, local governing
bodies, faced with complex land use issues and ever-increasing development pressures, have
found the limited flexibility of variances and special exceptions to be inadequate to meet their
needs." (Brown and Shilling 1981: 121)
Conditional zoning, in particular, arose as an alternative to the hierarchical structure of uses
embodied in Euclidean zoning. The focus of this subsection is on conditional zoning because
cash proffers are a type of condition. Under a conditional zoning system, a developer or
landowner makes an application for a zoning change to a parcel (rezoning). To lessen the impact
of the zoning change, the locality attaches a set of conditions to the case. These conditions are
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what sets apart conditional zoning from a regular rezoning application. Depending on the
authorizing statute, the conditions can consist of property dedication, off-site and/or on-site
improvements (roads, aesthetics, libraries, parks), as well as, cash payments. The applicant
agrees to the conditions under the belief that abiding to them will make the rezoning application
more palatable for approval by a local governing body and their constituents. Conditional zoning
has garnered names of contract zoning and spot zoning due to legal problems associated with its
use.
Indeed, legal scholars point out that conditional zoning has a rocky legal history. In his 1974
article, Miller wrote, "[t]he current status of the legal profession regarding the subject of zoning
accompanied by conditions is one of thorough confusion. The legality of this method of land-use
regulation is still questioned, and to this day courts and textwriters have not even been able to
uniformly to define conditional zoning" (Miller 1974: 121). Since the 1970s and early 80s, the
topic of conditional zoning has faded from the pages of law journals, but whether this is a sign of
its legal acceptance is unclear. There are four major issues raised about the use of the tool.
Freilich and Quinn (1979) state, "that it amounts to 'spot zoning'; that it will lead to problems in
meeting the uniformity requirement5 inherent in Euclidean ordinances; that it will lead to
disregard of the comprehensive plan; and that its use will create situations in which either
powerful developers or overweening bureaucrats will reach too far" (Freilich and Quinn 1979:
195). These concerns could just as well apply to the other "natural" tools of flexibility mentioned
above, but the application of conditions within variances and special use permits has been
generally accepted as a reasonable use of a governing body's discretionary power. Because
conditional zoning involves the act of rezoning a property from its original planned use to any
number of other possible uses, the tool has generated more controversy. In court cases, the legal
arguments have centered on whether first, the conditions asked for or offered bear a reasonable
relationship to the effects generated by the rezoning, i.e. do the conditions mitigate to some
extent the repercussions caused by the change in zoning; and second, by granting a rezoning in
exchange for the conditions, a legislative body is selling or bargaining away its governing power
(Miller 1974; Freilich and Quinn 1979; Brown and Shilling 1981).
For many years, the landmark case in favor of conditional zoning was out of New York in
Church v. Town of Islip.6 The dispute in this case revolved around the change in zoning from a
residential use to a business use with the following conditions: "the area of the buildings could
not constitute more than 25 percent of the rezoned tract; a six-foot-high fence was to be located
on a certain boundary; shrubbery was to be planted and allowed to grow to the height of the
fence and was to be maintained; and retail business, permissible within the new zone, could not
5 Uniformity requirement has its origins in the Equal Protection Clause also known as the 146 Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution where all persons in similar circumstances are to receive equal treatment under the law. The
extension of this to land use regulations is that "all property with the same classification should enjoy all possible
uses allowed by that classification" (Shapiro 1968: 282).
6 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1960).
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begin until the first three conditions were met" (Miller 1974: 122-123). The abutting property
owners challenged the rezoning on the grounds that "the amendment was not in conformity with
a comprehensive plan, that it arbitrarily singled out one tract for business zoning, and that it was
illegal 'contract zoning"' (Brown and Shilling 1981: 124). The case made its way up to the New
York Court of Appeals which sided with the town because it viewed the conditional zoning as an
attempt by Islip to deal with the growth issues facing the town. In their ruling, they stated, "[t]o
meet increasing needs of Suffolk County's own population explosion, and at the same time to
make as gradual and as little of an annoyance as possible the change from residence to business
on the main highways, the Town Board imposes conditions. There is nothing unconstitutional
about it. Incidentally, the record does not show any agreement in the sense that the owners made
an offer accepted by the board" (Brown and Shilling 1981: 125). The court's ruling established
the rationale of allowing conditional zoning if the underlying change in zoning is legal and the
conditions being attached to the rezoning are "reasonable." In addition, the imposed conditions
should not be so onerous that a property owner could challenge them on the grounds of a taking.
One could say that Church v. Town ofIslip set up very broad boundaries for conditional zoning
and that future cases would try to refine the concept (Miller 1974).
Two cases out of Washington and California added a degree of narrowness to the reasonableness
doctrine of Church v. Town of Islip. In State ex rel. Myhre v. Spokane7 , at issue was whether the
city of Spokane had bargained away its future governing power when in a set of conditions to
allow the change in zoning for a piece of property that would become a large shopping center,
there was a concomitant agreement between the property owner and the city whereby the
property owner would pay for future widening of streets as well as sidewalks, curbs, streetlights,
etc.; dedicate land for street widening at no cost; and apply for the vacation of land that would be
used for future streets (Miller 1974). The court ruled in favor of the city because it did not find
any evidence to indicate that the city had made legal promises if the property owners did acquire
future land for street vacation and that the city only agreed to be reimbursed financially if future
condemnation took place (Miller 1974). In their ruling, they argued, "[w]hen the city requires the
cost of such safety measures to be borne by the company, it is not bargaining away its regulatory
power but, rather, is determining that the cost should be borne by the persons who created the
necessity for the expenditure of such funds, instead of the city generally. Such a determination is
within the city's legislative authority. It follows that a written agreement results therefrom is not
ultra vires (Miller 1974: 136).
7 70 Wash. 2d 207, 422 P.2d 790 (1967).
8 Ultra vires translated from Latin means "beyond their powers" and its legal definition is "Descriptive of the acts of
a corporation when it exceeds the authority granted to it in its articles of incorporation or charter, e.g., by making a
contract concerning a particular subject." Brann, Amy B. (1997) The Law Dictionary. Cincinnati, OH: Andersen
Publishing Co., 7'h Edition.
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In another case, the Court of Appeal of California ruled against the county because one of its
conditions went too far, Scrutton v. County ofSacramento9 reinforced conditional zoning as
being within the realm of a locality's police powers. The court even stated, "[t]he power to
impose conditions on rezoning furthers the well-being of landowners, generally, promotes
community development and serves the general welfare" (Scrutton v. County ofSacramento
1969: 418) It narrowed the broadness of "reasonable" with the statement that "[a]lthough
'reasonableness' has been postulated as the hallmark of validity, a more precise standard is
available.... [T]hat conditions imposed on the grant of land use applications are valid if
reasonably conceived to fulfill public needs emanating from the landowner's proposed use....
[D]ecisions illustrate two kinds of need: the community's protection against potentially
deleterious effects of the landowner's proposal ... and the community's need for facilities to
meet public service demands created by the proposal" (Scrutton v. County ofSacramento 1969:
421). Additionally, it is important to note that the Court addressed the issue of conditional zoning
versus contract zoning. In its opinion, the Court found that contract zoning has no "legal
significance" and that there are no California decisions dealing with the issue. The opinion
defined contract zoning as "a reclassification of land use in which the landowner agrees to
perform conditions not imposed on other land in the same classification" and admitted that "[i]t
has been criticized and defended, nullified in some states, sustained in others" (Scrutton v.
County ofSacramento 1969: 419). In the end, the distinction between contract and conditional
zoning remains unclear because the opinion's definition is quite similar to how the California
court defined conditional zoning, "a zoning change which permits use of a particular property
subject to conditions not generally applicable to land similarly zoned" (Scrutton v. County of
Sacramento 1969: 417).
Based on this history, Brown and Shilling offered the following guidelines to localities for the
likelihood maximization that the decision in a conditional zoning case will be upheld by the
courts: " [t]he rezoning amendment, considered independently of the conditions, should
represent a reasonable exercise of the zoning power; the conditions should be imposed by a
method that avoids the abrogation by the governing body of its police powers, and the
municipality should avoid a promise, or appearance of a promise, that the rezoning will be
granted or obtained in consideration of the landowner's promise; and the promise exacted should
have a reasonable relation to the rezoning and not be solely the purpose of effecting a collateral
benefit on behalf of the municipality" (Brown and Shilling 1981: 130). The first guideline is
important because no matter how valid the attached conditions are if the underlying rezoning is
unconstitutional then the whole matter is illegal. The majority of the conditional zoning cases
that have been found in favor of plaintiffs have involved illegal zoning because there was no
underlying reason to approve the change in zoning (Brown and Shilling 1981). The remaining
guidelines are to protect public officials from overreaching and abusing the powers. A 2005 issue
of the Michigan Real Property Review reports that at a minimum nine states "explicitly sanction
9 Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969).
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conditions to a rezoning" - Arizona, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, North Carolina, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin (Pierson 2005: 68). For California, New York, Colorado,
and North Carolina, Pierson summarized that "courts have found conditional zoning valid on the
basis of their original zoning enabling legislation and home rule laws" (Pierson 2005: 68). If
conditional zoning is used properly, then it can become a key tool in land use planning for a
locality because it "provides a source of flexibility by allowing an intermediate use permit,
between absolute denial and complete approval of the [rezoning application]" (Smith 1974: 145).
This section has discussed the historic rationales behind land use regulations. In the course of
this discussion, I reviewed the most prominent form of land use regulation - zoning. In an effort
to bring flexibility into zoning ordinances, localities have developed innovations like conditional
zoning. The use of conditional zoning in Virginia resulted in the cash proffer tool. Conditional
zoning links cash proffers to land use regulations. A locality can only receive cash proffers when
it approves a rezoning case with them attached. In the next section, I discuss how cash proffers
are linked to infrastructure financing.
INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCING
Historical Background
The standard argument for infrastructure provision by local governments is derived from the
public goods literature. It is more efficient for the public sector to provide infrastructure because
they are better able to take advantage of the economies of scale and overcome the coordination
issues inherent in the provision of a public good. While this argument explained the initial
provision of infrastructure, the decision-making that has justified new extensions of
infrastructure has centered around three major reasons.
First, there is the attraction of new investment for potential economic activity. One could say that
infrastructure provision is characterized as "If you build it, they will come." Thus when a
locality wanted to attract economic development and population growth, the best way to achieve
it was the construction of the infrastructure to support it. New residential development signaled a
thriving area and local governments were willing to do whatever they could do to continue the
economic growth such as paying for the infrastructure costs of sewer and water lines, roads,
schools, parks, etc.
Second, development is not always the purest motivation for the provision of infrastructure. As
one author wrote, "[w]hile infrastructure construction patterns do relate closely to swings in the
development process and to city building cycles, government has also used public works for
countercyclical, employment, and political patronage purposes" (Tarr 1985: 5). Municipal
infrastructure development was and continues to be influenced by multiple interest groups
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including politicians, subdividers or developers, as well as, neighborhood groups. Throughout
the history of municipal infrastructure, providers have ranged from public to public-private to
private. This gives importance to acknowledging when there has been a transition in the type of
provider.
Finally, there is the people's expectations reason where infrastructure provision was assumed to
occur no matter the geographic location because the services were provided in the past. This
rationale has become costly for localities as cities have decentralized from their urban core into
suburbs and exurbs, their residents still expect access to the public services that they had in more
centralized locations. However, the cost of provision increases the further one lives from the
main infrastructure lines. While all of the reasons above justify the provision of municipal
infrastructure, there have been increasing concerns over the years about the rising costs of
infrastructure expansion from suburban sprawl (Carruthers and Ulfarsson 2003; Rosenberg
2003).
After approving a capital project, local governments face the decision of how to pay for it. From
colonial times up to the 2 0 th century, governments typically resorted to three methods of
financing -- taxes, assessments, and municipal bonds. Each instrument is discussed in this
section. Economic conditions and the specific capital project are influences on the selection of
financing tools. The historical review of this section begins in the middle of the 1 9 th century
because it was during this time that widespread construction of the core infrastructure of U.S.
cities began to take place. Local governments (cities or counties) are the constant financing
presence while state governments and the federal government drifted in and out. Infrastructure
finance innovations do not take off until the beginning of the 2 0 h century with the widespread
adoption of zoning and subdivision regulations (Snyder and Stegman 1986).
The first traditional source of infrastructure financing is taxes. Tax revenues result from either
general or special taxes levied by local governments. The largest source of general tax revenue
for funding urban infrastructure was and continues to be property taxes on real estate. The
reliance on the property tax stems from this country's emphasis on ownership and total property
wealth as opposed to income and rental value of property (Melosi 2000). Furthermore, property
taxes are the single area where the federal government has never been allowed to levy taxes. The
rate of taxation does not have to be uniform across localities in a single state. Other general tax
revenue sources are income and sales, but these tend to be restricted to state level taxes rather
than local. Furthermore, state governments have the power to control the type, rate, and base of a
local government's taxation scheme. In comparison to general taxes, special taxes are those
which are levied on a narrow base and restricted to a specific economic activity (Snyder et al
1986). Localities may have special sales taxes on restaurants, gasoline, hotels or special property
taxes on personal property like automobiles, but these revenues tend to be funded towards
specific infrastructure needs like road construction or other public facilities which are directly
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impacted by the taxed economic activity. In general, as the demand for more services increases
in the absence of alternative funding sources, tax rates must escalate in order to finance projects.
Assessments are a second traditional infrastructure financing instruments. They are tied to
financing specific infrastructure projects, usually on a smaller scale and may result in the
inequitable distribution of infrastructure. As an example, if a residential neighborhood wanted to
pave its streets, then residents comprising two-thirds of the street frontage on a block might need
to agree to an assessment in order for a city to act on the paving petition. The city would then
charge all of the abutters (regardless of how they voted) a special assessment to cover the cost of
the paving. The cost would vary depending upon the type of material used. As a result, one could
tell the wealth of a neighborhood by whether their streets were paved and the type of material
uses (gravel, cobblestone, etc.). If the funds collected from the assessment did not fully cover the
paving costs, revenues from the general tax fund made up the difference. The use of general tax
revenues was to be seen as backup measure rather than the entire funding source. So assessments
are really only a successful financial instrument if the infrastructure costs can be solely paid by
them rather than having to fall back on general tax revenues. In general, assessments follow four
defining principles. The first is the applicable parties to the assessment are all of those property
owners who would derive some benefit from the new infrastructure in a designated area.
Secondly, assessments are used because they can be applied to the current property owners who
enjoy a direct benefit. Third, it is the property owners themselves who ask for the assessment.
Finally, because the infrastructure is for their direct use, property owners should share in the
burden of its financing above what would be covered through their taxes.
Municipalities first ventured into debt financing on a large-scale because tax rates could only be
increased so much before citizens revolted, and special assessments were limited by their nature.
As one author described the scenario "[t]he demands of urban growth meant that a reliance on
taxes and special assessments to meet the needs and wants of the city was likely to satisfy neither
the citizenry nor the local business establishment" (Melosi 2000: 76). Debt financing is divided
into two instruments - funded and floating. The distinction between the two is that funded debt is
in the direct form of bonds or another tool of indebtedness while floating debt is not directly tied
to a specific form of debt (Melosi 2000). Typically, before a locality can issue a series of bonds
to fund an infrastructure project, the general public must give their approval at the ballot box.
Citizen approval is required because future tax revenues are used to secure the bonds. Debt
financing and assessments are supposed to slow down or even prevent future tax rate increases
on a locality's residents, but this may not always be possible given that both financing
instruments use tax revenues as their backups.
From the middle of the 1 9 th century to the beginning of the 2 0 th century, local governments
found their access to infrastructure capital periodically restricted. One factor creating the
restrictions was the economic turmoil of this time period which included depressions in 1873 and
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1893. Some local governments pursued strategies where their infrastructure projects coincided
with economic upswings. Others, however, used public works construction as opportunities to
turnaround their local economies which generated massive amounts of municipal debt. Because
increased debt raised fears of default, states stepped in to impose limitations on the borrowing
capacity of municipalities. States were able to pass statutory restrictions on municipalities' debt
load because local governments are creatures of the state and beholden to states for their powers.
This period marks the ascendency of Judge John F. Dillon and his infamous Dillon's Rule which
asserted that local governments possess only those powers that states have expressly granted to
them. Municipalities responded to statutory restrictions by either depending on the private sector
to pick up the slack in infrastructure provision or resorting to a "pay-as-you-go" mentality where
the level of construction corresponded to how much money was directly available to fund it at
the time.
For the remainder of the twentieth century, urban infrastructure was funded through the
conventional methods of municipal bonds, tax revenues, and assessments while new financial
tools were developed for the funding suburban infrastructure. A distinctive feature of these new
instruments was an attempt to shift part or all of the capital costs of infrastructure to the
subdivider or developer. Subdivision development prior to the 1930s in the United States was not
the result of a comprehensive process by one subdivider or development firm that completed all
planning, building, and financing elements of the development alone. Instead, the process as
described by one author was more of a cobbling of different parties at different points in time for
various elements. The first step began when "a landowner typically hired a civil engineer to
determine streets and lots, and then, depending upon local circumstances, either pressured the
municipal government to extend pavement at public expense or brought in private crews to
construct roads. The land was subsequently sold, often at auction in the nineteenth century, to
numerous buyers who would either build houses for their own occupancy for sale, or would
retain vacant lots for speculation" (Jackson 1985: 134). While some subdivisions were fully built
out by a single developer, the typical process described often led to the creation of subdivision
plans which were subdivisions on paper only. These plans provided few if any at all details on
how and where public infrastructure should be provided for the subdivided lots. There was
nothing in the law that forced a subdivider to cover the costs of the necessary infrastructure for
their subdivided lots. Hence, the name, "paper subdivisions" developed (Smith 1987). Since the
subdivider did not take the steps of installing the necessary infrastructure like streets, the
responsibility fell to municipal governments or those private individuals who bought lots in the
subdivisions. For either side, it was an unexpected and possibly, burdensome, financial expense.
"Paper subdivisions" resulted because suburban land conversion was largely a private enterprise.
Minimal government supervision only required filing accurate survey maps (Altshuler et al
1993). The proliferation of "paper subdivisions" created a cycle of effects. First, there ended up
being an oversupply of subdivided lots. The oversupply was the result of the ease at which land
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could be subdivided on paper without consideration for the provision of public improvements. In
many cases, there was no forethought given to whether this was an area where there was demand
for a subdivision, so land was subdivided prematurely. Since the subdivider did not have to make
any infrastructure improvements, these subdivisions were not attractive to the average buyer who
could not afford to buy the lot and pay for the necessary infrastructure. So these "paper
subdivisions" became "dead land" (Smith 1987). New residential development leapfrogged over
these failed areas in search of new greenfields of unsubdivided land. Thus suburban sprawl
begins with its patchwork pattern of land development. Furthermore, the tax delinquencies
started to appear in the "dead" subdivisions which made them more unattractive to sellers and
deprived the local governments of needed tax revenues. Finally, when the local government was
able to provide infrastructure to subdivisions, it was through assessments. However, this method
of financing had its own drawbacks. First, assessment revenues had to be used to pay the debt
service on the special assessment bonds. These bonds, which had been issued to finance the
construction of the infrastructure, are highly sensitive to swings in the economy. Therefore, if an
economic depression occurred, then both homeowners and bondholders are placed in dire
financial positions. All of these effects combined created momentum whereby "more and more
cities sought to solve the problem by securing the construction of physical improvements in
subdivisions" (Smith 1987: 6).
Localities needed statutory authority to force subdividers or developers to provide the necessary
infrastructure in subdivisions. The federal government provided a model for the statutory
language when the U.S. Commerce Department published its 1928 Standard City Planning
Enabling Act which was a template of statutory language related to planning issues. The Act
contained wording that "authorized local governments to require that subdividers or developers
provide streets, water mains, and sewer lines within the boundaries of their own sites" (Altshuler
et al 1993: 18). States followed this model from the federal government and thus adopted
statutory language in their state codes that allowed local governments to adopt subdivision
regulations. The early versions of these subdivision ordinances "required subdivision plats to be
approved and recorded" where as part of the approval process, local governments could require
"land be dedicated to the local government for streets, sidewalks, rights of ways, utility
easements, and drainage systems" (Delaney et al 1987: 141). These dedications are known as
"subdivision exactions" which are defined as "[t]raditional construction, dedication, or in-lieu-
fee payment for site-specific needs imposed at the time of subdivision. These improvements are
usually categorized as being 'minor' in scope and cost, and are typically provided on-site"
(Delaney et al 1987: 139). Localities began by mandating the dedication of land for on-site
improvements by the end of the 1950s, subdivision exactions evolved to include the construction
and dedication of on-site improvements by the subdivider. The next evolution in subdivision
exactions included the dedication of land for on-site schools and parks, as well as, in-lieu
payments for those instances where land dedications were not practical, but the funds could be
used for the provision of public facilities at other locations (Delaney et al 1987; Altshuler et al
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1993). The goal with all of these exactions was "to shift improvement costs to subdividers and
new residents" (Delaney et al 1987: 141).
Subdivision regulations established a precedent for shifting the costs of infrastructure
improvements away from being the sole responsibility of local governments. However, not all
residential development was subject to subdivision review, so financing local infrastructure
needs for other types of residential development remained. The expansion of the exactions
concept to the general development process entailed a larger level of growth-related issues and
community-wide support. Even though localities resorted to subdivision exactions in the 1930s,
growth was still viewed as positive event for communities which improved their economic
outlook and brought in additional revenues to fund the expansion of public services (Nelson
1988a). The environmental movement of the 1960s and 1970s along with other activist groups
began to raise concerns over the other byproducts of growth - traffic congestion, pollution, loss
of greenspace, overwhelmed municipal services, rising crime, etc (Nelson 1988a). Revenue
studies showed growth's costs exceeded its revenues (Burchell and Listokin 1978). At the same
time, all levels of government (federal, state, and local) were decreasing their commitment to
fund public facilities driven in part by the taxpayer revolt of the 1970s. Citizens voted down
general obligation bond referendums while simultaneously passing initiatives which restricted a
municipality's ability to increase property tax rates (Nelson 1988a). California's Proposition 13
was a product of this environment. Thus municipalities compelled by the actions of their
residents resorted to a broader use of exactions as the tools for financing the costs of new
infrastructure.
Impact fees are the most popular form of exactions and represent the cash payment element of
the exaction family. The generally accepted definition is that "impact fees are a monetary
payment, predetermined by a formula adopted by the governmental unit and levied to fund large-
scale off-site improvements, public facilities, and services that are necessary to serve new
development adequately; typical off-site projects include library expansion, streets, parks,
municipal buildings, schools, police/fire facilities and personnel, and water/sewer treatment
facilities" (Lawhon 2003: 27). They are not derived from a form of zoning and are applicable to
by-right development, so they can be assessed on every new house built in a community.
Typically, their application is tied to residential development because homeowners are more of
financial burden on public facilities and infrastructure than commercial and industrial
development. The tax revenues generated by non-residential development, typically, more than
covers the cost of providing public services to them. The opposite relationship applies to
residential development (Oakland and Testa 1995; Brueckner 2000; Lewis 2001; Crompton
2004). An impact fee's implementation and management is also considered easier than other
exactions because there is a set fee amount or schedule as opposed to individualized negotiated
payments with each developer over his or her project. Additionally, the amount is usually paid at
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the time the building permit is issued and the monies are deposited in a fund whose single
purpose is the construction of public infrastructure necessitated by the developer's project.
Across the United States, twenty-seven states have statewide enabling legislation for impact fees
not dealing with water and sewer infrastructure (Mullen 2007). In a 1984-1985 survey of 1,000
local governments 0 across the United States, seventy-nine communities out of the 220
respondents reported the use of impact fees (Bauman and Ethier 1987). There was very little use
in the New England and Mid-Atlantic regions with increasing numbers in the South, Midwest,
West, and California (Bauman and Ethier 1987). A more recent survey completed in 2002
received responses from 407 cities and 144 counties with 103 and 10 of them, respectively,
imposing impact fees (Lawhon 2003). " As in 1984-1985, use of impact fees was still spread
throughout the nation.
Judicial Approval /Legal Legitimacy
Exactions raise concerns about property rights issues and their legality like conditional zoning
has been tested through the court system. Until the rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nollan
v. California Coastal Commission (1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994), the issues of
infrastructure finance were left to the domain of the state courts. In summary, the rulings by
various courts in different states have been far more favorable to local governments on the issue
of on-site exactions than off-site exactions. Smith points out that "[a]s one would expect, the real
estate community was initially reluctant to recognize either the wisdom or the constitutionality of
conditioning subdivision plat approval on the installation of public improvements in the
subdivision. Most courts, however, did not share the real estate community's sense of outrage at
this burden, and such requirements were virtually uniformly upheld" (Smith 1987: 7). The case
law on exactions is built around two major questions - "(1) does the local government have
authority to enact the [exaction] and (2) does the [exaction] comply with state and federal
constitutional limitations" (Leitner et al 1995: 61). Typically, the first question is defused by a
state legislature passing statutory language which expressly enables local governments to adopt
exactions and defines which ones are permissible. In states where the legislature has not taken
this clear-cut tactic, then questions arise over whether there is anything in the state code that
expressly forbids the imposition of exactions or is this the type of locality that can adopt
exactions without the permission of the state.
On the issue of constitutionality, the tests from three different states (Illinois, Florida, and
California) present a spectrum of interpretation in regards to development conditions and
10 These local governments were communities that subscribed to American Planning Association's Planning
Advisory service. No distinction is made between government type, i.e. city v. county v. town.
" The counter-intuitive results on the survey responses between cities and counties where you would expect to see
more or equal participation by counties relative to cities because of the sprawling nature of counties and the existing
infrastructure of cities may be a function of the different samples sizes (1,350 cities v. 539 counties).
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exactions (Leitner et al 1995; Selmi 2004). The most rigid test is Illinois' "specifically and
uniquely attributable" or just "uniquely attributable" which "requires that the burden placed on a
developer be directly and uniquely attributable to that development" (Leitner et al 1995: 61).
Based on this test, a local government is "prohibited [from] charging developers where other
developments generated the demand for the infrastructure improvement or non-project residents
would enjoy the benefits from the conditions imposed" (Selmi 2004: 145). In the middle of
rigidity spectrum is Florida's "rational nexus" test where there is the requirement of
"proportionality between the amount of the fee and the type and amount of facilities demand
generated by the development and that there be a reasonable connection between the use of the
fees and the benefits accruing to new development" (Leitner et al 1995: 61). The majority of
states have followed the lead of Florida and used the "rational nexus" language in their state
enabling legislation. California follows the test with the most room for flexibility - "reasonable
relationship" whereby the only requirement is a "'reasonable' connection between the proposed
project and the condition such that project residents would benefit from the improvement and the
project would contribute to the demand for it" (Selmi 2004: 145). Regardless of which test a
state may follow, there are six factors that should be well-defined in the development of an
exaction to insure its constitutionality - (1) spatial, (2) temporal, (3) amount, (4) need, (5)
benefit, and (6) earmarking (Leitner et al 1995).
While the states may have various tests, the U.S. Supreme Court in Nollan and then Dolan
established some clearer boundaries on the use of exactions in infrastructure finance. On the one
hand, these precedents were a victory for the development interest groups, but at the same time,
the decisions validated the principle of being able to shift the costs of infrastructure to the
development industry. The U.S. Supreme Court found in Nollan that the ability of a government
"to impose conditions on discretionary permits, such as approvals of subdivisions, site plans,
variances, conditional rezoning, and use permit approvals" was limited by the principle of
"nexus" (Selmi 2004: 145). In order to prevent such conditions from being considered a "taking"
under the "Takings Clause" of the Fifth Amendment, the said conditions must meet the
requirement of the nexus test that "the condition must actually serve a legitimate state police
power interest" (Selmi 2004: 145). The right to regulate land use is based on police powers.
While Nollan focused on the constitutionality of a government's right to impose exactions,
Dolan according to Selmi "addresses the quantitative relationship between the demand for
infrastructure generated by the project and the cost of any condition or exaction imposed" (2004:
153). Out of the Dolan decision, the "rough proportionality" test is born which assesses the fit
between the condition and the project's needs. This test was actually the court's attempt to strike
a middle ground between the onerous nature of the "uniquely attributable" test and the too
lenient "reasonable relationship" test. Chief Justice Rehnquist in the majority's opinion wrote,
"[w]e think a term such as 'rough proportionality' best encapsulates what we hold to be the
requirement of the Fifth Amendment. No precise mathematical calculation is required, by the
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city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related
both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development" (Selmi 2004: 156).
For all the certainty that Nollan and Dolan brought to some elements of infrastructure finance,
these cases involved specific exaction examples. Thus questions remain on how relevant the
decisions are to instances which differ from them. For example, the Dolan case centered on the
dedication of land, so what does that mean for an exaction which involves the payment of
money. Both cases involved regulatory bodies making a ruling in adjudicative manner that
applied to a specific instance as opposed to the local governmental body approving a legislative
decision that could be applicable to everyone (Selmi 2004). Furthermore, there is a growing
trend among local governments to reach for exactions that fall outside of the legally recognized
aims of the police powers - the protection and promotion of the "health, safety, and welfare of
the community" (Taub 1995: 127). Exactions in the form of impact fees and its new innovation,
linkage fees1, are being used to move beyond traditional infrastructure finance to fund
nontraditional facilities and services like "child day care, public art, historic artifacts, public
transit systems, bookmobiles, jogging tracks, helicopter pads, recreational community gardening,
job training, the providing of low- or moderate-income housing, library sites, and police and fire
personnel and stations" (Taub 1995: 126-127). Indeed, local governments continue to be
expected to provide and modernize public services, facilities, and infrastructure. So their search
for additional sources of revenue outside of the historical triad of taxes, assessments, and bonds
continues.
Evolution of Planning
Throughout the discussion of infrastructure finance, there was a noticeable absence of a key
concept from land use-related matters - planning. In fact, the first and only mention of planning
comes up in regard to the 1928 Standard City Planning Enabling Act and there the focus was on
subdivision regulations not comprehensive planning. Perhaps, it was the absence of land use
planning in the United States until the early part of the 2 0th century that is partially responsible
for infrastructure financing issues that plague local governments into the 2 1st century. Prior to the
1900s, the number of U.S. cities influenced by a plan was small - Philadelphia by William Penn
in 1683; Savannah by General Oglethorpe in 1733; and Washington, D.C. by Pierre L'Enfant in
1791. However, Kaiser and Godschalk point out that "[t]hese plans ... were blueprints for
undeveloped sites, commissioned by unitary authorities with power to implement them
unilaterally" (1995: 367).
The walking cities that formed the urban foundations of the United States were defined by a set
of standard features. These early cities were not quiet places, but centers of intense and
12 Linkage fees are defined as "fees imposed on developers of office buildings or other forms of nonresidential uses,
such as commercial, retail, or institutional development to provide housing in the community" (Leitner 1995: 59).
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congested activity. There was clear visual demarcation between where the residential districts of
the city ended and the surrounding countryside began. Neighborhoods were predominately
mixed-use in nature which led to a pattern of individuals living close to where they worked,
perhaps even right above their place of employment. Finally, residences close to the center of the
city were those most coveted by a city's elite population. Real estate, itself, operated then on the
concept of "fee-simple tenure [which] enabled families to buy, sell, rent, and bequeath land with
great ease and a minimum of interference by government" (Jackson 1985: 53). The "fee-simple"
principle led to the situation where "whether well-born or an indentured servant, practically
everyone set himself quickly to the task of organizing the landscape into private parcels and
somehow procuring a share of the division" (Jackson 1985: 53). Furthermore, there really was no
institution around before 1860 to tell an individual how to efficiently use their lot for home
construction. So a person could either follow the model of their neighbors next to them or
develop their own method for house siting. The grid system became the organizing principle of
cities, but not because city planners developed a city master plan looking at where the best land
uses should go and the infrastructure to support them. Instead, a grid's design of straight lines
and right angles was chosen because it "simplified the problems of surveying, minimized legal
disputes over lot boundaries, maximized the number of houses that fronted on a given
thoroughfare, and stamped American cities with a standardized lot, often twenty-five feet wide
and one hundred feet deep" (Jackson 1985: 74). Additionally, the ease and uniformity of grid
system made the real estate world operate more smoothly.
By the late 1850s, planning outside of the grid pattern was taking place in the plans for the
subdivisions that were located in the growing suburbs of the cities. Rather than just stamping a
grid pattern onto a natural landscape, here a concerted effort was made to integrate nature with
the design and location of homes. As a result, streets were no longer at right-angles, but wide and
curvilinear. Although these subdivisions were well-planned out in terms of design, they were still
based on speculation with no guarantees that public infrastructure would be connected and
funded and no real consideration to whether this was the best use for this land or that the city
needed another subdivision of this concept.
The origins of modem land use planning in the United States can be traced to the City Beautiful
movement of the early 1900s when it was thought that the social ills of urban life could be
lessened by the provision and beautification of public spaces. The city plans of this time period,
most notably, Daniel Burnham's 1909 plan for the City of Chicago, focused on the design of
public spaces in the city with grand boulevards and ornately designed buildings (Kaiser et al
1995). As the 1920s ended, the City Beautiful approach to plans had become more
comprehensive. The plans no longer focused solely on public spaces, but were extended to
include private lands in their designs. Thus a comprehensive or master plan for a city would
contain the following elements: "the general location and extent of new public improvements[;] .
... the general distribution amongst various classes of land uses, such as residential, business,
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and industrial uses[; and] ... [be] designed for ... the future, twenty-five to fifty years"' (Kaiser
et al 1995: 367). Unfortunately, what seemed to be a consensus around what constitutes a plan
and how planning should be done gets lost in the wording of the 1928 Standard City Planning
Enabling Act, and as a result, planning becomes subservient to zoning.
With the resulting situation by the 1950s/60s that "planning and general plans gave way to
developers' site plans, highway engineers' concrete cloverleafs and asphalt ribbons, federal
officials' urban renewal, environmental regulations and impact reports, and lawyers' codes"
(Neuman 1998: 211). There was a shift in emphasis from plan to process. This separation of the
different elements that used to be part of the general plan (land use, transportation, housing,
environment, etc.) did not bode well for the coordination of residential development and
infrastructure with its financing, particularly if the infrastructure plan did not call for the
extension of public improvements to one segment of a jurisdiction while the land use plan called
for intensive resident development there or if a community only required a land use plan to be
created. By the 1990s, a new model of planning developed with influences from the growth
management movement - the hybrid-design-policy-management plan - which attempts to
combine the historical general plan with area specific policies and processes that looks at the
short term and long term while making sure there are linkages to transportation, environmental
protection and social concerns (Kaiser et al 1995).
Of course, all the plans in the world can be made, but they are useless if not adopted and
supported by the local government's governing body, as well as, the appropriate tools given to
government officials to carry them out. Part of the difficulty in the adoption of these plans is that
they operate in a political environment. In making land use decisions, government officials must
weigh political reality against the democratic process, itself. Both infrastructure financing and
subdivision review fall under the rubric of land use decisions. The conflict between politics and
the process leads to the situation where "[v]ery few communities adopt, through their legislative
bodies, a binding capital facilities plan and an accompanying budget that reflects the plan and
ensures that facilities plan and an accompanying budget that reflects the plan and ensures that the
extension of infrastructure is consistent with growth projections" (Selmi et al 2004: 146). The
explanation offered for the widespread failure to adopt such fiscally responsible and binding
plans is that they may lead to unpopular tax increases. Thus, there has been and continues to be a
movement to shift infrastructure costs to developers via the development of financing tools like
impact fees.
Growth Management
Roughly fifty years after the introduction of comprehensive zoning, it started to become apparent
that local zoning alone was not capable of dealing with the ramifications of growth on the scale
that communities across the United States began to experience after the end of World War II.
Popper described the situation as "[t]hey could not handle huge suburban residential projects that
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might affect dozens of rapidly growing localities beyond the boundaries of the regulating one.
They could not deal with big energy facilities that might have regional, state, or even national
impacts. They could not deal with large, complicated public works projects." (Popper 1988: 292)
The proposed solution was to engage a higher level of government in land use related issues.
This began what was known as the "Quiet Revolution in Land Use Controls" organized by "a
loose coalition of environmentalists, city planners, land use lawyers, state and federal officials,
progressive business people and developers, and citizen activists of all kinds" whose goal "was
new regulation that would operate at higher levels of government and would apply mainly to
projects that were large or in environmentally sensitive areas" (Popper 1988: 292).
Since 1961, fourteen states have become involved in state-sponsored land use planning through
their state-wide program with another two states playing an active role in designing local and
regional land use policies.' 3 While the revolutionary involvement of the federal and state
governments in land use regulations was taking place, local governments were also beginning to
focus on the problem with two different paths from the status quo - reduce the level of growth or
encourage growth, but make the growth generators start to share in the costs. Thus, growth
management can be defined as "those policies, plans, investments, incentives, and regulations to
guide the type, amount, location, timing, and cost of development to achieve a responsible
balance between the protection of the natural environment and the development to support
growth, a responsible fit between development and necessary infrastructure, and quality of life"
(Randolph 2004: 39).
In terms of growth management models for local governments, there are four cities whose
experience has been looked to as other communities have contemplated growth management
programs over the years. Ramapo, New York is the earliest of the cities with its program in 1969
to have development occur in stages over time along with provision of public infrastructure and
facilities. Fairfax County, Virginia actually looked to Ramapo's model and developed a similar
growth management strategy around adequate public facilities, but never implemented it. In
1972, Boulder, Colorado and Boca Raton, Florida both implemented growth boundaries in that
their communities would only accommodate an additional 40,000 housing units. At the same
time, Petaluma, California went in a more stringent direction by developing a growth cap
whereby only 500 additional housing units could be added annually.
No national database exists detailing the growth management measures in effect for every
municipality in the United States, so it is difficult to know how far and wide the measures have
13 The number of states with a state growth management program has grown from the eight (FL, GA, ME, OR, RI,
VT, and WA) identified in Gale (1992) to fourteen (HI, VT, OR, FL, NJ, ME, RI, GA, WA, MD, AZ, TN, CO, and
WI) in Anthony (2004). Hawaii and New Jersey could have been in Gale's study, but were either excluded or
examined individually because of the structure of the program. There was also discussion in Anthony's work about
whether California should be included in the list because of its local and regional land use policies, but lack of a
state-wide program. Both California and North Carolina were featured in DeGrove's (1984) First-Wave States.
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spread since the 1970s. Landis (1992) reports that as of 1989, there were 406 instances of growth
management measures being adopted by a California city and 76 by a county, respectively. The
tools were grouped into five major categories - housing infrastructure requirements and public
service standards; residential down-zoning; commercial infrastructure requirements & public
service standards; commercial down-zoning; and urban limit line or greenbelt (Landis 1992). A
2006 report by the Brookings Institution on land use regulations in the United States' fifty largest
metropolitan areas found that 16.4 percent of jurisdictions in these areas which covered 27.1
percent of the population and 37.9 percent of land had an urban containment program or policy
in place (Pendall et al 2006). The report's survey also asked about infrastructure tools - 37.5
percent of the jurisdictions with 55.6 percent of the population and 45.6 percent of the land
employed impact fees while 18.6 percent of the jurisdictions with 28.5 percent of the population
and 36.5 percent of the land an adequate public facilities ordinance (Pendall et al 2006).
Missing from the discussion, so far, has been whether growth management programs are
effective in their varied aims. The answer is that reported results have been mixed. Pendall et al
writes, "[s]tudies have shown that in some jurisdictions regulations have had little visible
influence on the location and amount of development or on the price of land. Other studies have
identified places and regions where regulations have had substantial direct effects on
development patterns and land prices" (Pendall et al 2006: 6). The varied results are a function of
the initial design of the growth management regulation and its implementation and the attempt to
measure the impacts, but also the political nature of local government and the influence of
interest groups.
Cash proffers are a municipal infrastructure financing tool. They follow in the tradition of
subdivision regulations and impact fees in shifting the costs of municipal infrastructure
improvements away from being the sole responsibility of local governments. Since cash proffers
have the generators of growth share in its costs, cash proffers are also part of the growth
management movement. The exaction court cases have set legal precedents for how localities
can have developers assist in financing the new or expanded capital projects that come with
residential growth. They also offer guiding principles that administrators of cash proffer systems
should keep in mind. A local government's comprehensive plan is the opportunity for a locality
to look at where there is existing infrastructure and envision which areas they plan for its
extension. The extent to which a locality aligns its zoning ordinance with its comprehensive plan
has an impact on rezoning activity and cash proffer collection.
The options available to localities to finance capital projects and regulate land uses may be
limited by their own governing authority. In addition, capital improvement plans and rezoning
cases are subject to the approval of the elected local governing body, for example, a county's
Board of Supervisors. The next section discusses how state and local political environments in
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theory can have an impact on a tool like cash proffers. I also illustrate how these concepts have
been applied in Virginia.
POLITICAL ECONOMY
Dillon's Rule
The ability of a locality to develop innovative land use regulations is directly impacted by the
institutional setting within which it operates. Local governments are creatures of the state and
thus reliant upon state legislatures to delineate the specific governing powers of localities. Within
the United States, the level of local government autonomy varies from state to state. The
distinction results in two groups of local governments - (1) "Dillon's Rule" where local
government powers have to be delineated by the state government and (2) "Home Rule" where
municipalities are fairly autonomous and can pass legislation without prior state approval. Judge
John F. Dillon, an Iowa Supreme Court justice in 1911, stated,
"It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation
possesses and can exercise the following powers, and not other: First, those
granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident
to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the
declared objects and purposes of the corporation, -- not simply convenient, but
indispensable. Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of
the power is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power is denied"
(Hall-Sizemore 1992: 15).
The opposing legal doctrine was championed by a Michigan judge named Thomas M. Cooley.
The doctrine of "Home Rule" consists of two major parts:
"1. Imperium in imperio (state within a state)-says that a locality can do anything
that is of a purely local character or not inconsistent with state law or policy.
2. devolution of powers-stands Dillon on its head and says that a locality can
exercise any power not expressly denied to it" (de Voursney 1992: 2).
The question of local government autonomy is important, particularly if municipalities need to
rely on higher levels of government in order to obtain the power to manage growth within their
own boundaries. Absent the right ex ante, local municipalities must have the clout to influence
state legislature members to pass statutory language authorizing the use of power in favor of
local governments as opposed to, for example, developers. Likewise, municipalities will be
restricted if there is no political will by the state legislature or other governing body to pass
growth management or other favorable legislation.
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A 2003 discussion paper for the Brookings Institution attempted to classify the fifty states into a
"Map of Local Government Autonomy" based upon their adherence to Dillon's Rule
(Richardson et al. 2003). Using the court cases in each state from 1944 to 2002 and other
supporting material, the authors came up with four classifications - Dillon's Rule State; Dillon's
Rule only for certain types of municipalities; Not a Dillon's Rule State; and Conflicting
Authority (Richardson et al. 2003). Thirty one states were classified as "Dillon's Rule State"
because all of their municipalities are subject Dillon's Rule. This finding was largely based on
the appearance of the words, "Dillon's Rule" or "Dillon Rule" in any state court cases
(Richardson et al. 2003). Eight states (Alabama, California, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, and Tennessee) were found to hold only select municipalities to Dillon's Rule. So
these states make up the "Dillon's Rule only for certain types of municipalities" category. Ten
states (Alaska, Iowa, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, South
Carolina and Utah) ignore Dillon's Rule completely and were classified as "Not a Dillon's Rule
State" (Richardson et al. 2003). Florida was the only state where the use of Dillon's Rule could
not be clearly determined. It was put into the "Conflicting Authority" category (Richardson et al.
2003). The report, however, makes no claims about how much autonomy a local government has
in each state relative to the other states, so just because two states fall into the same category
does not mean that the local governments in each state have the same level of autonomy.
In cases of the delegation of authority to local governments, Virginia follows the narrow
construct of Dillon's Rule. The implication for land use regulations is that "the Virginia
[Supreme] Court has never upheld a claim that a particular land use regulation power can be read
by implication into the enabling acts" (BeVier and Brion 1981: 21). So a Virginia locality cannot
adopt a land use regulation on the basis that "the claimed power is 'essential to the
accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes' of a locality or that the claimed power can
be 'necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted" (BeVier and
Brion 1981: 21). Localities can only adopt land use regulations that are expressly authorized by
the passage of legislation by the Virginia General Assembly. Additionally, Virginia follows a
corollary to Dillon's Rule whereby "[i]f a power is expressly delegated to local government, a
limitation on the scope of that power cannot be derived by implication from other legislative
language" (BeVier and Brion 1981: 22). This corollary leads to a greater reduction in "the
flexibility with which local government can exercise its land use control powers, even though the
societal context in which these powers are applied is in a state of a flux" (BeVier and Brion
1981: 22).
In states like Virginia which follow Dillon's Rule, localities are dependent upon the state
government to pass legislation to grant them the authority to try new policies and tools if that
authority has not already been explicitly endowed in an existing law or statute. Furthermore, the
legislature does not have to grant powers equally among locality types. For example, Virginia
counties, which are the focus of this dissertation, are more hindered by the practice of Dillon's
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Rule than the state's cities because cities have been granted the authority to levy new taxes
without prior approval from the Virginia General Assembly.
The question remains unanswered on whether Dillon's Rule has restricted the ability of Virginia
localities to respond to growth-related issues and if not restrict them, perhaps complicated their
responses. I would argue that a direct causal relationship may be difficult to determine, but that
Dillon's Rule is not something to be easily dismissed or erased from one's political heritage. If
this judicial line of thought were really harmless then there would not have been efforts in the
state since 1969 to add language to the state constitution that could be considered a reversal of
Dillon's Rule. The discontent with Dillon's Rule by local governments pops up in particular
public policy issues such as land use regulations and the discrepancies between the taxing and
borrowing powers of cities and counties (deVoursney 1992). The debate becomes whether the
state government would ever see these issues as purely local problems or ones that still require
involvement by the state and hence a continued adherence to Dillon's Rule. There has been a
clamoring for increased local discretion to deal with the ramifications of growth. The Local
Government Attorneys of Virginia has taken the position that "[t]he time has come to take a
comprehensive look at the powers granted to localities to regulate land development and its
effects on every public service, from public education to public roads. While the state considers
land use a local issue, it has significantly limited local freedom to develop an adequate response
to the pressures and costs of growth" (deVoursney 1992: 8).
In their respective works, authors like Fischel (2007) and Richardson (2000) contend that
Dillon's Rule is a moot point in today's era of land use regulations. Fischel's argument centers
around his belief that if a state court does strike down a locality's land use regulation on the basis
of Dillon's Rule, the locality will turn around and lobby their state legislators for the passage of a
bill granting them the power to impose such a regulation. So he concludes that "debate about the
jurisprudential merits of Dillon's Rule is kept alive even though its practical implications have
been negligible for nearly a century" (Fischel 2007: 18). Richardson and his co-authors argue
that Dillon's Rule is a non-factor because it "bears far less on the likelihood that a particular
region or state will implement effective growth management than such critical factors as timing,
political outlook, and socioeconomic issues" (Richardson et al 2003: 31). They contend that
Virginia's growth management style or lack thereof one is a function of strong historical support
for property rights; level of state funding on public infrastructure and facilities to localities; and
structure and number of local governments (Richardson et al 2003). Richardson (2000) in an
earlier work does admit that Dillon's Rule has complicated things for local governments in
rapidly responding to their growth issues, but has at the same time, possibly slowed the spread of
sprawl. This two-sided nature of Dillon's Rule stems from its ability to prevent the development
of innovative growth management tools by local governments, so each locality cannot come up
with its own unique solution. Thus, there is a forced consistency of solutions which may hinder
localities from shifting growth to their neighbors, so sprawl slows. In some ways, Dillon's Rule
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forces local governments to act as one unified voice at the state legislature if they want to
achieve greater autonomy to control growth because there are still opposing groups who will
argue against granting more authority on the grounds that they are not "going to give the local
governments a blank check to slam the door on development like this" (Richardson 2000: 23).
Reliance upon state legislators for the passage of growth management authority at the local level
highlights the potential for interest groups to play an important role in the adoption of legislation
enabling certain types of regulation at the state level. In illustrating their political models of local
government, both Ellickson (1977) and Fischel (2007) offer anecdotal evidence about the power
of interest groups in large counties in Virginia. In states like Virginia where there is great
diversity among the political, geographic, socioeconomic, and cultural facets of its localities, the
fact that the political process is not at the discretion of the localities only further complicates
legislative matters. A distinctive focus of this dissertation's analysis, however, is the interplay
between county decision makers, state-wide interest groups, and state legislators. The historical
analysis in Chapter 5 through Chapter 8 will trace the process of taking an issue at the local level
and following its path through the state legislature and back to localities for implementation of
the solution. As a result, these chapters will provide the opportunity to examine (1) Fischel's
conclusion on the current relevance of Dillon's Rule and (2) the ability of local governments to
overcome the power and influence of other interest groups in their pursuit of the authority to use
specific land use regulatory tools.
Land Use Politics
Typically, when one thinks of politics and land use regulations, the assumption is made that an
individual is referring to the local government level. There are four major points that drive the
discussion of land use politics. The first is that land use issues are inherently likely to be
controversial. The discussion below will show that this controversy stems from the unresolved
conflict over the purpose of land. Second, it is important to know who has the power in the
political process and when they have the opportunity to use it. The power of interest groups will
vary depending upon the political landscape in operation. The focus in the majoritarian/median
voter and influence/interest group models has been at the local level, but with the assertion that
the influence/interest group model grows in domination as the level of government rises. Actors
must work within a prescribed political process. Thus, thirdly, the process, itself, matters and
may influence the strategies that actors pursue. In particular, because Virginia strictly adheres to
Dillon's Rule, state politics are especially important. So there must be an understanding of the
relevance of the influence/interest group model in explaining the legislative process at the state
level. Finally, there are the contextual factors outside of the actors and the political process
which must be understood. Together, these elements contribute to the complicated nature and
cyclicality of land use regulations.
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Controversy
A major reason for the conflicts over land use is that communities have yet to reconcile their
beliefs over the purpose of land. Is land solely a factor of production to be exchanged into
something else for the pursuit of profit? Or is it to remain an element of nature to be enjoyed and
used for its natural properties with minor changes? In effect, you have private economy versus
public sector. The ideologies, however, are not without their own internal debates. Altshuler
points out that within the private ideology there is a conflict between "the right of homeowners
to undertake collective action against change (via private covenants or public zoning) and the
right of investors to develop their land with minimal concern for side-effects" (Altshuler 1999:
196). For the public ideology, the debate centers on the level of scale of involvement and where
it originates, so small-scale versus large-scale; democracy at the grass-roots level versus
government bureaucracy (Altshuler 1999).
Communities end up sending both ideologies mixed messages. Rather than choose one belief
system, policymakers select elements that appeal from both of them. For example, there may be
a stated goal of the protection and enhancement of property values, as well as, goals for
environmental protection even though there may arise a point when they conflict. At the same
time that communities use a mix of the ideologies, those who have wealth and influence will
pick and choose elements of the ideologies that best suit their needs (Altshuler 1999). In most
cases, one ideology will dominate the other one if it is the appropriate setting for that value to
triumph since Americans support both ideals. A role for state government is as the moderator of
these ideologies, particularly when the dispute is over controversial topics. Any influence that a
state government could exert to curb issues of inequality and exclusion, however, is tempered by
the fact that local governments will never willingly give up "the most valued jewel in the local
land-use crown-the capacity to veto unwanted development" (Altshuler 1999: 199).
Power Players
It is interest groups who have the power to influence which value ideology directs a locality's
land use regulations. There are two major models - majoritarian/ median voter model and
influence/ interest group model - whose origins stem from the social choice theory and public
finance literature (Ellickson 1977; Fischel 2007). Under the majoritarian model, conditions are
ripe for a local government to implement land use regulations that would make the locality an
exclusionary suburb when the local area is relatively small and homogenous in population
(Ellickson 1977). This would occur because "an individual's influence over governmental
decisions is proportionate to his voting strength at general elections" (Ellickson 1977: 405). The
majoritarian model is apt for describing how homeowners are able to dominate the land use
planning agenda of small municipalities in pushing for exclusionary policies that preserve the
value of their houses against the interests of prodevelopment groups.
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In the influence model, interest groups are "a function of [their] ability to contribute money,
manpower, or other political assets to election campaigns" (Ellickson 1977: 407). Interest groups
gain in strength as the number of issues and the size of a municipality increases. Thus the
influence model thrives on complexity and chaos. In applying the influence or interest group
model to land use regulations, Fischel acknowledges that its application is not as clear-cut as it
would be under the other model because one interest group has the capabilities to counteract the
power of other interest groups, for example, homeowners versus homebuilders because both
groups may be active political forces. House values and schools are issues that can bring
homeowners together despite their varying incomes, but close proximity, so that "homeowners
can easily form a group to jawbone city officials about the evils of some threatening
development" (Fischel 2007: 8). Ellickson points out that "homeowner domination of suburban
politics will lead to enactment of growth controls and the imposition of development charges.
Political domination by developers will lead to a different, but also troublesome, set of political
outcomes: for example, graft and the unwarranted subsidization of development" (Ellickson
1977: 409-410). Overall, Fischel concludes that "[t]he interest-group model is more likely to
produce a more elastic supply of housing, since developer interests will at least partially counter
the interests of homeowners" (Fischel 2007: 9). Both Fischel (2007) and Ellickson agree that
certain localities often engage in a regular cycle between "predevelopment and antidevelopment
phases" which might correspond to one or the other group gaining control periodically (Ellickson
1977: 409). Thus different settings are likely to be described by different interest group models
and in fact, the size of the constituency under the government's control matters whether the
geographic area is a neighborhood suburb, city, county, region, or state.
Legislative Process
Building on the theoretical discussion of competing values and interests embodied in land use
politics, it is important also to understand how things play out in the actual legislative process
and the resulting regulations. One of the first steps in the legislative process is the setting of the
agenda for a legislative session. When local governments are reliant upon the state government
to pass legislation to grant powers beyond those already explicitly endowed in an existing law or
statute, it is imperative that they are able to get their issues placed on the legislative calendar. In
Cobb and Elder (1983) theoretical framework, the ability to get an issue on the agenda of a
legislative body is a function of three things: definition of the issue (scope); expansion of the
issue to different subgroups within the conflict (intensity); and nature of the conflict (visibility)
(Assendelft 1994). The broadness or expansion of these things will in general lead to their
placement on the agenda. Assendelft explains, "[t]he more an issue is defined in ambiguous and
nontechnical terms and as having extended relevance and social significance, the greater the
likelihood it has to reach an expanded public and achieve a place on the agenda" (Assendelft
1994: 525). James Q. Wilson (1980) theory of the agenda setting process, policy change will
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occur through entrepreneurial politics if the costs are concentrated and the benefits diffuse
(Assendelft 1994). Concentration implies that the costs of the policy change are focused upon
one group which could be small or large in number, financially strapped or well-endowed,
powerless or powerful, etc. Diffusion of benefits would spread the benefits of the policy change
across the whole public. Entrepreneurial politics involves the "process by which a political
entrepreneur 'sells' the issue, using symbols and defining the problem in such a way that it
mobilizes latent public sentiment and attracts the attention of elected officials" (Assendelft 1994:
526). Wilson's theory presumes that only one group will engage in an entrepreneurial manner
and that it is most likely the group in favor of the regulation whose action catches the anti-
regulation forces offguard and possibly makes them susceptible to defeat (Assendelft 1994). The
caveat to Wilson's theory of entrepreneurial politics is that both sides can engage in the practice
and end up neutralizing each other. In the end, the influence of politics can result in the desired
legislation or no legislation or much stronger legislation based on interest group participation
(Assendelft 1994).
Once a piece of legislation makes it onto the agenda, then the focus in the legislative process
shifts to how politics affects what passes, as well as, how it passes into law. The theoretical
underpinning here is that members of a legislative body "take their voting cues from
constituents, other lawmakers, and interest groups" (Peters 1994: 62). Building on this
foundation, five factors are theorized to affect the content and success of a bill: "the proportion
of legislative districts confronting the problems of rapid growth; the ability of interest groups to
conduct effective grass roots campaigns; the use of floor amendments to 'catch the opposition off
guard'; effective communication between a bill's negotiators and its supporters; and the
appearance of flexibility on the part of the bill's supporters" (Peters 1994: 61). Peters (1994)
found that constituent interests do affect legislative voting patterns, but that they can also
influence the composition of the legislative package before the vote. Restructuring of a piece of
legislation either to remove those parts that generate the most opposition or adding elements to
generate interest among legislators who originally had no stake in the legislation. Factors 3
through 5 as listed above (floor amendments, communication, and flexibility) can also be used to
overcome the power of constituent interests, but they are less effective in achieving bill passage
than the actual content of the legislative package. For example, in Pennsylvania, passage of
impact fee legislation was achieved at the state level, but it was characterized as "legislation
constraining a locality's ability to shift infrastructure expansion costs to developers" (Peters
1994: 67). This characterization was the result of localities with either a stable or declining
population having held a numerical seat advantage in the legislative body and were convinced by
interest groups that the impact fee legislation held no interest for them and should not receive
their support. One could then argue that the passage of impact fee legislation in Pennsylvania
was also an example of symbolic politics. In symbolic politics, a gesture is made towards
supporting an idea like growth management, but in actuality, what was done was more of a
symbol of action than a policy with actionable consequences (Warner et al 1995). In the case of
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Pennsylvania, state legislators could say that they gave localities the ability to adopt impact fees
while localities could counter that it is purely symbolic because their effectiveness at shifting
costs was hampered by the legislative language.
The notion of broadness versus specificity in the legislative language and how it achieves
passage is illustrated in Virginia's distinction between "general law" and "special act" and the
necessary number of votes needed to pass each type. In Section 1 of Article VII of the Virginia
State Constitution which focuses solely on local government, "general law" is defined as, "a law
which on its effective date applies alike to all counties, cities, towns, or regional governments or
to a reasonable classification thereof." A "special act" is a "law applicable to a county, city,
town, or regional government and for enactment shall require an affirmative vote of two-thirds of
the members elected to each house of the General Assembly." If a local government wants a
piece of legislation passed that directly refers only to them by name, the procedure requires them
to obtain 2/3rds of a majority. Regular legislative acts only require a simple majority for passage.
As a result, "the reasonable classification thereof' element of a "general law" definition is used
often to avoid a "special act" wording. The key to writing the "reasonable classification" is to
make the act specific enough, so that it applies to a particular locality, but still broad enough, so
there is the possibility of other localities being eligible. For example, the legislation on
conditional zoning that passed in 1973 applied only to a locality having an urban county
executive form of government. At that point in time, Fairfax County was the only county in the
state with that form of government (and still is today), so the legislation was targeted for Fairfax,
but written in broad enough terms that it could be applicable to another county with an urban
county executive form of government, whenever that occurs.
Contextual Factors
In the end, the political environment is the most important element in preventing contrary policy
results. Both the length of a political regime and the institutionalization of policy tenets are
essential to give policies the chance to be effective (Warner et al 1995). Warner and Molotch
argue that it is "a favorable political environment sustained over time" more than "the number,
type, or title of controls" that leads to a set of policies having their desired impact (Warner et al
1995: 400). This sustained political environment is essential because interest groups will always
have the comparative advantage to local governments in terms of money, influence,
mobilization, and expertise. The majority of contrary policies may be considered unintentional
and occur via three factors -- episodic intervention, countervailing policies, and initiatives of the
regulated (Warner et al 1995). Episodic intervention occurs when a policy is not always active
either by design or a lapse in policy enforcement. During these periods of inactivity,
interventions take place which run counter to the lapsed policies leading to results that are the
opposite of the original policies. The third factor is countervailing policies where "[l]ocal
governments may be restraining development with some policies and simultaneously
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encouraging it with others" (Warner et al 1995: 379). A project that may not meet the goals of
growth management could be spun to show it supports other government goals like revitalization
or economic development and hence, gain approval to go forward. The final factor is initiatives
of the regulated where "actors may be able to take advantage of the unforeseen slack, loopholes,
or opportunities to ignore the rules" (Warner et al 1995: 380). Basically, the authors characterize
it as "[g]rowth grows in the legal and institutional cracks" (Warner et al 1995: 393). Strategies
range from pure litigation against a local government to fears over losing out on a project to
another jurisdiction to starting a project illegally and daring a local government to challenge it to
agreeing to development conditions, but never fulfilling them. Interest groups forcing local
governments to weigh the costs and benefits of having the unwanted growth occur versus the
costs and benefits of trying to prevent it and what the public perception becomes of those local
officials. Thus it may be that negotiation is a key to the successful passage of land use regulation
rather than imposition. The debate between negotiation and imposition played a major role in the
history of enabling conditional zoning in Virginia.
The section above reviewed the major theories about the involvement of politics in the land use
arena. They showed that just because a local government wants to controls its level of growth
does not mean that it always can. Their power to do so may be limited by the state government,
for example, through adherence to Dillon's Rule. Further, legislation may be passed that on the
surface appears to give them additional power. However, it may be so restrictive in
implementation that it achieves minimal results. Interest groups have the ability to shape
legislation, as well as, impede its path through the political process. Given the appropriate
political environment, local governments may be able to gain passage of growth management
legislation. Negotiation should not be overlooked as a tool. Land use regulations will always
operate within a contentious environment as long as there are conflicting views on the purpose of
land.
In this chapter, I have presented topics from the fields of land use regulation, infrastructure
financing, and political economy. Together, these topics provide a foundation upon which cash
proffers can be understood. Cash proffers are linked to both land use regulation and
infrastructure financing. Their link to land use regulations is through the rezoning activity that
leads to their generation. Once they are generated, cash proffers are used to finance the new or
expanded infrastructure needed by the rezoning activity. Cash proffers exist in an environment
influenced by politics. This influence extends from the state level down to the local level.
Through a discussion of Fairfax County's growth struggles in the post-World War II period, the
next chapter will illustrate many of the issues raised in this literature review. For example,
struggles within Fairfax County over the adoption of a zoning ordinance and comprehensive
plan. Chapter 3 lays out the historical foundation for the political process analysis conducted in
Chapters 5 through 8.
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CHAPTER 3
Before the detailed exploration of the progression of conditional zoning in 1973 to cash proffers
in 2008, it is important to understand how and why conditional zoning was proposed as one of
the solutions to help Fairfax County with the impacts of its rapid population growth. Not only is
Fairfax County the progenitor of conditional zoning in Virginia, its story also establishes the
nature of land use problems under the extant system of rules. There were two major issues that
conditional zoning was initially used to address for the county. First, the zoning ordinance was
not sufficient to deal with the level and type of development that occurred in the county. As a
result, the county engaged in "extra-legal procedures and practices" (Fairfax County Zoning
Procedures Study Committee 1967). As reported by The Washington Post newspaper, "the
Fairfax County Board frequently sees to it that applicants file indentures binding themselves to
higher standards then required by the zoning they seek" (Anderson 1960). Thus the county
earned a reputation for better or worse as "the metropolitan area's leader in experimenting with
flexible zoning rules, adaptable to varying topography and neighborhoods" and these activities
eventually got the county in legal trouble (Anderson 1960). Second, the county lacked authority
to enforce promises made by rezoning applicants. The departure between the "fantasy" presented
and the reality of what was eventually constructed generated anger and distrust toward members
of the development community. Neighborhood groups who opposed rezoning cases entirely or
supported them because of developer and local official promises were also angry with local
officials.
The influence of interest groups at the county level shaped the solutions to these two issues. The
role of interest groups at the government level has been well-examined in the literature by
individuals such as Fischel (2007). Interest groups in Fairfax County played an important role in
the origins of conditional zoning. I contend that county interest groups are supplanted by state
level interest groups in the push towards passage of legislation by the Virginia General Assembly
which granted the authority to local governments to engage in conditional zoning.
Fairfax County's growth has been well studied and documented by other researchers. However,
such literature looked at the County as a case study in sewerage planning or traced the
development of its Planning and Land Use System (PLUS) (See Hysom 1973; Peters 1974;
Dawson 1977; Mastran 1988). In contrast, I document in this chapter the history of this growth
through the lens of conditional zoning and cash proffers. Below, I discuss growth and other
major factors influencing the county's complicated path towards conditional zoning.
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ZONING WITHOUT A PLAN
Like many local governments across the United States, Fairfax County had a zoning ordinance
and subdivision regulations before it created a master plan for envisioning how the county would
grow over time. The county's first zoning ordinance was passed in 1941 and its subdivision
regulations followed in 1947. However, the completion of the county's first preliminary master
plan did not occur until 1954. While the U.S. Supreme Court's 1926 decision established the
constitutionality of zoning, Virginia did not give all of its counties the power to zone until 1938,
nor regulate subdivisions until 1946.14 Exceptions were made for four counties that legislators
felt needed the ability to engage in zoning because of the level of urban development - Arlington
(1927), Chesterfield (1930), Henrico (1930), and Norfolk (1932) (Makielski 1969).15 The
piecemeal allotment of zoning authority is a precedent for how later sessions of the General
Assembly doled out conditional zoning eligibility. While zoning authority was delivered in a
staggered manner, all counties in 193616 had been granted the authority to set up a planning
commission whose main task was to create a master plan. The plan "was to act as the major
guide for zoning, subdivision regulation, streets and highway planning, public works planning,
and a variety of other municipal activities, including civic beautification" (Makielski 1969: 21).
Fairfax County set up its planning commission in 1938, but it would take almost twenty years for
a master plan to be developed and adopted.
Netherton et al (1992) detailed that the county's zoning ordinance "provided that the county be
zoned into districts, that permits be obtained for building, altering or repairing structures; it
regulated the use and size of yards and other open spaces and provided penalties for failure to
comply" (Netherton et al 1992: 621). It was essentially an instrument that said, "[y]ou can build
here for things other than housing; here you can only build housing" (Dawson 1977: 15). The
zoning ordinance followed the Euclidean model of keeping incompatible uses away from each
other. The concern was over the prevention of nuisance claims, rather than whether an area was
suitable for new denser forms of suburban development. There was no forethought to what this
meant for development patterns in the county and whether services existed to support them
(Dawson 1977).
The lack of a planned vision for where growth in the county should occur contributed to such
issues as septic tank system failures, and water shortages as the county's population grew
rapidly. In fact, the county's natural features (soils, water table, and topography) are not suitable
for wide-scale use of septic tanks. The development of residential subdivisions should have been
predicated upon a sewer system to transport sewage waste (Tabors et al 1976). The Circuit Court
was actually responsible for the establishment of Fairfax County's first two sanitary districts for
14 Acts of the Assembly 1938, c. 415; Acts of the Assembly 1946, c. 369, entitled "The Virginia Land Subdivision
Law."
15 Norfolk is no longer a county because in 1963, it merged with South Norfolk City to form the City of Chesapeake.
16 Acts of the Assembly 1936, c. 427.
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the provision of sewer and water service (Netherton et al 1992). The districts were delineated in
1943 along the eastern edges of the county after the County decided they were necessary because
of the "close concentration of population" in the area (Netherton et al 1992). To mitigate the
septic tank failures, the county needed to put forth a $20 million bond issue to fund the
infrastructure for a county-wide sewer system (Dawson 1977). By 1952, the county sought to
find a solution to its growth troubles in the creation of a county master plan which would then
"form the basis for a modern zoning ordinance" (Fairfax County Zoning Procedures Study
Committee 1967: 1).
Figure 3.1. There were still elements of Fairfax County's rural heritage as it entered into the
1960s. A field near Sunset Hill farm in 1959. This area would later become part of the Reston
development.
Source:Photo courtesy of A. Smith Bowman Distillery in Netherton, Ross De Witt. 1986. Fairfax County in
Virginia: A Pictorial History. Norfolk: Donning, p. 126.
TRYING TO CREATE A MASTER PLAN
More so than the initial steps of a zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations, the debate over
the adoption of Fairfax County's first master plan signified the county's transition from a rural
county to a suburban county. However, it set into motion future development problems. The
proceedings for the plan were initiated in 1952. It was completed by Francis Dodd McHugh, a
professional planning consultant in 1954. His plan addressed public facilities, sewer and water
service, residential, commercial, and industrial development, and roads and highways. It also
sought to concentrate development in the already urbanizing eastern third of the county with a 3
to 5 acre minimum lot sizes in the western part of the county (BeVier et al 1981). The rationale
for the large-lot zoning by McHugh was made on an assumption that the western half of the
county would not have sewer service until the 1980s, so large minimum acre size would slow
down the rate of development, or even discourage it in this part of the county (Dawson 1977).
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McHugh's plan, however, was not adopted by the Board of Supervisors. The county's planning
staff was directed to take the plan and revise it. The Board, at that time, was composed of a
majority of supervisors who represented the rural interests of the county. These rural-minded
supervisors deemed the plan "unacceptable," as well as, "excessive and controversial" because of
concerns over how such large-lot zoning would affect the development value of their land
(Office of County Attorney 1974: 2; Fairfax County Zoning Procedures Study Committee 1967:
1).
Public sentiment, however, wavered in its support for the Board's action. The shift stemmed
from the view that certain supervisors put the interests of the development community and,
possibly, their own before those of the county's residents. In the run-up to the 1955 Board of
Supervisors election, residents were urged to examine seriously the past actions of board
members. For example, "voters were advised to check on voting records on zoning changes,
many of which had been a gold mine for speculative buyers and often not in the short- or long-
range interest of Fairfax County taxpayers" (Netherton et al 1992: 637). In addition, residents
were told that they could take a stand for the county's interests by voting into office candidates
with "broad public interest" rather than "narrow private interest," as well as, encouraging the
adoption of the master plan (Netherton et al 1992: 637). In 1956, the revised plan was presented
to a new Board of Supervisors, whose composition for the first time represented the interests of
the county's new urban and suburban residents as opposed to solely its rural heritage: "the
political posture of the board shifted from rural interests, favoring the protection of potential
development profits, to suburban interests, favoring the protection of the natural attributes of the
land (BeVier et al 1981: 44). The newly elected Board did not act upon McHugh's full master
plan, but they did amend the zoning ordinance with the Freehill Amendment which largely
adopted the residential zoning map in McHugh's Plan. In a striking departure from the plan, the
amendment changed the recommended zoning of 3 to 5 acre lot sizes in the western two-thirds of
the county to 2 acre lot sizes. At the same time, they added a grandfather clause to the
amendment that any plats filed within two years of the adoption date would not be affected by
the change in minimum lot size. The clause essentially erased any initial attempts at the
management of the county's rural growth because the existing minimum lot sizes in some areas
were as dense as %2 acre.
ATTRACTION OF SEWER SYSTEMS
In the absence of a comprehensive plan, the development in the county had to rely on other
strategies to guide its growth. The use of these approaches to direct growth was not a coordinated
and planned effort. One strategy was to avoid the "no residential build" areas indicated in the
zoning ordinance. The other tactic was to follow the availability and location of sewer lines. In
the end, the location of the majority of the population growth was determined by the presence of
sewer systems. For example, a 1961 report predicted that an area of the county with 3,600
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residents could grow to 55,000 with full sewerage service or 20,000 with partial sewerage
service in just over 20 years (Stansbury 1972). Tabor pointed out "[w]hat the planners and their
supporters did not realize was that sewerage, not planning, dominates the growth game in Fairfax
County" (Tabor 1976: 137). As a result, the planning staff would come up with development
plans for the county that revolved around land use, which would then be undercut by the Board
of Supervisors and the Division of Sanitary Engineering's decisions to extend trunk sewer lines.
The policy of trunk sewer extensions was conducted without regard to the county's own
development plans. This was a pattern that held when the county adopted a master plan in 1958
and revised it over a period of years beginning in 1963.
The lack of coordinated and planned development was not the only downside to the reliance
upon sewer service extensions as the county's growth strategy. To prevent a build-up of
development pressures, this tactic required the county to follow through on the construction of
these lines. Sewer expansion was a not cheap enterprise. Typically, it was financed through the
issuance of bonds like the $20 million in 1954. These financing schemes, however, were
predicated upon the county's attainment of minimum occupied housing development levels. For
example, the interest payments on these bonds would be paid through the connection fees
assessed on each building that tapped into the line. In order to prevent enormous size fees, there
needed to be a minimum number of buildings paying them. Thus, in a roundabout way, growth
was further encouraged in order to pay for sewer expansion. The county could have let these
special-purpose bonds become general obligation boards. This change would shift the financial
responsibility for sewer line extensions to all county taxpayers. They would pay for the
extensions through their property taxes which would raise the issue of why residents with septic
tanks should pay for other county residents to have sewerage service. An alternative financing
scheme was the creation of new sanitary districts. The county resorted to strategy in order to ease
development pressures. These designated areas were given special taxing powers to finance the
construction of sewer lines in those parts of the county which had not been approved for
sewerage service in the 1958 comprehensive plan, i.e. western half of the county. Bonds could be
issued by these districts based on a majority vote by the district's residents. Like the financing
through connection fees, the districts actually encouraged growth because the more individuals
that could be attracted to the area, then the lower the tax rate.
Growth through sewer line construction may not have seemed like a bad strategy in the early
years. With the passage of time, the absence of holistic thinking about the county's growth
patterns resulted in environmental problems. For example, a portion of the county's drinking
water supply became undrinkable. It was at this point in the late 1960s that the county's residents
finally organized as one voice against the level of rapid development occurring over the years. In
1970, residents voted 2 to 1 against a $39 million bond issue that would have financed a better
sewer technology, as well as, the expansion of three sewerage plants (Stansbury 1972). Using
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this vote as launching pad, sewer moratoriums and reductions in sewerage plant capacity limits
would become major growth management tools for the county.
Figure 3.2. Fairfax County's sanitary landfill was constructed on land that the county had since
1962. It covers 104 acres. When the facility was completed in 1982, it was the highest land mass
in the county with a top elevation of 575 feet. More than 3 million tons of solid waste had been
held within it. ?R; ~ 3______________AL k 2
Source:Photo courtesy of Fairfax County Library Photographic Archive in Netherton, Ross De Witt. 1986. Fairfi
County in Virginia: A Pictorial History. Norfolk: Donning, p. 130-131.
Figure 3.3. Ductile pipe like the type shown below was used as transmission mains to provide
water to customers in Fairfax County. The size ofthe pipe illustrates why infrastructure
nrovision can be so costlv.
Source:Photo courtesy of Fairfax County Department of Public Works in Netherton, Ross De Witt. 1986. Fairfax
County in Virginia: A Pictorial History. Norfolk: Donning, p. 131.
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INFLUENCE OF THE BLACK ROBES
When the 1955 Board of Supervisors election shifted the power balance in the county from rural
interest dominance to suburban interests, rural landowners and their development allies were not
without other options to advance their agendas. Indeed, a key supporter was found in the
Virginia court system which was known as an advocate and protector of private property rights.
The county's original 1941 zoning ordinance had been declared unconstitutional by the Circuit
Court at the end of the 1940s. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals overturned the lower
court's decisions in 1947. A former member of the Board of Supervisors, G. Wallace Carper,
who was also a larger landowner in the county, along with other property owners, filed suit
against the county on the grounds that the Freehill Amendment was unconstitutional. Altogether,
they represented seven percent of the land in the county (BeVier et al 1981). The plaintiffs
contended that "it had no reasonable relation to the public welfare and that a grandfather clause
built into the zoning ordinance was unconstitutionally discriminatory" (BeVier et al 1981: 45).
In 1959, Virginia Supreme Court ruled in Board ofSupervisors v. Carper7 that the Freehill
Amendment was "invalid" and an "unacceptable" economic effect on landowners while the
grandfather clause consisted of "unacceptable arbitrariness" (BeVier et al 1981: 45-46). The
county argued that the amendment was needed to prevent "an exhaustion of ground water
supplies by subdivisions of less than two-acre lots in the western two-thirds of the county; and
that it abolished the threat to public health by prohibiting the development of less than two acre
lots, using septic fields or private sewer systems" (BeVier et al 1981: 47). In addition, the county
argued that it had the power to decide "the density and distribution of population" (BeVier et al
1981: 47). Nonetheless, the court decided that the exclusionary impacts of minimum two-acre
lots combined with the fact that a date on the calendar would allow one neighbor to build at a
high density while another neighbor could not outweighed any public welfare concerns (BeVier
et al 1981). Following the Supreme Court decision, the Board of Supervisors resorted to a
minimum lot size of one-acre zoning in the western two-thirds of the county. Then, in 1959, the
Board of Supervisors adopted a new zoning ordinance which was based on the comprehensive
plan completed in 1958 by an outside zoning consultant. Dawson characterized the county's land
use planning as "seven pages plus one land-use map, with only two residential zones designated
on the map-open development (one- and two-acre lots) and closed development (multi- and
single-family development on smaller lots)" (Dawson 1977: 22). The actions at the end of that
1950s were significantly because "[t]his represents the first and only time planning and zoning
have been coterminously related to each other on a countywide basis" (Office of County
Attorney 1974: 4).
The Carper decision fell within a time period in Virginia Supreme Court's history when the court
was in a transition on how it viewed the use of zoning power. BeVier et al characterized the
17 Board ofSupervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959).
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period from 1955 to 1971 as the "transitional phase" (BeVier et al 1981). From its first zoning
case in 1926 (Gorieb v. Fox) to the case of Blankenship v. City of Richmond in 1948, the
Supreme Court upheld the actions of local governments in seven different court rulings. A view
of the court developed that "presumed that the zoning actions undertaken by local legislatures
were valid, thus placing a heavy burden on one who challenged these actions. The zoning actions
of local government were upheld except, under the 'plainly wrong' standard, in egregious
circumstances" (BeVier et al 1981: 36). This level of judicial deference to local governments
created a sense that their zoning powers were quite expansive. For example, BeVier et al states,
"Even if it caused substantial economic harm to the landowner, the challenged action was
reasonable so long as there was no denial of procedural due process. Failure to treat like
properties in a like manner did not constitute a denial of equal protection substantial enough to
invalidate a zoning action" (BeVier et al 1981: 37). The 1955 decision of Hopkins v. O'Meara,
197 Va. 202, 89 S.E.2d 1 (1955) signaled the end of the deference period. This was the first time
that the court ruled against actions taken by a local government in regard to land use. Out of the
six rulings made from 1955 to 1971, four did not uphold the decisions made by the local
government. No longer could local governments rely upon at least the Supreme Court of Virginia
to support their decisions. The result according to BeVier was a significant reduction in "the
discretion of local government to exercise the zoning power in order to advance the general
welfare if the effects of that exercise were to treat similar parcels of land differently and to
prevent landowners from putting their land to a more intensive use" (BeVier et al 1981: 56).
Furthermore, it seemed that the court was a creating a position for itself in land use decisions
which was better suited to the expertise of the local governments. BeVier writes that the general
welfare question "has been broadly redefined for the review of zoning challenges generally,
thereby ensuring a substantial judicial role in a decisionmaking process well within an area of
local legislative expertise" (BeVier et al 1981: 56).
While the transition of the Supreme Court of Virginia away from deference towards local
government on zoning matters occurred over a sixteen year time span, the Carper decision did
make an immediate impact on how Fairfax County dealt with its growth issues. The result was
the promotion of further sprawled growth: "[flrom 1959 to 1963, urban sprawl was openly
encouraged by the Supervisors and planning staff' (Stansbury 1972: 13). The county, apparently,
put on hold any county-initiated innovation in planning tools out of concern for potential future
legal action, so an attitude of "if-you-can't-beat-them-join-them" emerged (Stansbury 1972).
The county viewed itself as painted into a corner with only two options - "work like the devil
and the tax same way" or "say 'no rezonings' and watch the builders go into court and have the
man in black rezone the county" (Stansbury 1972: 22). The later path was not chosen. From 1960
to 1963, out of the 148 residential rezoning cases that involved ten or more acres, 106 of them
were granted with 21 denials and 21 withdrawals (Hysom 1973). Approximately, forty-seven
percent of the cases involved single-family rezonings (Hysom 1973). The second largest
category was "RM-2, Apartments" at roughly 24 percent (Hysom 1973). While the total number
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of multi-family rezoning cases outnumbered single-family, the difference was only eight cases.
By these numbers, there is a clear pattern of support by county officials for sprawl in the form
single-family subdivisions.
Figure 3.4. The aerial images below show the development ofthe Springfield area in Fairfax
County. The image on the left shows what it looked like in 1950 as the county emerged from
World War I The image on the right captures how developed the area had become by 1981.
Photo courtesy of Edwin Lynch (1950) and Blue Ridge Aerial Surveys (1981) in Netherton, Ross De Witt. 1986.
Fairfax County in Virginia: A Pictorial History. Norfolk: Donning, p. 129.
DEVELOPMENT FORCES AT WORK
During the 1960s, a perfect storm for rezoning applications was created by a growing real estate
market and the county's failure to rezone the county in accordance with a series of new
comprehensive plans. Virginia state law requires a locality's comprehensive plan to be updated
every five years. Fairfax County decided to conduct its update through a division of the county
into planning districts with a plan developed for each district. Together these district plans would
form the master plan for the county rather than updating the existing plan which covered the
county in its entirety. The plans for the fourteen districts were completed over a series of years
beginning in 1963 and starting with the eastern districts where growth pressures were the greatest
(Peters 1974). It was at this point that planning and zoning in the county became disconnected
again. The disconnection occurred as a result of the failure by the county to amend
comprehensively the zoning ordinance to conform to the use, location, and intensity of
development called for in the newly adopted district plans. The adoption and amendment should
have occurred simultaneously or at least directly right after the other. The result was that
property owners of individual parcels who wanted to take advantage of the changes in the district
plans, particularly the more intensive uses, had to file a rezoning application with the county.
Fairfax County became flooded with record numbers of rezoning applications from the mid-
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1960s onward. Rezonings, themselves, in effect gradually updated the old zoning ordinance, but
on a piecemeal basis over several years.
Land supplies in the metropolitan Washington, DC area, particularly Fairfax County, became
scarcer due to the continued population growth in the region. In 1935, roughly 60 percent of the
land in Fairfax County was employed in farming while after 1960, less than 20 percent remained
in agricultural use (Jantz 2005). People's expectations for future population growth and
development opportunities were reflected in the rapid rise in land prices in the county. In 1951,
the average price for an acre of land zoned residential and located near the construction of the
county's new transportation network, the Beltway, was $1,900 (Dawson 1977). By 1964, the
price was up to $16,700 (Dawson 1977). Typically, a locality may have a few rezoning
applications a year as property owners would like to change the designated use of their
individual parcel(s). Market forces combined with the government's "unintentional"
encouragement resulted in a backlog of hundreds of rezoning applications for the Board of
Supervisors to decide. At the beginning of January 1965, there was a backlog of 166 rezoning
applications (Fairfax County Zoning Procedures Study Committee 1967). By January 1967, the
number was up to 287 applications (Fairfax County Zoning Procedures Study Committee 1967).
Figure 3.5 shows a clear pattern where for the majority of the 1960s the number of rezoning
applications exceeded levels from the 1950s. From 1950 to 1959, 1,260 rezoning applications
were submitted while over the 1960s, the number totaled 2,033 (Mastran 1988). Of the 2,033
cases in the 1960s, 854 involved residential zoning (Hysom 1973). In a further breakdown of
residential rezoning applications, there were 523 approvals, 112 denials, and 219 withdrawals or
cancellations (Hysom 1973). These approval levels led to conclusions that "[b]ecause the
development industry and land investment, in general, formed the backbone of the county's
economy, development interests continued to exert considerable political power within the
county government" (Dawson 1977: 24).
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Figure 3.5 Rezoning Application Submissions for all land use categories in Fairfax County, 1950
to 1969
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Source: Mastran, Shelley Smith. 1988. The Evolution of Suburban Nucleations: Land Investment Activity in Fairfax
County, Virginia, 1958-1977. Unpublished PhD Dissertation. University of Maryland.
Figure 3.6. Images of Tysons Corner area of Fairfax County before and after it became a retail
and business center for the Northern Virginia region. The image on the left is from 1957 and
shows the two shopping markets that used to occupy the crossroads of Route 7 and Route 123.
The righthand image is circa 1982 and looks down on the intersection of Routes 7 and 123. The
Tysons Corner development was made possible through rezoning.
Photo courtesy of Fairfax County Library Photographic Archive (1957) and Blue Ridge Aerial Surveys (19
Netherton, Ross De Witt. 1986. Fairfax County in Virginia: A Pictorial History. Norfolk: Donning, p. 132.
2) in
TRYING TO BUY COUNTY CERTAINTY
Rezoning applications not only had an impact on the natural and built environment in Fairfax
County, but also on the political and administrative leaders of the county. The changing politics
of the county raised questions over whether rezoning applications would be approved as readily
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as they had been previously. Therefore developers looked for ways to guarantee certainty to
solve their need. One was could be by bribery. Government officials accepted the bribes as way
of having their own insurance policies to force developers to stick to the plans presented in their
rezoning applications. From 1966 to 1967, Federal and state grand juries indicted individuals
across five rezoning cases from Fairfax County on the grounds of bribery conspiracy (federal
crime) and bribery (state crime). Fifteen indictments were handed out at the federal level and
twelve at the state level. Out of the individuals indicted at either the federal or state level or both,
there were three current member of the Board of Supervisors, three former members of the Board
of Supervisors, two Planning Department officials (former Planning Director and present deputy
Planning Director), along with a former State Senator whose jurisdiction covered Fairfax County
and was in private practice as a zoning attorney. The remaining indicted individuals were
developers and zoning and land use attorneys. The majority of the indicted individuals were not
isolated to one rezoning case. In each case, the aim was to gain a favorable rezoning approval
with bribe amounts ranging from $1,000 to $27,487 (McLaughlin 1966). The rezoning cases also
involved a range of rezoning types from a 15-acre site zoned as single-family residences to
apartments; construction of a shopping center; allowing a trailer park on one site, but only
allowing apartments on the adjoining site; and granting an apartment rezoning within a
residential subdivision. In one particular case, the topic of conditional zoning comes up because
in its first appearance before the Board of Supervisors for rezoning approval, the application was
approved with the condition that no more than 700 trailers would be allowed in the two parks
(Burchard 1966). However, county residents filed a suit against the county for approving the
trailer park rezonings and the court overturned the rezonings on the grounds that "[clonditional
zoning is illegal" (Burchard 1966). It was in the case's second round before the Board of
Supervisors after the court's verdict overruling the first that the charges of bribery were made. In
the end, three former members of the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors were convicted on the
federal charges of bribery conspiracy.' 8
Whether these five cases were aberrations given the hundreds of rezoning applications, it
demonstrates that the decisions on rezoning applications may not have been decided solely on
the merits of the case, and rather were influenced by particular interest groups. Dawson writes,
"because the development industry and land investment, in general, formed the backbone of the
county's economy, development interests continued to exert considerable political power within
the county government-as evidenced by the number and percentage of rezoning applications
approved during the 1960s" (Dawson 1977: 24). After the first indictments in September of
1966, Fairfax County initiated a year-long study of its zoning and planning procedures in order
to prevent further scandals. As I explain in later sections, the power to engage in conditional
zoning emerged out of this study as one of a number of proposed solutions.
18 It is unclear from newspaper articles what happened with the cases at the state level.
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THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS TO FIX A STRESSED SYSTEM
For any proposal on zoning and planning procedure reforms to have had serious weight in the
county, membership of the committee that developed the proposal needed to be balanced among
the different interest groups in Fairfax County. The Zoning Procedures Study Commission
(ZPSC) was composed of nine members with an executive director. Members represented the
Northern Virginia Builders Association, League of Women Voters of the Fairfax Area, Fairfax
County Chamber of Commerce, Fairfax County Federation of Citizens Association, and Fairfax
County Bar Association. The Fairfax County government was represented by a member of the
Board of County Supervisors, a member of the Fairfax County Planning Commission, the
Commonwealth Attorney for Fairfax County, as well as, the County Attorney for Fairfax
County. It is important to note that the representative of the Board of Supervisors, John L.
Beerman, on the committee was indicted by the state on charges of bribery during the course of
the study and the representative of the Fairfax County Bar Association, John T. Hazel, Jr., was
the legal representation for the former State Senator, Andrew W. Clarke, who was indicted on
both federal and state charges connected to the rezoning cases. This is not to say that their ties to
the rezoning scandal would color their views on reform, but to indicate the closeness in
connections within the land use community of the county at the time. The only individual
without ties to Fairfax was the executive director, Fred A. Mauck, who was a land-use attorney
in Chicago.
Besides a balanced membership, there needed to be on the part of ZPSC an acknowledgement
that the proposal should arise above the political fray, as well as, be developed from a set of
common principles that reached across all interest groups in agreement. From September of 1966
until the committee's proposal was released in September of 1967, there were a total 36 regular
meetings of the members, 3 public hearings, and one panel discussion. 1967 was also a county-
wide general election year and the committee was cognizant of their proposal being released into
such a political environment. In the proposal's preface, they wrote, "We are aware that election
campaigns often generate far more heat than light. The Committee can only express its hope that
this report will be carefully evaluated before judgments are made on its recommendations. We
sincerely believe that the contents of this report are of such importance to the well-being of the
county for the next several decades that it would be most unfortunate to pass judgment on these
contents within a time span of a few weeks" (Fairfax County Zoning Procedures Study
Committee 1967: iii). The Committee's recommendations for reform were based on four
underlying principles:
"1. Zoning should be regarded as one of a number of governmental devices
to implement planning programs and policies. The proper place to formulate
policies and programs to influence, regulate and control land development is
the planning process, not the zoning process.
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2. The Virginia governmental philosophy is that elected legislators serve only
as part-time public servants.
3. The organizational structure and procedural standards for administering
planning programs and zoning regulations should result in maximum efficiency,
effectiveness and essential fairness. Unnecessary duplication of effort should
be avoided to the extent possible.
4. Initiative in the development of land should continue to remain in the private
sector, but the legitimate interest of the County in the nature, extent and timing
of development must be recognized. The powers of the County over land
development must reflect this legitimate interest. At the same time, the County
should regulate, restrict and control land development only to the extent required
to protect the County's interest in the process of land development".
(Fairfax County Zoning Procedures Study Committee 1967: 4)
The first and fourth principles speak to issues raised in earlier chapters, as well as, this chapter's
subsections. These issues are connection between planning and zoning; whether zoning
supplements or supplant planning; and the tension between private land development and
governmental land use regulation.
GAINING ZONING FLEXIBILITY AND DEVELOPMENT CERTAINTY
The Committee's task was to develop recommendations on reforms to lessen the possibility of
additional rezoning scandals and hopefully, prevent future ones which may seem at odds with the
concept of conditional zoning. The potential incongruity arises from concerns about the
susceptibility of political officials to the seduction of developers when making agreements on
conditions. Conditional zoning or "Conditional rezoning" as it was called in the proposal, was
introduced in the section of the proposal entitled, "New Development Powers for Fairfax
County," some of which were powers that the Committee admitted the county had engaged in
over the years, but without true legal authority and thus had resorted to "devious procedures" to
use them (Fairfax County Zoning Procedures Study Committee 1967: 49). The justification
given for their "illegal" use was "[i]n an effort to bridge the gap between the powers available to
the county under various enabling acts and the powers that are needed to control development,
the county has been forced to adopt some 'extra-legal' procedures and practices" (Fairfax
County Zoning Procedures Study Committee 1967: 49). The press coverage characterized
conditional zoning as a way of "forcing developers to stick to plans they present at the time
rezoning" (Yenckel 1967). More specifically, it would give the county the enforcement power to
do two things. First, they could make certain that the "pretty" drawings submitted as part of a
rezoning application are actually built, i.e. make reality match the fantasy. Second, the county
would have the ability to impose time limits on a rezoning whereby construction must begin at a
certain date and avoid speculative plans.
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Conditional zoning was summarized in the proposal as "[a]uthority to approve rezoning
applications conditionally by imposing reasonable conditions concerning use, site layout and
design and time schedule for development at the time of granting the rezoning" (Fairfax County
Zoning Procedures Study Committee 1967: 49). Like efforts from 1966 to 1969 in Montgomery
and Prince George's Counties, Maryland19, the impetus for Fairfax County to have the power to
impose conditions on a rezoning application stemmed from instances where rezoning applicants
tried to gain approval by the visual representation of their project, i.e. "selling" their application,
but what results after approval, "as built" oftentimes did not match the "as advertised" version
(Fairfax County Zoning Procedures Study Committee 1967). The Committee saw two options to
deal with this problem -- (1) conditional zoning or (2) "refusing to hear any evidence as to use,
design, lay-out or occupant at the rezoning hearing", so a "see no evil, hear no evil" strategy
where the rezoning decision was totally driven by what was submitted with the application
(Fairfax County Zoning Procedures Study Committee 1967: 49). The second option was ruled
out under the rationale that this evidence actually played a large role in rezoning decisions, plus
those applicants whose projects would be built as advertised would be penalized for the actions
of others.
Besides the ability to force applicants to actually build what they presented, conditional zoning
was lauded because it allowed for the restriction of uses. A rezoning would open a site up to all
permissible uses listed in the new zoning category. Applicant may say that he or she would only
be utilizing one use, but there is no assurance about actions of future landowners. Under
conditional zoning, a condition could be a limit on the permissible uses which would remain in
force with the new zoning category. The additional plus for conditional zoning as envisioned by
this committee for Fairfax was that it could address the issue of speculative rezoning.
Montgomery County, Maryland officials had raised speculative zoning as a justification for their
pursuit of conditional zoning. Speculative zoning is minimized through the use of specific
conditions on the time frame in which construction on the requested rezoning project must begin.
No longer could a developer hold a monopoly on land use type like a grocery store or shopping
center for a number of years in a certain region of the county and prevent similar developments
from occurring because there was already one in the planned pipeline, but just not constructed.
Thus a rezoning application approval with a time limit condition imposed through conditional
zoning could be used as a planning tool to reinforce connectedness with the comprehensive plan.
19 Prince George's County, Maryland is geographically located along Washington, D.C.'s southeastern border. From
1966 to 1969, Prince George's County and Montgomery County, which lies along Washington, D.C.'s northeastern
border, were engaged in efforts at the local and state levels to gain the authority to engage in conditional zoning.
Prince George's received state approval in 1968 and their local zoning ordinance was amended in 1969.
Montgomery failed to achieve passage of its legislation at the Maryland General Assembly. Since the 1960s, only
one other county in Maryland has been granted the authority by the state legislature to do conditional zoning -
Worcester County in 2000.
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To accompany the different types of conditions, the Committee identified four options for
enforcement of these conditions. In the first instance, any required certificates or permits such as
occupancy would be withheld until the conditions were met. The second option would be to treat
any unmet conditions as violations to the zoning ordinance and the appropriate penalties
assessed. Assurances by the developer to the county in the form of an escrow deposit or
performance bond are the third method. The fourth technique which the Committee admitted
should be the least used out of the four was reversion whereby if the property owner failed to
fulfill the conditions of the rezoning then the property would revert back to its original zoning
use.
Based on the paragraphs above, there may be the appearance of the Committee having
recommended giving the county carte blanche authority on attaching conditions to rezoning
applications. However, this was not the case and it was made clear with their statement, "Finally,
we do not believe that it would be appropriate for the County to have blanket authority to
attached conditions in connection with all rezoning applications" (Fairfax County Zoning
Procedures Study Committee 1967: 54). In their vision of conditional zoning, it would actually
be the applicant seeking the rezoning who would have control over whether conditions could be
imposed to his or her application, perhaps in a nod to Virginia's history of protecting private
property rights. If the applicant was willing to accept the attachment of conditions, then the
county was free to seek them. In cases where the applicant was unwilling to have conditions
imposed, then the county was out of luck, but the trade-off for the applicant was the loss of the
ability to make "any representations whatsoever with regard to the use, site layout and design,
time schedule for development and eventual tenant or occupant" (Fairfax County Zoning
Procedures Study Committee 1967: 54). If an applicant went forward with a presentation of their
representations, then they made themselves subject to the imposition of conditions by the county.
It was not clear in the discussion of conditional zoning for Montgomery and Prince George's
Counties whether they would give this level of deference to the applicant seeking the rezoning.
FORESHADOWING THE EVOLUTION TO CASH PROFFERS
At the time of ZPSC's proposal in 1967, there was no connection made between conditional
zoning and infrastructure financing. ZPSC did have a series of recommendations on new
development powers that addressed the financing and provision of public facilities. They were:
"Authority to require the payment of a school site acquisition fee upon the
issuance of a building permit;
Authority to require pro-rata contributions to the cost of off-site improvements
necessitated by a development;
Authority to require the installation of oversized improvements in new
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developments;
Authority to reserve land for public purposes shown for such purposes on an
official map, and authority to reserve land for school and park purposes in
connection with subdivision plat approval, but not necessarily shown on an
official map; and
Authority to adopt, in conjunction with the State Highway Department, a
priority program for road and highway land acquisition and construction, and
authority to establish a revolving fund to finance such acquisition and
construction" (Fairfax County Zoning Procedures Study Committee 1967: 49).
There is a clear trend among the recommendations that the county is looking to share the
financial burden of public infrastructure and facilities with other parties like developers and the
state. A Washington Post article made the point that at the time, the county already did some of
the above practices as part of those "extra-legal" activities referenced earlier. The reporter wrote,
"[w]hile these practices are not now mandatory, many developers voluntarily contribute land for
schools and parks and pay for drainage and other improvements in order to obtain approval for
their projects from the Supervisors. Because such practices are carried on outside the public
view, they can lead to abuses . . ." (Yenckel 1967). There was also the suggestion of a rezoning
tax which would be based on a percentage value change between the new zoning and the old
zoning classification, so it would apply to only those upzonings of properties where the increase
in intensity of use made the property more valuable. However, the Committee decided that the
defects of the rezoning tax technique outweighed its benefits, so it never made it to the official
recommendation list.
SEEKING STATE APPROVAL
Lacking home rule authority, Fairfax County needed the approval of the Virginia General
Assembly, the state legislature, before it could pass its own ordinance to allow conditional
zoning. Members of ZPSC acknowledged that their proposal's recommendations could not occur
within the given state statutory framework and that the Virginia General Assembly needed to
recognize the limitations of the existing enabling legislation to deal with the growth-related
problems of Fairfax County. They wrote, "Thus, the recommendations reflect the fact that what
may be appropriate for the greater portion of the Commonwealth of Virginia insofar as planning
and zoning is concerned, is not necessarily appropriate or desirable for Fairfax County. The
development pressures and rate of urbanization confronting Fairfax County must be taken into
account in establishing procedural and organizational standards for planning and zoning and in
determining the legislative powers available to implement planning programs. The present
Virginia enabling acts do not adequately reflect these considerations" (Fairfax County Zoning
Procedures Study Committee 1967: 4). A newspaper reporter writes of the position that the
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General Assembly was in, "[n]ow the General Assembly, which must enact any changes, will
choose between going along with the committee, formulating its own reforms or preserving the
status quo" (Yenckel 1968a).
The situation was complicated by the mixed messages that the General Assembly was receiving
from Fairfax County, itself, because the major reform of the committee's proposal was to turn
rezoning decisions from a legislative function done by the Board of Supervisors to an
administrative question decided by a newly created review board. On February 7, 1968, the
Fairfax County Board of Supervisors asked their delegation at the Virginia General Assembly to
offer legislation granting all of the recommendations in the zoning study, including conditional
zoning (Yenckel 1968b). This point in time was chosen because if they delayed, then they would
have to wait another two years for a regular session of the General Assembly. 0 All of the
recommendations were bundled together in one bill, so that then the Board of Supervisors could
go back and decide on an individual basis which of new powers to adopt in their ordinance. On
February 12 th, all thirty-seven pages of Bill 455 was introduced in the Senate under the patronage
of Fitzgerald, Hirst, and Brault. The bill would amend Title 15.1 Counties, Cities and Towns,
Chapter II Planning, Subdivision of Land and Zoning by adding a new article - Article 10
Planning, Subdivision of Land and Zoning in Urbanizing Counties. Given the distinction
between general and special legislation, the bill did not specifically restrict itself to Fairfax
County, but rather was applicable to "urbanizing county" defined as "any county in the State that
(1) ... a population of more than two hundred forty thousand persons, (2) ... total jurisdictional
land area, including areas within the corporate ... of towns and areas owned or controlled by the
United States government of more than 300 square miles, (3) does not adjoin a city lying ...
within the State which has a population of more than 200,000 persons" (Virginia Senate 1968, S
455). Conditional zoning came up on pages 19 and 20 of the bill in the section labeled, "§ 15.1-
503.42. Individual rezoning applications-imposition of reasonable conditions." The opening
paragraph stated,
"The board of supervisors may by resolution or ordinance adopt
regulations permitting reasonable conditions, concerning use, site layout and
design, and time schedule for development of the proposed project, to be attached
or imposed upon the granting of any individual rezoning application; provided,
however, that such conditions may be attached or imposed only in those
applications where the applicant indicates in writing at the time of filing an
application for rezoning he consents to the attachment or imposition of such
conditions in connection with the granting of the requested rezoning. Such
conditions may be in addition to any standards or conditions of general
applicability set forth in the zoning district regulations of the zoning
ordinance." (Virginia Senate 1968, S 455)
20 In 1971, the General Assembly amended the State Code to hold regular sessions every year instead of the previous
pattern of every two years. § 30-1.
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The remainder of the conditional zoning section echoed the ideas on applicability and
enforcement raised in the Committee's proposal. Senate Bill 455 was referred to the Committee
on Counties, Cities, and Towns, but unfortunately, it never made its way out of the committee
and was essentially killed. In fact, the committee hearing to decide whether the bill would move
to the Senate floor was held on the last day possible. The bill was left in Committee because
"[fjacing a legislative deadline, busy Senate Committee members said the Fairfax measure was
too complex and innovative to be acted on hastily. They suggested Fairfax return with the bill in
two years" (Yenckel 1968c). It was one of 529 bills introduced in the Senate that session and
only 255 of those bills gained passage in both houses and 248 were enacted into law. In an effort
to salvage the concepts of the Fairfax bill, two of Fairfax's senators (Fitzgerald and Hirst)
suggested it be used as the foundation of a two-year statewide study on rezoning problems in the
state. Hirst and Fitzgerald's rationale was that the other fast-growing localities in the state may
be facing their own ticking timebombs of rezoning scandals that just have not exploded yet, so
that "not only the quality of government" may be affected, but also "the honor of Virginia"
(Yenckel 1968c). A statewide study on urban zoning problems was authorized (The Washington
Post 1968). So the failure to pass Senate Bill 455 was not a statement about the political
feasibility of conditional zoning gaining passage in the General Assembly, but a comment on the
General Assembly's ability to deal with innovation and the unfamiliar in the arena of land use
regulations. All future legislation on conditional zoning would stand-alone on its own merits for
better or worse and a new conception of this land use regulatory power emerges.
This chapter laid out the historical foundation for the political process analysis to be conducted
in Chapters 5 through 8. The next chapter will describe the methodology behind this analysis.
Fairfax County's struggles in the post-World War II environment illustrated many of the themes
raised in Chapter 2's literature review. We clearly see the tension between county officials and
the development community over where growth should be occurring in the county and at what
pace. Both sides appeal to outside parties, for example the court system and the state legislature,
for resolution. Neither side receives the perfect answer. At this point in time, conditional zoning
is sought for flexibility and enforcement rather than infrastructure financing.
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CHAPTER 4
Conditional zoning is one of the tools enacted by the Virginia General Assembly to assist
Virginia localities in their management of growth-related issues. Yet, there is no consensus on its
effectiveness as a growth management tool. Furthermore, over the years, the state's conditional
zoning statutes have developed specific distinctive features. For example, developer participation
is voluntary and state authorization operates through a multiplicity of eligibility systems. The
most notable and controversial feature, cash proffer, is an anomaly in land use regulations. Given
that no other state has allowed cash proffers in conjunction with conditional zoning, the goal of
this chapter is to understand how and why Virginia arrived at such a policy.
Through an exploration of the state legislative history behind the creation and authorization of
conditional zoning, I investigate the hypothesis that conditional zoning's distinguishing features,
such as cash proffers, are a function of the state's political process. More specifically, I
hypothesize that it is the interactions between different agents at points along the political
process which shape the conditional zoning legislative outcomes. I will examine these
interactions, or lack thereof between agents at each stage of the political process model over four
decades to see whether the outcomes of the political process can be attributed in some way to
these agents. Historical evidence about the influence of the political process on the adoption of
conditional zoning in Virginia may be applicable elsewhere. To the extent that the same types of
agents shape the political process in other states, and due to the fact that state legislatures are
increasingly involved in local land use regulation, my findings suggest that the consequences of
the political process for legislative outcomes need to be anticipated in the design and evaluation
of state land use interventions.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
The theoretical underpinnings of this chapter are found in the political process theory literature.
This literature is relevant for questions that seek to understand how public policy is made in a
particular area. In this dissertation, the area is land use regulations and infrastructure financing.
My questions focus on the creation and maintenance of conditional zoning statutes. According to
McFarland (2004), the political process model is applicable to "questions on power,
policymaking, and interest groups in some field of action" (4). For conditional zoning statutes, I
seek to understand, for example, why every bill introduced on the issue was not enacted in law
and who benefited from these legislative outcomes. Other questions center on how and why
statutory wording changes occurred, as well as, who was responsible for them. Potential
explanations for these occurrences suggest a relationship between power, interest groups, and
73
policymaking. I use the political process model to explore the dynamics between interest groups,
political outcomes, and power.
The political process model is based on the works of Arthur F. Bentley (1908/1967) and David
Truman (1951) and is composed of the following facets:
"(1) empirical observation indicates a large number of agents having causal impact;
(2) these agents are seen as groups and individuals representing group interests; (3)
the numerous agents interact and affect one another's behavior; (4) the numerous
agents act to pursue their interests, defined according to their agents' own
definitions of interest, although sometimes this needs to be inferred from behavior;
(5) interests are not taken as given, but frequently change in the process of
interaction among the agents over time; and (6) implicit by the foregoing, empirical
observation should be made over a period sufficient to understand the fluctuations in
power, interest groups, and policy-making activities" (McFarland 2004: 5).
These facets show that the political process is complex. Multiple agents have plenty of chances
to interact with one another and redefine their interests over time. The connection between
political process and political power is established in two parts. The first is a sustained
observation of the political process where any interactions between agents are noted. The second
is the examination for signs of whether agent(s) gained the advantage in the process's outcomes
from these interactions. If the agent(s) succeeded, then this represents evidence of active political
power in the political process. Interest groups are an example of potential agents involved in
these interactions who may have power to determine specific outcomes to fulfill specific needs.
In the political process model, a clear distinction is made between influence and power.
Influence refers to any type of behavioral change in agents during their interactions with other
agents in the course of the political process. The definition of power is "an agent's ability to
cause changes in the sequence of events in the process in the direction of the agent's goals"
(McFarland 2004: 158). Power is a refinement of influence whereby the behavioral changes
occur in an agent's desired direction. An agent's goal does not necessarily have to be a bill's
passage. For example, an agent exerts influence on a bill that normally would move to the floor
of the legislature for debate. Instead, because of the agent's influence, the bill is killed in
committee because it goes against the interests of the agent. Influence thus becomes power. In
comparison, you can have a case where a bill is amended from its original language. But, the
new wording accomplishes a different goal than that of the agent who initiated the change
interaction. Thus the agent was able to exert influence which resulted in an amendment, but they
lacked the power to ensure that the final outcome was in their favor. As a result, an agent can be
influential in the political process, but influence does not necessarily lead to power.
There are variations of power based on how the favorable behavioral change is achieved. At one
extreme is suggestive power and at the other extreme is coercive power. Additionally,
Baumgartner (1998) allows power to be direct or indirect, as well as, reciprocal or unilateral.
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Power is achieved through the use of resources. Depending on the agent involved and the policy
area, the resources could range from money to military supplies, to votes to laws, and court
rulings. The literature has raised questions as to whether one agent's power over another agent is
actually measurable. The difficulty stems from the complexity of the interactions and outcomes,
which do not always allow for a clear path of causality to be determined. As a result, there is an
acceptance of studies in the literature that are only able to show a "high degree of plausibility"
about who has power rather than an absolute certainty (McFarland 2004: 157). I acknowledge
that there are times when outcomes of the political process may result from exogenous factors
like economic shocks rather than the influence or power of interest groups on the political
process. My analysis focuses on the determination of whether political outcomes like bill
amendments, legislative committee failures, or floor votes are the result of influence by interest
groups in the political process. To the extent possible, I attempt to draw direct lines of causation
between outcomes and interest groups to show power beyond influence.
Given the policy area under investigation, the opportunity exists for a wide range of agents to be
involved in the political process. As mentioned by McFarland (2004), agents could include
individuals, political parties, groups, the bureaucracy, and the courts. It is the interactions of
these agents at events in the political process that I suggest lead to certain political outcomes. In
the case of conditional zoning in Virginia, I argue that the interactions of interest groups with
each other and with other agents like state legislators are responsible for features such as the
voluntary nature of developer participation. In addition, the type and number of agents involved
in process interactions are not constant. Variations in agents result from redefinitions of the
interests that make up the policy area. Certain interest definitions attract more attention than
others. Their ramifications for policy outcomes may be controversial in nature. Furthermore,
every agent in the political process is not actively in pursuit of another agent to put under their
influence in the hopes of power achievement. Certain agents are better suited as intermediaries in
the interactions of other agents. For example, interest groups may use decisions or rulings by the
courts as a way to employ their power or exert influence indirectly on other agents such as
legislators.
Thus, tension between private and public interests in land use regulations leads to movements in
and out of the political process by a variety of agents. I focus on the actions of agents embodied
by two interest groups -- local governments and the development community. I use a relatively
broad definition of interest groups from Hrebenar and Thomas (1992) which is "any association
of individuals or organizations, whether formally organized or not, that attempts to influence
public policy" (Hrebenar and Thomas 1992: 9). With Virginia's adherence to Dillon's Rule,
local governments do not have expansive powers to deal with their pressing growth concerns.
They have to lobby the state's legislative body, the General Assembly, for additional powers.
Typically, individual local governments are not treated as interest groups, but as entities that are
acted upon by various interest groups. Local governments are interest groups in the context of
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conditional zoning and its features allowed by state statutes. This characterization holds because
they must lobby the state legislature for passage of legislation that serves or protects their own
interests. They may act as individual agents for legislation that is tailored to their specific
jurisdiction or band together through membership organizations like the Virginia Association of
Counties (VACo) and the Virginia Municipal League (VML), which are paid to lobby on behalf
of the various interests of local government organizations. Besides the membership
organizations, which are open to all local governments, certain local governments may coalesce
around a specific interest and form a lobby around that topic. For example, counties experiencing
high growth rates in the state may not feel that their needs are being fully served by large
organizations like VACo and VML. They may therefore form new interest groups, like the
Coalition of High Growth Counties whose lobbying platform specializes on the needs of high
growth counties.
Typically, the development community exerts direct influence through lobbying or campaign
donations in opposition to the interests of local governments in the realm of land use regulations.
Like individual local governments, individual homebuilders and contractors contact their
respective delegate or senator to sponsor legislation to solve a problem that affects them. At the
same time, the individual homebuilder brings the problem to the attention of various membership
organizations of which they are a member. These organizations can have local chapters, a state
association, as well as, a national association. By taking the issue to a membership organization,
the individual homebuilder is able to tap into a network of fellow builders who may have
encountered the same problem or see the potential for it to affect them at a later date.
Membership also gives them access to the organization's financial and lobbying resources. For
Virginia, the development community is embodied by the Home Builders Association of
Virginia (HBAV) and its local chapters, in particular Northern Virginia Building Industry
Association (NVBIA) and the Home Building Association of Richmond (HBAR).
Empirical research is mixed on whether interest groups really are powerful in the political
process. Baumgartner states, "a literature ... has been divided among those who see interest
groups and lobbyists as 'pressuring' legislators and distorting democracy and those who see
lobbyists playing a more passive role" (Baumgarter 1998: 121). Part of the confusion stems from
the fact it is often assumed that they should be using their resources to affect outcomes in their
favor all the time. However, many studies only look at one point in time to assess the power of
interest groups. If the evidence shows that a participating group was not powerful, then it leads
the researchers to conclude that interest groups do not matter in the political process. Because the
issue context and issue definition matter for the involvement of interest groups in the political
process, when resources for power are limited, it makes sense to conserve them for opportunities
that will really affect change in the political process. Therefore interest group involvement is
more likely to exhibit a pattern of ebbs and flows over time. The question becomes not whether
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interest groups have power in the political process, but how, when, and why they seek to cause
changes in the political process, which may or may not result in their desired outcome.
HYPOTHESES
Because conditional zoning has direct implications for local governments and the development
community, I expect interest groups composed of individuals and/or organizations from these
groups to attempt to assert influence over the state political process. However, the intensity and
level of influence by interest groups will likely vary over time. As a result, agent interactions
may provide a causal link in political outcomes. Evidence of influence is the intermediate step on
the path towards the characterization of power as the causal mechanism in the political process
interactions of interest groups. Their actions may be carried out in various ways such as agent
interactions, legislative events, and local level implementation efforts. Using the theoretical
foundation laid out above, combined with my focus on interest groups, my analysis is guided by
a singular hypothesis.
Hypothesis: Conditional zoning statutes in Virginia resulted from variations over
time in the power of interest groups to affect outcomes of the political process.
METHODOLOGY
Qualitative methods will be used to establish the history of the political process behind the
creation and authorization of conditional zoning and thereby, cash proffers. After a historical
overview of initial conditions , which sets up the issue definition and context, the history is
broken up chronologically into ten year increments representing each decade beginning with the
1970s and ending with the 2008 legislative session, so that there are four time periods overall.2'
For each of the four decades under study, my analysis starts with an explanation of how the issue
of conditional zoning emerged and was maintained or redefined over the ten year time span.
Issue emergence is the first stage of Birkland (200 1)'s six stage model of policymaking.22 While
the linearity suggested by the model is not necessarily a perfect description of the political
process, the division of the process into stages allows me to isolate the path of influence exerted
by various agents. In addition, I can draw conclusions about whether influence has been
transformed into power. For this reason, among others, I use the stages model as a tool for the
21 justify the ten year time increments on the grounds that there was conditional zoning-related legislation
introduced during each of the decades with at least one significant state statute enacted. The year in each decade
when the centerpiece bill(s) passed is not consistent, for example, one was in 1973 while another was 1989. Thus
given that I want to fully capture the swings in power over time, I have chosen a length of time that allows for an
examination of the years before the legislation passes and afterwards.
22 The six stages in order are issue emergence, agenda settings, alternative selection, enactment, implementation, and
evaluation (Birkland 2001). The third stage, alternative selection, only occurs if alternatives are proposed. The last
stage, evaluation, feedbacks into the first stage of issue emergence.
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structure of my analysis of the political process. The stages model matches well with the step-by-
step illustration of how a bill becomes law in the Commonwealth of Virginia shown in Figure
4.1. I initially focus on Fairfax County because it serves to describe how the concept of
conditional zoning was born. As implementation expands across the state, it becomes
increasingly important to pay attention to how conditional zoning is defined as an issue. The
importance stems from the contention that the issues associated with conditional zoning in the
1970s are unlikely to be the same across every decade. If the definition varies, does the context
of issue emergence also vary? The early history of conditional zoning suggests that proffers
were not initially intended to be a growth management tool at all (despite the claims to the
contrary), but a tool designed to help developers win the ability to do new development. An
examination of issue emergence will shed light on this transformation of the justification for
conditional zoning.
After issue emergence and context, I investigate the legislative process stages of agenda setting,
alternative selection, and enactment within the stages framework. Given that legislators are
dealing with thousands of bills in a legislative session, it is imperative for bills to be able to
move out of committee and to the floor for debate by the entire legislative body. During the
legislative process, the interactions of agents at various points may lead to wording changes,
roadblocks, parliamentary maneuvers, or passage of a bill. Legislative failures are just as
important to my analysis as legislative successes, i.e. enacted bills. The point of my analysis is to
uncover what these agents are doing. These interactions show influence in action and, depending
on the direction of the outcome, power, too. Furthermore, it is important to examine whether
there is variation in the content of conditional zoning bills introduced over time. If I find that the
issues have been redefined over time, then there should be corresponding changes in the types of
bills introduced in each time period. In addition, variation in bill type and content suggests that
agents may have to switch the strategies used to exert influence in the political process. This
level of change over time generates an expectation for different outcomes. An absence of
outcome variation in each decade leads to the mindset that one agent, perhaps an interest group,
controls the political process.
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Figure 4.1. How a Bill Becomes a Law in Virginia
Citizen has a problem and requests that Delegate
introduce legislation to deal with problem. Delegate
considers the request and, finding it worthy, asks
Division of Legislative Services to draft bill.
Subcommittee reports bill back to Standing Committee,
which reports bill to full House.
If the bill is passed by the House, it is then send to the Senate. In the Senate,
the bill goes through similar process, and after approval, is printed and signed
by the presiding officer of each chamber.
The bill is then send to the Governor for his approval. The
Governor can either sign the bill into law, veto the bill, or sign
the bill into law with suggested changes.
Bill is enacted into law during a regular session are effective on
the 1' of July following the adjournment of the regular session.
Bills enacted during a special session are effective the 1' day of
the 4 month following the adjournment of the special session.
Appropriations Acts are usually effective July 1".
If the version of the bill that is passed by the Senate and House
differ, then a temporary committee made up of members of both
the House and the Senate is formed to reconcile the differences
in the bills. Once this Conference Committee has agreed on the
same version, the bill is then sent back to each chamber where
roll call votes are again taken.
The bill is then send to the Governor for his approval. The
Governor can either sign the bill into law, veto the bill, or sign
the bill into law with suggested changes.
Bill is enacted into law during a regular session are effective on
the I' of July following the adjournment of the regular session.
Bills enacted during a special session are effective the I' day of
the 4* month following the adjournment of the special session.
Appropriations Acts are usually effective July 1'.
Source: Kidd, Quentin and Connie Jorgensen. 1999. "The General Assembly: Coping with Change and Tradition." in
Government and Politics in Virginia: The Old Dominion at the 21" Century. ed Kidd, Quentin. Needham Heights,
MA: Simon & Schuster Custom Publishing, p. 37.
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The bill is read three times in the full House. During the First
Reading, the bill's title is read to the House and members vote to
advance the bill to its Second Reading. On the Second Reading,
the Delegate who sponsored the bill makes himself available for
questions and the bill is debated by the full House. Amendments
are considered during the Second Reading. The House then votes
to advance the bill to its Third Reading. On the Third Reading, a
roll call vote is held to determine whether the bill passes or fails to
pass.
I
Bill is introduced into House by Delegate. Speaker of the House
refers bill to appropriate Standing Committee .. .. Standing
01 Committee chairman refers bill to subcommittee, where
hearings are held and the bill is debated.
I examine each piece of legislation related to state statutes involving conditional zoning from
which cash proffers are derived. My analysis does not focus only on the bills that make it
through to the implementation stage, but rather on all of the bills introduced that pertain to
conditional zoning and cash proffers. I follow bills through committee hearings, the floor of the
legislative body, etc. through the "Enactment" stage to describe how many fail or are amended,
and where these changes occur in the process. I also examine outcomes, i.e. the enacted bill. By
comparing the initial set of bills to those which are ultimately enacted through the legislative
process, I will be making a judgment on which interest group won the legislative battle.
The final stages of the political process are implementation and evaluation. In this chapter, my
analysis emphasizes implementation rather than evaluation. I evaluate cash proffers in later
chapters. Because I review the political process over time, I observe how implementation feeds
back as an influence on issue emergence in later time periods. I expect that the manner in which
conditional zoning is implemented at the local level generates demand for future legislative
changes at the state level.
Throughout the stages of the political process model, the agents involved are highlighted.
Particular attention is paid to how agents contribute to the political process, i.e. the form and
level of their involvement over time. For each time period, a series of questions are asked for
these agents based on the research material. These questions are:
" Which agents are originators, sustainers, and/or amenders?
" Why are these specific agents involved?
" What are the goals and interests of these agents?
" Which outcomes were influenced by these agents?
" How did the agents influence the outcomes?
The questions are worded in terms of agents, generally, rather than interest groups. Although the
focus is on interest groups, there are times when other agents may dominate the political process.
It is important to know which agents are always active in the political process. Besides local
governments and the development community, state legislators and the courts play varying roles
over time in the legislative history of conditional zoning. The roles can range from
intermediaries for other agents to solo agents in pursuit of their own agenda.
DATA AND EVIDENCE
This chapter's qualitative analysis is based on the use of archival materials and interviews. The
primary data used to establish how the legislative process proceeds is archival materials which
include newspaper articles, legislative session journals, government reports, videotaped
legislative sessions, legislation drafts, and signed legislative bills. This dissertation is not a study
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of the power of interest groups or more generally, interest groups themselves; therefore my
research materials have focused on the political process rather than the specific defined goals and
inner-workings of local governments and the development community for each decade. I arrive
at conclusions about interest group power through the use of newspaper articles, as well as,
legislative language and outcomes. Thus I will be using proxies for the power of either interest
group rather than the direct measures suggested by the literature.
Interviews with key participants in the process are used to fill in gaps or sort out discrepancies
raised by archival materials. The method behind the selection of interviewees is loosely based on
a snowball sampling scheme. I started with individuals identified in the archival materials as
active agents in the legislative history. During the course of my interviews, I asked if the
interviewee had any suggestions for other individuals involved, but not recognized in print. In
total, ten individual phone interviews took place. I conducted follow-up interviews via phone or
email with some of the interviewees.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
In 1973, the General Assembly of Virginia passed a statute authorizing conditional zoning for
counties with an urban county executive form of government, which meant that the new law was
only applicable to Fairfax County. The impetus for conditional zoning stemmed from Fairfax
County's level of population growth and housing development that was at a level never
experienced before by the state. Since the 1920s, Fairfax County had experienced a decennial
population growth rate in the double digits, which by 1950 had reached triple digits and peaked
in the 1960s with a population growth rate of 179 percent over that decade.2 3 In sum, from 1930
to 1970, the Fairfax population increased from 25,264 persons to 454,275.24 The explosiveness
of the population growth is immense when one realizes that the county took more than a hundred
years to double its population size from 12,320 in 1790 to 25,264 in 1930.25 Furthermore, while
the Commonwealth of Virginia, as a whole, has had positive decennial growth rates since 1850;
its peak was the change between 1940 and 1950 at 24 percent.2 6 To accommodate the population
growth, the number of housing units in the county also increased at decennial double-digit rates.
In 1940, there were 8,747 occupied housing units by 1980, the number stood at 205,106.27
23 Based on the author's calculations using data from the Weldon Cooper Center for Public Service at the University
of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia -
http://www.coopercenter.org/demographics/sitefiles/documents/excel/census2000/historiccensus/historic census.xls
. Additionally, Fairfax County had two geographic areas annexed out of it to form two independent cities - Falls
Church City in 1948 and Fairfax City on June 30, 1961.
24 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 County and City Data Book. 2003. Last accessed May 27, 2007, from the University of Virginia, Geospatial and
Statistical Data Center: http://fisher.libvirginia.edu/collections/stats/ccdb/.
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The original state statute focused the creation of a system whereby the development community
could offer conditions attached to their rezoning application to make the proposed zoning change
more palatable for approval by the local governing body and its constituents. Conditions
provided a way to make the existing zoning ordinance more flexible. At the time, the general
understanding was that proffers dealt with issues of design and uses. Proffers would be used to
make a rezoning more successfully blend in with its neighboring properties or mitigate any
perceived negative impacts. The enacted legislation, however, did not codify this mindset into
the details on what constituted an acceptable condition to be offered by rezoning applicants. The
only specific requirement was a "reasonable" connection between the proffer and the impact of
the rezoning. Thus with no clear declaration of their unauthorized status, cash payments began in
the mid- 1 970s to be proffered by developers to Fairfax County and other localities that had been
enabled to use conditional zoning under amendments to the 1973 legislation.
The passage of the 1973 legislation was a joint effort between localities and the development
community. The subsequent introduction of money into the conditional zoning system through
cash proffers led to a pitched battle between the two sides over eligibility expansion of the
conditional zoning system and cash proffers. The conflict among interest groups detailed in
Chapters 5 through 8 resulted in three different cash proffer enabling statutes. Each statute has its
own eligibility requirements and rules (See Table 4.1). In addition, there is one statewide statute
that allows conditional zoning without cash proffers. The 1978 statute granted the power of
conditional zoning to the entire state of Virginia, but did not allow localities to accept cash
proffers as part of the rezoning application (localities authorized under the 1973 legislation and
its amendments are not affected by the 1978 law). It also imposed additional constraints on
conditions, like requirements that conditions must be consistent with the comprehensive plan. In
1989, the General Assembly authorized conditional zoning with the acceptance of cash proffers,
but only to those localities with relatively high population growth rates and the localities adjacent
to them. Thus, this legislation officially tied the use of cash proffers to growth rates and also
provided a greater structure for the acceptance and expenditure of cash proffers. For example, it
imposed the requirement that the project being funded by cash proffers must be in a locality's
capital improvement plan (CIP) and that the rezoning itself must have created the need for cash
proffers. Despite their differences, all the statutes are based on the same principle - a cash
proffer must be voluntarily offered by the developer in a rezoning application.
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.Table 4.1 Locality Cash Proffer Acceptance Eligibility Requirements by State Statute 28
Statutory Types of Localities Eligible to Accept Cash Proffers
Authority
§ 15.2-2298 With the exception of localities eligible under the terms of 15.2-2303:
e Any locality with a decennial census growth rate > 5%;
e Any city adjoining another city or county which had a decennial census growth
rate> 5%;
e Any towns located within a county which had a decennial census growth rate >
5%; and
e Any county contiguous with at least three counties which had a decennial census
growth rate ? 5%;
§15.2-2303 * Any county with an urban county executive form of government (i.e. Fairfax
County);
e Any town within a county with an urban county executive form of government;
e Any city adjacent to or completely surrounded by a county with an urban county
executive form of government;
e Any county contiguous to a county with an urban county executive form of
government;
e Any city adjacent to or completely surrounded by a county contiguous to a
county with an urban county executive form of government;
* Any town within a county contiguous to a county with an urban county executive
form of government; and
e Any county east of the Chesapeake Bay.
§15.2-2303.1 0 Any county with a 1990 census population between 10,300 and 11,000 through
which an interstate highway passes (i.e. New Kent County).
Source: Commission on Local Government.
The fact that the General Assembly was willing to extend conditional zoning without cash
proffers to the entire state five years after the original legislation, but that it took sixteen years to
expand conditional zoning with cash proffers to other parts of the state outside of Northern
Virginia and the Eastern Shore suggests the greater level of controversy with cash proffers
compared to non-cash proffers. It is less clear why cash or the financial ramifications of
development needed to be combined with the conditional zoning system at all. The historic
concern of zoning flexibility and the more current public financing problems are not necessarily
served or solved by the same tools.
CONCLUSION
Chapters 5 through 8 present the detailed analysis of the political process by decade. Each
chapter represents an individual decade beginning with the 1970s in Chapter 5 and ending with
the period of 2000-2008 in Chapter 8. They contain the evidence for the overarching conclusions
that I present below as an end to this chapter. These conclusions serve as a preview of what to
28 "HB 1506, enacted by the General Assembly in 2006, became effective on July 1, 2006 and amended 15.2-2298
to permit locality to accept proffered conditions if such locality has had population growth of five percent or more
from the next-to-latest to latest decennial census year, based on population reported by the United State Bureau of
the Census" (Commission on Local Government 2007: 2).
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look for in the next four chapters. Table 4.2 shows the major events that I consider the most
important out of all of those discussed in Chapters 5 through 8, as well as, Chapter 3. Finally,
Table 4.3 displays a timeline of all the conditional zoning and impact fee legislation in Virginia
mentioned throughout the historical analysis.
In the early 1970s, Fairfax County needed conditional zoning to deal with its growth issues.
Conditional zoning was a solution, but not the only solution. The county could have been granted
the statutory authority by the General Assembly to implement additional land use tools as
envisioned by SB 455 in 1968. Their lack of familiarity with Fairfax's problems and a historical
reluctance to embrace the unknown prevented state legislators from properly enabling Fairfax
with all of the necessary tools. Fairfax's use of conditional zoning with rezoning applications did
resolve some of the tension between the development community, citizens, and government
officials that had developed because of the county's rapid growth. When other localities over the
years developed growth issues, conditional zoning became the go-to solution regardless of
whether it was appropriate for the situation. It was much easier for the state legislature to expand
conditional zoning authority and amend its applicability and regulations rather than grant
authority for a new innovative tool with which they had no experience. As a result, conditional
zoning became a catch-all tool used for flexibility issues, as well as, infrastructure financing.
Dillon's Rule has created a political structure where everything circles back to the state level. If a
local government's solution has not already been expressly authorized or restricted in state
statutes, the locality must go to the state legislature to seek the authority for the remedy. This
structure allows interest groups an amount of freedom to concentrate their lobbying activities on
the state legislature rather than individual local governments across the state. Interest groups
whose work is concentrated in a single interest area like development have an advantage in this
political structure compared to local governments who would have a range of issues before the
state legislature. As a result, localities have to selectively choose the issues with which to
engage. Thus they may succeed in getting a few bills passed or killed while with the majority of
bills, they have to be content with getting an amendment added to the original language.
Chapters 5 through 8 show a clear influence by the development community and local
governments on the political process of conditional zoning. The legislative efforts by local
governments in regard to conditional zoning can be characterized as the pursuit of legal
authority, widest eligibility possible, and the most legally unrestrictive system possible. To
answer the question of when do local governments intervene in the political process to influence
the outcome, most often, their influence was visible in the cases where their existing statutory
authority was threatened. The loss of existing authority when a locality's authority was already
limited was enough of a threat to both fractionalize local governments, as well as, unite them.
Amendments to the conditional zoning statutes have been driven by the development
community's efforts to limit the amount of discretion and variation that local governments can
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introduce into their land use regulations. Ideally, the development community would like to
encounter the same conditional zoning framework and policies in a place regardless of its
geographic location. Conditional zoning should be implemented the same in Fairfax County,
Chesterfield County, Albemarle County, James City County, etc.
The distinguishing features of conditional zoning can largely be attributed to both the intentional
and unintentional actions of the development community. As originally proposed, local
governments only had to get the permission of the rezoning applicant to be able to impose
conditions. The localities would come up with the conditions. In order to remove their opposition
to the bill's passage, the development industry insisted that the conditions had to be voluntarily
offered by the rezoning applicant. The only role for the local government was to approve the
rezoning application and approval could not be based on the conditions proffered. The applicant
would come up with the conditions that he or she agreed to have attached to the rezoning
application. As a result, conditional zoning has the "voluntary" feature. A condition in the form
of cash payments was the unintentional result of a developer trying to find a way to gain
approval votes from members of Fairfax County's Board of Supervisors during a hearing on his
rezoning application. His unintended action combined with no clear restriction on the offering of
cash payments in the 1973 original statute created a precedent for what became known as cash
proffers. This unintentional action led to the very much intended third feature of conditional
zoning. The third feature was the multiplicity of conditional zoning statutes. To limit the use of
cash proffers, two new sections were intentionally added to the original statute. The first in 1978
set up a statewide system where conditional zoning could be used, but cash proffers were not
allowed. The second in 1989 set up a system based around growth rates that allowed cash
proffers as a part of conditional zoning.
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Table 4.2.Major Events in the History of Conditional Zoning and Cash
Zoning Procedures Study
Commission
Senate Bill 455
Charles E. Smith Company
Rezoning Case
Sewer and Zoning Moratoriums
Senate Bill 637
House Bill 1398
House Bill 1185
House Bill 487
House Bill 840
Statewide Public Hearings
House Bill 135
House Bill 348
Senate Bill 141
House Bill 1484
1967
1968
1969
Local Government
Study
Legislation
Land Use Decision
1972-1973 Land Use Decision
1973
1975
1976
1976
1976
1977
1978
1983
1988
1989
Legislation
Legislation
Legislation
Legislation
Legislation
State Government
Study
Legislation
Legislation
Legislation
Legislation
Proffers in Virginia
Acin!Cosqec
Introduced the idea of conditional zoning to Fairfax County
First legislative bill in the General Assembly to authorize conditional zoning;
Failed to gain passage but led to a two-year statewide study on rezoning
problems in the state
Developer offered conditions as part of his rezoning case and the county
approved them; Local neighborhood civic associations filed suit against the
county; Court upheld the county's decision but questioned the legality of the
developer contributing up to $50,000 for construction of a new governmental
office
Fairfax County's Board of Supervisors tried to control county's growth
through a series of moratoriums; Developers challenged the moratoriums in
court; Courts found the moratoriums to be invalid
Bill passage established the first conditional zoning statute in the state;
Applicable only to a locality with an urban county executive form of
government (Fairfax County); Cash proffers are allowed
Bill passage expanded conditional zoning eligibility to include towns with
planning commissions in a county with an urban executive form of
government; Three towns were affected
Bill passage expanded conditional zoning eligibility to cities surrounded by a
county with an urban executive form of government; Two cities were affected
Bill passage expanded conditional zoning eligibility to counties contiguous to
a county with an urban executive form of government; Three counties were
affected
Bill passage expanded conditional zoning eligibility to counties east of the
Chesapeake Bay; Two counties were affected
Public hearings held across the state to gain input on whether conditional
zoning should be expanded statewide, but in a more limited form; Led to the
introduction of House Bill 135 in the 1978 General Assembly Session
Bill passage established the second conditional zoning statute in the state;
Applicable to all localities; Cash proffers are not allowed
Bill passage expanded conditional zoning eligibility under the 1973 statute to
the Town of Leesburg; One town was affected
Bill passage expanded conditional zoning eligibility under the 1973 statute to
any town within a contiguous county whose population is less than 100,000;
Ten towns were affected
Bill passage established the third conditional zoning statute in the state;
Eligibility based on decennial population growth rates as well as proximity to
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House Bill 1485
Letters to State Attorney General
Chesterfield Adopts Ordinance
Allowing Cash Proffers
House Bill 721
Board of Supervisors of Powhatan
County v. Reed's Landing
Corporation
National Association of Home
Builders of the United States;
Home Builders Association of
Virginia; Home Builders
Association of Richmond v.
Chesterfield County, Virginia
James E. Gregory, Sr. Et Al. v.
The Board of Supervisors of
Chesterfield County
Patrick v. McHale
House Bill 2476
House Bill 2456
1989
1989
1989
1990
Legislation
Judicial
Board of
Supervisors
Decision
Legislation
1994 - 1995 Judicial
1995 - 1996 Judicial
1995 - 1999 Judicial
2000
2001
2005
Judicial
Legislation
Legislation
high growth localities; Cash proffers are allowed; Forty-one counties, twenty-
four cities, and sixty-one towns were affected
Bill passage allowed for the use of impact fees in counties with a population
over 500,000; Impact fees may only be used for roads
Attorney General Opinions provide guidance to local governments on how to
administer conditional zoning and cash proffers
Chesterfield County was the first locality in the Richmond MSA to allow
cash proffers under the 1989 statute; In 1990, they adopted a cash proffer
policy; Bill to grant the locality the power to levy impact fees failed
Bill passage prohibited downzoning in future cases involving conditional
zoning and established a five year time window for developers to comply
with what they proffered
Landmark case that established a bright-line test of what a locality could not
do in a rezoning case involving cash proffers; Both the Circuit Court and
State Supreme Court ruled against the county and its decision to deny a
rezoning application on the basis of the developer's refusal to pay the
county's cash proffer amount
Federal Court ruled that Chesterfield's cash proffer policy does not violate the
takings clause under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; Decision
was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals
Landmark that established a bright level test of what a locality could do in a
rezoning case involving cash proffers; Court supported the county's actions
and the State Supreme Court affirmed the decision; Case showed that a
rezoning decision will be upheld if there is enough evidence in the
application's record to show that multiple factors contributed to the decision
Circuit Court upheld Chesterfield County's denial of a rezoning application;
Judge laid out a framework that plaintiffs need to meet if they want to
overturn a county's rezoning decision; Provided further substantiation to how
Chesterfield conducts its cash proffer system
Bill passage required localities to begin disclosing to the Commission on
Local Government their proffered cash payments and expenditures on an
annual basis; First real statewide monitoring of cash proffer systems by the
state government
Bill passage standardized the timing of when cash payments occur and the
indexing of increases in cash proffer amounts; Represented another step by
the development community in standardizing cash proffer administration
across the state
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ia-
House Bill 1506
House Bill 2500
David J. Sowers v. Powhatan
County, Virginia et al.
Senate Bill 768
2006
2007
2008
2008
Legislation
Legislation
Judicial
Legislation
Bill passage reduced the decennial population growth rate from 10 percent
(House Bill 1484) to 5 percent for localities to be eligible to accept cash
proffers; Seven jurisdictions were affected
Bill passage expanded conditional zoning eligibility under the 1973 statute to
locality eligible under the 1989 statute; Allowed more local governments to
have greater flexibility in the structure of their conditional zoning system
Federal court ruled against the plaintiff in his suit against the County over the
denial of his rezoning application; Importance of the case is that it shows how
a county conducts its rezoning process involving proffers
Bill passage would have given localities the authority to impose impact fees
for a range of public facilities, but in return, they had to give up the ability to
accept cash proffers and off-site proffers; Failed to gain passage in 2008 and
was held over to the 2009 General Assembly session
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Figure 4.3 Timeline ofAll Conditional Zoning and Impact Fee Legislation in Chapters 5 through 8
M U Ui
1968 Senate Bill 455
1972 House Bill 305
1973 House Bill 305
Senate Bill 637
1975 House Bill 1398
1976 House Bill 840
House Bill 1185
House Bill 487
House Bill 840
Senate Bill 155
Senate Bill 636
1977 Senate Bill 871
House Bill 1594
House Bill 1529
1978 House Bill 135
House Bill 173
House Bill 1141
1980 House Bill 415
1981 House Bill 1827
1982 House Bill 273
1983 House Bill 53
House Bill 348
1984 House Bill 644
1986 House Bill 438
1987 House Bill 438
1988 House Bill 554
Senate Bill 141
House Bill 451
House Bill 857
House Bill 902
House Bill 1021
House Bill 1033
1989 House Bill 1521
House Bill 1980
House Bill 1483
House Bill 1484
House Bill 1485
House Bill 1661
Senate Bill 613
1990 Senate Bill 48
House Bill 721
House Bill 1121
House Bill 1122
Senate Bill 146
1991 House Bill 1254
House Bill 1141
1992 House Bill 945
House Bill 209
House Bill 166
House Bill 1138
Senate Bill 340
1993 House Bill 1544
House Bill 1780
1994 House Bill 683
House Joint Resolution 280
1995 House Bill 1782
House Bill 2187
House Bill 2234
House Bill 2485
House Bill 2103
House Joint Resolution 542
1996 House Bill 1049
House Bill 1200
1997 House Bill 2627
2008
House Bill 3202
House Bill 954
House Bill 726
House Bill 111
House Bill 1084
Senate Bill 768
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House Bill 2657
1998 House Bill 440
Senate Bill 693
Senate Joint Resolution 107
Senate Joint Resolution 53
House Joint Resolution 195
1999 Senate Bill 1137
House Bill 2112
House Joint Resolution 543
2000 House Bill 1129
Senate Bill 714
2001 House Bill 2476
Senate Bill 874
2003 House Bill 2600
House Bill 2694
2004 House Bill 417
House Joint Resolution 170
2005 House Bill 2456
House Bill 2888
House Bill 2479
2006 House Bill 1506
House Bill 1520
House Bill 5048
House Bill 128
House Bill 1520
House Bill 1073
House Bill 1192
Senate Bill 681
2007 House Bill 2500
House Bill 2380
House Bill 2986
House Bill 2888
i44
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CHAPTER 5
The conditional zoning story of the 1970s is not one of clear-cut tension between the two interest
groups - local governments and the development community. It is much more a story of the
navigation of the political process to achieve authorization of conditional zoning. Fairfax County
served as the poster child or the frontman in the push for conditional zoning authorization from
the state legislature. The driving force behind their efforts was an attitude change among
government officials in regard to growth, as well as, continued frustration with a local
government's ability to develop innovative land use tools for dealing with growth issues. The
conflict over the local government's use of other land use tools fuels the tension between the
interest groups. This fighting is partially responsible for the joint effort between the interest
groups to gain conditional zoning authority. The experiences in Northern Virginia between the
two arc used to shape future relations in later decades. This period of time gave us some of the
unique characteristics of the conditional zoning that remain with us today. Despite other changes
to the statutes over this decade, the one constant has been its applicability to zoning amendments
only.
ISSUE CONTEXT AND EMERGENCE
Conditional zoning emerged in the 1960s in the context of a multi-agent effort to bring reform to
the zoning system in Fairfax County. For the 1970s, the issue resurfaced in an environment that
was becoming ripe for growth management efforts. Both citizens of the county and their local
government representatives, members of the Board of Supervisors, engaged in efforts to affect
the level of growth in the county, but not always on the same side. Both groups, however, did
find their efforts ending up in the same location -- the courts. I discuss below two illustrations of
the environment in which conditional zoning resurfaced. The first instance involves a case of
citizens who filed suit against the county on the grounds that they engaged in conditional zoning
without the authority to do so. This case is relevant because it provides evidence on how the
county hoped to use conditional zoning. It also exemplifies a situation where local government
and development community are on the same side. The second illustration is the county's
multiple attempts to exert some control over the county's level of growth. While conditional
zoning is never directly referenced, it shows the county's willingness to try any tool available in
its effort to affect growth. Furthermore, in contrast to the first illustration, it shows our two
interest groups, local government and the development community, in conflict, and how the
court system is resorted to in an effort to establish who has the upper hand. Finally, both
examples demonstrate the limited ability of local governments to create land use regulations at
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will, thus forcing local governments to fight to put their needed expansion of powers on the state
legislative body's agenda.
As much as local governments sought ways to add flexibility to an existing zoning ordinance, the
development community was just as active. Conditional zoning is touted for the added flexibility
that it can bring to a local government's existing zoning classifications. Prior to the concept of
conditional zoning, the development community sought to increase flexibility in Fairfax's zoning
ordinance with the addition of a new series of land use codes. In the mid-i 960s, developers
influenced the planning department to introduce Planned Development Housing (PDH) and
Planned Development Commercial (PDC). These new codes allowed for the creation of
communities which conformed to their own development plan rather than the county's zoning
regulations and were characterized by higher levels of density. Planners supported these new
codes because their flexibility and denser population would allow for open space preservation, as
well as, the possibility of mass transit (Dawson 1977). In October 1969, the developer, Charles
E. Smith Co., proposed a $200 million complex of residential and commercial uses as the
county's first development under these new planned development zoning codes. Rezoning of the
project was approved in December of 1969 with several conditions agreed upon by the county's
planning staff and the developer. Recall, however, the General Assembly had not granted Fairfax
County the power to use conditions in a rezoning application. The conditions ranged from the
removal of 66 town houses to be replaced with an open recreation area; financial contributions
for the purchase of a site for public safety facilities, as well as, road construction; reservation of
office space for government services; realignment and enlargement of roads; and attainment of
certain road standards (Pettey 1969).
Unhappy with the size and potential growth impacts of the new development, a local civic
association challenged the legality of the rezoning decision. The Dowden Terrace Civic
Association filed the suit on grounds that "the planned development commercial zoning
classification under which the project was approved 'makes no provision for conditions to be
attached to the granting of any rezoning applications"' (The Washington Post 1970). Their
argument was that the Board of Supervisors only approved the rezoning because of the attached
conditions. But, if the county was not allowed to impose conditions on a rezoning application
because of the lack of conditional zoning authority, then the decision was invalid. A second civic
association, the Aurora Highlands Civic Association, threw their support behind the plaintiffs. In
May of 1970, Judge Barnard F. Jennings, a Fairfax County Circuit Court judge, ruled in favor of
the County's decision by upholding the rezoning. His rationale behind his ruling was that "the
various conditions agreed to by the developer, Charles E. Smith Co., before the supervisors
granted the rezoning last December were tied to the development plan for the project and not to
the rezoning itself' (Bredemeier 1970). Although the judge upheld the county's decision, he did
have concerns about some of the conditions and their appropriateness. According to The
Washington Post, Jennings had " 'serious reservations and doubts about enforceability' of the
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two conditions: that by September the developer prepay $500,000 in county taxes and contribute
up to $50,000 for construction of a proposed county governmental office in the Baileys area. He
said these two conditions were 'not a proper part of a development plan"' (Bredemeier 1970).
Despite the judge's misgivings over certain conditions, the developers offered the county the
assurances that all agreed upon conditions would be met and construction on the project began in
December 1970.
Besides its role in the establishment of the issue context, this case is important in the evolution of
cash proffers out of conditional zoning. First, it highlights a distinction between the legality of
condition(s) attachment to a development plan versus attachment to a rezoning application.
While the judge of this case upheld the county's decision, it called in to question the county's
actions and paved the way for further legal action in regard to rezoning decisions. Secondly, the
specter of financial payments as a term of a condition is brought up. There was no mention of
financial payments in Fairfax County Zoning Procedure Study Committee's (ZPSC) proposal for
conditional zoning. Based on newspaper accounts, it was actually the developer, Charles E.
Smith Co., who offered financial payments as a condition rather than the county's request. But it
stipulated that there was the expectation that the county would match the developer's payments.
As the allowable conditions in conditional zoning evolved to cash proffers, this example suggests
that developers were partly responsible for its introduction.
The 1971 Board of Supervisors election in Fairfax County was a watershed moment for the
county in its growth management efforts. All nine members of the Board of Supervisors were up
for reelection - five Democrats and four Republicans. The debate across the board centered on
how the incumbent supervisors had handled the issues on the growth. The challengers argued
that growth had not been properly managed with negative ramifications, for instance, on the
county's natural environment, traffic levels, tax rates, and development design. The outcome of
the election was the replacement of five of the incumbent members. Dawson credited their
defeats to "failing to convince voters that growth control could be accomplished only at a price -
higher taxes, denser development patterns, or perhaps both. . ." (Dawson 1977: 26). The new
board consisted of eight Democrats and one Republican. While growth management candidates
were elected, it is important to point out that their victories were not landslides of support for
putting an end to development in the county. Out of the thousands of votes cast in their
respective districts, the margins of victory in some cases were a few hundred votes, but also as
small as six votes (Dawson 1977). No matter the size of their victory, however, the new Board
started in January 1972 to implement their attempts at controlling the county's growth. Their
growth management efforts were focused on sewer capacity and rezoning applications.
The newly elected Board decided to try to control the county's growth by a manipulation of
sewer capacity allocation. At first, the county changed course by not following the existing
policy where available sewer capacity was allocated to developers on a "first-come, first-served"
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basis (Dawson 1977). The courts, however, did not uphold the county's refusal to allocate sewer
taps. In Alexander Feldman v. Board of Supervisors (Cir. Ct. of Fairfax County, Law No. 29409,
1973), the judge ruled that the county was not operating under the police powers justification of
protecting general welfare, but rather the unjustified practice of growth control. The Board of
Supervisors were not be deterred from their growth management efforts. In Camelot Builders,
Inc. v. Board of Supervisors (Cir. Ct. of Fairfax County, Chancery No. 38968, 1973), the
county's second effort at a sewer moratorium was more successful, but geographically limited in
its impact. The limitation stemmed from its restriction to only the one sewer shed where the
moratorium could be upheld on the grounds of pollution control, i.e. protection of public welfare,
rather than growth control. Growth management in the form of sewer moratoria was heavily
opposed by the development community. In addition to the cases above, there were at least four
other cases filed against the county.29
Besides the legal challenges, the sewer moratoria may not have been the county's best growth
management strategy because of its unintended consequences. Rather than chasing developers
away from the county, the moratoria intensified their efforts to take advantage of the windows of
development opportunity that were still open in the county. So there was a rush by developers to
have their projects vested and construction started to gain the right to a portion of the available
sewer capacity. In some cases, these efforts were done prematurely. A surge in permit requests
accompanied the sewer moratoria rather than a decline. Another effect of the moratoria was an
increase in development in areas with septic tanks. Because a developer could not have the same
level of density on a lot served by a septic tank as opposed to sewer service, the resulting
development pattern was one of large lots. The county attempted to counter this new
development with changes to the subdivision ordinance regulations on the required size of septic
tank fields and pumping of waste disposal. Despite their continued efforts to slow development,
Dawson writes, "[b]ut again, this amendment did not stop or even slow development, but rather
spread it less densely and more widely over the developable land" (Dawson 1977: 27).
In tandem with the sewer moratoria, the Board of Supervisors resorted to a multi-month zoning
moratorium in early 1972. Their rationale for the halt to zoning decisions was to allow the
county's planning staff time to develop a new comprehensive growth plan for the county. Again
as with the sewer moratoria, the court system on behalf of the development community ruled the
zoning moratorium invalid. 30 The argument made by the plaintiff which was actually twelve
different cases that had been merged into one was that the county had violated their due process
29 The additional cases are Levin Const. Co. v. Board of Supervisors (Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Law No.
29201), Edsall Interchange Investments, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors (Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Chancery N.
38978, 1974), Gulf Reston, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors (Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Chancery No. 38421,
1974), Chantilly Development Corporation, et al. v. Board of Supervisors (Circuit Court of Fairfax County,
Chancery No. 43235, 1975), Langley Development Corporation, et al. v. Board of Supervisors (Circuit Court of
Fairfax County, Chancery No. 46273, 1976).
30 See Deluca Enterprises Inc. v. Board of County Supervisors (Cir. Ct. of Fairfax County, Chancery No. 37254,
1973).
94
by the denial of a chance to let their rezoning applications have the hearing entitled to them
under the U.S. and Virginia constitutions. As a result of the decision, while the county developed
its Five-Year County-wide Development Program, it had to keep in mind that rezoning
applications were being decided at the same time which may run contrary to their plans. Figure
5.1 shows that the number of rezoning applications submitted to the county remained at high
levels for most of the early 1970s. The court's decision also forced the county to begin to deal
with the backlog of rezoning applications which numbered around 300 cases in 1972 (Hazel
1976). The rezoning process was therefore in a state of disarray where a case could be deferred
for seven years and newer cases heard before older ones (Peters 1974). The county finally
established a zoning docket which required a minimum number of cases to be heard each month.
Plus, they had to be heard in the chronological order of their filing date (Peters 1974; Hazel
1976). Despite the court's refusal to uphold the zoning moratoria, the county showed the
extremes that it was willing to go in order to bring the level of growth under its direction.
Figure 5.1. Number of Rezoning Applications Submitted County-wide By Year for All Land-Use
Categories
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Source: Mastran, Shelley Smith. 1988. The Evolution of Suburban Nucleations: Land Investment Activity in Fairfax
County, Virginia, 1958-1977. Unpublished PhD Dissertation. University of Maryland.
While the court system had dealt severe blows to their chosen growth management tools, zoning
and sewer moratoria, the Board of Supervisors turned to another instrument which was outside of
the court's purview. Following the examples of previous boards, but at much more heightened
and strategic level, they used their administrative powers to target developers. Peters
characterized it as "the supervisors harassed developers that they could not vanquish" (Peters
1974: 52). Prior boards may have delayed a decision because they did not want to take a position
on a controversial case. Under the 1972 Board, delay was a tactic used to control development.
The court system had forced the supervisors to hear cases which they would do, but they would
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defer a decision for an indefinite period of time under the guise of the need for and demand of
additional information. In another delay tactic, the Board increased the amount of paperwork
needed to complete the development process, as well as, the number of reviews of construction
progress. The Board's subjected the development community to "an ordeal of trial by paper"
(Peters 1974: 53).
Prior to the election of the 1972 Board of Supervisors, the relationship between the development
community and the supervisors had been civil in nature. One might even argue that it was the
developers who were in charge of planning the county's future land use patterns. Peters (1974)
points to three trends over the 1960 to 1971 period that supports this argument. The first is that
without initiative from the development community, there would not have been a modernization
of what planning and zoning meant in the county. Second, the needs of the development
community drove updates in the comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance. Finally, the general
criteria for decisions on amendments to the zoning ordinance were subverted in favor of
proposals by the development community. Hazel described the attitude change among
developers as a move from "the prior reluctance of the development industry to become engaged
in protracted litigation with local authorities ... [to] the recognition that only by litigation would
the industry survive" (Hazel 1976: 9). The environment in the county was split between "[t]he
supervisors [who] saw developers as rapists of the land" and "the industry [who] claimed the
board wanted to quash the entrepreneurial spirit" (Peters 1974: 59). The voters of Fairfax County
would make the final decision on the victor with the Board of Supervisors elections scheduled
for November 1975. Given the amount of time until the elections, the two sides, however, could
not sit on the sidelines and wait each other out. The old adage of "time is money" hung over
everything and set up the opportunity for the two sides to work together to develop solutions to
some of their less controversial conflicts.
It was into this contentious environment that conditional zoning was introduced again. Under the
subject matter heading of "Planning and Community Development" for the county's proposed
1973 legislative program, conditional zoning occupied the top position out of thirteen subjects
which ranged from public facility holding zones to underground utilities to zoning hearing
examiner. The Board of Supervisors' November 1972 general background information packet for
their potential legislative program contended that "'conditioned' zoning May be permissible
under existing enabling legislation" (Acting County Executive 1972: 2). The county made the
decision to pursue the issue because "we believe a specific enabling provision should be
incorporated into the Virginia enabling legislation in order to avoid any question of its legality"
(Acting County Executive 1972: 2). Their conception of conditional zoning was still to resolve
the discrepancies between presentations of proposed development at public hearings and the
eventual construction of the development project. Insurance against deviations would be imposed
as conditions to the rezoning. At the November 6, 1972 meeting of the Board of Supervisors, the
legislation on conditional zoning was given the highest priority rating of "A".
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Fairfax County did reach out to other agents to garner their support for the effort to pass
conditional zoning authority legislation in the 1973 legislative session. The county's legislative
proposal had the support of the Virginia Municipal League (VML). In their 1972-1973
Preliminary Report of Legislative Committee of Virginia Municipal League, VML stated "[l]ocal
governments should be granted more flexibility and adaptability in guiding the physical and
human growth and development in their communities". In order to accomplish this, VML made
the recommendation to "[e]nable local governments to impose conditions for the re-zoning of a
parcel over and above those provided in the general regulations of the category to which the
parcel is to be re-zoned". During board meetings in November 1972, supervisors stressed the
importance of attendance at meetings for the Virginia Association of Counties (VaCO) and VML
to understand their legislative programs for the 1973 General Assembly session. Supervisors also
reached outside of VaCO and VML for support of their 1973 legislative package. During the
December 11, 1972 meeting, a motion was passed to organize a committee comprised of
"Virginia Society of Professional Engineers, members of the Northern Virginia Builders
Association, the Federal of Citizens Associations and other organizations, such as the Chamber
of Commerce" that could be used "to aid the Board in presenting its Legislative Package to the
General Assembly" (Board of Supervisors 1972: 175).
Their efforts to reach out to other agents provides evidence for the contention that Fairfax
County did not have enough influence on the legislative process on its own to ensure passage of
a conditional zoning bill. Further, county officials were even concerned about the loyalty of their
own elected representation in the state legislature to the county's legislative program. First, this
group of supervisors at the January 16, 1973 meeting brought up the issue that not all legislation
presented at the General Assembly that was related to Fairfax County was submitted to them
ahead of its introduction. The Board also stated at its January 22, 1973 meeting that it wanted to
be kept abreast of the voting record of Fairfax County's delegation in regard to the county's
legislative package. In particular, they wanted to know if the legislative members supported the
legislative package as proposed by the Board, i.e. the original wording. This level of vote
tracking would indicate that not all the legislative members who represented Fairfax County
citizens could be counted on to support the Board's legislative package.
AGENDA SETTING/ ALTERNATIVE SELECTION/ ENACTMENT
The tactics for the placement of conditional zoning on the legislative agenda of the 1970s
changed between the 1960s and the 1970s. Conditional zoning had to achieve passage on its own
merits as a land use regulation rather than as part of a land use regulatory package. In the 1968
legislation, Senate Bill 455 (SB 455), conditional zoning was lumped together with other land
use regulatory methods under a blanket authority bill. If the bill had passed, then the local
government was free to choose from a variety of land use regulations which ones that it wanted
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to adopt as part of its own zoning ordinance. In the 1970s, thirteen bills were introduced related
to conditional zoning (See Figure 5.2). Seven bills were enacted into law. Out of the seven bills,
there were two significant pieces of legislation that formed the foundation for subsequent
conditional zoning statutes - SB 637 in 1973 and HB 135 in 1978.
Figure 5.2. Conditional Zoning-Related Bills Introduced in General Assembly by Year of
Introduction and Status
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Source: Author's calculations based on Journal of the House of Delegates and Journal of the Senate.
One of the issues that conditional zoning had been proposed to solve was lack of consistency
between what was proposed in a plan and what was constructed in reality. This issue was
actually resolved separately from conditional zoning. For the 1972 legislative session, the Fairfax
County delegation to the General Assembly sponsored a series of bills related to issues raised in
the 1967 Zoning Procedures Study Committee (ZPSC) proposal. Some were successful and
others were not. House Bill 305 was enacted and addressed the problem of reality not matching
the visual images presented at the time of a rezoning hearing. Only applicable to a county which
had adopted an urban county form of government (Fairfax County), the bill stated "may provide
by ordinance for the use ofplans, profiles, elevations, and other such demonstrative materials in
the presentation of requests for amendments to the zoning ordinance and/or map, and may
provide for the manner and extent to which construction on the property which is subject of such
amendment shall conform to any such visual representations, and for the incorporation into the
zoning map ofnotice ofsuch required conformance" (HB 305). Thus an urban county now had
the power to force the constructed built environment to conform to the demonstrative materials.
With the passage of HB 305, the rationale for conditional zoning to progress along the political
process needed to go beyond its original justifications.
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While news accounts at the time focused on the legislation's original justifications, later
publications provided a different interpretation on the legislation's rationale and perhaps, the real
reason for the passage of the original conditional zoning statute in 1973. In a 1989 issue of
Planning in Virginia, Roger Snyder, Chief Executive Officer of the Northern Virginia Building
Industry Association (NVBIA), wrote of the legislation that it "was supported by county
lawmakers who sought the opportunity to negotiate the construction of or payment for public
infrastructure improvements with private developers since 'just saying no' to rezoning proposals
was not being supported in the courts. The building industry, on the other hand, saw this new
zoning process as a way to make county leaders 'offers they couldn't refuse" (Snyder 1989: 11).
Although the June 1991 issue of Virginia Business did report the history as stemming from the
broken pledges, the reporter wrote, "Virgina's proffer system began in Fairfax County in the
early 1970s as a means of assuring neighbors of proposed subdivisions and commercial projects
that developers would honor promises made during the heat of rezoning hearings" (Hardcastle
1991: 58). The voluntary idea stemmed from Virginia's tradition of property rights protection.
The article continued, "So local attorneys devised a concept they called 'proffers.' Given the
strong tradition of property rights in Virginia, they theorized that governments could not demand
concessions in return for rezoning. But an applicant could voluntarily agree to just about
anything" (Hardcastle 1991: 58). These publications from the late 1980s and early 1990s,
however, made no mention of conditional zoning's presence in the ZOSC's proposal in 1967 or
that both Montgomery County and Prince George's County in Maryland had made attempts at
gaining conditional zoning statutory authority prior to Fairfax.
1973 was the turning point in the conditional zoning saga. The piece of legislation authorizing
conditional zoning was presented, ordered printed in the Senate and referred to the Committee on
Local Government on January 10, 1973 as SB 637. The bill's chief patron was Senator Joseph V.
Gartlan, Jr., State Senator from Fairfax County and a Democrat. The bill was sponsored by four
additional senators - Brault, Duval, Hirst, and Waddell. Adelard L. Brault was the Senate
Majority Leader at the time and a Democrat from Fairfax. Clive L. Duval and Omer L. Hirst
were also members of the Fairfax County delegation and Democrats. Charles L. Waddell was a
Democrat senator from Loudoun County. The bill sought to amend § 15.1-491 of the Code of
Virginia with the addition of the words italicized below to the existing code:
"§ 15.1-491. Permitted provisions in ordinances; amendments.-A zoning
ordinance may include, among other things, reasonable regulations and
provisions as to any or all of the following matters:
(a) For variations in or exceptions to the general regulations in any district
in cases of unusual situations or to ease the transition from one district to
another or for buildings, structures or uses having special requirements,
and for the imposition by the governing body of reasonable conditions in
addition to those provided for in the general district regulations, when the
owner ofproperty seeks to have the ordinance amended to place his
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property in such district and such conditions are imposed with such owner's
express consent and are incorporated in and made a part of such amendment."
This section of the code then continued for an additional seven subsections. In the original
version of the bill, there was no use of the term, conditional zoning, and no geographic limitation
on which localities were eligible to add this wording to their ordinances. By the time, SB 637
made its way out of committee and back to the floor of the Senate to be read and voted on, the
wording of the legislation had changed in its application and eligibility. On January 30, 1973, the
agreed upon committee amendment, detailed below, was read on the Senate floor. All of the
language of the original bill had been stricken and replaced, starting after "requirements" with:
", and for the adoption, in counties wherein the urban county executive
form of government is in effect as a part of an amendment to the zoning
map of reasonable conditions, in addition to the regulations provided for
the zoning district by the ordinance, when such conditions shall have been
proffered in writing, in advance of the public hearing required by § 15.1-493
by the owner of the property which is the subject of the proposed zoning map
amendment." (Journal of the Senate 1973: 200)
With the new wording, conditional zoning would be restricted to, at the time, Fairfax County
because it was the only county in Virginia classified as "urban county executive." In addition,
the term, "proffered" from which proffers was derived was introduced to the lexicon of the
debate. Finally, the use of "reasonable conditions" harkens back to the discussion in Chapter 2 of
what constitutes "reasonableness" in terms of land use regulations.
On January 31, 1973, the bill passed the Senate on a vote of 36-1. The next step was to achieve
passage in the House of Delegates. The bill began its path through the House on February 1st
where on February 2 2 "d it was up before the House floor and an amendment was offered to
slightly alter the wording by the insertion of "at or" after the word "writing" to read: "writing, at
or in advance of the public hearing." The amendment was agreed to and the bill passed the
House 64-12. The passage of this amendment meant that proffers could be now be voluntarily
offered at the public hearing for the rezoning application rather than just in advance of it as
allowed by the Senate version of the bill. The Senate under motion of the bill's chief patron,
Senator Gartlan, rejected the amended House version 37-0 on February 2 3rd. Upon learning the
news of the Senate vote, Delegate Moss who was a member of the Fairfax delegation made a
motion for the House to drop its amendment and the members of the House agreed to do so.
Finally, on March 13, 1973, SB 637 was signed into law by the Speaker of the House of
Delegates and approved by the Governor on March 15th to become Chapter 286 of the Acts of
the Assembly of 1973. Conditional zoning gained a legal toehold in Virginia.
Today, there is no one reliable source to explain the path of the conditional zoning legislation
from its mention at the November 6, 1972, Board of Supervisors meeting to approval by the
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Governor on March 15, 1973. The House of Delegates and Senate Journals provide only a
minimal record of the bill's progress through the General Assembly recording only floor votes,
amendment changes, etc. There is no written transcription of committee debates or floor debates.
Video recordings of floor activity did not begin until the 1982 and then only in the House of
Delegates. As a result, there is no primary source to refer to in order to figure out why certain
political outcomes like the amendments occurred. Interviews were conducted of individuals
mentioned in various publications as participants in the conditional zoning history or identified
by others as individuals who may have had some knowledge of its history. Important players
included Allan C. Hubbard, Assistant County Attorney in Fairfax, John Tilghman Hazel, Jr., a
land use attorney and future developer in Fairfax, William P. Croom, executive vice-president of
the Northern Virginia Builders Association, and Senator Joseph V. Gartlan, Jr., State Senator
from Fairfax County and a Democrat. I was able to speak via phone with Hubbard, Hazel, and
31Senator Gartlan who actually passed away a few weeks after our brief phone conversation.
Given that the events happened more than thirty years ago and the age of the interviewees,
ranging from late fifties to early eighties, the interviews do not provide a complete picture of the
process. Thus any determination of which agent(s) were responsible for the changes in SB 637
must be made based upon the reporting of secondary sources and the recollections of important
players involved in its legislative process.
The original wording of SB 637 reflected the interests of local governments. It had been drafted
by Allan C. Hubbard, Assistant County Attorney in Fairfax, and the county's lobbyist for the
1973 General Assembly session. Although the legislation was patronized by the Fairfax County
delegation in the Senate, the original draft granted the authority to any local government with a
zoning ordinance. The bill also gave local governments the right to impose the conditions on the
rezoning application. A local government would have to have the agreement of the applicant to
impose the conditions, but it is the government officials who come up with the conditions. If this
version of the bill had passed, it would have provided evidence that local governments could get
their own bills enacted as state statutes. SB 637 was first amended according to a Washington
Post article from February 4, 1973 because the development community opposed the original
wording. The author reported that after originally opposing the conditional zoning legislation,
Northern Virginia Builders Association (NVBA) threw their support behind the legislation after
the bill was amended to reflect their desired wording (Bredemeier 1973). The development
community's opposition was spearheaded by William P. Croom, executive vice-president of the
NVBA. The 1973 legislative session was the first year that the NVBA sent a lobbyist to the
General Assembly in a full-time capacity. Croom was the individual selected to fill that role.
Kenneth Bredemeier writes, "Among the bills that county supervisors (Fairfax) particularly
want-and the builders' group particularly doesn't want-are measures calling for: Conditional
31 Senator Gartlan passed away on July 18, 2008. 1 tried to find the contact information for Mr. Croom in order to
arrange an interview. However, during the course of another interview when I inquired if the interviewee knew a
way to contact Mr. Croom, I was informed that he was deceased.
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land zoning that would permit supervisors to set conditions, with the agreement of the builder, on
specific amenities to be included in a proposed development. 'We feel it's legalized blackmail,'
said Croom (lobbyist for NVBA). (After suggesting a change in the wording of the provision, but
not its meaning, Croom supported the county's request and a Senate committee reported the bill
to the floor)" (Bredemeier 1973). In a discussion about the changes, which he characterized as
"interesting", Hubbard agreed that any amendments to the bill could be attributed to efforts by
the builders' association to lobby for corrections. So there would have been some level of horse
trading done to make the bill acceptable to them.
The role of "mediator" between local government and development community interests in
revisions to SB 637 was played by John Tilghman Hazel, Jr., a land use attorney and future
developer in Fairfax County. Although news accounts from 1973 do not mention his
involvement, later publications have hailed him as "the father of the proffer system" whether this
pertains to the state level legislative authority or the development of Fairfax's own proffer
system, it is unclear (McAllister 1985). In 1991, a reporter for Virginia Business wrote of
Hazel's involvement, "Fairfax County couldn't make a move without the General Assembly's
permission, so local officials turned to developer Til Hazel to sell the idea in Richmond. 'My
colleagues thought I was crazy,' Hazel recalls. 'Coming up with the theory of conditional zoning
was treasonous as far as they were concerned"' (Hardcastle 1991: 58). It was through Hazel's
efforts that the bill was able to make its way out of the Senate committee. He was responsible for
the introduction of the notion that it would be the rezoning applicants who would voluntarily
offer conditions to the local government to attach to their rezoning application, i.e. proffered
conditions. Hazel made clear that even though he was chosen to lobby the bill through the
General Assembly, he would have opposed any changes that made the nature of conditional
zoning involuntary, as well as, created allowances for cash payments. Croom and Hazel were
friends, in addition to Croom's wife's employment as a real estate paralegal at Hazel's law firm
for several years. Further, Hazel emailed that "Bill, as most of the development/building
industry, was reluctant to provide any authority to the county to demand proffers" (John T.
Hazel, Jr. July 24, 2008, e-mail message to author). Hazel believed that his influence played a
role in the persuasion of "Bill to accept the legislation without opposition in the General
Assembly where he was a very good lobbyist" (John T. Hazel, Jr. July 24, 2008, e-mail message
to author).
The selection of Hazel in this key role was interesting because he was at that time the legal
representation for several developers in their lawsuits against the county for its decisions on
rezoning applications. At the same time, he was a member of the ZPSC which had proposed the
idea of conditional zoning for Fairfax County in the first place. Thus he occupied a unique
position as someone who had clearly represented the interests of the development community,
but now recognized the importance of the passage of the conditional zoning bill for the county.
Hazel also acknowledged that his involvement was important because of his ability to connect
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with legislators outside of Northern Virginia. This bond centered around his ties to the Byrd
political organization, which basically ran Virginia politics and its Democratic party from 1920s
to 1980s (Grubisich 1975). His ties gave him a way to relate to the rest of the legislators rather
than being considered as some stranger from Northern Virginia. In a May 11, 1985 Washington
Post article, the reporter wrote, "According to Hazel, the proffer system is legal under legislation
enacted by Virginia in the mid-1970s after intense lobbying in the days 'when Fairfax wasn't
allowed in the state capitol building"' (McAllister 1985).
While the first amendment can be viewed as a win for the development community, the second
amendment was not as successful. It is clear from the evidence above that the first amendment
was done to satisfy the concerns of the development community. For the second amendment, the
path of influence is uncertain. From the date of the newspaper article, February 4, 1973, Croom
confirmed that the development community now supported SB 637, so the second amendment
which was introduced on February 2 2 "d was unnecessary if it was being done in order to garner
further support from the development community. The amendment could be interpreted as
favorable to the development community because it would give them two opportunities to
proffer conditions with their rezoning application either before the meeting or at the meeting. If
the mood of the Board of Supervisors at a hypothetical meeting seemed to be leaning in favor of
rejecting an application, this amendment would have allowed the applicant the opportunity to try
to come up with a series of conditions which may change rejection votes into approval votes.
While the amendment seemed to be a simple enough change or in Hubbard's words, "a tweak,"
he said that it would have the effect of "gutting the bill" (Hubbard 2008).
The amendment was offered by Delegate David A. Sutherland, a Republican who represented
Fairfax County in the House of Delegates which normally might signal that the local government
supported this amendment. This contention is thrown into question because I earlier
acknowledged that the Board of Supervisors had concerns about legislation being introduced that
affected Fairfax County which they did not support. Furthermore, Hubbard remembered this
amendment and the "drama" it created in the push for final passage of the bill (Hubbard 2008).
The situation was such that it left him with the impression that it was a "close call" in the
passage of the bill by both legislative bodies (Hubbard 2008). Gartlan opposed the amendment,
but found out too late about it to stop the House's passage of it. Hubbard recalled that during the
House vote, there was whispering of "bad bill" among the House members, but the vote was
already occurring, so there were not enough "No" votes to stop it (Hubbard 2008). Gartlan made
sure that the amended version failed to pass the Senate. Another Republican delegate from
Fairfax County, William H. Moss, Sr., after hearing of the Senate vote, moved that the
amendment be dropped and it was agreed to, so the version of the conditional zoning bill that
first passed the Senate is what was enacted into law.
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The passage of SB 637 was not a clear-cut victory for either interest group in the political
process. While Fairfax County was the only local government to receive the authority to engage
in conditional zoning which was not the original intent of the legislation, all local governments
did win, in that there was now a conditional zoning state statute. In addition, the second
amendment was defeated. For the development community, they were able to prevent the
establishment of statewide conditional zoning authority. This is conjecture on my part, based on
the fact that the restriction to Fairfax County arose out of the first amendment for which the
development community lobbied. In fact, the eligibility limitation could have been the idea of
other legislators who would only allow the bill to pass out of committee if it did not apply
statewide. There was a division between Fairfax County and the rest of the state regarding the
passage of legislation key to assisting Fairfax with its growth issues. In a March 11, 1974
Washington Post article, Delegate Wyatt B. Durrette Jr, a Republican representing part of
Fairfax, was quoted as saying, "I think most members of the General Assembly wish that
Northern Virginia were not part of the Commonwealth" (Nicol 1974). Senator Clive L. Duval, a
Democrat from Fairfax, said, "We're facing rapid development and we're coming up with things
they (downstate legislators) think are innovative or pie in the sky" (Bredemeier 1973). Delegate
Vincent F. Callahan, Jr., a Republican from Fairfax, echoed Duval in saying, "Much of the
legislation requested by the Fairfax supervisors was 'too radical for the heavily rural and
conservative legislature" (Nicol 1974). Most importantly, the development community turned
conditional zoning from a concept where the local government imposed conditions with the
approval of the rezoning applicant, to the applicants voluntarily offering conditions to the local
government with their application. Voluntary nature, one of Virginia's conditional zoning
statutes' distinguishing features, was the result of the political process.
After the fight to get a conditional zoning statute in the state code, the remainder of the
conditional zoning bills introduced in the 1970s focused on expansion of the eligibility criteria.
The expansion fight ranged from efforts for a single county to whole groups of localities to
statewide. Not a single bill was introduced that would have further restricted eligibility, but then
neither were all of the bills enacted. Figure 4.2 showed that out of the twelve conditional zoning
bills introduced after 1973, six were enacted into law. With the exception of HB 840 in 1976 and
HB 135 in 1978, successful eligibility expansion bills could be characterized as ones that focused
their effort on the Northern Virginia region.
The first expansion of conditional zoning eligibility was in 1975 with the passage of HB 1398
allowing "towns therein which have planning commissions" to be eligible to perform conditional
zoning. This language applied only to those towns with a planning commission in a county with
an urban county executive form of leadership. The number of eligible local governments
increased from Fairfax County alone to include the county's three incorporated towns-Clifton,
Herndon, and Vienna. 1976 represented a real expansion of conditional zoning power in
Virginia. In three separate pieces of passed legislation, the ability to zone conditionally was
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extended to "a city completely surrounded by such a county" (urban county executive form) [HB
1185]; "a county contiguous to any such county" (urban county executive form) [HB 487]; and
"the counties east ofthe Chesapeake Bay" [HB 840]. The number of eligible localities increased
from four (Fairfax County and its three towns) to eleven (Fairfax County and its three towns,
Loudoun County, Prince William County, Arlington County, Accomack County, Northampton
County, and the cities of Falls Church and Fairfax). § 15.1-491(a) was successfully modified
again in 1978 by HB 173 to include "a city completely surrounded by such a contiguous county"
which expanded the number of eligible localities to fourteen with the additions of the cities of
Alexandria, Manassas, and Manassas Park.
Out of the § 15.1-491(a) expansion bills that were enacted into law, only two bills (HB 487 in
1976 and HB 173 in 1978) were amended during the course of the legislative process. Table 4.2
shows the conditional zoning bills for the 1970s that were amended along with their
original/amended/passed language. The fact that these two bills only successfully passed both
houses after being amended, suggests that certain agents involved in the political process would
not have supported their passage without the amendments. Neither bill, however, received press
coverage, so it is unclear who the influential agents were. All of the patrons were Democrats, so
the political party in the role of agent is not an explanation for the amendments. HB 487 had five
patrons - 3 from the Loudoun and Prince William County area and 2 patrons from
Charlottesville and Albemarle County region. Originally, this bill was an effort to expand
conditional zoning not only further within the Northern Virginia region, but also extend it to
jurisdictions in the western part of the state. Specifically, the bill would have allowed counties
under the "county executive" form of government to be eligible to engage in conditional zoning.
Prince William and Albemarle are the only counties in the state with this form. Although HB 487
made it out of the Committee on Counties, Cities and Towns, the vote was 9-4-2 which may
have been closer than some of its patrons wanted and perhaps, signaled that it may face a
difficult floor vote. The first amendment was actually offered by one of the bill's patrons,
Delegate Floyd C. Bagley (D) of Prince William County. His amendment, in effect, opened up
eligibility to those counties contiguous to Albemarle and Prince William County, but actually,
removed those local governments with a "county executive" from eligibility. There was a
procedural maneuver by Delegate Robert E. Washington (D) of Norfolk to send the bill back to
committee based on this amendment and continue it to the 1977 session. His maneuver was
rejected and the House passed the bill 94-2 with one of the "No" votes coming from Washington.
In the Senate, HB 487 was amended again with an amendment from Senator Charles L. Waddell
(D) of Loudoun County. Waddell's amendment eliminated any language related to "county
executive" local governments and focused contiguousness on proximity to "urban county
executive" counties. Eligibility expansion no longer reached to the western part of the state and
was consolidated around the Northern Virginia region. The bill in its amended form passed the
Senate 30-7. The House passed the Senate's amended version 72-2.
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HB 173 did not have as many twists and turns in its progression toward passage in 1978 that HB
487 had in 1976, but it shared several similarities outside of its amended status. First, it was
introduced by three of the same patrons as HB 487 - Bagley (D), Bell (D), and Brickley (D) of
the Prince William and Loudoun county area. Second, its original wording tried to extend
eligibility again to the "county executive" form of government. Given the eligibility language
statutes passed in 1976, the passage of HB 173 in its original wording would have extended
conditional zoning authority to the western part of the state, as well as, further south. More than
the three localities added to the eligibility list under the bill's enacted language would have been
added with the original language. The bill did not encounter any difficulties in the Committee on
Counties, Cities and Towns where it passed on a vote of 13-0. The House of Delegates sent it on
to the Senate via a vote of 90-6. Because the Senate amended HB 173 while it was in the Local
Government Committee, there is no written record to explain why the bill's language was
changed from one that dealt with eligibility criteria for counties, to cities. The amendment did
not prompt any debate in the Senate where the amendments were approved by a vote of 32-0 and
the amended bill passed 33-2. There was even less opposition in the House for the amended
version compared to the original version as evidenced by the 75-1 vote. Finally, with its passage,
HB 173 further consolidated conditional zoning eligibility to the Northern Virginia region.
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Table 5.1. Conditional Zoning Legislation with Amendments by Year
Bill Number Original Wording Amendment(s) Passed Wording
(Legislative
Session)
Senate Bill 637 , andfor the imposition by the , and for the imposition by the , and for the adoption, in , and for the adoption, in
(1973) governing body ofreasonable geverning body of reasonable counties wherein urban counties wherein the urban
conditions in addition to those eonditions in addition to those county executive form of county executive form of
providedfor in the general provided for in the general distr government is in effect, as a government is in effect as a
district regulations, when the regulations, when the owner o part of an amendment to the part of an amendment to the
owner ofpropery seeks to property seeks to havethe zoning map of reasonable zoning map of reasonable
have the ordinance amended to ordinance amended to place his conditions, in addition to the conditions, in addition to the
place his property in such prFoperty in such distfict and such regulations provided for the regulations provided for the
district and such conditions conditions are imposed with such zoning district by ordinance, zoning district by the
are imposed with such owner's owner's express consent and are when such conditions shall ordinance, when such
express consent and are incorporated in and made a part o have been proffered in conditions shall have been
incorporated in and made a such amendment. the adoption, in writing, at or in advance of proffered in writing, in
part ofsuch amendment. counties wherein urban county the public hearing required by advance of the public hearing
executiveform ofgovernment is in 15.1-493 by the owner of the required by 15.1-493 by the
effect, as a part of an amendment to property which is the subject owner of the property which is
the zoning map ofreasonable of the proposed zoning map the subject of the proposed
conditions, in addition to the amendment. zoning map amendment.
regulations provided for the zoning
district by ordinance, when such
conditions shall have been
proffered in writing, in advance of
the public hearing required by
15.1-493 by the owner of the
property which is the subject of the
proposed zoning map amendment.
House Bill 487 , and for the adoption, in , and for the adoption, in counties, , and for the adoption, in , and for the adoption, in
(1976) counties, or towns therein or towns therein which have counties, or towns therein counties, or towns therein
which have planning planning commissions, wherein the which have planning which have planning
commissions, wherein the county executive count" form ot commissions, wherein the commissions, wherein the
county executiveform of goveRnent-or-the urban county urban county executive form urban county executive form of
government or the urban executive form of government is in of government is in effect, of government is in effect, or in a
county executive form of effect, or in a county contiguous to in a county contiguous to such county contiguous to any such
government is in effect such a county wherein the county a county wherein the count county
executive form of government is in executive from of government
effect is-in-effeet, or in a county
contiguous to any such
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House Bill 135
(1978)
. . . It is the purpose of 15.1-
491.1 through 15.1-491.4 to
provide a more flexible and
adaptable zoning method to
cope with situations found in
such zones through conditional
zoning, whereby a zoning
reclassification may be
allowed subject to certain
conditions proffered by the
zoning applicant for the
protection of the community
that are not generally
applicable to land similarly
zoned.
15.1-491.6. Amendments and
variations of conditions.-
There shall be no amendment
or variation of conditions
created pursuant to the
provisions of 15.1-491.2 until
after a public hearing before
the governing body advertised
pursuant to the provisions of
15.1-431.
... It is the purpose of 15.1-491.1
through 15.1-491.4 to provide a
more flexible and adaptable zoning
method to cope with situations
found in such zones through
conditional zoning, whereby a
zoning reclassification may be
allowed subject to certain
conditions proffered by the zoning
applicant for the protection of the
community that are not generally
applicable to land similarly zoned.
[The provisions of this section and
the following five sections shall not
be used for the purpose of
discrimination in housing.]
15.1-491.6. Amendments and
variations of conditions,-There
shall be no amendment or variation
of conditions created pursuant to
the provisions of 15.1-491.2 until
after a public hearing before the
governing body advertised pursuant
to the provisions of 15.1-431. [2.
That the provisions of this act shall
not be effective as to those
counties, cities or towns specified
in paragraph of (a) of 15.1-491
unless and until adopted in whole
or in part by amendment of the
zoning ordinance.]
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15.1-491.6. Amendments and
variations of conditions.-
There shall be no amendment
or variation of conditions
created pursuant to the
provisions of 15.1-491.2 until
after a public hearing before
the governing body advertised
pursuant to the provisions of
15.1-431. [2. That the
provisions of this act shall not
be effective as to those
counties, cities or towns
specified in paragraph of (a)
of 15.1-491 unless and until
adopted in whole or in part by
amendment of the zoning
ordinance.] The provisions of
this act are permissive and
shall not be construed to limit
or restrict the powers
otherwise granted to any
county, city or town, nor to
affect the validity of any
ordinance adopted by any
such county, city or town
which would be valid without
regard to this act.
__ I I_ 1county, I
... It is the purpose of 15.1-
491.1 through 15.1-491.4 to
provide a more flexible and
adaptable zoning method to
cope with situations found in
such zones through conditional
zoning, whereby a zoning
reclassification may be allowed
subject to certain conditions
proffered by the zoning
applicant for the protection of
the community that are not
generally applicable to land
similarly zoned. The
provisions of this section and
the following five sections
shall not be used for the
purpose of discrimination in
housing.
15.1-491.6. Amendments and
variations of conditions.-
There shall be no amendment
or variation of conditions
created pursuant to the
provisions of 15.1-491.2 until
after a public hearing before
the governing body advertised
pursuant to the provisions of
15.1-431.
2. That the provisions of this
act shall not be effective as to
those counties, cities or towns
specified in paragraph of (a) of
15.1-491 unless and until
adopted in whole or in part by
amendment of the zoning
ordinance. The provisions of
this act are permissive and
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shall not be construed to limit
or restrict the powers otherwise
granted to any county, city or
town, nor to affect the validity
of any ordinance adopted by
any such county, city or town
which would be valid without
regard to this act.
House Bill 173 , and for the adoption, in , and for the adoption, in counties, , and for the adoption, in
(1978) counties, or towns therein or towns therein which have counties, or towns therein
which have planning planning commissions, wherein the which have planning
commissions, wherein the urban county executive er-eeunty commissions, wherein the
urban county executive or exeeutive form of government is in urban county executive form of
county executive form of effect, or in a city completely government is in effect, or in a
government is in effect, or in a surrounded by such a county, or in city completely surrounded by
city completely surrounded by a county contiguous to any such such a county, or in a county
such a county, or in a county county, or in a city completely contiguous to any such county,
contiguous to any such county, surrounded by such a contiguous or in a city completely
and in the counties east of the county, and in the counties east of surrounded by such a
Chesapeake Bay the Chesapeake Bay contiguous county, and in the
counties east of the
Chesapeake Bay
Despite their lack of amendment(s) status upon passage, there was opposition to the enactment of
HB 1398, HB 1185, and HB 840 in both legislative bodies. While HB 1398 passed the Senate on
vote of 40-0, the House vote was 89-2 with dissent coming from delegates in Chesapeake and
Richmond. HB 1185 received the most opposition with a vote of 7-4-3 to move out of the
Committee on Counties, Cities and Towns and passage votes of 78-12 and 29-9 in the House and
Senate, respectively. Although HB 840 advanced out of committee on a vote of 15-1, it still
recorded votes of 78-14 in the House and 34-3 in the Senate. Opposition to these bills, as well as,
HB 487 and HB 173 came from a geographically diverse set of legislators, but certain legislators
voted against more than one of the bills. There was a mixture of Democrats, Republicans, and
Independents. In addition, legislators who registered opposition were from counties, as well as,
cities. The only bill where opposition came from the Northern Virginia delegation was HB 840
which extended eligibility outside of Northern Virginia to the counties in the Eastern Shore
region. The lack of support from members of the Northern Virginia area may be an early sign of
their reluctance to expand conditional zoning authority outside of their region without assurances
that they receive something in return.
The conditional zoning legislative failures of the 1970s share a common feature. All six bills
never achieved a final vote for passage on the floor of either legislative body. Any assessment of
what influence(s) may have led to this result must be based solely upon the language of the bills.
Five out of the six bills never made it out of committee, so there are no committee records
available to indicate what agent interactions may have taken place. The bills, shown in Table 4.3,
were split evenly between the House of Delegates and the Senate. Besides the commonality of
being legislature failures, all of the bills aimed to expand conditional zoning to local
governments outside of the Northern Virginia region. Perhaps, this shared trait was their
legislative downfall. Four of the bills were specifically written to extend eligibility to one local
government. Three bills out of the four attempted with various word orders to gain the authority
for Chesterfield County which is located along the western border of the state's capital city -
Richmond. Another one would have extended eligibility to Roanoke County, which surrounds
Roanoke City, the largest city in the southwestern area of the state. The failure of these four bills
is evidence that even though an individual local government may want a certain bill passed, their
need is not always enough of an impetus for a legislature to act. The other two bills attempted to
extend conditional zoning eligibility statewide with the removal of any statutory language tied to
the "urban county executive" form of government restriction. SB 155 in 1976 bill applied to any
county, city, and town with a planning commission while 1977's SB 871 was even less
restrictive by allowing any county or municipality to adopt conditional zoning. Despite their
status as legislative failures, SB 155 and SB 871 gave legislators the opportunity to grow more
comfortable with the notion of statewide conditional zoning authority. This sense of fostering a
familiarity over time with an issue that some consider controversial or unpopular, is important
with a legislative body that has the reputation of being conservative and slow to respond.
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Table 5.2 Conditional Zoning Legislative Failures in the 1970s
Bill Number
(Legislative Patron(s) Legislative Language Outcome
Session)
Senate Bill Gray, F.T. , and for the adoption in counties, or towns therein Indefinitely Passed
636 (1976) which have planning commissions, wherein the by Committee on
urban county executive form of government is in Local Government
effect, or in a city completely surrounded by such a in 1977
county, or in a county contiguous to any such
county, in Chesterfield County and in the counties
east of the Chesapeake Bay
House Bill Jones, G.W. , and for the adoption in counties, or towns therein Referred to
1594 (1977) which have planning commissions, wherein the Committee on
urban county executive form of government is in Counties, Cities
effect, or in a city completely surrounded by such a and Towns
county, or in a county contiguous to any such
county, and in the counties east of the Chesapeake
Bay, or in Chesterfield County
House Bill McMurtrie and , and for the adoption in counties, or towns therein Passed by
1141(1978) Jones, G.W. which have planning commissions, wherein the Indefinitely
urban county executive form of government is in
effect, or in a city completely surrounded by such a
county, or in a county contiguous to any such
county, or in Chesterfield County and in the
counties east of the Chesapeake Bay
House Bill Cranwell and , and for the adoption in counties, or towns therein Referred to
1529 (1977) Robrecht which have planning commissions, wherein the Committee on
urban county executive form of government is in Counties, Cities
effect, or in a city completely surrounded by such a and Towns
county, or in a county contiguous to any such
county, and in the counties east of the Chesapeake
Bay, or in Roanoke County
Senate Bill Colgan, , and for the adoption, in counties, cities or towns Referred to
155 (1976) Gartlan, and therein which have planning commissions, whereim Committee on
Waddell the urban county executive form of goverment is Local Government
in-effeet
Senate Bill Gartlan , and for the adoption in counties, or tons th Referred to
871 (1977) which have plaing comm is, wherein Committee on
urban county executive form of goverment is in Local Government
effect, or in a city completely surrFounded by sucha
county, or in a county contiguous to any such
county, and in the counties east of the Chesapeake
Bay any county or municipality
Passage of HB 135 in 1978 represented the second turning point in the conditional zoning
legislative history in 1970s. Its significance stems from the creation of a new form or system of
conditional zoning applicable to the whole state with a different section number (§ 15.1-491.1).
Thus it is not found statutorily with the existing system authorized in 1973. As will be later
discussed in the Implementation subsection of this section, HB 135 was a bill influenced by the
concerns of both local governments and the development community after SB 637 was enacted.
Some would argue that the development community and the court system had the largest amount
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of influence because HB 135 provided a specific definition 32 for conditional zoning, the
legislature's intent and findings for conditional zoning, guidelines for what could and could not
be a reasonable condition, as well as, enforcement and record keeping. Brown and Shilling
(1981) write, "a review of the Virginia statute, in comparison with the experience of conditional
zoning in other states, reveals that the General Assembly incorporated provisions into the
Virginia statute which obviate many of the problems encountered in other states" (133). The
1978 Virginia Law Review echoed those sentiments, stating, "Virginia's new conditional zoning
provision establishes the state as one of the few jurisdictions to codify conditional zoning and as
the only state to do so in a comprehensive fashion" (1497).
While the Northern Virginia legislative delegation, particularly the members in the Senate, had
patronized the earlier efforts at statewide expansion of conditional zoning, HB 135's patrons
represented a cross-section of the state. They included for example Delegate C. Richard
Cranwell (D) from the Roanoke area, Delegate C. D. Dunford (D) from Tazewell County along
the southern border of West Virginia, and also Delegate Robert E. Washington (D) from the city
of Norfolk. In having representation from both counties and cities, this bill showed its
importance to urban, suburban, and rural interests. There was a clear effort to gain broad-based
support for the bill. A surprising move by the bill's patrons was the section describing the
legislative intent and findings for conditional zoning. The Virginia General Assembly is known
for keeping the intent of legislation guarded. Section § 15.1-491.1 as introduced read:
"It is the general policy of the Commonwealth in accordance with the
provisions of§ 15.1-489 to provide for the orderly development of land,
for all purposes, through zoning and other land development legislation.
Frequently, where competing and incompatible uses conflict, traditional
zoning methods and procedures are inadequate. In these cases, more
flexible and adaptable zoning methods are needed to permit differing land
uses ad the same time to recognize effects ofchange. It is the purpose of
§§ 15.1-491.1 through 15.1-491.4 to provide a more flexible and adaptable
zoning method to cope with situations found in such zones through
conditional zoning, whereby a zoning reclassification may be allowed
subject to certain conditions proffered by the zoning applicant for the
protection of the community that are not generally applicable to land
similarly zoned"
The "intent" section addressed the issue of flexibility in zoning while the concept of voluntary
was reinforced.
12 § 15.1-430 (q) "Conditional zoning" means as part of classifying land within a governmental entity into areas
and districts by legislative action, the allowing ofreasonable conditions governing the use of such property, such
conditions being in addition to the regulations provided for by a particular zoning district or zone by the overall
zoning ordinance.
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HB 135 was not immune from amendments. There were actually three separate amendments to
the bill. However, none of the suggested changes altered the essence of the bill. The first
amendment came from the Committee on Counties, Cities and Towns. Their amendment
reinforced the notion of two separate conditional zoning systems. It stated, "[2. That the
provisions of this act shall not be effective as to those counties, cities or towns specified in
paragraph (a) of § 15.1-491 unless and until adopted in whole or in part by amendment of the
zoning ordinance,]." This amendment was meant to address any concerns that Northern Virginia
local governments, in particular Fairfax County, had about the loss of their existing conditional
zoning powers had under the existing system if a new system of conditional zoning was
approved by the legislature. A lobbyist from the Fairfax County Federation of Citizen
Associations made the point in the press that "we'll also be making sure that there is support in
Richmond for the continuation of conditional zoning" (Digilio 1978). The second amendment
was offered by Delegate Franklin P. Hall (D) of the city of Richmond and dealt with the notion
that conditional zoning would be used by local governments as a tool for housing discrimination.
His amendment read, "The provisions of this section and the following five sections shall not be
used for the purpose of discrimination in housing." Both House amendments were approved and
HB 135 passed the House on a vote of 91-4. In a move to further protect the existing conditional
zoning system, Senator Wiley F. Mitchell Jr. (R) of the city of Alexandria offered an amendment
to the already amended House version that stated, "The provisions of this act are permissive and
shall not be construed to limit or restrict the powers otherwise granted to any county, city or
town, nor to affect the validity of any ordinance adopted by such county, city or town which
would be valid without regard to this act." The Senate voted 37-0 to approve the amendment
followed by a vote of 39-0 to pass HB 135. The House approved the amended Senate version on
a vote of 89-3. With their passage of HB 135 and failure to repeal paragraph (a) of § 15.1-491,
the General Assembly set up two systems of conditional zoning. The first was very permissive
while the second was more restrictive. In the establishment of a two-party system of conditional
zoning, the General Assembly preordains a future showdown over cash proffers in 1989 where
the final votes for passage are much more divided than that of any 1970s conditional zoning bill.
As mentioned above, conditional zoning under § 15.1-491.1 was a more restrictive regime than
paragraph (a) of § 15.1-491. The increased level of restrictions was due to the influence of
representatives from the development community who were members of the legislative study
committee that drafted the legislation (Churn 1978). The restrictions were an attempt to reduce
what conditions localities allowed rezoning applicants to voluntarily offer under conditional
zoning which developers considered "legalized blackmail" (Bredemeier 1973). Under the new
system, proffered conditions must meet seven requirements in order to be considered in
accordance with the new statute other than just "reasonableness" requirement under paragraph
(a) of § 15.1-491. The seven are listed below:
"(i) the rezoning itself must give rise for the need for the conditions;
(ii) such conditions shall have a reasonable relation to the rezoning;
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(iii) such conditions shall not include a cash contribution to the county
or municipality;
(iv) such conditions shall not include mandatory dedication of real or
personal property for open space, parks, schools, fire departments or
other public facilities not otherwise providedfor in § 15.1-466 (f);
(v) such conditions shall not include payment for in § 15.1-466 (j);
(vi) no condition shall be proffered that is not related to the physical
development or physical operation of the property; and
(vii) all such conditions shall be in conformity with the comprehensive
plan as defined in § 15.1-466.1."
It is requirement (iii) not allowing cash contributions, also known as cash proffers, that becomes
the source of debate in 1989 because the fourteen eligible localities under paragraph (a) of §
15.1-491 can accept cash proffers from developers while the remainder of the state's localities
cannot. If a local government operated under paragraph (a) of § 15.1-491, there was no incentive
to amend its ordinance to switch to the restrictive regime of § 15.1-491.1.
In interviews, two participants in the legislative process of HB 135 expressed support for what
was finally passed by the General Assembly in 1978. John G. Kines, Jr, Planning and Zoning
Administrator for the Town of Culpeper and a member of the 1977 conditional zoning study
discussed in the next section, testified in 1978 at the committee hearing. He believed that part of
the successful passage of the bill was that the General Assembly at the time was in stronger
support of local governments than even possibly today. Furthermore, local governments were
able to get more of their voice heard because the lobbying by developers was not as strong.
Delegate Cranwell, one of the HB 135's patrons, felt that since the Senate Majority Leader at the
time, William B. Hopkins, was from Roanoke City, i.e. Cranwell's home territory, this was an
added assistance in the movement of the legislation through the Senate. As a local governmental
official, Kines did admit that conditional zoning "certainly could have been a greater tool"
(Kines 2008). Its ability to make an impact would have been improved by giving greater
authority to local governments to require more in exchange for development. The resulting
system in 1978 was a "compromise" (Kines 2008).
IMPLEMENTATION
The implementation of conditional zoning statutes by local governments had their first impact on
future conditional zoning legislation in 1977. Legislative failures in 1976 and 1977 to expand
conditional zoning across the state attracted enough attention to the issue which its supporters
actually called "contract zoning" that the House of Delegates' Committee on Counties, Cities
and Towns under the leadership of Delegate Orby L. Cantrell (D) from Wise County located in
the southwestern area of the state agreed to study the subject after the end of the 1977 legislative
session and before the 1978 session began. The goal of the committee was to determine how to
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make conditional zoning available statewide given a political climate that would not allow the
Northern Virginia style system everywhere. The subcommittee in charge of the study consisted
of eight members - five from the House of Delegates and three citizen members. The five
delegates represented a cross-section of the state, a mix of party affiliation, as well as, locality
type. The subcommittee was chaired by C. Richard Cranwell (D) who as stated earlier was
affiliated with Roanoke County. The remaining four members were Floyd C. Bagley (D) of
Prince William County, Clinton Miller (R) of Shenandoah County, Robert E. Washington (D) of
Norfolk, and C. D. Dunford (D) of Tazewell County. The citizen members were Gladys B.
Keating, Carl Bowmer, attorney for Virginia Homebuilders Association (VBA), and John G.
Kines, Jr, Planning and Zoning Administrator for the Town of Culpeper. Bowmer could be
characterized as the citizen member representing the interests of the development community
while Kines represented local government interests. From July 1 8th to July 2 1 st, the
subcommittee held public hearings in four locations across the state to gather public opinion on
their legislative proposal to expand conditional zoning in a more limited form to the rest of the
state. Hearings began in Roanoke followed by Fairfax and Richmond with the final one held in
Virginia Beach.
The three major issues at the hearings were expansion to the rest of the state; question of cash
contributions; and what would expansion of a restricted system mean for localities already using
conditional zoning. In their bid to determine whether expansion should be restrictive in nature,
the committee relied mainly on the experiences of two counties, Fairfax and Prince William, who
had adopted conditional zoning under the original system in 1975 and 1976, respectively.
Developers' experiences with these counties colored their opinion of whether conditional zoning
should be expanded to the rest of the state and in what form. Although developers felt that local
governments were excessive in their requirements, there was never any hard evidence of abuse
given to the committee rather just anecdotes. Furthermore, there were members on the
subcommittee who represented areas that did not have any zoning at all and were unfamiliar with
the concerns and issues being discussed at the hearings. These areas, in the southwestern section
of the state, were particularly hostile to the idea of conditional zoning for the simple reason that
they viewed any type of land use regulation as government intrusion. In my interview with
Kines, he recalled that the speakers could be broken down into three groups - local governments,
private citizens, and development industry. As to be expected, local governments were very
supportive of the effort at expansion. Northern Virginia local governments, however, did not
want to lose their original system. Additionally, the bill needed the support of the Northern
Virginia delegation if it would have any chance of passage in both houses, so the decision was
made to retain the separate system.
Private citizens who spoke tended to address environmental concerns and were largely
supportive. The majority of the development industry testified against the proposal. In their
opinion, the experience in Northern Virginia had not been productive. Although in my interview
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with Cranwell, he mentioned that the development industry's attitude to expansion changed
when three prominent developers stood up at one of the hearings and made the point in
Cranwell's words that "if a developer got up and said he was going to do something, then it
should be done period" (Cranwell 2008). These key developers also made the point that they
thought conditional zoning would increase their chances of getting zoning approvals. There was
a clear stance from the development industry against cash payment allowance in the expansion.
Cash may lead to the creation of an undue burden. A lot of the concern around financial
payments centered on the question of whether this would authorize the buying and selling of
rezonings. The voluntary nature of the system must remain.
In addition to input from various interest groups, the subcommittee took the steps to inquire from
the legal system about the constitutionality of a new system. Bagley wrote to the Virginia
Attorney General on whether "there is any constitutional impediment to the enactment of such
legislation and whether such a statute would survive a constitutional challenge" where the
legislation would be "a proposed statute which would enable all general purpose political
subdivisions to adopt 'conditional' or 'contract' zoning ordinances" (Commonwealth of Virginia
1978: 516). The Attorney General concluded in his July 28, 1977 letter response that there was
no such impediment if the statute is written with the guidelines that "it has a valid purpose,
establishes a reasonable method of setting conditions, and the local zoning authorities do not
base their decision solely upon the satisfaction of conditions by the private landowner"
(Commonwealth of Virginia 1978: 517-518).
The preliminary bill was part of the discussion at the public hearings. It contained seven
conditions absent from the 1973 legislation. The conditions were:
"(i) that all conditions shall have a reasonable relation to the rezoning;
(ii) that the rezoning itself must give rise for the need for the conditions
that are imposed;
(iii) that such conditions shall not require a cash contribution to the
governing body;
(iv) nor shall such conditions require mandatory dedication of real personal
property for open space, parks, schools, fire departments or other public facilities
not otherwise provided in 151.1-446(f);
(v) shall not require payment for or construction of off-site improvements
except those provided for in 15.1-466(j) of the state code;
(vi) no conditions shall be imposed that are not related to the physical
development or physical operation of the property and
(vii) all such conditions shall be in conformity with the locality's
comprehensive plan" (VCPA 1977: 2).
The conditions on the prohibition of cash payments and land dedications were put in place to
address the abuse concerns. The proposal also made clear the distinction between on-site and off-
site improvements. At this time, conditions would be limited to on-site needs. In the
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development of their proposal, Cranwell stated that the subcommittee decided to offer expansion,
but in honor of Virginia traditions, to go slowly with it. In his words, this was "a new thing for
us" (Cranwell 2008). So local governments would build up experience with this system over the
years, and then modifications if needed could be made at a later point in time.
The conditional zoning provision passed in 1978 was quickly adopted or studied by different
local governments. The Cooperative Extension Service of Virginia Tech University in September
of 1978 released a publication on conditional zoning which was basically a "Frequently Asked
Questions" (FAQ) document. There were answers to over twenty questions on the topic ranging
from the legislation's purpose, permissible conditions, similar tools, and administration. In
March of 1979, the Planning Commission of Bedford City wrote to the VML in search of
information on conditional zoning. VML ended up conducting a short survey of its members.
Three cities (Alexandria, Hampton, and Portsmouth) had adopted conditional zoning while
Manassas had studied it. The counties of Goochland, Henrico, Montgomery, and York had
adopted conditional zoning. Frederick and Prince George counties had studied the topic. Two
towns (Blacksburg and Culpeper) adopted it while Herndon had studied it. Despite the number of
adoptions, there was an air of caution about conditional zoning's longevity among the local
governments. Norman F. Hammer, Jr., Herndon's Planning Director, best captured this
uncertainty when at the Virginia Chapter of the American Planning Association's Annual
Meeting in March of 1979, he said, "I fear that if suit is brought for whatever reason, the entire
house of cards may collapse. On this basis, I would recommend that any jurisdiction considering
adopting the system proceed very cautiously, especially in the area of spending large sums of
money on legal fees and [s]taff expansion to implent such a system" (Hammer 1979: 6). The
Virginia Attorney General responded in June of 1979 to concerns raised by Albemarle County
about the proper course of action to follow if an applicant's proffered conditions are amended at
a public hearing and whether there needs to be a readvertisement of the case, etc. His opinion
was that a proffer that is amended during a hearing before the governing body to a less intensive
use does not have to be readvertised to the public (Commonwealth of Virginia 1979: 336). The
first true test of the system's fragility came less than a year later in Fairfax County.
Overall, localities that had been without the power of conditional zoning were grateful to have it
because it gave them the assurance that they "can exert some control on how and when property
is developed" (Churn 1978). Prior to conditional zoning, localities like Henrico County had to
accept on faith that restrictive covenants between a set of property owners would be enough
enforcement to ensure certain conditions were attached to the development of a property (Churn
1978). HB 135 became law effective July 1, 1978 and in August, Henrico County passed its
conditional zoning ordinance followed by Chesterfield County in October (Churn 1978). The
major concern of developers in the Richmond Region with the new legislation was the inequities
between what a larger developer could offer to "sweeten" the rezoning application for a locality
compared to a smaller developer who did not have the same amount of resources (Churn 1978).
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For example, the large developer could give the county a site for a school (Chum 1978). Of
course, a locality is not supposed to base their decision to approve a rezoning application on the
proffered conditions.
CONCLUSION
In the span of ten years from when legislation was first requested on the issue (1968) to its
extension statewide in 1978, conditional zoning goes from not existing as term in the Virginia
State Code to having its own subheading in the 1978 version of the Code of Virginia. I would
argue that local governments and the development community were influential in the political
process in the 1970s. Every local government now has the opportunity to use at least some form
of conditional zoning legally. Given that at the end of 1979, only 14 localities were eligible for
the more permissive form under paragraph (a) of § 15.1-491 when it could have been 135 cities
and counties under the original version of SB 637 in 1973 is proof that local governments did not
have the power to have their legislative wish lists approved without interference from other
agents. One of those agents happened to be the development community. The original legislation
was worded to apply to the entire state, so there was no original intent behind the legislation's
sponsors to pit local governments against one another. There was a clear wording change to
emphasis the voluntary nature of the statute, i.e. the word "imposition" disappears from the
statute. The simplicity of the 1973 statute stemmed from either an assumption made by the
authors that everyone involved understood what were acceptable conditions, or a naivete on their
part that as time passed, the system would not try to be gamed by either side. Although the court
case involved financial payments, it is clear that this was never the aim of the statute. There were
efforts to finance infrastructure, but through other pieces of legislation. For the most part, the
debate over conditional zoning was civil between the different parties, but as localities start to
gain in familiarity with the tool and the pressure on the development community increases, the
tone of the debate shifts sharply in the 1.980s.
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CHAPTER 6
The 1980s was a period of regulation tweaking, limited expansion of existing conditional zoning
authority, and the creation of a third system of conditional zoning. This decade also witnessed
the beginnings of the debate about impact fees and cash proffers. Additionally, it was significant
for the change in the tone of the debate between the two key interest groups, localities and
developers, over the management of growth. Finally, while conditional zoning issues in the
1960s and 1970s were defined by the experiences of the Northern Virginia region, particularly
Fairfax County, other regions in the 1980s, such as the Richmond, VA Metropolitan Statistical
Area, as well as, the Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC Metropolitan Statistical
Area, began to add their growth concerns to the list of issues that defined conditional zoning.3 3
ISSUE CONTEXT AND EMERGENCE
The issue context for conditional zoning in the 1980s was shaped by implementation at the local
level, and the search at the local level for financial resources to fund infrastructure. These two
factors almost act as a clear division between the types of conditional zoning legislation offered
in the early 80s versus the late 80s. Present throughout the decade was still the factor of
eligibility expansion, but the desire by local governments to be eligible was driven by a new
need. I discuss below two examples that illustrate the issues that shaped the conditional zoning
legislation in the 1980s, as well as, the changes in the dynamic between local governments and
the development community. The first example focuses on the conflict that erupted between
members of the development community in Fairfax County and the Board of Supervisors and the
staff of the Planning Department in regard to the administration of the conditional zoning system
at the beginning of 1980. At this point in time, Fairfax County had been operating with a
provision on conditional zoning in their zoning ordinance for five years. The conflict centers on
concerns by the development community that government officials are overreaching their
authority in regard to the types of conditions that the officials suggest developers should proffer
to the county. This example shows how far one interest group was willing to go in order to get
their concerns addressed. While the first example focuses on the implementation issue, the
3 The Richmond, VA Metropolitan Statistical Area as defined by the Office of Management and Budget in
December 2005 is composed of Amelia County, Caroline County, Charles City County, Chesterfield County,
Cumberland County, Dinwiddie County, Goochland County, Hanover County, Henrico County, King and Queen
County, King William County, Louisa County, New Kent County, Powhatan County, Prince George County, Sussex
County, and the cities of Colonial Heights, Hopewell, Petersburg, and Richmond. The Virginia Beach-Norfolk-
Newport News, VA-NC Metropolitan Statistical Area is composed of Gloucester County, Isle of Wight County,
James City County, Mathews County, Surry County, York County, and the cities of Chesapeake, Hampton, Newport
News, Norfolk, Poquoson, Portsmouth, Suffolk, Virginia Beach, and Williamsburg. Currituck County in North
Carolina is also a part of this MSA.
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second example analyzes conditional zoning as a potential tool for infrastructure financing. The
illustration, here, is the work of the Commission on Transportation in the Twenty-First Century
from 1986 to 1987 on potential alternative funding options for the transportation needs of local
governments. Impact fees and the expansion of the conditional zoning authority under the 1973
statute (15.1-491(a)) are proposed as funding options. The second example set the groundwork
for how conditional zoning through cash proffers becomes redefined as a local government
revenue source.
The first flare-up between developers and localities over conditional zoning occurred in early
1980. Developers in Fairfax County felt that the county's supervisors were overreaching in their
suggestions for potential proffers. In a letter dated January 28, 1980, twelve prominent
individuals involved in the "land ownership, rezoning, and development" process in Fairfax
County wrote to the Board of Supervisors with their concerns about the operation of the county's
conditional zoning process. The lead signature belonged to Cecil M. Boyer, Jr., President of the
Northern Virginia Builders Association, Inc. (NVBA). John T. Hazel, Jr. was also one of the
signees. The signees indicated their importance by highlighting the roles that they played in the
passage of conditional zoning in 1970s. The letter stated, "[a]s I am sure, you are aware, some of
the undersigned participated in and helped to draft the provisions contained in Title 15.1-491(a),
et seq. Indeed, some of the undersigned on more than one occasion testified in either Richmond
or in Fairfax County before Committees of the General Assembly in favor of the adopted statute
and against later suggestions of potential abuse" (Board of Supervisors 1981: A-3(d)).
These twelve individuals essentially accused the county of abuse because the voluntary nature of
the system was being replaced with county suggested proffers. Their conclusion was that
conditional zoning as practiced in Fairfax County suffered from a lack of uniformity in practice
and legality. As an indication of their potential power and influence, the letter concluded with
what could be considered a veiled threat. The signees wrote, "It would be indeed unfortunate if a
voluntary system could not exist which would allow an applicant or developer to voluntarily bind
himself to adjust his proposed development for the benefit of the community. However, the
proffer process has become so onerous and extra-legal that its continuance under present
circumstances compels the undersigned to request a change in practices or in the alternative,
abandonment of the concept" (Board of Supervisors 1981: A-3(f)).
Given the tone of the letter, the development industry, perhaps, expected Fairfax officials to
behave quickly and respond to their charges and implement the necessary changes without delay.
From later communication between the County and NVBA, it was apparent that the demands of
the developers were not met. The development industry took their recommendations to the
Planning Commission in April of 1980. A letter dated October 1, 1980, from Boyer, himself, to
the Chairman of the BOS, John F. Herrity, further conveyed the seriousness of the development
industry and showed how far they had been willing to push, in order to get their demands met.
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The letter led off with the claim that "[t]o date, the response of Fairfax County has been
unsatisfactory. We are now appealing directly to the Board of Supervisors for a specific response
to our points of contention" (Board of Supervisors 1980: 1-13(a)). Boyer ended the letter by
pointing out that if the local level would not solve the problems, then things would have to be
taken to the state level. He wrote, "If procedures are not established by the Board to implement
these principles, we intend to seek legislative remedies at the State level. We hereby request a
meeting with the full Board of Supervisors to be scheduled not later than the week of November
3, 1980. The purpose of this meeting will be to determine where the proffer procedures in Fairfax
County can be modified sufficiently to obviate the need for an amendment to the current State
legislation" (Board of Supervisors 1980:1-13(d)). The letter was cc'ed to Senator Joseph V.
Gartlan, Jr. who was the chief patron of the 1973 legislation.
Board of Supervisors members comments ranged from "It's an arrogant power play. I'll be
damned if I'll just roll over" to "I feel like they think they're holding a gun to our heads" and "I
won't stand for an ultimatum" (Grubisich 1980). The main author of the legislation, Senator
Joseph Gartlan, Democrat from Fairfax, admitted that the system had problems and that abuses
were possibly taking place (Grubisich 1980). But Gartlan believed that confrontation in the
General Assembly was not the answer (Grubisich 1980). The Board of Supervisors ended up
creating a Board subcommittee to meet with the NVBA to address their concerns. This
subcommittee was appointed on October 20, 1980. By January 12, 1981, a proposed resolution
had been developed for consideration by the full Board of Supervisors. The resolution responded
specifically to two of the development community's major concerns while two others were
directly unaddressed. The concerns that the resolution addressed were "the voluntary submission
of proffers" and "restriction of proffers to issues having a 'reasonable relationship to the
proposed rezoning"' (Board of Supervisors 1981: 11). Left unaddressed were the concerns that
the dealt with "[e]limination of proffers that 'restate applicable requirements of local ordinances
and State statutes"' and "[e]limination of proffers as 'a mechanism to enforce a bonus density
system"' (Board of Supervisors 1981: 12).34 NVBA was still disappointed in this version of the
resolution and recommended additional changes. These final changes were approved by the
Board and on January 26, 1981, the Board adopted the resolution by a unanimous vote. At the
May 4, 1981 meeting, the Board received a status report of how the actions outlined in the
resolution had been addressed.
As an end to the conflict, the Board of Supervisors on October 20, 1981 amended the zoning
ordinance to add a new separate section, 18-204 Proffered Conditions Regulations. This section
clearly stated the county's procedures and regulations on proffers. It would eliminate any further
confusion over what the county required where conditional zoning was applicable. While it
34 The bonus density system refers to the policy in the Comprehensive Plan where density ranges are given for the
recommended land uses and in order to achieve the higher end of the ranges, references are made to specific
conditions that must be met.
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remains unclear whether NVBA had enough clout to have the original conditional zoning statute
repealed, if it had been repealed, conditional zoning would still have been available to the
Northern Virginia and Eastern Shore localities under the 1978 statute, but in a more restrictive
format. This assumes, of course, that the development industry would only target the 1973
statute and not the 1978 statute. Herndon's Director of Planning in 1979 cautioned that the whole
house of conditional zoning was built around Fairfax County and should it fall, then everything
had the potential to collapse.
The Commission on Transportation in the 2 1st Century was formed in 1986 by a Senate Joint
Resolution to examine the transportation system in Virginia, particularly its future needs and
financing concerns. The second phase of the Commission's work which started in 1987 focused
on "(1) builder contributions to off-site road improvements; (2) development impact fees; (3)
granting to local governments increased statutory authority to consider the capacity of local
roads and other public facilities when rendering land use decisions such as rezoning; and (4)
proposals to grant to local units of government expanded power to construct and control local
roads."35 The Local Government Advisory Committee, which was a special advisory committee
to the Commission, was given the task to conduct a survey of localities on how they felt about
potential alternative funding options like those listed above.
The survey was sent to every local government in Virginia and 112 local governments responded
(26 cities, 43 counties, and 43 towns). In total, the responses represented a population of over 3.9
million.36 For each financial option, the local governments were asked to rate their level of
interest. Their response would provide an indicator of how well that tool would operate in the
community. The possible rating options were strong, moderate, low, no interest, don't know, and
not applicable. The number of local governments who responded to each level of interest option
for extending conditional zoning were 41, 16, 18, 17, 14, and 3, respectively. Out of the 75 local
governments that expressed at least some level of interest in the extension of conditional zoning,
all eight geographic areas of the state were represented.37 The region with the highest number of
35Commission on Transportation in the Twenty-First Century (Va.). 2001. Agency History. Richmond, VA: Virginia
State Library. Last accessed May 29, 2012,
http://lval .hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/F/IEM87 I E3953TBH5H8Tl UEHCPTS9E4JKITVMAR8LA65RFTEHMMT-
11542?func=full-set-set&set number=001113&set entry-000001&format=999.
36 The total population number does not reflect the population of the towns.
37 The respondents for each of the eight regions are as follows: Central (Albemarle County, Amherst County,
Ashland, Blackstone, Bowling Green, Broadway, Caroline County, Charlottesville, Chesterfield County, Colonial
Heights, Farmville, Fauquier County, Fredericksburg, Goochland County, Hanover, Hanover County, Henrico
County, Hopewell, New Kent County, Orange County, Petersburg, Rapppahannock, Richmond, Spotsylvania, The
Plains, and Warrenton); Eastern Shore (Cape Charles, Northampton); Northern Neck (Essex, Gloucester, Richmond
County, Westmoreland County); Northern Virginia (Alexandria, Arlington County, Dumfries, Fairfax County,
Fairfax, Falls Church, Herndon, Leesburg, Loudoun County, Manassas Park, Middleburg, Quantico, Stafford,
Vienna); Southside (Appomattox, Brookneal, Campbell, Chase City, Clarksville, Crewe, Dinwiddie, Greensville,
Halifax, Martinsville, Prince Edward, South Boston, Victoria); Tidewater (Hallwood, Hampton, James City,
Newport News, Poquoson, Portsmouth, Suffolk, Virginia Beach, Waverly, York); Valley (Alleghany, Altavista,
Berryville, Blacksburg, Botetourt, Bridgewater, Buena Vista, Christiansburg, Clarke, Clifton Forge, Craig,
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local governments expressing a "strong" interest was the Central with 11 local governments, but
Northern Virginia was close behind with 10 and the Valley had 9. The region with the greatest
representation across the board in interest level was the Valley with 19 local governments. Local
governments were also asked to give their top three financing options that they "most favored"
and "least favored". Conditional zoning garnered the most votes for being the third "most
favored" choice. Impact fees and off-site road improvements received the most votes for first and
second "most favored" choices, respectively. In terms of population, conditional zoning received
the highest percentage of the total survey population for the "strong" response at 65.8 percent.
In the press coverage of the committee's survey findings in 1987, the issue of extending the
powers of the first conditional zoning system (15.1-491(a)) to the rest of the state was raised. At
the same time, impact fees emerged as a favorite among local governments as a new source of
revenue. The conclusion of the survey was that "[L]ocal governments apparently favor special
assessments on property developers as the best sources of funds to finance local transportation
needs" (Burrows 1987). This sentiment was also echoed in a June 6, 1987 Washington Post
article stating, "In the belief that 'growth should help pay for itself,' officials in high-growth
areas from Tidewater to suburban Richmond and beyond now favor an array of builder fees,
special taxing districts, expanded zoning authority and other new powers over development"
(Melton 1987). The author additionally makes the point that Delegate Cranwell (Democrat from
Vinton) who was one of the patrons of the 1978 legislation alluded that "today there is
considerable legislative support for extending to other jurisdictions at least one set of zoning
powers that Northern Virginia has had since 1976," i.e. conditional zoning (Melton 1987).
Local governments outside of the Northern Virginia region saw the amount of money that
Northern Virginia localities were able to raise through proffers under the "old" conditional
zoning system and wanted to be given the same opportunity. They were particularly envious in
terms of transportation funding. In a September 1987 report entitled Report on the Contribution
of Conditional Zoning Towards Meeting Northern Virginia's Transportation Requirements,
Kathleen K. Seefeldt, a member of the Local Government Advisory Committee, tried to
determine the "value" of the proffers related to transportation approved in Fiscal Year 1987 for
the cities of Alexandria, Falls Church, Fairfax and the counties of Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince
William. Alexandria and Falls Church did not approve any rezoning requests that involved
transportation proffers for Fiscal Year 1987. Fairfax County's data did not lend itself to the
report's format, so their response was that in 1986, the twelve largest development projects had
proffered over $98 million in road improvements (Seefeldt 1987). For the Fiscal Year 1987,
Fairfax City approved three rezoning cases which involved a total of 65 residential units,
650,000 non-residential square footage, and an estimated value of $792,000 in transportation
Frederick, Front Royal, Grottoes, Harrisonburg, Lexington, Luray, Lynchburg, Monterey, Montgomery, Pulaski,
Radford, Roanoke, Roanoke County, Salem, Shenandoah, Timberville, Winchester); and West (Abingdon,
Bluefield, Buchanan, Cedar Bluff, Dublin, Galax, Grundy, Hillsville, Mt. Rogers, Norton, Pearisburg, Pulaski,
Richlands, Rocky Mount, Russell, Scott, Tazewell, Washington, and Wythe).
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proffers (Seefeldt 1987). Loudoun County approved 20 rezoning cases with 3,977 residential
units, 20.1 million in non-residential square footage, and an estimated value of $21 million in
transportation proffers (Seefeldt 1987). Finally, Prince William County approved 43 rezoning
cases with 2,447 residential units, 7.5 million in non-residential square footage, and an estimated
value of $10.5 million in transportation proffers (Seefeldt 1987). The transportation
improvements proffered ranged from right-of-way dedications/reservations, road construction,
signalization and street lights, to cash contributions. Seefeldt stressed the importance of the
connection between conditional zoning and transportation improvements. She concluded, "[i]n a
rapidly growing area, conditional zoning proffers have expedited specific roadway projects, have
allowed private developers to contribute their fair share to the local transportation system, and
most importantly, have reduced the cost of constructing major new roadway improvements and
the time required to build these improvements" (Seefeldt 1987: 4).
Regardless of the interest level by local governments for each financial option, the committee
needed to know the pros and cons of each option. This task fell to the state Department of
Taxation which summarized the advantages and disadvantages of each financial option that the
state's Constitution authorized the General Assembly to use as a way to augment state
transportation revenues. The Department of Taxation considered the expansion of 1973
conditional zoning statute (15.1-491(a)) statewide as a financial option for local governments
because developers could proffer rights-of-way and road construction funds (Virginia Local
Government Advisory Committee 1987). However, they identified both advantages and
disadvantages to its use. The first advantage was that conditional zoning would not increase
property taxes (Virginia Local Government Advisory Committee 1987). The second advantage
was "[s]ubstantially increases ability of the locality and the developer to mitigate potentially
damaging development problems" (Virginia Local Government Advisory Committee 1987: 20).
In terms of disadvantages, the first one was the inherent level of uncertainty in conditional
zoning systems because the conditions will vary by local government and project (Virginia Local
Government Advisory Committee 1987). As a result, development costs would not be consistent
across the state. Finally, the Department of Taxation concluded conditional zoning has the
disadvantage of "[i]ncrease[ing] the cost of development and new housing," but no figures were
offered to support this conclusion (Virginia Local Government Advisory Committee 1987: 20).
Local governments were not deterred by the Department of Taxation's findings. The 1988
General Assembly Session wish list for both Henrico County and the Richmond Regional
Planning District Commission included the goal of obtaining the same conditional zoning powers
authorized for Northern Virginia and the counties along the Eastern Shore (Potter 1987;
Richmond Times-Dispatch 1987). The Board of Supervisors for Chesterfield County requested
their General Assembly delegation to draft legislation enabling them to accept cash proffers and
impose impact fees, but their delegation dropped them from the legislative agenda for 1988 out
of the fear that they would chase developers away from the county (Williams 1988). The issues
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were brought to the 1988 General Assembly under the guise of providing municipalities with a
greater range of options to finance public improvements.
AGENDA SETTING/ ALTERNATIVE SELECTION/ ENACTMENT
In light of the conflict in Fairfax County that was resolved in 1981, legislative activity related to
the two conditional zoning statutes occurs almost annually in the 1980s. Despite the threat from
the Northern Virginia development community, none of the bills contain any language on the
abolishment of either system. In total, twenty bills were introduced over the 1980s that dealt with
changes to the two conditional zoning statutes. Figure 6.1 shows the total number of bills by their
year of introduction. Out of the ten years in this decade, only two legislative sessions (1985 and
1987) did not have any bills related to conditional zoning introduced in them. In terms of bill
passage, nine out of the twenty bills passed which meant that eleven failed. In contrast to Figure
6.1, Figure 6.2 shows that a trend for the 1980s was an increase in the number of bills whose
legislative outcome was determined in a legislative session different from the one in which the
bill was introduced. For example, 1985 and 1987 were the two years without conditional zoning
bills introduced in them while Figure 6.1 has 1980, 1984, and 1986 as the only years where a
legislative outcome was not decided for the bills introduced that year. The carrying over of bills
to a later legislative session is not a new strategy for legislators, but its use in regard to
conditional zoning bills definitely increased in the 1980s. During the 1970s, only one conditional
zoning bill was carried over to the next legislative session (SB 155 from 1976 to 1977) compared
to more than five in 1980s.
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While the bills of the 1970s were focused exclusively on the establishment and eligibility
expansion of conditional zoning, the 1980s bills were an even mix of eligibility expansion bills
and statutory changes related to the implementation of conditional zoning. Ten of the bills
focused on eligibility expansion while ten proposed changes not related to eligibility to the
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statutes. Based on a bill's original language, legislators attempted to amend the 1973 conditional
zoning statute (15.1-491(a)) twelve times. There were eight bills whose original language wanted
to amend the 1978 conditional zoning statutes (15.1-491.1 to 15.1-491.6).
Since the 1978 statutes applied to every local government in the state, the bills amending these
statutes addressed non-eligibility issues. In comparison, ten of the twelve bills that sought to
amend the 1973 statute were eligibility expansion bills. These ten bills are summarized in Table
6.1 which shows their original wording along with any amended language; local governments
that would become eligible; and the legislative outcome of these bills. Four out of the ten bills
were enacted into law, but only two of these actually amended the eligibility language for 15.1-
491(a). As I will discuss in more detail later in this section, HB 1484 set up a new conditional
zoning statute (15.1-491.2:1) and HB 1485 had its proposed changes to 15.1-491(a) removed by
amendment. SB 141 passed in 1988 ends up removing the language passed by HB 348 in 1983.
Further, the amended language of SB 141 closely approximated the original language of HB 348.
In the end, the two bills that did amend the eligibility language of 15.1-491(a) only expanded it
within the confines of the Northern Virginia region. In this case, SB 141 made sure consistency
existed in the conditional zoning statutes between towns and the counties within which they
reside. Builders or developers with rezoning applications in towns should not face a more
restrictive conditional zoning system because their project occurs within town boundaries rather
than outside in the county's unincorporated area. Thus the eligibility bubble was not pushed
farther outward from where the lines at the end of the 1970s for 15.1-491(a) were drawn, but
rather any cracks that popped up from hindsight in it are being filled.
The eligibility expansion bills of the 1980s differed from the 1970s. First, none of the bills in the
1980s tried in either their original or amended language to extend the 1973 less restrictive system
of conditional zoning (15.1-491(a)) statewide. Instead, the largest legislative expansion effort
based eligibility on population growth rates, but even that did not cast the net that far. The lack
of bills on this type of expansion can be seen as a sign of the lack of political feasibility for such
an effort during this time period. Eligibility expansion can make it on the legislative agenda, but
only in a limited manner. Statewide eligibility of 15.1-491(a) is a nonstarter. Second, there was a
new set of individual local governments who sought the powers of 15.1-491(a). In the 1970s,
Chesterfield County and Roanoke County had eligibility legislation. Their efforts were not
renewed in the 1980s. For the first time, local governments in the Tidewater area of the state
were involved in these expansion efforts. Plus, cities were the focus of legislation. There was still
a presence of local governments from the Northern Virginia region, but these were efforts by
localities that were not directly contiguous to Fairfax County. Finally, individual local
governments in the 1980s sought to gain eligibility with legislative language that did not refer to
them by name instead by numbers. This strategy differs greatly from the 1970s where expansion
legislation directly referred to individual governments by name. For this decade, several bills
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contained language with restrictive population parameters in which only one or two local
governments could fit at that time, but the individual localities are never mentioned. There are
multiple efforts to have eligibility extended to these counties or cities.
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Table 6.1. Conditional Zoning Eligibility Expansion Bills - Amend 15.1-491(a)
Bill Number Legislative Language (Original and Amended) Local Government(s) Interpretation Legislative
(Legislative Outcome
Session)
House Bill 348 Original: or in a county contiguous to any such county and the towns Original: Towns of Leesburg, Hamilton, Approved by
(1983) therein, or in a city completely surrounded by such a contiguous county Hillsboro, Lovettsville, Middleburg, Governor -
Purcellville, and Round Hill in Loudoun Chapter No.
Amended: or in a county contiguous to any such county and-thewns County; Towns of Dumfries, Haymarket, 392
therein, or in a city completely surrounded by such a contiguous county or Occoquan, and Quantico in Prince
in the Town ofLeesburg William County
Amended: Leesburg in Loudoun County
House Bill 857 any county with a 1980 population ofmore than 35,800 but less than 37,800 Fauquier County (1980 population: Carried over
(1988) 35,889) to the 1989
Session; No
action taken
House Bill 1033 Original: or in cities with a population of250,000 or more Original: Cities of Norfolk (1980 Carried over
(1988) population: 266,979) and Virginia Beach to the 1989
Amended: (1980 population: 262,199) Session; No
action taken
Amended:
House Bill 1521 any county with a population ofmore than 40,000 but less than 43,000 Stafford County (1980 population: Stricken from
(1989) 40,470) Calendar
House Bill 1980 Original: any city with a population ofmore than 260,000 but less than Original: City of Virginia Beach (1980 Conference
(1989) 265,000; Any county with a population ofmore than 35,800 but less than population: 262,199); Fauquier County Committee
37,800 (1980 population: 35,889) appointed;
No further
Amended: any city with a population ofmore than 260,000 butless than Amended: Cities of Norfolk (1980 action taken
2 6
-5,00; Any county with a population of more than 35,800 but less than population: 266,979) and Virginia Beach
37,800 (1980 population: 262,199); Fauquier
County (1980 population: 35,889)
House Bill 1484 Original: any county or city which has hadpopulation growth often percent Original: 33 counties, 24 cities, 52 towns Approved by
(1989) or more from the next to latest to latest decennial census year, based on Governor -
population reported by the United States Bureau of the Census, or any city Amended: 41 counties, 24 cities, 61 Chapter No.
adjoining such city or county or town located within such county, provided towns 697
that until the 1990 census is reported, any county or city instead may qualify
only if it has had an estimated population growth often percent or more
from 1980 to the most recent year for which population estimates are
available from the Center for Public Service of the University of Virginia
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Amended: All language in regard to 15.1-491(a) applicability was removed;
Instead set up a new section numbered 15.1-491.2:1
(i) any county or city which has had population growth of ten percent or
more from the next-to-latest to latest decennial census year, based on
population reported by the United States Bureau of the Census, provided
that until the 1990 Census is reported, any county or city instead may
qualfy only if it has had an estimated population growth of ten percent or
more from 1980 to the most recent year for which population estimates are
available from the Center for Public Service of the University of Virginia;
(ii) any city adjoining such city or county; (iii) any towns located within
such county; and (iv) any county contiguous by land with at least three such
counties, and any town located in that county.
House Bill 1485 Original: Any county, city or town to whom Article 8.1 of this chapter is Original: 33 counties, 24 cities, 52 towns Approved by
(1989) applicable; This article shall apply to any county or city which has had Governor -
population growth of ten percent or more from the next to latest to latest Chapter No.
decennial census year, based on population reported by the United States 485
Bureau of the Census. However, this measurement shall not be used until
after the Bureau has reported the 1990 census. Until the 1990 census is
reported, any county or city instead may qualify if it has had an estimated
population growth of ten percent or more from 1980 to the most recent year
for which population estimates are available from the Center for Public
Service of the University of Virginia. This article shall also apply to any city
adjoining such city or county, or any town located within such county.
Amended: All language in regard to 15.1-491(a) applicability was removed
House Bill 1661 Original: in any county having a population ofmore than 35,800 but less Original: Fauquier County (1980 Stricken from
(1989) than 37,800 population: 35,889) Calendar
Amendment #1: [and in any county having a population ofmore than Amendment #1: Fauquier County (1980
40,000 but less than 43,000] population: 35,889) and Stafford County
(1980 population: 40,470)
Amendment #2: All language in regard to 15.1-491(a) applicability was
removed; Instead set up a new section numbered 15.1-491.2:1 Amendment #2: 41 counties, 24 cities, 61
(i) any county or city which has had population growth often percent or towns
more from the next-to-latest to latest decennial census year, based on
population reported by the United States Bureau of the Census, provided
that until the 1990 Census is reported, any county or city instead may
qualify only if it has had an estimated population growth often percent or
more from 1980 to the most recent year for which population estimates are
available from the Center for Public Service of the University of Virginia;
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(ii) any city adjoining such city or county; (iii) any towns located within
such county; and (iv) any county contiguous by land with at least three such
counties, and any town located in that county.
Senate Bill 613
(1989)
Original: in any city with a population ofmore than 46,000 but less than
50,000, or in any city with a population of more than 110,000 but less than
120,000
Amended: All language in regard to 15.1-491(a) applicability was removed;
Instead set up a new section numbered 15.1-491.2:1
(i) any county or city which has had population growth of ten percent or
more from the next-to-latest to latest decennial census year, based on
population reported by the United States Bureau of the Census, provided
that until the 1990 Census is reported, any county or city instead may
qualify only if it has had an estimated population growth often percent or
more from 1980 to the most recent year for which population estimates are
available from the Center for Public Service of the University of Virginia;
(ii) any city adjoining such city or county; (iii) any towns located within
such county; and (iv) any county contiguous by land with at least three such
counties, and any town located in that county.
Original: Cities of Suffolk (1980
population: 47,621) and Chesapeake
(1980 population: 114,486)
Amended: 41 counties, 24 cities, 61
towns
Passed by
Senate Bill 141 Original: In the town of Leesburg any town within such contiguous county if Original: Towns of Leesburg, Hamilton, Approved by
(1988) such county has a population of less than 100,000 Hillsboro, Lovettsville, Middleburg, Governor -
Purcellville, and Round Hill in Loudoun Chapter No.
Amended: In the towe of Leesburg any town within such contiguous county County (1980 population: 57,427) 481
if such county has a population of kss than 100, 000
Amended: Towns of Leesburg, Hamilton,
Hillsboro, Lovettsville, Middleburg,
Purcellville, and Round Hill in Loudoun
County; Towns of Dumfries, Haymarket,
Occoquan, and Quantico in Prince
William County
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For the 1980s, five out of the ten non-eligibility bills were successfully enacted. Four of these
five bills passed proposed statutory changes to 1978 conditional zoning statute system (15.1-
491.1 to 15.1-491.6) while only one amended the 1973 conditional zoning statute system (15.1-
491(a)). The 1978 conditional zoning statute system (15.1-491.1 to 15.1-491.6) actually ended
only being amended three times rather than four because HB 554 (1988) was amended during the
course of the legislative process with language that removed all references to 15.1-491.2. The
three bills that remained amended separate subsections of the 1978 conditional zoning statute -
15.1-491.2 (Conditions as part of a rezoning or amendment to zoning map), 15.1-491.3
(Enforcement and guarantees), and 15.1-491.5 (Petition for review of decision). None of these
enacted bills substantially changed the spirit of the 1978 statute instead they added clarification
or refinement to how the statute should be implemented by local governments and the
protections in place for rezoning applicants. The one bill that was enacted to amend 15.1-491(a),
HB 438 in 1987, was the completion of an effort begun in 1984 with another bill to more
stringently define the justification for the use of conditional zoning under the 1973 conditional
zoning statute. While this statute was always identified with conditional zoning, it actually never
used the words, "conditional zoning." HB 438 officially put the words, conditional zoning, in
the 1973 statute.
There were unsuccessful efforts made by multiple bills to expand the concept of what could be
proffered under the 1978 conditional zoning statute system. In particular, HB 1021 in 1988
wanted to remove the prohibition on cash payments by allowing them if they were used for
public improvements to a property's facilities. Additional condition expansion bills looked at
off-site improvements and mandatory property dedications. The eligibility bills showed a pattern
for this decade where there were repeated efforts to expand the eligibility criteria of existing
statutes, but with little real expansion to show. This pattern is just as applicable to the non-
eligibility bills where bills that sought to expand what was an allowable conditions were
legislative failures while bills that reinforced regulations were enacted.
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Table 6.2. Conditional Zoning Non-Eligibility Expansion Bills (Amend 15.1-491(a) or 15.1-491.1 to 15.1-491.6)
Bill Number Patron(s) Legislative Language (Original and Amended) Legislative Outcome
(Legislative
Session)
House Bill 415 Mitchie 15.1-491.2 Carried over to 1981
(1980) Such proffer may include construction or improvement of any public facility, on-site or off-site, Session; Passed by
need for which is specifically generated by the proposed rezoning, if the local capital outlay indefinitely
program including the six-year secondary highway plan does not envision such construction or
improvement prior to or at the time the need will be generated by the rezoning.
House Bill 1827 McMurtrie 15.1-491.2 Passed by indefinitely
(1981) A zoning ordinance may include and provide for the voluntary proffering in writing, by the
owner, of reasonable conditions, prior to or at a public hearing before the governing body,
House Bill 273 15.1-491.2 Approved by
(1982) Once proffered and accepted as part of an amendment to the zoning ordinance, such conditions Governor - Chapter
shall continue in full force and effect until a subsequent amendment changes the zoning on the No. 293
property covered by such conditions; provided, however, that such conditions shall continue if
the subsequent amendment is part of a comprehensive implementation of a new or substantially
revised zoning ordinance.
House Bill 53 Cranwell Amend 15.1-491.3 Approved by
(1983) Governor - Chapter
No. 221
House Bill 644 Watkins Original Carried over to 1985
(1984) 15.1-430(q) "Conditional zoning" means, as part of classifying land with a governmental entity Session; Defeated in
into areas and districts by legislative action, the allowing of reasonable conditions governing House and
the use of such property, such conditions being in addition to, or modification of; the Reconsideration
regulations provided for a particular zoning district or zone by the overall zoning ordinance. Rejected
15.1-49 1(a)For variations [as defined in 15.1-430(p)] in or exceptions [as defined in 15.1-
430(i)] to the general regulations in any district in cases of unusual situations or to ease the
transition from one district to another or for buildings, structures or uses having speeial
requi'ements to be accomplished by conditional zoning [as defined in 15.1-430(q)], and, in
addition to or lieu of the provisions of 15.1-491.1 et seq., for the adoption,
Amendment
For variatieons variances [as defined in 15.1-430(p)] in or special exceptions [as defined in
15.1-430(i)] to the general regulations in any district in cases of unusual situations in other than
usual and ordinary situations or to ease the transition from one district to another or for
buildings, struetures or uses having special requirements to be- acomplished by andfor
conditional zoning [as defined in 15.1-430(q)], and, in addition to or lieu ofhe-provis-iens-of
1-5.1 491.1 tseq. conditional zoning, for the adoption,
House Bill 438 Watkins Original Carried over to 1987
133
15.1-430(q) "Conditional zoning" means, as part of classifying land with a governmental entity
into areas and districts by legislative action, the allowing of reasonable conditions governing
the use of such property, such conditions being in addition to, or modification of, the
regulations provided for a particular zoning district or zone by the overall zoning ordinance.
15.1-491(a) For variations variances as defined in 15.1-430 in or special exceptions as defined
in 15.1-430(i) to the general regulations in any district in cases of unusual other than usual and
ordinary situations or to ease the transition from one district to another or for buildings-
struetures or uses having special requirements and for conditional zoning as defined in 15.1-430
(q) and in addition to or in lieu of conditional zoning and for the adoption
Session; Approved by
Governor - Chapter
No. 8
Amendment
(a) For vafiations s defined in 15.1 430 in or special exceptions as defied in 15.
4300) to the general regulations in any district in cases of unusual other than U-sual an
oirdinar-y situations or to ease the tfansition from one distr-ict to another or fef buildings,
st4aetures ei uses having special requirements variances as defined in 15.1-430 (1) or special
exceptions as defined in 15.1-430 (1) to the general regulations in any district in cases of
unusual situations or to ease the transition from one district to another, or for buildings,
structures or uses having special requirements, and for conditional zoning as defined in 15.1-
430 (q) and in addin to or in lieu of condinal and for the adoption
House Bill 902 Keating, et al. Original Approved by
(1988) Governor - Chapter
Amendment No. 856
15.1-491.5. Same; petition for review of decision.-Any zoning applicant or any other person
who is aggrieved by the a decision of the zoning administrator made pursuant to the provisions
of 15.1-491.3 may petition the governing body for the review of the decision of the zoning
administrator. All such petitions for review shall be filed with the zoning administrator and with
the clerk of the governing body within thirty days from the date of the decision for which review
is sought, and such petitions shall specify the grounds upon which the petitioner is aggrieved
House Bill 1021 Hargrove 15.1-491.2. Same; conditions as part of a rezoning or amendment to zoning map.-A zoning Carried over to 1989
(1988) ordinance may include and provide for the voluntary proffering in writing, by the owner, of Session; No action
reasonable conditions, prior to a public hearing before the governing body, in addition to the taken
regulations provided for the zoning district or zone by the ordinance, as a part of a rezoning or
amendment to a zoning map; provided that (i) the rezoning itself must give rise for the need for
the conditions; (ii) such conditions shall have a reasonable relation to the rezoning; (iii) such
conditions shall not include a cash contribution to the county or municipality unless such
contribution is for the provision ofpublic improvements offacilities related to the development
or operation of the property; (iv) such conditions shall not include mandatory dedication o
real or personal property for open spacse, parks, schools, fire departments or other public
facailities not otherWisepoie for! in subdivision A (f) of 15.1 466; (v) such conditions shall
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(1986)
subdivision A 0) of 15. 1 4 66; (v4 (iv) no condition shall be proffered that is not related to the
physical development or physical operation of the property; and (Vii) (v) all such conditions
shall be in conformity with the comprehensive plan as defined in 15.1-446.1. Once proffered
and accepted as part of an amendment to the zoning ordinance, such conditions shall continue
in full-force and effect until a subsequent amendment changes the zoning on the property
covered by such conditions; provided, however, that such conditions shall continue if the
subsequent amendment is part of a comprehensive implementation of a new or substantially
revised zoning ordinance.
House Bill 451 Cranwell 15.1-491.2. Same; conditions as part of a rezoning or amendment to zoning map.-A zoning Carried over to 1989
(1988) ordinance may include and provide for the voluntary proffering in writing, by the owner, of Session; Stricken from
reasonable conditions, prior to a public hearing before the governing body, in addition to the docket
regulations provided for the zoning district or zone by the ordinance, as a part of a rezoning or
amendment to a zoning map; pfovidedhat however, (i) the rezoning itself must give rise for the
need for the conditions; (ii) such conditions shall have a reasonable relation to the rezoning;
(iii) such conditions shall not include a cash contribution to the county or municipality; (iv)
such conditions shall not include mandatory dedication of real or personal property for open
space, parks, schools, fire departments or other public facilities not otherwise provided for in
subdivision A (f) of 15.1-466; (v) such conditions shall not include payment for or construction
of off-site improvements except those provided for in subdivision A (j) of 15.1-466 or in 15.1-
491.2:1 ; (vi) no condition shall be proffered that is not related to the physical development or
physical operation of the property; and (vii) all such conditions shall be in conformity with the
comprehensive plan as defined in 15.1-446.1. Once proffered and accepted as part of an
amendment to the zoning ordinance, such conditions shall continue in full-fefee-and effect until
a subsequent amendment changes the zoning on the property covered by such conditions ;
provided, however, that such .Such conditions shall, however, continue if the subsequent
amendment is part of a comprehensive implementation of a new or substantially revised zoning
ordinance.
15.1-491.2:1. Same; off-site road improvements as apart ofrezoning or zoning map
amendment; reimbursements to profferer by subsequent developers.-A zoning ordinance may
include and provide, as a part of a rezoning or amendment to the zoning map, for the voluntary
proffering by the subdivider or developer in writing, pursuant to 15.1-491.2, ofpayments for or
construction of reasonable and necessary road improvements located outside the property
limits of the land owned or controlled by him but necessitated or required, at least in part, by
the construction or improvement of his subdivision or development....
House Bill 554 Cranwell Original Approved by
(1988) 15.1-491.2. Same; conditions as part of a rezoning or amendment to zoning map.-A zoning Governor - Chapter
ordinance may include and provide for the voluntary pFeffennig agreement to advancefunds or No. 735
to proffer in writing, by the owner, of reasonable conditions, prior to a public hearing before the
governing body, in addition to the regulations provided for the zoning district or zone by the
ordinance, as a part of a rezoning or amendment to a zoning map; provided 4hat however, (i) the
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rezoning itself must give rise for the need for the conditions; (ii) such conditions shall have a
reasonable relation to the rezoning; (iii) such conditions shall not include a non-refundable cash
contribution to the county or municipality; (iv) such conditions shall not include mandatory
dedication of real or personal property for open space, parks, schools, fire departments or other
public facilities not otherwise provided for in subdivision A (f) of 15.1-466; (v) such conditions
shall not include payment for or construction of off-site improvements except those provided
for in subdivision A (j) of 15.1-466 or in 15.1-491.2:1 ; (vi) no condition shall be proffered
required that is not related to the physical development or physical operation of the property;
and (vii) all such conditions shall be in conformity with the comprehensive plan as defined in
15.1-446.1. Once pfoffefedfunds are advanced or proffers are made and accepted as part of an
amendment to the zoning ordinance, such conditions shall continue in full-fere-and effect until
a subsequent amendment changes the zoning on the property covered by such conditions ;
provided, however, that such Such conditions shall, however, continue if the subsequent
amendment is part of a comprehensive implementation of a new or substantially revised zoning
ordinance.
15.1-491.2:1. Same; off-site road improvements as a part ofrezoning or zoning map
amendment; reimbursements to profferer by subsequent developers.-A zoning ordinance may
include and provide, as a part of a rezoning or amendment to the zoning map, for the voluntary
proffering by the subdivider or developer in writing, pursuant to 15.1-491.2, ofpayments for or
construction of reasonable and necessary road improvements located outside the property
limits of the land owned or controlled by him but necessitated or required, at least in part, by
the construction or improvement of his subdivision or development....
15.1-491.2:2. Same; off-site road improvements as apart ofrezoning or zoning map
amendment; reimbursements of advances or to profferors by governing body.--If a subdivider
or developer makes a voluntary advance or proffer pursuant to 15.1-491.2 and 15.1-491.2:1 of
payments for or construction of reasonable and necessary road improvements located outside
the property limits of the land owned or controlled by him but necessitated or required, at least
in part, by the construction or improvement of his subdivision or development and such
advance or proffer is accepted, the governing body may agree to reimburse the subdivider or
developer for the cost of such advance or proffer, together with interest, which shall be
excludable from gross income for federal income tax purposes, at a rate equal to the rate of
interest on bonds most recently issued by the governing body prior to the date of acceptance of
such proffer or advance, on the following terms and conditions: ...
Amendment
Removes all statutory language in regard to 15.1-491.2 and Amends 15.1-466(1)
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Besides the legislation that been carried over from the 1988 Session, there were six bills
introduced in the 1989 Session to expand the number of local governments eligible to act under
the 1973 conditional zoning statute. In making their way through the legislative process, the bills
which were once distinct entities began to take on the characteristics of each other in their quest
for passage. Out of the six bills, only two actually became chapters in the 1989 Acts of the
Assembly - HB 1484 and HB 1485. Before tracing the legislative path of HB 1484 and HB 1485,
it is important to know what happened to two of the other bills - SB 613 and HB 1661 - because
their failure is tied up in the success of HB 1484 and HB 1485.
HB 1661 was attempt by Delegates Rollins, Guest, and Howell to extend the "old" conditional
zoning statute (15.1-491(a)) to Fauquier County. The wording that would have been added to the
statute was "any county having a population of more than 35,800 but less than 37,800." After
being read for the second time on the House floor, HB 1661 was amended to take on the features
of prior conditional zoning expansion bills - HB 1521 and HB 1980. Delegate Howell added the
language from HB 1521 on extending "old" conditional zoning to a county with a population
more than 40,000, but less than 43,000. Delegate John G. Dicks III (D) of Chesterfield County
amended the bill to include the restrictions that he had attached to HB 1980. These restrictions
would make 15.1-491(a) operate like the 1978 conditional zoning statutes. They could have been
interpreted as ways to improve the legal standing of the 1973 statute. The amendment did not
impose any limits on cash contributions or land dedications. The bill passed the House, and went
to the Senate where it was further amended, but still achieved passage. Since the legislative
bodies had passed two different versions of HB 1661, and each insisted upon final passage of
their version, a conference committee was set up with the purpose of drafting a compromise. The
amended version proposed by the committee bared little resemblance either to the introduced bill
or the bill that had been engrossed by the Senate. Instead, the Committee had left the 1973
statute alone while it added a new section to the state code entitled 15.1-491.2:1. This section set
up eligibility requirements based on population growth rates and allowed cash proffers if certain
conditions were met. This new version of HB 1661 would have essentially set up a third system
of conditional zoning that was a hybrid of the "old" conditional zoning and the 1978 version.
The bill was passed by both legislative bodies, but ended up being vetoed by the Governor
because what it wanted to accomplish, was already embodied in another piece of legislation (HB
1484). Once the Governor vetoed the bill, it was stricken from the legislative calendar.
Despite its origin in a different legislative body, SB 613 traveled a similar path to and suffered a
similar fate as HB 1661. Senator Earley, who served on the 1988 Subcommittee on Off-Site
Road Improvements, introduced SB 613 which would have allowed the cities of Suffolk and
Chesapeake to use "old" conditional zoning. 15.1-491(a) would be amended with language such
that "any city with a population of more than 46,000 but less than 50,000, or in any city with a
population of more than 110,000 but less than 120,000" would become eligible for "old"
conditional zoning. Suffolk had a 1980 population of 47,621 while Chesapeake's was 114,486.
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SB 613 made it out of the Senate to the House without any additional amendments by vote of 20-
16. There was, however, a "Ruling of the Chair" called for before the bill's Senate passage on
whether "S.B. 613 would, under Article VII, Section 1 (6) of the Constitution, be a 'special act"'
(Journal of the Senate 1989: 326). The ruling from the President of the Senate was that the SB
613 was a "general bill" and thus not subject to the higher vote requirement. 38 In the House, the
bill was amended so that the 1973 statute was now only applicable to the cities of Suffolk and
Chesapeake, but in the restricted format that Delegate Dicks had tried to achieve with HB 1661.
The House's amendments would have stripped away the "old" conditional zoning powers of
Fairfax County and its surrounding localities, as well as, Accomack and Northampton Counties
on the Eastern Shore. The Senate rejected the House's amendments by a vote of 6 to 33. Like the
Senate had done with other conditional zoning bills, the House insisted on its amendments, so a
conference committee was formed. The product of this committee was the exact same legislative
wording that had come out of the conference committee for HB 1661. Like HB 1661, the
amended version of SB 613 passed both legislative bodies. The vote in the Senate was 28-10.
However, Governor Gerald L. Baliles returned SB 613 to the Senate without a signature because
he objected that "it achieves the same purpose as House Bill No. 1484 which I have returned for
amendments" (Journal of the Senate 1989: 1205). The decision was made to pass the bill by and
hence, it died.
As the versions of HB 1661 and SB 613 that came out of Conference Committee show, the
House of Delegates and Senate had found a unique design for the expansion of conditional
zoning. This design could achieve passage in both legislative bodies, and receive the Governor's
signature. In becoming mirror images of each other and HB 1484, it seemed that the supporters
of conditional zoning expansion were coming up with backup plans, in case HB 1484 fell
through. Having the bills go through the legislative process at the same time, but with origins in
different legislative bodies, they made an attempt to dilute opposition efforts. Opponents would
have to fight the battle on multiple fronts rather than each bill continuously after the other. It was
clear, however, that there would be no additional localities added to the 1973 statute. "Old"
conditional zoning would remain a tool for only select Northern Virginia local governments and
localities east of the Chesapeake Bay.
On January 23, 1989, Delegate Cranwell introduced three bills - HB 1483, HB 1484, and HB
1485 whose fates were intertwined. In the end, only two were enacted and neither bill resembled
its original self. HB 1483 was a straight road impact fees bill with eligibility based on population
growth rates. HB 1484 was focused solely on the expansion of "old" conditional zoning to other
localities in the state by amending 15.1-491(a) with the language shown in Table 6.1. Expansion
was based on the same high population growth rate criteria used in HB 1483. HB 1485 was a
mirror image of the recommended legislative changes to § 15.1-491 that the 1988 Subcommittee
on Off-Site Road Improvements had drafted. Road impact fees would be allowed and their
38 The Lieutenant Governor of Virginia acts as the President of the Senate.
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eligibility requirements would be the same requirements used to grant an extension of "old"
conditional zoning to additional localities in the state - high population growth rates. HB 1485
connected the legislative fate of road impact fees and "old" conditional zoning expansion
together. So expansion of the first conditional zoning system would not be granted to all
localities, but rather extended to those who are dealing with high rates of growth. This rationale
was justified based on the testimony and data presented to the Subcommittee during its 1988
study.
"Old" conditional zoning needed to be expanded, but only to those localities who suffered from
their own growth or the growth spillovers of their neighbors rather than the entire state. This
decision fit the tradition of taking things slowly in the State, and monitoring what develops rather
than jumping headfirst into statewide expansion. However, what Delegate Cranwell presented
and had ordered printed for consideration by both chambers in January of 1989 morphed through
the interactions of various agents in the legislative process. It went from an expansion of the
original conditional zoning system into a separate third regime (HB 1484) and the creation of
road impact fee system with no ties to conditional zoning (HB 1485). HB 1483 was referred first
to Committee on Roads and Internal Navigation and then the Committee on Counties, Cities and
Towns before it was stricken from the legislative session's docket.
A piece of legislation without any amendments would typically have had nine or fewer entries in
either the House of Delegates or Senate Journal which tracks the daily activities of a legislative
body during a General Assembly session. HB 1484 had 29 entries in the House of Delegates
Journal and 27 in the Senate Journal. This large number of postings indicated the controversial
nature of the legislation, as well as, the large effort made to ensure that some type of legislation
which addressed the expansion of the ability to accept cash proffers as part of a conditional
zoning system passed in the 1989 session. SB 637, which initiated the conditional zoning system
in 1973 and was amended, had seven postings in the House of Delegates Journal. HB 135, which
set up the second conditional zoning system in 1978, had twelve postings including two
amendments. The entries associated with the effort to obtain passage of HB 1484 in 1989 took
matters to a whole other level of importance and decision-making.
The plight of HB 1484 was made difficult from the beginning. Typically, a bill would be
reported out of committee on a unanimous vote, but with HB 1484, the vote was 13-7 in favor.
Having made it out of committee, the bill progressed to the constitutionally required three
readings on separate days on the House floor. It was at this point on February 4th that two
amendments were offered to the bill. One amendment offered by Delegate Clinton Miller (R) of
Shenandoah County was the first attempt at the imposition of restrictions on the conditions
available to be proffered under the "old" conditional zoning system. Part of his amendment read:
"[ ; provided that (i) all such conditions are necessitated by and attributable to
the rezoning and not by any demand for public facilities which existed prior to
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said rezoning; (ii) all such conditions are primarily for the benefit of the property
subject to rezoning; (iii) all such conditions shall be in conformity with the
comprehensive plan as defined in § 15.1-446.1; and (iv) any such conditions
relating to the provision ofpublic facilities shall not become effective until
made part of the local capital improvement plan as provided by § 15.1-464]"
The language of Miller's amendment matched that of the amendments offered by Delegate Dicks
to other conditional zoning bills during the Session (HB 1661 and SB 613). Furthermore, the
proposed restrictions on "old" conditional zoning was what Fairfax County foresaw in 1988 as
happening and had made them afraid. Yes, a locality could still receive cash proffers under the
system, but in a much stricter setting. The amendment went a step further than some of the
conditions under the 1978 conditional zoning system by tying the conditions to not only the
comprehensive plan, but also the capital improvement plan. The amendment was written at the
behest of the homebuilders lobbying group. The Richmond Times-Dispatch reported, "Miller had
inserted language in Cranwell's bill to prohibit localities from demanding proffers to pay for
community services that were needed before the development.... Miller said later [the
amendment] was written at his request by Carl F. Bowmer, lobbyist for the Homebuilders
Association of Virginia" (Schapiro and Booker 1989). Additionally, the second amendment by
Delegate Raymond R. Guest. Jr (R) of Warren County expanded the localities eligible under the
growth rate category to include "[ , or any county contiguous by land with at least three such
counties and any towns in that county]" so a locality did not necessarily have to have the
experience of high growth rates itself, rather it could just be surrounded by them. HB 1484 with
two amendments attached, achieved passage in the House of Delegates by a vote of 60 to 39 with
one abstention and moved to the Senate for passage.
Despite its passage in the House, the February 4, 1989 debate over the addition of the
amendments was quite heated. While no one rose in opposition to Delegate Guest's amendment,
there was strong opposition from Delegate Cranwell in regards to Delegate Miller's amendment.
Cranwell urged members to reject the Miller amendment, and accept the Guest amendment. In
the video recording of the debate, Miller argued that his amendment was necessary to bring an
element of "fairness" to this proffer system. The same philosophy that guides the legal standing
of an impact fee system would be fitted to the conditional zoning system as a way of bringing
rules. Cranwell contended that Miller's amendment would be a step back because localities need
the flexibility inherent in the "old" conditional zoning and that system has worked well with no
evidence of abuse or litigation brought up about its improper use. Furthermore, he continued that
there is a philosophical distinction between conditional zoning and impact fees. Conditional
zoning is a voluntary process because the developer wants to increase the density and intensity of
use. Denials of rezoning can be based on an overloading of the system. In Cranwell's view, there
was legal mischief embedded in the amendment which may lead to a situation where a local
government does not have the flexibility to deny a rezoning. According to Cranwell, you "don't
fix a lawnmower in the same way that you fix a Sherman tank."
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Early on in the legislative process for HB 1484 and HB 1485, interest groups made their stances
on the bills known through letters to legislators and policy memos. For example, if we analyze a
January 30, 1989 letter to Delegate Mary A. Marshall, Chairman of the House Committee on
Counties, Cities and Towns, by Ed Maroney, City Manager of Newport News, he expressed the
support of the City Council of the City of Newport News for "legislation currently before the
Virginia General Assembly granting local government authority for conditional zoning to
address on-site and off-site transportation issues. The ability to use 'old style' conditional zoning
is critical if we are to support growth and development with needed infrastructure." Lane B.
Ramsey, County Administrator of Chesterfield County sent a letter dated February 3, 1989 to
Delegate John C. Watkins in which he wrote, "I would like to relay to you the unanimous
support of the Board of Supervisors for Delegate Cranwell's HB 1484 and HB 1485 .... This
support was confirmed in a poll yesterday and today with all Board members." Letters from
local governments even went to Delegates who were not their local representative. For example,
L. Kimball Payne, III, County Administrator of Spotsylvania County wrote to Delegate Watkins
of Chesterfield County on January 26, 1989 and stated that "[t]he legislation proposed in House
Bill Nos. 1483, 1484 and 1485 has been carefully drafted to assist in growing localities while
remaining sensitive to the concerns of the development community. We urge your support of this
important legislation."
Local governments were not the only interest groups to express their position on the bills to their
legislators. Membership organizations also lobbied the legislature. The Thomas Jefferson
Planning District Commission came out with their legislative program for 1989 which stated,
"The Planning District Commission Supports Enactment of Enabling Legislation to Allow the
Use of Growth Management Tools in All Localities". They considered conditional zoning and
impact fees to be growth management tools. The Citizens for Fauquier County also sent letters to
Delegates that asked them to vote "YES" in support of HB 1484 and HB 1485. VACo also
weighed in on the bills and gave their endorsement of them because they addressed one of the
Association's priority issues for the 1989 legislative session. The membership of VACo
unanimously approved the following position:
"VACo opposes any dilution of existing local government conditional zoning
enabling authority established pursuant to Virginia Code Section 15.1-491 (a),
and supports extending such authority to all counties. VACo also supports
allowing all counties to require that developers contribute pro rata shares or
impact fees, as a condition of site plan or subdivision approval, to defray the costs
of off-site public improvements necessitated by new development."
The Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce which covers the geographic area of Chesapeake,
Norfolk, Portsmouth, Suffolk, and Virginia Beach came out against the expansion of conditional
zoning, as well as, the introduction of road impact fees. Their opposition to conditional zoning
was based on four reasons. First, "[c]onditional zoning will increase the costs of home ownership
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and industrial development". Second, "[c]onditional zoning will results in the double taxation of
citizens who are already shouldering the largest percentage of the state and local tax burden".
Third, "[c]onditional zoning increases the likelihood of discriminatory treatment, political
favoritism, and arbitrary acts". Lastly, "[c]onditional zoning generates a relatively insignificant
amount of new revenues". The Home Builders Association of Richmond (HBAR) wrote to
Delegate Watkins on January 20, 1989 to express their opposition to any piece of legislation that
involved the extension of conditional zoning and impact taxes. They framed their opposition in
terms of concern for housing affordability and ownership. R. Michael Pierce, President of HBAR
wrote, "[w]e urge you to oppose these issues! If the General Assembly truly wishes to help local
governments solve their fiscal problems, you should consider broad-based, large-revenue
producing measures such as a local option gasoline tax, local option sales tax, or Governor
Baliles' proposed one percent surcharge on state income tax .... This way, everyone pays a fair
share!"
The amendments added to HB 1484 also generated attention from interest groups, particularly
the local governments in Northern Virginia. On February 7, 1989, John H. Foote, Prince William
County's County Attorney wrote a memo to the county's Board of Supervisors in regard to
Delegate Miller's amendment. Foote warned that "[t]hese amendments may be extremely
adverse to land use practices in Northern Virginia as they have been evolved to the mutual
benefit of localities and landowners in the last decade. If they become law, it is my view that
they can have a significant, probably adverse effect on the economic boom we have experienced
in most 'old conditional zoning' localities." On the opposite side, Delegate Watkins, an
opponent to conditional zoning expansion and impact fees, responded to a constituent who
happened to be the president of a construction firm in a February 10, 1989 letter. He wrote:
"The second issue is conditional zoning (HB 1484). We were able to place an
amendment on that bill which developed specific conditions in which proffers
could be requested. This amendment limits considerably the scope of
conditional zoning. I supported the amendment, and the bill with the amendment
included. If the amendment is removed by the Senate, I intend to oppose this bill."
Upon reaching the Senate, the Committee on Local Government proposed its own amendments
to HB 1484 in place of the House's. The House amendments are struck from the bill and
replaced with wording that expands eligibility to additional localities while also removing any
restrictions on the conditional zoning regime that had existed since 1973. Eligible localities
would now include, " or any city adjoining such city or county or town located within such
county, or any county contiguous by land with at least three such counties and any towns in that
county, for the adoption[.]" This wording change by the Senate matches wording in the House
version, but the Senate rearranged its location in the eligible criteria. In regard to the wording on
the conditions attached to expansion of conditional zoning powers, the Senate originally agreed
to an amendment which struck those conditions imposed by the House from the legislation, but
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then an amendment was offered on the Senate floor to put them back with the following
wording:
" ; provided that in the counties and cities identified in (vii) above (i) all such
conditions are necessitated by and attributable to the rezoning and not by any
demand for public facilities which existed prior to said rezoning; (ii) all such
conditions are primarily for the benefit ofthe property subject to the rezoning;
(iii) all such conditions shall be in conformity with the comprehensive plan as
defined in § 15.1-446.1; and (iv) any such conditions relating to the provision of
public facilities, shall not become effective until made part of the local capital
improvement plan as provided by§ 15.1-464."
The amendment was offered by Senator William E. Fears (D) of Accomack County, as an
attempt by the home building lobby to attach some amount of conditions to the expansion of
conditional zoning powers. The first line of the amendment is important because it would only
impose restrictions on those localities who gained eligibility to use the "old" conditional zoning
regime by way of HB 1484. So localities in Northern Virginia and along the Eastern Shore
would not be affected by the new restrictions. Fears defended his amendment by stating, "I'm
coming down on the side of the builders, the developers, the real estate people and all other
people who are going to get hurt by this kind of legislation[.]" (Martz 1989b) Fears' amendment
died on the Senate Floor and the Senate passed the amended and unrestricted version of HB 1484
by a vote of 26-14.
The debate in the House on February 20, 1989, over whether to accept the Senate's amended
version was a verbal joust between Cranwell and all takers, particularly Dicks and Miller.
Cranwell encouraged House members to accept the Senate version because two of its
amendments were merely attempts to put the eligibility language in the correct order. The third
amendment stripped away the restrictive language out of the House amendment which had the
net effect of gutting the broad conditional zoning powers of Northern Virginia had. Dicks urged
the rejection of the Senate amendments on the grounds that the House in the legislative process
had already essentially passed Miller's amendments three times. Below is an example of the
back and forth in the debate:
Cranwell: The Gentleman from Shenandoah does not have an Argument, but
is draping himself in the flag of small builders. The small builders
can get along fine under this proposal. Big city lawyer from
richmond drafted the amendments to have us (local governing bodies
and taxpayers) subsidize the building industry. Builders ought to
pay their fair share. He doesn't want to help the taxpayer who has
to bear the burden of the infrastructure.
Miller: If the system is really voluntary, what would keep developers from
doing what they are doing now?
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Cranwell: The gentlemen knows this is a Dillon's Rule state and without the
authority from the state, they can not accept cash or land dedication.
Nothing prohibits cash proffer, But sets up a situation where that is
going to require - First, all proffers would have to go through amendment
process to the comprehensive plan. Second, amend CIP
and commit itself to certain capital improvements in order to
accommodate builder who wants to intensify the use of land going beyond
the planning process of a locality. Wants to put the handcuffs
on local governing bodies so they have to subsidize. All rezoning are
going beyond the comprehensive plan.39
The majority of the House was unmoved by Cranwell's pleas and voted 44-52 to reject the
Senate version. Cranwell originally voted to approve the bill, but in a procedural move, he had
the Speaker of the House change his vote to No. So the final vote count was 43-53. VACo tried
to influence the final vote count. Barry R. Lawrence, Executive Director of VACo, wrote a letter
on February 21, 1989, to the House of Delegates members asking them to support the Senate's
amendments. He argued that
"[t]he amendments previously added to H.B. 1484 on the House floor were
rejected by the Senate because they would upset the public-private balance in
development practices provided for in 'old-style' conditional zoning. Should H.B.
1484 pass the General Assembly with the House amendments, the proffer system as it
currently exists in Northern Virginia will be effectively gutted, contributions from
developers will be dramatically reduced, and pressure on the General Assembly to
provide funds for local capital improvements will be dramatically intensified in future
years.... The Virginia Association of Counties respectfully urges your support in
removing the House floor amendments to H.B. 1484 and acceptance of the Senate
version of this legislation as originally proposed by Delegate Cranwell."
Dicks in a celebratory move sent a letter to members of the House on February 21, 1989 in
which he thanked them for their vote of "No" against the Senate amendments and outlined the
next moves for the bill. He wrote, "[b]y rejecting the Senate amendments, and holding the line
on your vote, the bill will either go into conference, or more than likely, the bill will die on the
calendar leaving Northern Virginia with the expanded conditional zoning under existing law.
The House amendments would restrict the application of the expanded conditional zoning as it
currently exists in Northern Virginia. If I move to reconsider the vote by which we rejected the
Senate amendments to HB 1484, please vote NO - not to reconsider - which will prevent the bill
from being reconsidered again."
39 The selection from this debate was transcribed by the author off of video recordings. Any mistakes are my own.
An official transcription of the debate was not available from the Virginia Division of Legislative Services.
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The Senate insisted upon its amendments and so a conference committee composed of members
from both chambers was initiated to salvage the legislation. The versions of the bill were
characterized as "The House, which voted 60-39 for this measure, would have limited those
'proffers' to whatever portion of the public costs is directly related to development. In a 26-14
vote, the Senate opted to give the localities more flexibility, enabling them to extract fees or
property according to public needs regardless of their direct connection to a particular project."
(Paust 1989b) This was when the horse-trading began between cash proffers and impact fees.
As HB 1484 was making its way through the legislative process, its "companion" bill, HB 1485
which is "A BILL to amend the Code of Virginia by adding in Chapter ]] of Title 15.1 an article
numbered 8.1, consisting of sections numbered 15.1-498.1 through 15.1-498.10, relating to
authorizing certain counties, cities, and towns to impose impact fees for road improvements" and
also sponsored by Del Cranwell was jumping through legislative hurdles, too. In fact from the
newspaper accounts, it was as if HB 1485 was providing protective cover for HB 1484 by taking
the majority of the heat in committee meetings and on the assembly floors. A Richmond Times-
Dispatch article from February 1, 1989 stated, "After more than three hours of testimony and
debate, the House of Delegates Committee on Counties, Cities and Towns voted 13-7 to approve
Cranwell's proposal to allow localities to levy 'impact fees' against developers to help pay for
road improvements required by growth" and then like an afterthought continues, "By the same
margin, it also approved Cranwell's bill to give localities the option of using conditional zoning
to negotiate with developers for public improvements" (Martz 1989a). The Daily Press, a
Newport News newspaper, echoed these sentiments when in a February 5th article, stated, "After
two hours of debate, and in separate votes, the delegates passed 60-30 a bill that would allow
localities to impose conditional zoning, and a 59-40 a measure that would provide localities with
the alternative of levying impact fees for development.... Most of the debate was on the impact
fee bill, which was considered first, although the same arguments applied to both measures."
(Paust 1989a)
Similar to HB 1484 which had different versions passed by each chamber, the HB 1485
legislation passed by the Senate Finance Committee would apply only to localities in Northern
Virginia while the House version allowed all localities with at least a ten percent growth rate
(Paust 1989c). HB 1485 also ended up in conference committee like HB 1484 when the full
Senate passed the Northern Virginia only impact fee bill as opposed to the growth rate version of
the House. On the next last day of the 1989 General Assembly session, a compromise was
achieved between HB 1484 and HB 1485 which left some localities out in the cold. Richmond
Times-Dispatch reported, "Cranwell succeeded in cutting back House amendments that would
have restricted conditional zoning powers not only where they are newly granted, but also in
areas that have used them for more than 15 years. The trade-off was that no localities outside of
Northern Virginia would be given the power to levy impact fees.... Under the compromise, any
locality using broad conditional zoning would have to adopt a five-year capital-improvements
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program. The rezoning agreement must specify how such property is to be used. The locality
wouldn't gain the title to the property until the project was included in the capital-improvements
program.... However, Dicks also made clear that all deals were off if Cranwell tried to expand
use of impact fees outside Northern Virginia. 'Impact fees were an important part of the overall
compromise,' he said." (Martz 1989c) The compromise version of HB 1484 passed the House
by a vote of 84-12 with four delegates not voting and in the Senate 26-14.
The passage of HB 1484 ushered in the third regime of conditional zoning for eligible localities
in Virginia. Whereas the original piece of legislation and even the amended versions passed by
each chamber before the conference committee compromise would have affected § 15.1-491 (a)
of the State Code [the first conditional zoning regime], the legislation that arose out of the
conference committee and was subsequently passed by both chambers affected the State Code by
adding a new section § 15.1-491.2:1 and thus created the third regime. HB 1484 as approved by
the Governor on April 5, 1989, stated:
"1. That the Code of Virginia is amended by adding a section numbered
§ 15.1-491.2:1 as follows:
§ 15.1-491.2:1. Same; conditions as apart ofrezoning or zoning map
amendment in certain localities. -Except for those localities to which
§ 15.1-491(a) is applicable, this section shall apply to (i) any county or
city which has had population growth of ten percent or more from the
next-to-latest to latest decennial census year, based on population
reported by the United States Bureau of the Census, provided that until
the 1990 census is reported, any county or city instead may qualify only if
it has had an estimated population growth often percent or more from
1980 to the most recent year for which population estimates are available
from the Center for Public Service of the University of Virginia; (ii) any city
adjoining such city or county; (iii) any towns located within such county;
and (iv) any county contiguous with at least three such counties, and any
town located in that county.
In any such county, city, or town, notwithstanding any contrary provisions
of§ 15.1-491.2, a zoning ordinance may include and provide for the
voluntary proffering in writing, by the owner, ofreasonable conditions,
prior to a public hearing before the governing body, in addition to the
regulations provided for the zoning district or zone by the ordinance, as a
part of a rezoning or amendment to a zoning map, provided that (i) the
rezoning itself gives rise to the need for the conditions; (ii) such conditions
have a reasonable relation to the rezoning; and (iii) all such conditions are
in conformity with the comprehensive plan as defined in § 15.1-446.1.
Once proffered and accepted as part of an amendment to the zoning
ordinance, such conditions shall continue in effect until a subsequent
amendment changes the zoning on the property covered by such
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conditions; however, such conditions shall continue if the subsequent
amendment is part of a comprehensive implementation of a new or
substantially revised zoning ordinance.
No proffer shall be accepted by a county, city, or town unless it has adopted
a capital improvement program pursuant to § 15.1-464 or local charter. In
the event proffered conditions include the dedication of real property or payment
of cash, such property shall not transfer and such payment of cash shall not be
made until the facilities for which such property is dedicated
or cash is tendered are included in the capital improvement program,
provided nothing herein shall prevent a county, city, or town from accepting
proffered conditions which are not normally included in such capital
improvement program. Ifproffered conditions include the dedication of real
property or the payment of cash, the proffered conditions shall provide for
the disposition of such property or cash payment in the event the property or cash
payment is not used for the purpose for which proffered
2. That the provisions of this act shall not apply to any application for rezoning filed
prior to July 1, 1989."
The restrictions, especially the link to the capital improvement plans, and eligibility requirements
are distinguishing features of the third conditional zoning regime, but even more important is the
expansion of the ability by localities to accept voluntary cash payments from developers as part
of a rezoning application, that is, cash proffers.
IMPLEMENTATION
The implementation stage of the political process model is important for showing how future
legislation is affected and shaped by the feedback derived from efforts at implementing state
statutes at the local level. Earlier in this section, I discussed how Fairfax County's conditional
zoning policies partially reshaped the issue context of conditional zoning for the first half of the
1980s. The argument could be made that this was an example better suited to the implementation
subsection. I choose to place it at the beginning of the issue context section because it was more
a case of tone-setting than about a specific piece of legislation. In comparison, the hearings held
by the General Assembly subcommittee and its subsequent report in 1988 are a case that
illustrates how implementation at the local level and its impacts, directly shaped specific
legislation in the 1989 General Assembly session. The 1988 hearings performed a role for the
1980s political process that was very similar to that of the 1977 hearings in the 1970s. The
passage of HB 1484 in 1989 which arose out of the 1988 hearings changed how conditional
zoning would be implemented for the remainder of the 1980s and into the 1990s.
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Prior to the hearings on conditional zoning in 1988 and the subsequent legislative battle in 1989,
the press coverage on conditional zoning or proffers in the electronic databases of the
Washington Post and major Virginia newspapers like the Richmond Times-Dispatch was very
sparse. Despite the presence of conditional zoning bills in almost every legislative session, the
majority of the media reported in the articles on how localities were coping with their conditional
zoning powers. For example, there was an article from 1986 on Henrico County's struggles to
determine "What is a proper proffer?" (Jones 1986). This local implementation theme continued
after 1986 illustrated by two articles focusing on Prince William County; one discusses the role
that conditional zoning could play in the downzoning of land to remove "stale zoning" while the
other mentions the usefulness that proffers have played in obtaining school sites from developers
as part of the rezoning application (Harris 1987; Digilio 1988).
Municipalities outside of Northern Virginia aimed to have the same revenue sources and legal
support as their fellow NOVA localities. Prior to the 1989 legislation, Chesterfield County, for
example, could accept land for a new school from a developer, but not receive any financial
assistance from the developer in the construction of a new school building. In a 1988 Richmond
Times-Dispatch article, the reporter wrote, "[a]lthough county officials are happy to get free land
for schools, there is still the expense of building them. 'That's the area where we need help - in
getting them (developers) to share the cost of the facilities. We don't have the strong legal
support to get them to do that,' Jacobson (Chesterfield's Planning Director) said" (Smith 1988).
In 1988, the General Assembly decided rather than take a definitive stand on the topic of
conditional zoning expansion and cash proffers during that legislative session, it would spend
time studying the topics and then bring them up for consideration in the 1989 General Assembly.
Their hesitation about expanding the eligibility criteria for the 1973 conditional zoning statute
(15.1-491(a)) stemmed from concerns over increasing house prices as a result of any extension
of conditional zoning and cash proffers. A joint legislative subcommittee headed by Delegate
Cranwell studied the issue of expansion along with other options under consideration including
"impact fees, across-the-board taxes on growth typically based on traffic count or number of
dwelling units stemming from the development, and transfer taxes, fees charged to record the
sale of property" (Booker 1988). The subcommittee was appointed under House Joint Resolution
No. 125 and charged to study "off-site road improvements, local zoning and subdivision
authority, and the impact of land development on the public infrastructure" (House Document
No 7 1990:1). The subcommittee was composed of a mix of Delegates, Senators, and private
citizens. Besides Delegate Cranwell, the subcommittee's chairman, the other Delegates were
Thomas M. Jackson, Jr. (D) of Wythe County and Robert Tata (R) of Virginia Beach. The Senate
was represented by Charles J. Colgan (D) of Prince William County and Mark L. Earley (R) of
Chesapeake. The final two members of the subcommittee were local government officials - Mr.
Joseph Alexander, member of the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors and Mr. Harold
Heischober, member of the Virginia Beach City Council. Alexander was also selected as the
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subcommittee's vice-chairman. Similar to the 1977 subcommittee that studied the expansion of
conditional zoning, this subcommittee held a series of public hearings across the state to gauge
public opinions. There were five hearings in all held beginning in July with Chesapeake followed
by Abingdon, Prince William, Charlottesville, and ending in Richmond in December.
The hearings played an important role in the subcommittee's recommendations and how the
legislation was shaped in the 1989 General Assembly Session. One conclusion reached was that
consequences of growth and development are not issues that affect the entire state. The
subcommittee reported, "[i]t appears to the joint subcommittee, however, that the primary
concern came from the groups of counties within or on the fringe of the Golden Crescent40 who
are experiencing spillover growth from the main metropolitan areas and who would fall within
the area which the joint subcommittee recommends for inclusion in its legislative
recommendations" (Virginia General Assembly 1990:3). While the subcommittee could agree
that "[t]he cost of expanding the public infrastructure to meet demand in the high growth areas
far exceeds the capacity of local governments from existing funding sources alone," they could
not come an agreement on how to fund the necessary capital improvements (Virginia General
Assembly 1990: 3). The second recommendation of the subcommittee was "[expand authority to
use the 'old' conditional zoning]" (Virginia General Assembly 1990:8). The subcommittee saw
three major benefits of the proffer system that other financing options did not possess. First,
there was "[fjlexibility in resolving site specific problems which may not be easily addressed
under general 'formula' approaches to developer contributions" (Virginia General Assembly
1990:10). Second, "[s]ignificant savings in time, as in direct land dedications or developer
construction of facilities rather than public acquisition or construction" (Virginia General
Assembly 1990:10). Lastly, "[s]ignificant reductions in litigation over land use and
development" because conditional zoning creates the opportunity for developers to offer
conditions to local governments that would mitigate issues which may otherwise result in
litigation (Virginia General Assembly 1990:10). It also came out in the hearings that if local
governments had to lose their conditional zoning authority in order to gain impact fee authority,
they would rather retain the conditional zoning. Local government support for conditional zoning
is rooted in the variety of things that these powers allow them to accomplish while impact fees
are purely sources of revenue.
Not all of the testimony on conditional zoning was positive. The development community
expressed their belief that "the 'unlimited' conditional zoning should be curtailed to bring it
more in line with the newer statute" (Virginia General Assembly 1990: 10). Despite their
concerns, the subcommittee did not recommend any specific changes to the 1973 statute that
40 Golden Crescent is defined as the geographic area that "runs from Washington, D.C. in the north and swings south
through the Richmond metropolitan area, then east to the Hampton Roads metropolitan area." Source: Virginia
Department of Emergency Management. 2008. Commonwealth of Virginia Emergency Operations Plan, Standard
and Enhanced Hazard Mitigation Support Annex 3. Volume 2: p. 5-3. Last accessed November 19, 2008,
httD://www.vaemerzencv.com/librarv/nlans/coveoD/enh mit Dlan 0307/5 Local Plans SRL Rev070308.pdf.
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would have imposed restrictions on the existing conditional zoning system. The lack of action
stemmed from an agreement reached by a task force created by the subcommittee composed of
Northern Virginia local governments, developers, and others interested parties which stated that
they would resolve their differences within each individual locality rather than at the state
legislature. Thus the subcommittee's recommended change to 15.1-491 (a) was the addition of
another eligibility category - "or (vii) any county, city or town to whom Article 8.1 of this
chapter is applicable, for the adoption" (Virginia General Assembly 1990: A-20). Article 8.1
would be a new section to the state code entitled, "Road Impact Fees" where applicability is
defined as
"any county or city which has had population growth of ten percent or more from
the next to latest to latest decennial census year, based on population reported by
the United States Bureau of the Census. However, this measurement shall not be
used until after the Bureau has reported the 1990 census. Until the 1990 census is
reported, any county or city instead may qualify if it has had an estimated
population growth of ten percent or more from 1980 to the most recent year for
which population estimates are available from the Center for Public Service of the
University of Virginia. This article shall also apply to any city adjoining such
city or county, or any town located within such county" (Virginia General Assembly
1990: A22-23).
The subcommittee had now tied expansion of "old" conditional zoning authority to population
growth rates and their geographic spillover rather than a blanket statewide extension. Not all of
the subcommittee's members agreed with its final recommendations. Heischober, the
subcommittee member who was a Virginia Beach city councilman at the time and former mayor,
wrote his own white paper entitled, The Misleading Lure ofImpact Fees and Unlimited Proffer
Zoning to accompany the subcommitttee's final report. His overall recommendation was that
"the Committee turn its attention to a comprehensive solution involving the many different
sources of revenue which have been previously identified as the way to proceed, rather than
altering state law in a manner with such severe consequences" (Heischober 1989: 5). Finally, the
subcommittee's Acknowledgements section outlined the potential players in the expansion
debate for the 1989 General Assembly Session. On the local government side, the organizations
represented outside of individual local government and planning commissions were VML,
VACo, VAPA, and the Rural Planning Caucus. For the development and business community,
the subcommittee called attention to the Virginia Home Builders Association (HBAV), the
Northern Virginia Building Industries Association, and the Virginia Association of Realtors. In
expectation of how difficult passage would be for their legislative recommendations, Delegate
Cranwell and Senator Colgan sent a joint memo on January 25, 1989 to all of the members of the
General Assembly that asked for them to keep an open mind during the legislative proceedings.
They wrote, "[y]ou will be contacted, if not already, by special interest groups urging you to vote
against the legislation. We would appreciate it if you would (i) read the reports and (ii) not make
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any commitment until you have had an opportunity to hear all the merits and demerits of the
legislation."
While the appointment of another committee to study the issue may have signaled a step forward
in the multiple attempts to pass expansion legislation, not all localities rejoiced at the news. In
fact, the announcement generated fear among Fairfax County officials that their current system
would be heavily modified or removed in the 1989 General Assembly session. As a result they
sought to develop strategies to protect the system which had brought in hundreds of millions of
dollars in contributions from developers over the years (Anderson 1988). Their fear was based
on the fact that "developers and other powerful groups in Richmond generally do not like
conditional zoning" (Anderson 1988). The rationale behind the possible extension was that
"some of Virginia's developing jurisdictions need more money to pay for public works
improvements necessitated by rapid urban growth" (Anderson 1988). This set the stage for the
showdown in the 1989 General Assembly session where localities battled each other and
developers fought everyone.
At the end of 1983, the number of localities eligible to use conditional zoning under the 1973
statute (15.1-491(a)) reached fifteen. Legislation passed in 1988 increased the number to twenty-
five local governments ranging from counties, cities, and towns. The enactment of HB 1484 in
1989 set up a new conditional zoning system that was a hybrid of the 1973 statute and 1978
statute. By combining the number of localities who became eligible to accept cash proffers under
the enactment of the 1989 statute with those of the 1973 statute, there were at the end of the
1980s, a total of one hundred and fifty eligible local governments (47 counties, 29 cities, and 74
towns). The number of localities who actually took the steps in 1989 to implement their newly
bestowed authority was far below the number eligible.
Despite the authority for impact fees in HB 1485 limited to the Northern Virginia region,
Chesterfield and Henrico counties were happy with the extension of conditional zoning powers
under HB 1484. In March 1989, State Senator Robert E. Russell, R-Chesterfield, was quoted as
saying, "This bill has enormous benefits for the county. It basically will allow the county to say
to the developer, 'You've got to pay your own way.' . . . This bill is going to allow the costs of
development to be allocated to the developers rather than asking residents who already live here
to subsidize new development through increased real estate taxes." (Osborn 1989) Chesterfield's
Planning Director, Thomas E. Jacobson said of the legislation, "We'll get tremendous new tools
to better pay for the public cost of development." (Osborn 1989) Although they embraced the
ability to use cash proffers, Henrico in 1989 saw their approach as more slow and cautious.
Ronald J. Dahlstedt, Henrico's Planning Director, tells the Richmond Times-Dispatch, "The
county has no immediate plans to begin using the cash proffer system, although the county
attorney is examining its legal aspects. 'I think we're taking a slower pace.... We've done very
well under the old proffer system. I'm not saying we don't have growth problems, but they're not
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to the magnitude of Chesterfield's particularly in residential growth.'." (Sauder 1989a) In fact,
Henrico would wait and see how Chesterfield developed its policies and what success they
achieved with it. Chesterfield became the test case for the Richmond region, as well as, other
localities over the state.
Given the mixed feelings of local governments on the legislative success of conditional zoning
power expansion coupled with the failure to extend impact fees beyond Northern Virginia, one
might wonder how the home builders viewed the completed 1989 General Assembly session. As
mentioned earlier, the new conditional zoning power was more structured than its predecessor
with the requirement of the adoption of a five year capital improvement program with any
proposed proffer projects included in the program. The restructuring was the influence of the
homebuilding/real estate/development lobbies. Rick Sauder for the Richmond Times-Dispatch in
July 1989 writes, "Although the development industry is opposed to cash proffers in principle, it
has accepted the new law as a better system than the one being used in Northern Virginia. 'If we
had to have something, this was a far better system than the open-ended system in Northern
Virginia,' said Bambi L. Barnette, legislative and political coordinator for the Home Builders
Association of Richmond." (Sauder 1989b) Localities in Northern Virginia were considered to
have used their powers more broadly than intended with extracting proffers for improvements
that were not a result of new development. Additionally, the legislation that was passed in late
February 1989, was designed to take effect on July 1, 1989. This delay gave developers extra
time to get their rezoning applications in order to evade the rising costs of development.
Localities tried to implement rezoning moratoriums in order to prevent a flood of rezoning
applications, but they were not effective. In Chesterfield alone, the applications totaled over
6,200 acres of virgin land amounting to more than 10,000 lots which would bring the total
number of lots not subject to proffers in the county up to roughly 30,000.
Localities again looked to guidance from the Virginia Attorney General on how to navigate the
multitude of conditional zoning statutes. In 1989, the county attorneys for Fauquier County,
Powhatan County, Isle of Wight County, and Charles City County wrote separately to the
Attorney General with questions on how to interpret the statutes in regard to different issues that
would affect their county's use of conditional zoning. Fauquier County actually twice sought the
opinion of the Attorney General. Table 6.3 below summarizes the questions asked of the
Attorney General by the localities, as well as, the Attorney General's opinions. The motivations
for the questions range from actual cases in the specific locality to the actions of other
jurisdictions. For example, Fauquier's first letter to the Attorney General was prompted by the
county's finding that "the authority of counties to accept gifts has been interpreted in some
jurisdictions as limiting the effect of the prohibition in 15.1-491.2 against conditioning a
rezoning on cash contributions by a zoning applicant" (Virginia Office of the Attorney General
1989: 91). Rather than just blindly follow the actions of other localities which may be violating
state code, Fauquier sought the opinion of the Attorney General. While the Virginia Attorney
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General's opinion may be one legal interpretation out of multiple opinions, localities by
proactively seeking it out are attempting to provide a firmer foundation for their conditional
zoning system and discourage any attacks upon it by the development community whether
through future legislation at the state level or lawsuits in the courts.
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Table 6.3. Opinions of the State Attorney General on Conditional Zoning Usage by Virginia Localities
Date of Attorney Addressee of Question(s) of Attorney General Summary of Opinion
General Opinion Opinion asked by Addressee
January 24, 1989 Fauquier County "[W]hether cash contributions may be offered by "15.1-491.2 expressly prohibits the voluntary written
developers and accepted by a county as part of proffer of cash contributions as part of the conditional
the conditional zoning process in those counties zoning process ..... [T]he attempt to avoid this
having general conditional zoning authority under prohibition, by accepting cash gifts as a condition of
15.1-491.1 through 15.1-491.6 of the Code of rezoning, violates 15.1-491.2. In the appropriate
Virginia?" circumstances, therefore, the acceptance of a cash
contribution as a gift may call into question the
validity of conditional zoning action."
February 16, 1989 Isle of Wight County "[W]hether certain proffers made by a rezoning "[P]romises to pay for off-site road improvements or
applicant as part of the conditional zoning to pay impact fees to the County are unenforceable
process for off-site improvements and impact fees even voluntarily proffered as a part of the conditional
are legally enforceable by a county when the rezoning process. It is further my opinion that the
proffers were made voluntarily, the proffer promise not to contest the future enforceability of
document includes a promise not the contest the prohibited proffers also would be unenforceable....
future enforcement of the proffers, and the Finally, defenses available to the rezoning applicant to
proffers are supported by a surety bond?" contest the enforceability of proffered conditions also
would be available to a surety."
March 21, 1989 Fauquier County "[W]hether a county may amend its zoning "[Z]oning enabling statutes authorize a local
ordinance to require that any person applying for government to adopt, as part of a zoning ordinance,
rezoning under the conditional zoning process reasonable procedural provisions governing the
submit any voluntary written proffers seven days administration of the ordinance. These procedural
prior to the public hearing held by the board of provisions must be consistent with the express
supervisors on the application?" statutory requirements concerning the amendment of a
zoning ordinance.... [A] county may amend its
zoning ordinance to require that any person applying
for rezoning under the conditional zoning process
must submit any voluntary written proffers seven days
prior to the public hearing held by the board of
supervisors on the application."
May 9, 1989 Powhatan County Question 1 Answer to Question 1
"[W]hether 15.1-491(a) applies to Powhatan "[T]he provisions of 15.1-491(a) authorizing a
County?" conditional zoning process do not apply to Powhatan
County."
Question 2
"[W]hether 15.1-491.2:1 applies to Powhatan Answer to Question 2
County?" "15.1-491.2:1 applies to Powhatan County.
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Question 3 Answer to Question 3
"[W]hether the proffered conditions authorized "15.1-491.2:1 authorizes proffered conditions
by 15.1-491.2:1 include the dedication of real including the dedication of real property or the
property or the payment of cash as a part of the payment of cash subject to the limitations provided
conditional zoning process?" for in the statute."
August 9, 1989 Charles City County Question 1 Answer to Question 1
"[W]hether a property owner may limit the There are two options available outside of conditional
development of his property, other than by a zoning. The first is restrictive covenants, but these are
conditional zoning proffer, to a density less than "subject to private enforcement and a local
that allowed by its current zoning where the government generally would not have standing to
limitation is enforceable by the local enforce the recorded development limitations." Open-
government?" space easements are the second option whereby "[i]f a
property owner chooses to donate or sell open-space
Question 2 easements to a local government, the resulting
"[W]hether conditional zoning proffers may be restrictions on the development of the property would
submitted during a recess of a public hearing at be enforceable by the local government."
which a rezoning application involving the
property for which the proffers are submitted is Answer to Question 2
being considered?" "15.1-491.2 would not permit the rezoning applicant
to submit proffers for the first time during a public
hearing.... [P]roffers may be submitted during a
recess of the public hearing, provided the amended
rezoning application, including the written proffers, is
properly advertised pursuant to 15.1-431 prior to the
reconvening of the public hearing."
CONCLUSION
In the eyes of the home builders, the conditional zoning legislation in Virginia progressed from
being a great asset to them to a form of extortion in the span of fifteen years. Maria Osborn
summarized this progression in 1989 article for the Richmond Times-Dispatch. She wrote,
"Northern Virginia builders supported the implementation of conditional zoning when it was
approved in the mid-I 970s. For them, it was a way to bargain with local governments who were
hearing calls for no more growth from their residents. Developers wanted conditional zoning 'in
order to be able to make offers to the local government that they couldn't refuse,' Snyder said.
'It's worked reasonably well.' Yet the process has since changed - for the worse, he said. 'The
developers are being asked to pay, more and more, for what was formerly public costs....
Conditional zoning has evolved up here into a system of negotiated impact fees.'." (Osborn
1989) With conditional zoning authority involving the ability to accept cash proffers expanded
to the majority of localities in the state, the 1990s would be a decade of monitoring, statute
tweaking, and legal challenges. University of Richmond Law Review in its 1989 summer volume
alluded to what was ahead: "Both the cost and pace of real estate development in Virginia will
undoubtedly foster many legislative initiatives and judicial attacks throughout the next decade"
(Theobald and Rothenberg 1989: 808).
In terms of the political process, itself, I would argue that given the language of the conditional
zoning bills as they were introduced in the 1980s legislative sessions and what was enacted, local
governments were short-changed. While there was never a bill to extend the 1973 conditional
zoning statute (15.1-491(a)) statewide, HB 1484 in its original language would have expanded
this unrestricted form of conditional zoning to localities based on their growth rates. The enacted
version of HB 1484 retained the growth rate eligibility language, but created a more restricted
form of the 1973 statute. There was the same occurrence for the road impact fees legislation. HB
1485 went from being applicable to any jurisdiction with at least a ten percent decennial growth
rate to counties with a population over 500,000. The only local governments who did not lose out
in the 1980s were those in the Northern Virginia region. As an interest group, local governments
did have enough influence to ensure some conditional zoning legislation was enacted. Given that
enacted conditional zoning legislation was largely amended in ways that benefited the
development community, I would conclude that for the 1980s their influence level at the points
of agent interaction in the political process was greater than that of local governments as an
interest group. Finally, conditional zoning's identity which had been multifaceted in the 1970s
becomes by the end of the 1980s dominated by cash proffers. Conditional zoning was never
envisioned as a tool for revenue raising, but through the acceptance of cash proffers and the
debate over who should be eligible to accept them, it becomes rebranded as such a tool.
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CHAPTER 7
Unlike the 1970s and 1980s, conditional zoning did not fundamentally change during the 1990s.
Instead, this was a period of adjustment for local governments and interest groups to the
expanded conditional zoning powers of jurisdictions under the 1989 state statute (15.1-491.2:1).
Local governments eligible to accept cash proffers increased from 6 counties, 5 cities, and 14
towns concentrated in the Northern Virginia region and the Eastern Shore to 41 counties, 24
cities, and 60 towns the stretched from the Atlantic coastline to the Blue Ridge Mountains. The
focus in the state legislature was on statutory changes that affected how the systems would be
run rather than issues of eligibility. Legislative efforts to expand eligibility focused on road
impact fees system rather than conditional zoning. Interest groups spent more time monitoring
what was taking place at the local level. Finally, following in the 1980s a period of few legal
challenges, the courts reemerged during the 1990s to establish new precedent on how local
governments should conduct their conditional zoning systems involving cash proffers.
ISSUE CONTEXT AND EMERGENCE
While legislation after the 1973 conditional zoning statute was aimed at correcting the perceived
liberties that Fairfax County took with its conditional zoning system, the legislation of the 1990s
was in a way rooted in how Chesterfield County developed and operated its "new" conditional
zoning system authorized under the 1989 state statute. In October 1978, Chesterfield adopted an
ordinance allowing conditional zoning in the county under the 1978 state statute (15.1-491.2). As
a result, there was familiarity in the county with conditional zoning and the types of restrictions
imposed on its use by the state legislature. "New" conditional zoning was set to become effective
on July 1, 1989. Chesterfield had a schedule for consideration by the Board of Supervisors of an
amendment to the zoning ordinance to allow for the new form of conditional zoning along with
an implementation policy at a July 26, 1989 public hearing. The whole schedule for adoption
was based around a series of five dates that began on June 14, 1989 with a work session of the
Board of Supervisors. Chesterfield's fast-track schedule toward adoption shows the importance
and impatience held for finally being able to accept cash proffers. A June 9, 1989 memo showed
that the County was going to set a "minimum reasonable proffer" level of $3,000 per dwelling
unit for schools and necessary and road improvements, but that the actual proffer amount could
go as high as the full public facility cost per dwelling unit (John C. Watkins Papers).
Furthermore, if the proposed project was not consistent with the adopted Comprehensive Plan,
then proffers in larger amount should be considered. All non-residential development involving
cash proffers would be on a case-by-case basis. Underlying the county's cash proffer policy
calculations was the assumption "that residential development will occur in a planned and
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orderly pattern, consistent with the adopted County Comprehensive Plan. If residential
development occurs in a leapfrog, urban sprawl pattern, the cost of constructing public capital
facilities to serve new residential development would be substantially higher" (Chesterfield
County Planning Department, June 1989, Memo, 3, John C. Watkins Papers).
Chesterfield's Board of Supervisors adopted its ordinance allowing cash proffers on August 23,
1989. The delay in adoption from the proposed July date may have been due to the involvement
of interest groups. In a letter dated September 8, 1989, Steven L. Micas, the County Attorney,
wrote to Delegate John C. Watkins about the county's ordinance adoption and stated, "[tlhe
ordinance is virtually identical to the state enabling legislation and includes several revisions
recommended by Carl Bowmer from the Virginia Homebuilders Association" (John C. Watkins
Papers). Similar to Fairfax County's entanglements with the development community in the
early 1980s that led to a threat by the development community of resolving things at the state
legislature, Delegate Watkins had similar words for Chesterfield in regard to elements of its
ordinance and potential proffer policy. The dispute between Watkins and Chesterfield County
centered on the disposition of cash proffers and non-cash proffers that end up not being used for
the specific capital improvement project that they were originally proffered towards. Watkins felt
that Chesterfield was not adhering to the initial intent of the legislation and thus stated in a letter
to Micas on September 21, 1989, "I feel certain that if Chesterfield County continues to pursue
this formulation of an ordinance development for proffers, the General Assembly will amend the
required statutes to insure that this is not allowed" (John C. Watkins Papers). Micas responded to
Watkins in a September 29, 1989 that indicated the County had made a wording change to its
policy which he hoped, "allays your fear that Chesterfield County intends to use proffered
property or cash for capital improvements unrelated to the underlying zoning request. I assure
you that this is not the case" (John C. Watkins Papers).
While the adoption of the ordinance that allowed cash proffers attracted minimal attention in the
press, Chesterfield's consideration of a cash proffer policy received a full-court press of attention
from the development community and new media coverage from January 1990 to March 1990.
Part of the heavy press coverage was due to the county's efforts to gain impact fee authorization
during the 1990 General Assembly session. Cash proffer policy and impact fee authority became
intertwined. The Home Builders Association of Richmond (HBAR) took out ads in the
newspapers that urged Chesterfield residents to contact the Board of Supervisors and attend the
public hearings to voice their opposition to cash proffers in the county (See Figure 7.1). They
introduced the argument that cash proffers were really taxes in disguise and that "mom and pop"
businesses would be endangered by them. Delegate Watkins responded to a phone call from his
constituents on their opposition to cash proffers in Chesterfield County by writing in a letter, "I
agree with your position entirely. I believe the method Chesterfield County is utilizing is not
only inappropriate but is probably illegal. I feel growth must pay for itself, but I also believe
there are no free rides on the backs of growth and development. The county needs to bring the
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assessment rates up to par as well as the tax rates. Cash proffers are not the only answer" (John
C. Watkins to Mr. and Mrs. Elwood Cox, January 19, 1990, John C. Watkins Papers).
1990 Newspaper Ad from the Home Builders Association of Richmond
Small Business Threatened
By Effects Of New Tax.
If the Chesterfield Board of Supervisors has
its way and enacts "cash proffers on new homes.
small business, as well as new home buyers, will
he at risk.
Cosh proffesare nothing but disguised taxes
Levied on new home buyers to help for ads,
schools and other public fcilties. not only
drive up the price of homes. but increase down
payments, mortgage payments, aome fees,
cloia estate taxesas wet
Allof which means fewer people would be
able to qualify for new homes in the county. And
those who could, would have less disposable
income. This would affect every business in the
county. Large or small. Fewer people, fewer dollars.
All suffer. Only the strong survive. Cood-bye
mom and pop operations.
Fewer New Homes Means Loss Of
Money, Jobs And Opportunities.
Conservatively assuming that cash proffers
would result in a drop in new construction of 1%.
over $13,600,000 would be lost to the county's
economy, in addition to the loss of over 100 jobs.
Downturns in the econotmy and employment hit
small business hardest-
What's more, corporate relocators who deem
affordable housinga major factor for moving peo-
ple and opening offices might look elsewhere.
Construction-related service industries and all
The Home Budder Association of Rihmond. 264-2821
retail establishments would be the losers.
Let Growth Pay For Itself.
Let's continue to let growth pay for itself and
move forward with the sound programs that have
made Chesterfield County one of the most stable
and productive counties in Virginia. This way a
healthy economy will not be threatened and the
continued success ofsmall business will not be
unjusdy jeopardized.
Before the Board meets, January 25, speak
out against cash proffers by writing to the Board
at P.O. Box 40, Chesterfield, VA 23832. Or call
the Home Builders Association at 264-2821. And
attend the public hearings to follow That way,
mom and pops can stay in business.
Source: The Richmond News Leader. 1990. Advertisement. January 15.
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The effort in Chesterfield County by the development industry was so widespread because
Chesterfield was seen as the tipping point for the use of cash proffers in other localities. The
president of the HBAR, Barry Bishop was quoted, "I think every locality will look at the
opportunity to pull in some more money" (Smith 1990b). The Richmond Times-Dispatch
described the scene at a hearing on January 2 4th, 1990, "For three hours ... 23 speakers
associated with the home building and real estate industries told the supervisors that cash
proffers and impact fees would make housing unaffordable for many buyers, raise the price of all
homes in the county - choking off sales - and ultimately cripple the home building industry. The
speakers packed the supervisors' meeting room and the crowd of more than 250 spilled out into
the hallway. More than a dozen people marched outside of the courthouse carrying signs reading
'Citizens Against Double Taxes' and 'Save Our Jobs"' (Smith 1990a).
At the February hearing, interest groups outside of the home builders shared their opposition to
cash proffers. These interest groups were composed of bankers, insurance salesmen, contractors,
and real estate agents. The livelihoods of these individuals depended upon a healthy residential
housing market. It was summed up by commercial real estate official, "Residential drives light
industrial, retail and office development .... It's a very delicate balance. It appears that cash
proffers would have an impact on residential demand. And as you retard residential, so you
retard commercial" (Smith 1990c). The decision by the Chesterfield Board of Supervisors on
setting their cash proffer policy, however, was delayed in wait for passage of impact fee
legislation for the county. While the county aggressively fought for the authority to accept cash
proffers, their deference to impact fees showed the county's preferred infrastructure financing
tool. As one reporter wrote, "The supervisors are more interested in impact fees because that
would allow them to collect fees on the 39,000 vacant home lots in the county that have either
been rezoned or are contained in pending zoning requests that would escape cash proffers....
Several supervisors indicated they wanted to wait until the General Assembly recesses next
month before taking final action on the cash proffer proposal" (Smith 1990c).
On March 1 4 th, 1990, Board of Supervisors of Chesterfield County adopted a cash proffer policy
which would allow the county to accept up to $2,000 per home lot through June 30, 1991. There
would be an annual review of the amount which the Board preliminarily set to increase to $3,000
per lot on July 1, 1991 and $4,000 per lot on July Is', 1992. The vote was 4-1. However, the
adoption of the policy created mixed feelings among the supervisors. The Richmond Times-
Dispatch reported, "Early in last night's debate, Geoffrey H. Applegate, the Clover Hill District
Supervisor, suggested delaying action on cash proffers for one year to wait for another shot at
impact fees. 'I don't want to give the citizens of this county false hope that by adopting cash
proffers we're going to solve the problems.... If those 39,000 lots are developed, we have to
way to control it.' But [Supervisor Maurice B.] Sullivan [of Midlothian] and Harry G. Daniel,
the Dale District supervisor, said Chesterfield should defray growth-related costs by using any
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methods state law allows. 'It's not anybody's idea of a perfect solution, but it's a start,' said
Daniel" (Smith 1990f).
The amount of the cash proffer was smaller than what was originally proposed in 1989 ($3,000)
and the figure of $4,724 calculated in 1990 by the county's planning staff ($3,224 for municipal
services and $1,500 for road improvements). Interest groups also had their varying takes on what
the appropriate proffer amount should be. At one point, the Home Builders Association of
Richmond in a report recommended a maximum cash proffer amount of $797 per home. Paul
Tischler, a consultant, for HBAR calculated that the amount should be $1,153 per lot, but an
amount up to $1,915 could be justified (Smith 1990e). Tischler admitted that the difference
between his number and the county's was the length of time that tax credits would be applied
against the costs of capital facilities. He spread the credits over an additional five years (Smith
1990c).
The final amount of the cash proffer may also have been influenced by the Chesterfield Business
Council weighing in two days before the vote at the hearing with its reluctant support for a cash
proffer amount of $2,000 per lot. The council according to the Richmond Times Dispatch said in
a statement, " 'In summary, a cash proffer is a politically expedient, though ineffectual, method
for raising revenue.... If the Board of Supervisors feels compelled to adopt a cash proffer, the
Business Council would reluctantly support a $2,000 cap"' (Smith 1990e). The Council went on
to state, "[we want to] participate in the development of a long-term comprehensive funding
plan, including legislation for an appropriate impact fee, which would eliminate cash proffers, a
real estate tax rate that properly reflects the actual cost of services ... and other measures that
will solve the county's budgetary problems"' (Robertson 1990).
Interest groups sought to remain involved after the initial cash proffer policy level was set.
HBAR sent a letter to the Chairman of Chesterfield's Board of Supervisors. The letter stated,
"The Home Builders Association of Richmond would like to state that although we are not in
total agreement with the County's adopted Cash Proffer Policy, we would appreciate the
opportunity to participate in the annual review of the proffer policy and evaluation of the
amount" (Barry I. Bishop and J. Russell Parker, III, to C. F. Currin, Jr., March 27, 1990, John C.
Watkins Papers).
Cash proffer policy adoption was overshadowed by Chesterfield's failure to gain impact fees.
While the bill was carried over to the 1991 General Assembly Session rather than outright killed,
it can be argued that the failure was the result of the state's adherence to Dillon's Rule and the
conservative nature of the state legislature. The conservative nature was exemplified in the state
legislature's take it slow approach to new tools. The 1990 bill for Chesterfield County would
have changed the county's charter to allow it to charge impacts fees to fund either transportation
improvements or new school construction. Opposition stemmed from the fact that the impact fee
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for roads in Northern Virginia approved in 1989 had not yet been put into action. The effective
date of the impact fee statute (15.1-498.1 to 15.1-498.10) had been set for July 1, 1990. Delegate
C. Richard Cranwell (D) who had been a leader in the fight for impact fees in 1989 opposed on
the 1990 bill on the grounds, "We have no experience in how transportation impact fees even
work. Now we're fixing to take a quantum leap by applying impact fees to education" (Smith
1990d). Dillon's Rule prevents localities from conducting their own pilot programs because they
did not have the authority. Yet it creates a situation where local governments have to seek
permission from the state legislature if they want to be innovative. All of this feeds into the
second reason the opposition raised to Chesterfield's impact fee as stated by Cranwell, "If you
put this on for Chesterfield County, we're going to have to do it for every single county that will
come in here after that and we'll be piecemealing it across the state" (Smith 1990d). Dillon's
Rule lends itself to a desire for standardization. The legislative debates over the years have
shown that different parts of the state need tools specialized to their situation. All of which leads
to conflict between local needs and the desire of state legislators who would prefer to "have 'the
infrastructure problem' associated with rapid growth ... addressed statewide rather than for
individual localities" (Smith 1990d).
The third factor in the defeat was the power of interest groups exemplified by the development
industry. A Richmond Times-Dispatch article described their efforts, "Saying that the fees place
an unfair burden on their industry, Chesterfield's home builders have fought impact fees with all
their might for more than two years. They hired consultants and economists who have
prophesied the disappearance of affordable housing and a countywide recession if new taxes
increased home prices. They enlisted their friends in the General Assembly to stymie impact fee
legislation. Last year, Russell's impact fee bill was effectively buried by the House Committee
on Counties, Cities and Towns after it passed the Senate, and a variety of parliamentary
maneuvers by Russell to resurrect the bill were thwarted" (Smith 1990g).
AGENDA SETTING/ ALTERNATIVE SELECTION/ ENACTMENT
After the conditional zoning legislative milestones of the 1970s and the 1980s, the 1990s was
legislatively anticlimactic. There was an absence of a true legislative turning point. The
Chesterfield story showed how a jurisdiction could be torn between trying to implement the long
fought for conditional zoning authority and continuing a newer fight for the power to levy impact
fees. As a result, legislation could be broken into three categories - conditional zoning, impact
fees, and legislative studies. The number of conditional zoning bills introduced over this time
period decreased from the levels of prior decades. With three conditional zoning statutes
available to different sets of localities, the focus of the conditional zoning-related bills introduced
was on clarifying administrative procedures under each system. Some bills applied the same
statutory changes to all three systems while others were targeted at one particular statute. Impact
fee bills outnumbered conditional zoning bills. The agenda for impact fees targeted expansion of
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eligible jurisdictions and impact fee applicability. Legislators authorized legislative studies to
investigate claims about how localities were implementing conditional zoning, in particular,
issues of abusing their authority. In addition, studies delved further as to what a more expansive
use and conception of impact fees would mean for the state and localities. For the 1990s, the
argument could be made that the major interactions of interest groups on the issue of conditional
zoning took place outside the legislative stages of the political process model.
Legislative activity on conditional zoning in comparison to impact fees is a study of contrast for
the 1990s. Impact fees legislation was introduced in more legislative sessions than conditional
zoning from 1990 and 1999 as shown in Figure 7.2. In addition, there were seventeen impact
fees bills introduced for the decade compared to ten for conditional zoning. However, as depicted
in Figures 7.3 and 7.4, conditional zoning bills were more successful in achieving passage. The
passage rate for impact fees was roughly 6 percent (1 out of 17) while conditional zoning's was
50 percent (5 out of 10). The number of bills for each legislative session in Figures 7.3 and 7.4
do not match those shown in Figure 7.2 because of the fact that a bill can be introduced in one
legislative session, but its final legislative outcome (passage or failure) can be determined in a
later legislative session. This pattern of carrying over conditional zoning legislation to another
year quickly increased in use for the 1980s and has continued in the 1990s and now applied to
impact fees bills. Since this dissertation is about conditional zoning rather than impact fees, I do
not go into detail on the navigation of impact fee bills through the legislative process.
Table 7.1 provides a synopsis of the impact fee bills that were legislative failures. I included
impact fees in this discussion as a counterpoint to the legislative activity of the conditional
zoning bills and as a possible explanation for why the decline in the number of bills. The bills
aimed to move the existing legislative authority from solely road impact fees to impact fees for
schools and public safety. Further, there was an effort to expand eligibility from the Northern
Virginia region to other jurisdictions in the state. The one impact fee bill that achieved passage
was HB 209 in the 1992 legislative session. As Chapter 465 in the 1992 Acts of the Assembly,
HB 209 amended the impact fee statutes (15.1-498.2 to 15.1-498.10) with changes to the
administration of impact fees such as the creation of an impact fee advisory committee in the
jurisdiction, as well as, impact fee service area. There was no expansion of eligibility or impact
fee types.
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Figure 7.2. Total Number of Conditional Zoning and Impact Fee Bills Introduced by Legislative
Session
10 -
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
2
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
EConditional Zoning DImpact Fees
Source: Author's calculations based on Journal of the House of Delegates and Journal of the Senate.
164
4
3
2 2 2
3
2
Figure 7.3. Conditional Zoning Bills by Legislative Outcome and Session
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Figure 7.4. Impact Fees Bills by Legislative Outcome and Session
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Table 7.1. Impact Fee Bill Legislative Failures in the 1990s
Bill Number
(Legislative Type of Impact Fee Eligibility Language (Original and Amended)
Session)
Senate Bill 48 School and Road Impact Fees Chesterfield County
(1990)
House Bill 1254 School and Road Impact Fees Chesterfield County
(1991)
House Bill 166 Road Impact Fees Any county having a population of 500,000 or more
(1992) as determined by the most recent U.S. Census, any
county or city adjacent thereto, any city contiguous
to such adjacent county or city, and any town within
such county or adjacent county and any county
having a population between 58,000 and 63,000.
House Bill 1138 School Impact Fees (i) any county having a population of 500,000 or
(1992) more as determined by the most recent United States
Census, any county or city adjacent thereto, any city
contiguous to such adjacent county or city, any town
within such county or adjacent county and (ii) any
county or city having a population of 200,000 or
more as determined by the most recent United States
Census.
Senate Bill 340 School Impact Fees Original
(1992) Any county or city (i) with a population of 80,000 or
more, and (ii) which has had a population growth of
twenty percent or more from the next-to-latest to
latest decennial census year, base on population
reported by the United States Bureau of the Census
Amendment
Any county with a county charter and a population in
excess of 200,000
House Bill 1544 School Impact fees Any county having a population between 16,400 and
(1993) 17,000, or between 48,000 and 50,000 .... No such
ordinance shall become effective in the county until a
referendum is held on the question and approved by
a majority of those voting in such election.
House Bill 1780 Road Impact Fees Any county having a population of 500,000 or more
(1993) as determined by the most recent U.S. Census, any
county or city adjacent thereto, any city contiguous
to such adjacent county or city, and any town within
such county or adjacent county and any county
having a population between 58,000 and 63,000.
House Bill 683 Road, School, and Public Safety Any county having a population of 500,000 or more
(1994) Impact Fees as determined by the most recent U.S. Census, any
county or city adjacent thereto, any city contiguous
to such adjacent county or city, and-any town within
such county or adjacent county and any county
having a population between 48,000 and 50,000
House Bill 1782 Road, School, and Public Safety Any county having a population of 500,000 or more
(1995) Impact Fees as determined by the most recent U.S. Census, any
county or city adjacent thereto, any city contiguous
to such adjacent county or city, and-any town within
such county or adjacent county and any county
having a population between 48,000 and 50,000
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House Bill 2187 Road Impact Fees Any county having a population of 500,000 or more
(1995) as determined by the most recent U.S. Census, any
county or city adjacent thereto, any city contiguous
to such adjacent county or city, and-any town within
such county or adjacent county, and any county
having a population between 58,000 and 62,000
House Bill 2234 Road and School Impact Fees Any county having a population of 500,000 or more
(1995) as determined by the most recent U.S. Census, any
county or city adjacent thereto, any city contiguous
to such adjacent county or city, and-any town within
such county or adjacent county and any city having a
population between 140,000 and 160,000.
House Bill 1049 Road Impact Fees Any county having a population of 500,000 or more
(1996) as determined by the most recent U.S. Census, any
county or city adjacent thereto, any city contiguous
to such adjacent county or city, and-any town within
such county or adjacent county, and any county
having a population between 58,000 and 62,000.
House Bill 1200 Road, School, and Public Safety Any county having a population of 500,000 or more
(1996) Impact Fees as determined by the most recent U.S. Census, any
county or city adjacent thereto, any city contiguous
to such adjacent county or city, and-any town within
such county or adjacent county, any county having a
population between 48,000 and 50,000 and any
county having a population between 6,600 and
7,000.
House Bill 440 Road Impact Fees (i) any county having a population of 500,000 or
(1998) more as determined by the most recent U.S. Census,
(ii) any county or city adjacent thereto, (iii) any city
contiguous to such adjacent county or city-and, (iv)
any town within such county or an adjacent county
and (v) any county having a population between
58,000 and 62,000
Senate Bill 693 School Impact Fees Original
(1998) Any locality operating a public school system
Amendment
Any county with a population between 80,000 and
90,000 may by ordinance, and only after approval by
voter referendum
Senate Bill 1137 Road and School Impact Fees (i) any county having a population of 500,000 or
(1999) more as determined by the most recent U.S. Census,
(ii) any county or city adjacent4her-ete to such
county, (iii) any city contiguous to such adjacent
county or city and (iv) any town within such county
or an adjacent county.
The dominant theme of conditional zoning legislation was minor statutory changes. Out of the
ten bills introduced, eight sought to amend the existing the statutes with language on
administrative concerns. The remaining two bills were eligibility expansion legislation with one
applicable to the 1973 statute (15.1-491(a)) and the other to the 1989 statute (15.1-491.2:1).
While I stated earlier that conditional zoning bills achieved a fifty percent passage rate for the
decade, in terms of amending the conditional zoning statutes, only four of the five actually did.
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This is an example of the legislative process at work. HB 2485 in 1995 was introduced as
making the same proposed change to all three separate conditional zoning statutes, but in the
legislative process, the language was removed by amendment and a non-conditional zoning-
related statute was amended instead. The bill became Chapter 603 of the 1995 Acts of the
Assembly. In total, the 1973 statute (15.1-491(a)) was successfully amended three times while
the 1989 statute (15.1-491.2:1) was twice and only once for the 1978 statute (15.1-491.2). Table
7.2 below provides a summary of the ten conditional zoning bills with their original and
amended language, as well as, legislative outcome.
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Table 7.2 Conditional Zoning Bills in the 1990s (Amend 15.1-491(a) or 15.1-491.1 to 15.1-491.6)
Bill Number ILegislative
(Legislative Patron(s) Legislative Language (Original and Amended) Outcome
Session)
House Bill 721
(1990)
Quillen Original
15.1-491(a)
... Once proffered and accepted as part of an amendment to the zoning ordinance, such conditions
and the zoning provisions then applicable shall continue in full force and effect until a subsequent
amendment, mutually agreed to by the landowner and the governing body, changes the zoning or
the conditions on the property covered by such conditions; provided, however, that such
conditions and the applicable zoning provisions shall continue if the subsequent amendment is
part of a comprehensive implementation of a new or substantially revised zoning ordinance.
15.1-491.2
... Once proffered and accepted as part of an amendment to the zoning ordinance, such conditions
and the zoning provisions then applicable shall continue in full force and effect until a subsequent
amendment, mutually agreed to by the landowner and the governing body, changes the zoning or
the conditions on the property covered by such conditions; provided, however, that such
conditions and the applicable zoning provisions shall continue if the subsequent amendment is
part of a comprehensive implementation of a new or substantially revised zoning ordinance.
15.1-491.2:1
... Once proffered and accepted as part of an amendment to the zoning ordinance, such conditions
and the zoning provisions then applicable shall continue in effect until a subsequent amendment,
mutually agreed to by the landowner and the governing body, changes the zoning or the
conditions on the property covered by such conditions; however, that such conditions and the
applicable zoning provisions shall continue if the subsequent amendment is part of a
comprehensive implementation of a new or substantially revised zoning ordinance.
Amendment
15.1-491(a)
... for the adoption, in counties, or towns, therein which have planning commissions, wherein the
urban county executive form of government is in effect, or in a city adjacent to or in a city
adjacent to or completely surround by such a contiguous county ... .Once proffered and
accepted as part of an amendment to the zoning ordinance, such conditions shall continue in full
foree and effect until a subsequent amendment changes the zoning on the property covered by
such conditions; provided, however, that such conditions shall continue if the subsequent
amendment is part of a comprehensive implementation of a new or substantially revised zoning
ordinance.
(al) In the event proffered conditions include a requirement for the dedication ofreal property of
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Approved by
Governor-
Chapter No.
868
substantial value, or substantial cash payments for or construction of substantial public
improvements, the need for which is not generated solely by the rezoning itself then no
amendment to the zoning map for the property subject to such conditions, nor the conditions
themselves, nor any amendments to the text of the zoning ordinance with respect to the zoning
district applicable thereto initiated by the governing body, which eliminate, or materially restrict,
reduce, or modify the uses, the floor area ratio, or the density of use permitted in the zoning
district applicable to such property, shall be effective with respect to such property unless there
has been mistake, fraud, or a change in circumstances substantially affecting the public health,
safety, or welfare.
(a2) Any landowner who has prior to July 1, 1990, proffered the dedication of real property of
substantial value, or substantial cash payments for or construction of substantial public
improvements, the need for which is not generated solely by the rezoning itself; but who has not
substantially implemented such proffers prior to July 1, 1990, shall advise the local governing
body by certified mail prior to July 1, 1991, that he intends to proceed with the implementation of
such proffers. Such notice shall identify the property to be developed, the zoning district, and the
proffers applicable thereto. Thereafter, any landowner giving such notice shall have until July 1,
1995, substantially to implement such proffers, or such later time as the governing body may
allow. Thereafter, the landowner in good faith shall diligently pursue the completion of the
development of the property. Any landowner who complies with the requirements of this
subdivision shall be entitled to the protection against action initiated by the governing body
affecting use, floor area ratio, and density set out in subdivision (a]), unless there has been
mistake, fraud, or a change in circumstances substantially affecting the public health, safety, or
welfare, but any landowner failing to comply with the requirements of this subdivision shall
acquire no rights pursuant to this section.
(a3) The provisions of subdivisions (a]) and (a2) of this section shall be effective prospectively
only, and not retroactively, and shall not apply to any zoning ordinance text amendments which
may have been enacted prior to March 10, 1990. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to
affect any litigation pending prior to July 1, 1990, or any such litigation nonsuited and thereafter
refiled
Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect or impair the authority of a governing body to:
1. Accept proffered conditions which include provisions for timing or phasing of dedications,
payments, or improvements; or
2. Accept or impose valid conditions pursuant to subsection (c) of this section or other provision
of law.
15.1-491.2
Once proffered and accepted as part of an amendment to the zoning ordinance, such conditions
shall continue in full-feree and effect until a subsequent amendment changes the zoning on the
property covered by such conditions; pFovided, however, that such conditions shall continue if the
subsequent amendment is part of a comprehensive implementation of a new or substantially
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revised zoning ordinance.
B. In the event proffered conditions include a requirement for the dedication of real property of
substantial value or construction of substantial public improvements, the need for which is not
generated solely by the rezoning itself then no amendment to the zoning map for the property
subject to such conditions, nor the conditions themselves, nor any amendments to the text of the
zoning ordinance with respect to the zoning district applicable thereto initiated by the governing
body, which eliminate, or materially restrict, reduce, or modify the uses, the floor area ratio, or
the density of use permitted in the zoning district applicable to such property, shall be effective
with respect to such property unless there has been mistake, fraud, or a change in circumstances
substantially affecting the public health, safety, or welfare.
C. Any landowner who has prior to July 1, 1990, proffered the dedication of real property of
substantial value or construction of substantial public improvements, the need for which is not
generated solely by the rezoning itself; but who has not substantially implemented such proffers
prior to July 1, 1990, shall advise the local governing body by certified mail prior to July 1, 1991,
that he intends to proceed with the implementation of such proffers. Such notice shall identify the
property to be developed, the zoning district, and the proffers applicable thereto. Thereafter, any
landowner giving such notice shall have until July 1, 1995, substantially to implement such
proffers, or such later time as the governing body may allow. Thereafter, the landowner in good
faith shall diligently pursue the completion of the development of the property. Any landowner
who complies with the requirements of this subdivision shall be entitled to the protection against
action initiated by the governing body affecting use, floor area ratio, and density set out in
subsection B, unless there has been mistake, fraud, or a change in circumstances substantially
affecting the public health, safety, or welfare, but any landowner failing to comply with the
requirements of this subdivision shall acquire no rights pursuant to this section.
D. The provisions of subsections B and C of this section shall be effective prospectively only, and
not retroactively, and shall not apply to any zoning ordinance text amendments which may have
been enacted prior to March 10, 1990. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to affect any
litigation pending prior to July 1, 1990, or any such litigation nonsuited and thereafter refiled.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect or impair the authority of a governing body to:
1. Accept proffered conditions which include provisions for timing or phasing of dedications,
payments, or improvements; or
2. Accept or impose valid conditions pursuant to subsection (c) of 15.1-491 or other provision of
law.
15.1-491.2:1
B. In the event proffered conditions include a requirement for the dedication of real property of
substantial value, or substantial cash payments for or construction of substantial public
improvements, the needfor which is not generated solely by the rezoning itself then no
amendment to the zoning map for the property subject to such conditions, nor the conditions
themselves, nor any amendments to the text of the zoning ordinance with respect to the zoning
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district applicable thereto initiated by the governing body, which eliminate, or materially restrict,
reduce, or modify the uses, the floor area ratio, or the density of use permitted in the zoning
district applicable to such property, shall be effective with respect to such property unless there
has been mistake, fraud, or a change in circumstances substantially affecting the public health,
safety, or welfare.
C. Any landowner who has prior to July 1, 1990, proffered the dedication of real property of
substantial value, or substantial cash payments for or construction of substantial public
improvements, the need for which is not generated solely by the rezoning itself but who has not
substantially implemented such proffers prior to July 1, 1990, shall advise the local governing
body by certified mail prior to July 1, 1991, that he intends to proceed with the implementation of
such proffers. Such notice shall identify the property to be developed, the zoning district, and the
proffers applicable thereto. Thereafter, any landowner giving such notice shall have until July 1,
1995, substantially to implement such proffers, or such later time as the governing body may
allow. Thereafter, the landowner in good faith shall diligently pursue the completion of the
development of the property. Any landowner who complies with the requirements of this
subdivision shall be entitled to the protection against action initiated by the governing body
affecting use, floor area ratio, and density set out in subsection B, unless there has been mistake,
fraud, or a change in circumstances substantially affecting the public health, safety, or welfare,
but any landowner failing to comply with the requirements ofthis subdivision shall acquire no
rights pursuant to this section.
D. The provisions of subsections B and C of this section shall be effective prospectively only, and
not retroactively, and shall not apply to any zoning ordinance text amendments which may have
been enacted prior to March 10, 1990. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to affect any
litigation pending prior to July 1, 1990, or any such litigation nonsuited and thereafter refiled.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect or impair the authority of a governing body to:
1. Accept proffered conditions which include provisions for timing or phasing of dedications,
payments, or improvements; or
2. Accept or impose valid conditions pursuant to subsection (c) of 15.1-491 or other provision of
law.
House Bill 1121 Jackson and 15.1-491(a) No action taken
(1990) Hall ... Once proffered and accepted as part of an amendment to the zoning ordinance, such conditions
shall continue in full-feFee and effect until a subsequent amendment changes the zoning on the
property covered by such conditions; pevided, however- that such conditions shall continue if
subsequent amendment is part of a comprehensive implementaion of a e rsbstantially
revised zoning ordinanee and the local governing body shall not change the zoning, use, or
density permitted at the time of the amendment to the ordinance except upon written application
of the owner of the property .
15.1-491.2
... Once proffered and accepted as part of an amendment to the zoning ordinance, such conditions
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shall continue in full-fefee and effect until a subsequent amendment changes the zoning on the
property overed by such conditions; provided however that such conditions shall continue if t
subsequent amendment is part of a comprehensive implementation of anwo usatal
revised zoning ordinance and the local governing body shall not change the zoning, use, or
density permitted at the time of the amendment to the ordinance except upon written application
of the owner of the property.
15.1-491.2:1
... Once proffered and accepted as part of an amendment to the zoning ordinance, such conditions
shall continue in effect until a subsequent amendment changes the z the property covere
by such conditions; however, that such conditions shall continue if the subsequent amendment is
part of a omprehensive implementation of a new or substantially revised zoning ordinance and
the local governing body shall not change the zoning, use, or density permitted at the time of the
amendment to the ordinance except upon written application of the owner of the property.
Senate Bill 146 Russell; 15.1-491(a) Approved by
(1990) Delegates Cox, ... Once proffered and accepted as part of an amendment to the zoning ordinance, such conditions Governor-
Martin, and shall continue in full force and effect until a subsequent amendment changes the zoning on the Chapter No.
Watkins property covered by such conditions ; provided, however that . However, such conditions shall 672
continue if the subsequent amendment is part of a comprehensive implementation of a new or
substantially revised zoning ordinance.
House Bill 1411 Miller 15.1-491.2:1 Approved by
(1991) ... Except for those localities to which 15.1-491(a) is applicable, this section shall apply to (i) any Governor-
county of, city, or town which has had population growth of ten percent or more from the next- Chapter No.
to-latest to latest decennial census year, based on population reported by the United States Bureau 233
of Census, provided that until the 1990 census is reported, any county Or, city, or town instead
may qualify only if it has had an estimated population growth of ten percent or more from 1980 to
the most recent year for which population estimates are available from the Center for Public
Service of the University of Virginia;
House Bill 945 Cranwell, Original Approved by
(1992) Bickley, 15.1-491(a) Governor-
Byrne, ... (a3) The provisions of subdivisions (al) and (a2) of this section shall be effective prospectively Chapter No.
Callahan, only, and not retroactively, and shall not apply to any zoning ordinance text amendments which 380
Diamonstein, may have been enacted prior to March 10, 1990. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to
Giesen, Hall, affect any litigation pending prior to July 1, 1990, or any such litigation nonsuited and thereafter
Jackson, refiled.
Keating, Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect or impair the authority of a governing body to:
Mayer, 1. Accept proffered conditions which include provisions for timing or phasing of dedications,
Morgan, payments, or improvements; or
Puller, Smith, 2. Accept or impose valid conditions pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, subsection H of
Van 15.1-466, or other provision of law.
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Landingham
and Van Amendment
Yahres; This bill was further amended, but the amendments did not affect the proposed wording changes
Senators to 15.1-491(a).
Barry,
Calhoun,
Howell,
Saslaw and
Waddell
House Bill 2485 McClure Original Approved by
(1995) 15.1-491(a) Governor-
... Proffered conditions affecting the affordability of housing shall be reasonably related to the Chapter No.
scope and purpose of the comprehensive plan and the purpose of zoning ordinances as stated in 603
15.1-446.1 and 15.1-489, respectively.
15.1-491.2
A. ... Proffered conditions affecting the affordability of housing shall be reasonably related to
the scope and purpose of the comprehensive plan and the purpose of zoning ordinances as stated
in 15.1-446.1 and 15.1-489, respectively....
15.1-491.2:1
A. ... Proffered conditions affecting the affordability of housing shall be reasonably related to
the scope and purpose of the comprehensive plan and the purpose of zoning ordinances as stated
in 15.1-446.1 and 15.1-489, respectively....
Amendment
15.1-491.2:1
A. ... In any such county, city, or town, notwithstanding any contrary provisions of § 15.1-491.2,
a zoning ordinance may include and provide for the voluntary proffering in writing, by the owner,
of reasonable conditions, prior to a public hearing before the governing body, in addition to the
regulations provided for the zoning district or zone by the ordinance, as a part of a rezoning or
amendment to a zoning map, provided that (i) the rezoning itself gives rise to the need for the
conditions; (ii) such conditions have a reasonable relation to the rezoning; and (iii) all such
conditions are in conformity with the comprehensive plan as defined in § 15.1-446.1. A locality
shall not presume that a proffer of cash, land dedication, or construction of offsite improvements
in a predetermined amount is necessary or appropriate for the approval of every rezoning
throughout the locality. Once proffered and accepted as part of an amendment to the zoning
ordinance, such conditions shall continue in effect until a subsequent amendment changes the
zoning on the property covered by such conditions; however, such conditions shall continue if the
subsequent amendment is part of a comprehensive implementation of a new or substantially
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revised zoning ordinance.
**This bill was further amended, but the amendments removed any proposed changes to 15.1-
491(a), 15.1-491.2, and 15.1-491.2:1. The enacted version did not affect the conditional zoning
statutes.
House Bill 2103
(1995)
Cranwell and
Hall
Original
15.1-491(a)
... A locality shall not presume that a proffer of cash, land dedication, or construction of offsite
improvements in a predetermined amount is necessary or appropriate for the approval of every
rezoning throughout the locality....
15.1-491.2:1
A. ... In any such county, city, or town, notwithstanding any contrary provisions of § 15.1-491.2,
a zoning ordinance may include and provide for the voluntary proffering in writing, by the owner,
of reasonable conditions, prior to a public hearing before the governing body, in addition to the
regulations provided for the zoning district or zone by the ordinance, as a part of a rezoning or
amendment to a zoning map, provided that (i) the rezoning itself gives rise to the need for the
conditions; (ii) such conditions have a reasonable relation to the rezoning; and (iii) all such
conditions are in conformity with the comprehensive plan as defined in § 15.1-446.1. A locality
shall not presume that a proffer of cash, land dedication, or construction of offsite improvements
in a predetermined amount is necessary or appropriate for the approval of every rezoning
throughout the locality. Once proffered and accepted as part of an amendment to the zoning
ordinance, such conditions shall continue in effect until a subsequent amendment changes the
zoning on the property covered by such conditions; however, such conditions shall continue if the
subsequent amendment is part of a comprehensive implementation of a new or substantially
revised zoning ordinance.
Amendment
Amendment #1
Removed the language in regard to changes in the wording of 15.1-491(a)
Amendment #2
Restored the proposed changes from the introduced version of the bill to both statutes
Left in Senate
Committee
House Bill 2627 Barlow and 15.1-491.2:1 No action taken
(1997) Ingram A. Except for those localities to which § 15.1-491(a) is applicable, this section shall apply to (i)
any county, city, or town which has had population growth of ten percent or more from the next-
to-latest to latest decennial census year, based on population reported by the United States Bureau
of the Census, provided that until the 1990 census is reported, any county, city, or town instead
may qualify only if it has had an estimated population growth of ten percent or more from 1980 to
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the most recent year for which population estimates are available from the Center for Public
Service of the University of Virginia; (ii) any city adjoining such city or county; (iii) any towns
located within such county; and (iv) any county contiguous with at least three such counties, and
any town located in that county. In calculating the rate ofpopulation growth, a county may
exclude any population housed on afederal military reservation.
House Bill 2657 Katzen; 15.1-491(a) No action taken
(1997) Senators ... for the adoption, in counties, or towns, therein which have planning commissions, wherein the
Miller, K. G. urban county executive form of government is in effect, or in a city adjacent to or completely
and Potts surrounded by such a county, or in a county contiguous to any such county, or in a city adjacent to
or completely surrounded by such a contiguous county, or in any town within such contiguous
county, or in any county contiguous to more than one county which is contiguous to a county
having the urban county executiveform ofgovernment, and in the counties east of the Chesapeake
Bay as a part of an amendment to the zoning map of reasonable conditions, in addition to the
regulations provided for the zoning district by the ordinance, when such conditions shall have
been proffered in writing, in advance of the public hearing before the governing body required by
§ 15.1-493 by the owner of the property which is the subject of the proposed zoning map
amendment.
House Bill 2112 Grayson 15.2-2303 (Previously coded as 15.1-491(a)) Passed by
(1999) G. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection A, upon an affirmative vote ofthe governing body indefinitely
any locality may choose to exercise the conditional zoning powers granted under this section in
addition to any powers the locality may possess under j§ 15.2-2296 through 15.2-2302. 1
Of the ten conditional zoning bills introduced in the 1990s, HB 721 in 1990 had the most impact
for future implementation of conditional zoning statutes. HB 721 which started out as a bill that
would add roughly twenty-five words to each of the three conditional zoning statutes ends up
adding three new subsections or subdivisions to each statute, as well as, expanding the eligibility
criteria for the 1973 statute (15.1-491(a)). Because of the less than controversial nature of the
majority of the conditional zoning legislation in the 1990s, the legislative history of HB 721
presents the best opportunity to examine the interactions of agents in the political process for this
decade. Although I described the issue context of this decade using Chesterfield County, the
plight of HB 721 through the legislature will show that the old guard jurisdictions of conditional
zoning like Fairfax County are still very relevant to the discussion. Finally, this example
illustrates how a bill (HB 721) can take on the properties of another piece of legislation (HB
1121).
House Bill 721 (HB 721), which was approved by the Governor on April 9, 1990 to become
Chapter 868 of the Acts of the Assembly, expanded the number of cities eligible under "old"
conditional zoning. The existing wording read as, "or in a city completely surrounded by such a
county, or in a county contiguous to any such county, or in a city completely surrounded by such
a contiguous county ... ." The new wording allowed more flexibility in the location of a city.
No longer was a city required to be a surrounded by a county to be eligible. With the change, a
city could now be eligible by being adjacent to a county. Thus the amended statute stated, "or in
a city adjacent to or completely surrounded by such a county, or in a county contiguous to any
such county, or in a city adjacent to or completely surrounded by such a contiguous county. . .
This eligibility expansion, however, was not the goal of the original legislation (HB 721), but a
product, again, of the legislative process.
In the version introduced in the House of Delegates on January 23, 1990, HB 721 sponsored by
Delegate Ford C. Quillen (D) of Scott County did not mention eligibility changes. The eligibility
language on cities first appeared in the February 27, 1990 amendment proposed by the Senate
Committee on Local Government. Quillen's bill was aimed at addressing concerns over local
governments taking legislative action to change the zoning or other land use regulations on
properties with conditions and proffers in place. These properties may or may not have the
project already constructed. The intent was to give these landowners a form of vested rights
similar to that of other landowners involved in by-right projects. For all three conditional zoning
systems, he wanted the changes shown in italics made, "Once proffered and accepted as part of
an amendment to the zoning ordinance, such conditions and the zoning provisions then
applicable shall continue in full force and effect until a subsequent amendment, mutually agreed
to by the landowner and governing body, changes the zoning or the conditions on the property
covered by such conditions; provided, however, that such conditions and the applicable zoning
provisions shall continue if the subsequent amendment is part of a comprehensive
implementation of a new or substantially revised zoning ordinance." At the same time, there was
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another bill, House Bill 1121 (HB 1121), introduced in the House by Delegates Thomas M.
Jackson Jr. (D) of Wythe County and Franklin P. Hall (D) of Richmond which aimed to limit
what future changes that a local government could do without the consent of the property owner
when conditional zoning was involved. Again, the changes would be applicable to all three
systems such that "Once proffered and accepted as part of an amendment to the zoning
ordinance, such conditions shall continue in ful4 feree and effect until a subsequent amendment
ehanges the zening en the pfoperty eevered by sueh eenditiens prvidedi hewever that sueh
eenditiens shall eentinue if the subsequent amendment is part of a eemprehensive
implementatin of a new or substantially revised zening erdinanee and the local governing body
shall not change the zoning, use, or density permitted at the time ofthe amendment to the
ordinance except upon written application of the owner of the property ." HB 1121 died in the
Committee on Counties, Cities and Towns because no action was taken on it. The greater level of
specificity in HB 1121 was reflected in the amended version of HB 721 proposed by the House
Committee on Counties, Cities and Towns.
Although HB 1121 did not advance past the preliminary stages of the legislative process, HB 721
tagged by the media with a new legislative partner, HB 1122. Like HB 1121, HB 1122 had
Delegate Jackson as its lead sponsor, but its application was to § 15.1-491.2 rather than § 15.1-
491.1 which contained the conditional zoning systems. 15.1-491.2 was the statute in the Virginia
state code that generally deals with vested rights and land use. Labeled as the "Downzoning
Bills" by the Washington Post, HB 721 and HB 1122 were further characterized as "two
development bills ... that would strengthen individual property rights and weaken local
authority over land-use controls" (Anderson 1990). Whether intentionally aimed at Fairfax or
not, these bills like those in previous decades brought the issues of Fairfax County and its land
use regulations before the state legislature. The bills raised the ire of Audrey Moore, Chairman
of the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors, who saw them as an attack on the actions of local
governments. Her view was based on the fact that the bills came soon after Fairfax County made
the decision to downzone 14,000 acres in the county. According to the Washington Post, Moore
saw "the matter [as] a local one, not one to be decided at the state level" (Anderson 1990). It had
been brought to the General Assembly because particular interest groups like the development
community thought that they could use the state legislature to overturn or restrict the actions of
local governments. Moore who was elected in 1987 on a slow-growth platform responded that
"The people of Fairfax spoke, and what's happening in the General Assembly is the developers
are saying, 'We don't have to worry about the people of Fairfax County, because we can turn
things around' in Richmond" (Anderson 1990).
The version of HB 721 that emerged out of the House Committee on Counties, Cities and Towns
was more detailed than Quillen's original bill. Rather than adding wording to the existing
language, the revised version added a new subsection or subdivision to each of the statutes on
conditional zoning. The new language stated:
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(a]) In the event proffered conditions include a requirement for the
dedication of real property of substantial value, or substantial payments for or
construction of substantial public improvements the need for which is not
generated solely by the rezoning itself; then no amendment to the zoning map for
the property subject to such conditions, nor the conditions themselves, nor any
amendments to the text ofthe zoning ordinance with respect to the zoning
district applicable thereto initiated by the governing body, which eliminate,
or materially restrict, reduce, or modify the uses, the floor area ratio, or the
density of use permitted in the zoning district applicable to such property, shall be
effective with respect to such property unless there has been mistake, fraud, or a
change in circumstances substantially affecting the public health, safety, or welfare.
(a2) Any landowner who has prior to July 1, 1990, proffered the dedication
of real property of substantial value, or substantial payments for or construction of
substantial public improvements the need for which is not generated solely by the
rezoning itself; but who has not substantially implemented such proffers prior to
July 1, 1990 shall advise the local governing body by certified mail prior to July 1,
1991, that he intends to proceed with implementation of such proffers. Thereafter,
any landowner giving such notice shall have until July 1, 1995, substantially to
implement such proffers, or such later time as the governing body may allow.
Thereafter, the landowner in good faith must pursue the completion of the project.
Any landowner who complies with the requirements of this subdivision shall be
entitled to the protections against legislative action affecting use, floor area ratio,
and density set out in subdivision (a]), but any landowner failing to comply with the
requirements of this subdivision shall acquire no rights pursuant to this section.
(a3) The provisions of subdivisions (a]) and (a2) of this section shall be effective
prospectively only, and not retroactively, and shall not apply to any zoning ordinance
text amendments which may have been enacted prior to March 10, 1990. Nothing
contained herein shall be construed to affect any litigation pending prior to July 1,
1990, or any such litigation nonsuited and thereafter refilled"
Essentially, the bill would prohibit downzoning in future cases where conditional zoning was
involved and the proffers went above what was necessary to mitigate the rezoning change.
Furthermore, HB 721 gave a five year window to properties which had received rezoning
approval that involved the use of proffers, but had not yet fully complied with the agreed upon
conditions to implement them. If the property remained out of compliance, then it opened itself
up to the possibility of legislative action by the local government, for example being downzoned.
Despite Moore's opposition to the bills, Delegate Cranwell pointed out in the same Washington
Post article that the versions of the bills that were reported out of Committee were the result of
negotiations between developers and local government officials with assistance in bill drafting
by Fairfax County attorneys (Anderson 1990).
Reaction by local governments to the amended House version of HB 721 was less than
enthusiastic. Fairfax's County Executive at the time, J. Hamilton Lambert, recommended that the
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county suspend consideration of any rezoning applications that involved proffers until after the
final fate of the bills had been decided. Going even further, Lambert indicated that if such
legislative language had been in the original 1973 state statute, then Fairfax County most likely
would never have implemented a proffer system. He said, "If these provisions had been in the
original enabling legislation... , staff would have recommended against ever implementing the
proffer system[.] ... Given this, staff cannot recommend future acceptance of proffers"
(Anderson 1990). HB 721 passed the House and as discussed above was further amended in the
Senate. Besides the addition of the eligibility expansion to adjacent cities, the Senate amended
the bill with what could be construed as more local government friendly language to the details
of the House version. The Senate's Committee on Local Government added at the end of (a3) the
following wording, "Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect or impair the authority of
a governing body to: 1. Accept proffered conditions which include provisions for timing or
phasing of dedications, payments, or improvements; or 2. Accept or impose valid conditions
pursuant to subsection (c) of this section of other provision of law." In a repeat of the legislative
process for past conditional zoning legislation, the Senate passed its amended version which the
House rejected and thus a conference committee was called upon to settle the differences. In this
case, the Senate version of the bill was reported out of conference; passed both legislative
bodies, and signed by the Governor into law.
With three conditional zoning statutes and one impact fee statute authorized, legislators took
steps in the mid-i 990s to get a sense now after a period of years on how things were being
implemented on the local level. A series of resolutions were passed by the House and the Senate
to set up committees to investigate conditional zoning and impact fees. The claims of abuse
against rezoning applicants by local governments with their conditional zoning systems was the
impetus for Delegate C. Richard Cranwell (D) of Roanoke County to introduce House Joint
Resolution No. 280 (HJR 280) in January 1994. In Cranwell's original resolution, as well as, the
substitute versions that were passed by the House and the Senate, there were six situations
outlined where either abuses have occurred or the potential exists for them. The resolution stated:
"WHEREAS, pursuant to this authority, some jurisdictions are
requiring the payment of cash, dedication of land, and/or construction of offsite
facilities as a condition to rezoning without following the procedures required by
statute; and
WHEREAS, in some jurisdictions proffers of cash, land, and/or offsite
facilities for public purposes are required by an adopted fee schedule which bears
no rational nexus or relation to the need for the proffer demand and the impact
of the proposed rezoning; and
WHEREAS, rather than being voluntary concessions on the part of
a landowner seeking rezoning to compensate in part for the demand for
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increased services generated by the proposed project, proffers have become
institutionalized demands from localities as general sources of revenue; and
WHEREAS, the proffer system as utilized in some jurisdictions forces
landowners to 'buy' rezonings with proffers of cash, land, and/or offsite facilities
for public purposes which go far beyond any need created by the proposed
development; and
WHEREAS, in some jurisdictions the proffer system is being used to
impose extraordinary construction requirements in excess of the Uniform
Statewide Building Code; and
WHEREAS, the abuse of the proffer system by some jurisdictions unduly
increases the cost of providing housing to the citizens of Virginia and impedes
economic development; ... ".
It is unknown whether there was a general lack of understanding among legislators about what
was going on in the localities in regard to their conditional zoning systems. I raise this issue
because of the comment made by Delegate Franklin P. Hall (D) of Richmond, who was one of
the members serving on the subcommittee. He said, "he was amazed at how proffer procedures
vary from locality to locality. 'Our first meeting was extremely revealing because people were
doing all sort of things .... It seems we need to revisit the existing law and make some
adjustments and make sure in fact it was voluntary ... that the spirit and intent of the law is
being carried out" (Winiecki 1994). So an argument could be made for standardization in the
systems across localities. This argument harkens back to one of the tensions between Dillon's
Rule and Home Rule. Home Rule would supposedly lead to every locality having their own
individualized way of doing things. Dillon's Rule would provide a level of standardization
because the State can legislatively limit the amount of discretion available to localities.
The subcommittee was supposed to release a report before the 1995 General Assembly session,
but it did not. Instead, the subcommittee under House Joint Resolution No. 542 (HJR 542)
passed in 1995 continued its work into the 1996 session. One idea under consideration by the
subcommittee was the standardization of the systems statewide. The greater push for this was
motivated by the 1995 Virginia Supreme Court Case of Board ofSupervisors v. Reed's Landing
Corporation which showed that at least one locality, Powhatan County, required a cash proffer
of the correct amount in exchange for rezoning approval (This case is detailed in the next
section). In reaction to the verdict, Delegate Hall said, "What we're going to need to do is look at
the system on a statewide basis" (Winiecki 1995). Furthermore, he hoped that the issues could be
worked out in a compromise by local governments, developers, and other building industry
officials. However, if that did not happen, he said, "My guess is that if they have not reached a
compromise by next session, there will probably be a more formalized approach, and there may
be a new look at the whole issue of proffers and establishment of guidelines" (Winiecki 1995).
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The subcommittee never released its report on what amendments it recommended to be passed in
order to prevent the occurrence of abuses in the conditional zoning systems.
In 1998, Senator William C. Mims (R) of Loudoun County and Delegate Joe T. May (R) of
Loudoun County co-sponsored Senate Joint Resolution No. 107 (SJR 107) which aimed to
establish a subcommittee to study the use of proffer zoning and impact fees. Proffer zoning is a
new label attached to conditional zoning. Their resolution listed six justifications for the
formation of the subcommittee. They stated,
"WHEREAS, many of Virginia's localities are experiencing rapid
population growth and a corresponding growth in school-age population; and
WHEREAS, one of the primary consequences of such growth is an
increasing need for infrastructure, such as schools, transportation, and public
safety facilities; and
WHEREAS, the utilization of funding mechanisms currently available
to localities, such as proffer zoning, to finance the cost of such infrastructure has
often proven inadequate or undesirable to fund the needs that rapid growth can
create; and
WHEREAS, many rapidly-growing localities have significant areas which
were zoned for residential use prior to adoption of proffer zoning and therefore are
not subject to the proffer zoning process; and
WHEREAS, the three different types of proffer zoning often cause confusion
and uncertainty in the rezoning process and are often portrayed by the development
community unfairly and unevenly applied; and
WHEREAS, not only government officials but also the development
community and the general citizenry recognize the need for localities to be able to
obtain revenue to pay for infrastructure in a fair and equitable manner; and
WHEREAS, impact fees may offer an alternative to proffer zoning which is
more fair and equitable and which will inject greater certainty into the development
process; . . .".
It would appear from their justification list that the resolution's sponsors had a clear
understanding of the issues involved when conditional zoning was used as a source of
infrastructure financing. In the Senate Committee on Rules, SJR 107 became incorporated into
another resolution - Senate Joint Resolution No. 53 (SJR 53). So the subcommittee authorized
under SJR 53 to identify "approaches by which local governments can address demands for
increased services and infrastructure resulting from residential growth" was also tasked with
studying conditional zoning and impact fees. In particular, whether localities should be allowed
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to substitute impact fees for those instances where they had previously used conditional zoning.
While both resolutions made it out of the Senate, they became absorbed into another resolution
that was introduced in the House - House Joint Resolution No. 195 (HJR 195).
The subcommittee for HJR 195 was comprised of 11 members -6 from the House of Delegates
appointed by the Speaker of the House and 5 from the Senate selected by the Senate Committee
on Privileges and Elections. A report from the subcommittee was supposed to be ready in time
for the 1999 General Assembly session. In January 1999, the subcommittee released an interim
report of their activities. They did not make any specific recommendations in regard to
conditional zoning and impact fees. Instead, the overall recommendation was to continue the
study. However, the report did acknowledge a recommendation that emerged out of the
participants at the public hearings for "[a]uthority to assess impact fees and continue to allow
localities to accept cash proffers" (Virginia General Assembly 1999: A-24). This
recommendation was characterized as having been recommended by "one or more
environmental, planning, or citizen interests" as well as "one or more localities" (Virginia
General Assembly 1999: A-24).
The subcommittee was extended for another year under House Joint Resolution No. 543 (HJR
543) in the 1999 General Assembly Session. In regard to conditional zoning, the new resolution
included the wording that "concerns have been expressed about the perceived increases in
exactions under the conditional zoning and proffer system in some high-growth localities". The
subcommittee was supposed to release its final report in time for the 2000 General Assembly
session. However, no final report was released. Unfortunately, no reason has to be given for why
this occurred. While it may have been more efficient to have all of the issues related to land
development studied by one subcommittee, there is the risk of trying to do too much in a short
period of time. The hope with a separate report on conditional zoning was that it would finally
resolve the various claims from both sides of the issue. Unfortunately, for Virginia's citizens, its
absence only pushed the debate into another decade.
IMPLEMENTATION
Since there was no signature or turning point piece of legislation for the 1990s to shape the
implementation stage of the political process, I examine the interactions of different agents with
the legal system and what repercussions if any, there are for future implementation of conditional
zoning. The agents involved in these interactions range from legislators, local jurisdictions,
citizens, and members of the development community. The legal system in this discussion is
composed of the opinions of the Virginia Attorney General and rulings from local, state, and
federal cases. In the 1970s, the balance of rulings on land use regulations were heavily tilted
towards the protection of property rights, thereby the development community. I will show
below, in regard to the 1990s, that decisions have become more balanced, so that the court
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system cannot be counted on always to be a friend to the development community at the expense
of local governments.
In contrast to the Virginia Attorney General Opinions in the 1980s which were initiated by
county attorneys from multiple jurisdictions, state legislators over this time period were the ones
who inquired for legal advice. Delegate Vincent F. Callahan Jr. (R) who represented parts of
Fairfax County, as well as, the City of Falls Church asked "[W]hether certain proffers of cash
and off-site road improvements by a Fairfax County developer qualify for the protections of
15.1-491(al) of the Code of Virginia[?]" (Virginia Office of the Attorney General 1991: 63).
Callahan's question was from an actual case in December 1990 where the Board of Supervisors
in Fairfax County approved a rezoning application for a 24-acre office development. The
applicant proffered to the county off-site road improvements with an estimated cost of
$3,028,000 along with a cash contribution in the amount of $500,000 which the county would
apply towards other off-site improvements. The cash proffer would be paid in quarterly
installments that began before the project's site plans were submitted. The amount of the proffers
was based upon a formula that the county used in its evaluation of rezoning applications, where
the projected density was above the county's Comprehensive Plan's designated density. Given
the amount of money involved in these proffers, Callahan sought a legal opinion to determine if
the proffers could be viewed as a form of vested rights for the applicant, so that the project
would have protection from any future actions by the county in terms of zoning or other
legislative changes.
Subdivision (al) of 15.1-491 authorized this level of protection for the rezoning applicant if the
proffers met two requirements. First, the proffers had to reach a "substantial" threshold which
was applicable to the value of dedication of real property, amount of cash payments, or size of
public improvements constructed. The statute does not give a numeric value or formula for how
to determine what constitutes "substantial". Second, the dedications, cash payments or
construction had to be motivated by something else in addition to the rezoning. Unfortunately,
the Attorney General was unable to give a definitive answer to Callahan based on the facts with
which he had been presented. In his August 19, 1991 opinion, the Attorney General alluded to
the complicated nature of implementing and enforcing this subdivision of the statute. The
Attorney General wrote, "Whether the proffered conditions are 'substantial' necessarily depends
on an evaluation of all the relevant surrounding facts and circumstances, include the total size
and total cost of the project. Similarly, whether the need for the proffered contributions for off-
site road improvements is created solely by the rezoning also requires an evaluation of the
attendant facts and circumstances, including other projects in the area and their likely impact on
traffic volume. Expert testimony on complex urban planning and economic issues may be needed
to apply these statutory tests properly" (Virginia Office of the Attorney General 1991: 65).
The second Attorney General Opinion that addressed implementation issues with conditional
zoning statutes was from 1997. Delegate John C. Watkins (R) who represented parts of
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Chesterfield and Powhatan counties had asked "[W]hether a locality is authorized to use a
conditional zoning process in considering an applicant's request this his property be rezoned to a
residential use when residential use is 'compatible' with other uses in the zoning district?"
(Virginia Office of the Attorney General 1997: 67). Due to the vagueness of the question and the
lack of a specific case to illustrate Watkins' concerns, the Attorney General based his response
on a series of assumptions. He assumed that Watkins was really asking a two-part question. First,
"whether when the requested use is residential, a locality would have to either permit or deny the
use on the basis of traditional zoning considerations?" or secondly, "whether the locality would
have the additional option of permitting the use subject to the proffer of conditions authorized
under the conditional zoning method?" (Virginia Office of the Attorney General 1997: 68).
In his opinion on January 1 0 th, the Attorney General simplified his response to a discussion of
when it was appropriate to use conditional zoning which he saw as not being limited to those
instances where traditional zoning fails. The only limits on its use are those "restrictions
applicable to all land use regulations and the particular restrictions applicable to conditional
zoning," but otherwise, conditional zoning could be used to accomplish any of the purposes and
objectives that the state code considered appropriate in a zoning ordinance (Virginia Office of
the Attorney General 1997: 68). A few of the potential purposes and objectives available range
from the reduction or prevention of congestion on public roads; "creation of convenient,
attractive, and harmonious communit[ies];" "provision of adequate police and fire protection,
disaster evacuation, civil defense, transportation, water, sewerage, flood protection, schools,
parks, forests, playgrounds, recreational facilities, airports and other public requirements;" to
"preservation of agricultural and forestal lands and other lands of significance for the protection
of the natural environment" (Virginia State Code 1993). This 1997 Opinion of the Virginia
Attorney General shows that conditional zoning can be used to accomplish many things and it
hinders the tool to try to attach only the label of revenue raiser to it.
As the use of cash proffers spread outside of the Northern Virginia area, there were judicial
challenges to rezoning application cases that involved cash proffers, as well as, local
governments' cash proffer systems. On September 16th, 1994, Judge Thomas V. Warren of the
1 1 th Judicial Circuit of Virginial overturned Powhatan County Board of Supervisors' decision to
deny the rezoning request of Reed's Landing Corporation. Warren's ruling was based on "[i]n
my opinion, the sole reason for denial of Reed's Landing's request was it's failure or refusal to
proffer $2439 per lot. The County is clearly imposing an impact fee not authorized by statute and
which it is without power to impose" (Thomas V. Warren to Frank N. Cowan and James W.
Hopper, September 16, 1994, John C. Watkins Papers). The case centered on roughly 233 acres
of land that the developer wanted to rezone from agricultural (A-1) to single-family residential
(R-1). The applicant filed for the zoning change on June 30, 1993. At the public hearing held on
41 This circuit court covers the jurisdictions of Amelia County, Dinwiddie County, Nottoway County, Petersburg,
and Powhatan County.
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August 3, 1993, there was no public opposition made to the rezoning change. Since the
application met all of the requirements for the rezoning along with a lack of public outcry over it,
the planning staff and the Planning Commission recommended approval of the rezoning.
Powhatan County's Board of Supervisors on August 9, 1993 adopted proffer guidelines which
set a recommended proffer level of $2,439 per lot. Although Reed's Landing Corporation's
rezoning application had been filed before the initiation of the proffer policy, it did not come
before the Board of Supervisors until September 13, 1993. At the September meeting, court
records state that the developer "proffered a cash payment 'under protest"', but the Board
postponed its decision until the October meeting. There was another public hearing during the
October meeting at which no public opposition was given to the case, but it "was apparent,
however, that the Board would not approve the rezoning request unless the Developer agreed to
pay $2,439 per lot, even though the Developer's counsel asserted that the cash proffer demand
was illegal" (Board of Supervisors of Powhatan County v. Reed's Landing Corporation 1995).
Reed's Landing refused to proffer $2,439 per lot and the Board of Supervisors denied the
rezoning application.
Warren's ruling was seen as a victory for developers. The response from the legal community
was that the prospects for cash proffers do not look good. In an October 9, 1994, Richmond-
Times Dispatch article, J. Thomas O'Brien, a Richmond area land-use lawyer, was quoted,
"[b]ecause there has been a successful challenge, not only will developers try to use it as a
bargaining chip, the larger developers who have financial resources may bring challenges. . .
(Winiecki 1994). At the same time, another lawyer, John V. Cogbill III, stated, "I think cash
proffers are in serious trouble.. .. I think (the court ruling) has broader implications.... I think
the General Assembly is going to have to rethink the issue of cash proffers and how they are
being used by local governments" (Winiecki 1994). Frank Cowan, the lawyer for Reed's
Landing Corporation, said, "What Powhatan has done, and other jurisdictions have in essence,
are backdoor impact fees. They are doing indirectly what the Virginia legislature has refused to
let them do directly. 'This is a question of the government exceeding its lawful authorities"'
(Winiecki 1994).
Powhatan County reacted to the court's ruling in two ways. First, it decided to consider changing
the minimum lot size in the county from 2 acres to 5 acres. The rationale for the increase
according to the Chairman of the Board of Supervisors, Robert Cosby, was "[t]he result of the
court case prompted us to advertise a proposed increase in the lot size.... Upping the lot size
would cut the problem of growing demands on county services in half or better. Existing citizens
can't weather the storm" (Winiecki 1994). Second, the county appealed the Circuit Court's
decision. On November 3, 1995, the Supreme Court of Virginia in Board ofSupervisors of
Powhatan County v. Reed's Landing Corporation affirmed the Circuit Court's decision and
remanded the case back to the Circuit Court where it directed the lower court to have the
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Powhatan County Board of Supervisors reconsider the rezoning application. In the case's
opinion, Justice Roscoe E. Stephenson, Jr. wrote,
"A plain reading of code § 15.1-491.2:1 in the light of the foregoing principles of
law demonstrates that a county is not empowered to require a specified proffer as a
condition precedent to a rezoning. The statute clearly states that proffers of
conditions by zoning applicant must be made voluntarily. In the present case, the
trial court found that the sole reason the Board denied the rezoning request was the
Developer's refusal to proffer $2439 per lot, a finding fully supported by the
evidence. Therefore, under the facts presented, the proffer constituted a condition
precedent and was not voluntary within the meaning of the statute. Consequently,
we hold, as did the trial court, that the Board imposed an unlawful condition on the
Developer" (Board of Supervisors of Powhatan County v. Reed's Landing
Corporation 1995).
This landmark case established a bright-line test of what a locality could not do in a rezoning
case involving cash proffers. They could not deny a rezoning application simply because the
applicant would not proffer the correct cash payment. As a result, in the opinion of a one lawyer
quoted in the Richmond Times-Dispatch, "I think where there will be a practical effect is that
counties will have to do a better job of analyzing a rezoning case in those situations where they
aren't other objective problems (with a case). . .. If a county wants to 'require' a cash proffer,
they would have to find objective problems unrelated to the cash proffer, such as impact on
adjoining roads (and) incompatibility with adjoining land uses" (Winiecki 1995b). While it ruled
against the local government, Justice Stephenson did acknowledge in the opinion that the
General Assembly has prevented localities from having great powers to deal with growth issues.
He wrote in a comment designated with an asterisk, "[i]t is interesting to note that, since the
enactment of Code § 15.1-491.2:1, the General Assembly has rejected all efforts to grant to
localities greater power to charge landowners and developers with the capital costs associated
with residential growth. See, e.g., S.B. 788, 1989 Sess. (no action taken); S.B. 340, 1992 Sess.
(passed by Senate, but stricken from House docket by Committee on Counties, Cities and Towns
in 1993); H.B. 1138, 1992 Sess. (passed by indefinitely by Committee on Counties, Cities and
Towns); H.B. 2323, 1993 Sess. (passed by indefinitely by Committee on Counties, Cities and
Towns)" (Board of Supervisors of Powhatan County v. Reed's Landing Corporation 1995).
The Circuit Court's decision in the Powhatan case created a window of opportunity for other
legal challenges to cash proffers. Two cases stand out during this time period - one at the federal
level and one at the state level. In May of 1995, the National Association of Home Builders of
the United States (NAHB) along with the Home Builders Association of Virginia (HBAV) and
the Home Builders Association of Richmond (HBAR) filed suit against Chesterfield County in
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on the grounds that the county's cash
proffer policy was a violation of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs
contended that the policy violated the Takings Clause because it "mandated the payment of cash
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in exchange for favorable action on residential rezoning applications" (National Association of
Home Builders of the United States, et al., v. Chesterfield County 1995). Susan Sprigg, Executive
Vice President of the HBAV, released a statement at the time on the lawsuit which said, "the
abuse of the voluntary cash proffer system is a problem faced by builders/developers throughout
the commonwealth, which severely impacts the affordability of housing.... Although the abuse
is practiced in other areas, Chesterfield County was identified as the target of this action due to
its being one of the first jurisdictions statewide to adopt these policies" (Winiecki 1995a).
Furthermore, plaintiffs alleged in their suit, "[u]nless property owners agree to pay for the
construction of capital facilities in Chesterfield County - irrespective of any need created by a
proposed development - Chesterfield County will use its zoning powers to delay the use of that
land. In other words, these property owners are required to bear the brunt of providing the entire
population of Chesterfield County with public facilities" (Winiecki 1995c).
In order to be a taking, the presiding United States District Judge, Robert R. Merhige, Jr., wrote
that the policy or ordinance "does not substantially advance legitimate state interests . .. or
denies an owner economically viable use of his land" (National Association of Home Builders of
the United States, et al., v. Chesterfield County 1995). Since the policy only affects property
owners when they apply for a rezoning, its mere adoption by the county did not result in the
physical occupation of someone's land or the deprivation of its economic value, thus no grounds
for the second definition of a taking exist. For the advancement of legitimate state interests, there
was a two part test. The policy passed the first part because no one denied that it was "designed
to provide for the capital improvements required by development in the County" which is a
legitimate state interest (National Association of Home Builders of the United States, et al., v.
Chesterfield County 1995). The second part of the test revolved around the issues of nexus and
rough proportionality as discussed in Chapter 2 in regard to the Nollan and Dolan U.S. Supreme
Court cases. So at issue was whether the exaction, in this case, cash proffers, had a nexus with
the state interest - the provision of capital improvements-as measured by a test of rough
proportionality.
Judge Merhige used the definition of rough proportionality from Dolan where it is "some sort of
individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to
the impact of the proposed development" (National Association of Home Builders ofthe United
States, et al., v. Chesterfield County 1995). Chesterfield's policy met this test for three reasons.
First, the calculation of the cash proffer amount was based on "the average cost to the County of
a new home" (National Association of Home Builders of the United States, et al., v. Chesterfield
County 1995). Secondly, the policy explicitly stated that this amount was only a maximum level,
so there was room for tailoring of the amount to the specific project. Finally, there was nothing
in the policy that specifically said a cash proffers or any proffer for that matter was a requirement
for rezoning approval. Together these reasons led Judge Merhige to conclude, "there is no reason
apparent on the face of the Policy why the proffers required, if any, can not determined in an
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'individualized' manner and fixed at an amount 'roughly proportional' in 'nature and extent to
the impact of the proposed development' according to the test set out in Dolan v. Tigard"
(National Association of Home Builders of the United States, et al., v. Chesterfield County 1995).
Thus, the Court ruled "the Cash Proffer Policy of the County of Chesterfield is not facially
violative of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution"
(National Association of Home Builders of the United States, et al., v. Chesterfield County 1995).
The associations appealed Judge Merhige's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit. In their appeal, the plaintiffs argued that "rough proportionality requires the
County to make more stringent individualized determinations before calculating a cash proffer
amount" (National Association of Home Builders of the United States; Home Builders
Association of Virginia; Home Builders Association of Richmond v. Chesterfield County,
Virginia 1996). In their July 1996 ruling, the Appeals Court rejected this line of argument
because it would exceed the "roughly proportional" test to become one of "exact proportionality"
(National Association of Home Builders of the United States; Home Builders Association of
Virginia; Home Builders Association of Richmond v. Chesterfield County, Virginia 1996).
Additionally, the Constitution does not require such exactness and its practical feasibility is
questionable. In their rejection of the appellants' arguments and the absence of error in the
district court opinion, the three-judge panel unanimously affirmed the district court's decision.
Chesterfield's reaction to the ruling was made by the Deputy County Attorney, Jeffrey L. Mincks
who stated, "The board spent a lot of time developing this policy, and it's good to have it
affirmed constitutionally" (Cooper 1996).
While Chesterfield County was contending with the home building associations at the federal
level in 1995, they also had a cash proffer case to deal with at the Circuit Court level. While the
Powhatan case set up the bright line test for what not to do in rezoning decisions involving cash
proffers, this Chesterfield case served as an example of how things should be conducted. In
January 1995, the Chesterfield Board of Supervisors voted to deny the rezoning application of
Oscar H. Harriss, a developer who had entered into a contract with the Gregorys, the owners of
the property in question. The two parties "filed a motion for declaratory judgment in the Circuit
Court of Chesterfield County, seeking a declaration that the Board's denial of the rezoning
application was, among other things, unlawful, arbitrary, and unreasonable" (James E. Gregory,
Sr., et al. v. The Board of Supervisors of Chesterfield County 1999). The final rezoning
application sought to rezone the 30-acre parcel of land that the Gregorys resided on from
Agricultural (A) to Single-Family Residential (R- 12) with an 81-lot residential subdivision of
approximately 2.7 dwelling units per acre. As part of the final application, Harriss proffered cash
payments of $1,500 per lot, "the dedication of an easement to permit the widening of Newbys
Bridge Road[,] and the construction of off-site improvements designed to minimize the
development's impact on the surrounding area" (James E. Gregory, Sr., et al. v. The Board of
Supervisors of Chesterfield County 1999). The County's Planning Department staff
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recommended approval of the rezoning subject to "the applicant addressing the impact on capital
facilities and the transportation network, consistent with the Board's policy" (James E Gregory,
Sr., et al. v. The Board of Supervisors of Chesterfield County 1999). While the county had a
maximum cash proffer policy amount of $5,083 per lot, the staff's calculation of this project's
impact on the county's capital facilities resulted in a cash proffer amount of $5,156 per lot. The
County's Planning Commission discussed the application at two separate meetings in 1994. The
end result was a recommendation of denial because of "concerns regarding the impact that the
rezoning would have on traffic, drainage, schools, and fire and rescue service" (James E
Gregory, Sr., et al. v. The Board of Supervisors of Chesterfield County 1999). In January 1995,
the application came before the Board of Supervisors. At the public hearing, 16 citizens spoke
against the application while one citizen supported the rezoning. The county's Assistant Director
of Planning, William Poole, presented the viewpoint of the planning staff. He indicated that the
change to R-12 would be consistent with the county's Land Use Plan. Furthermore, the majority
of the land in the area surrounding the parcel was zoned single-family residential. However, the
parcels directly adjacent to it were still zoned agriculture. Poole reiterated the staff's initial
recommendation that the rezoning be approved only if "the Board was satisfied that the
application adequately addressed the fiscal impact of the proposed development on
transportation, schools, drainage, and other residential development in the area" (James E
Gregory, Sr., et al. v. The Board of Supervisors of Chesterfield County 1999). In the end, the
Board voted against the rezoning the parcel and the County was sued.
Judge William R. Shelton of the Circuit Court of Chesterfield County ruled in favor of the
defendants. The trial court did acknowledge that there was evidence in a persuasive amount that
"full cash proffers or lack thereof played a key factor in the Board['s] determination" (James E.
Gregory, Sr., et al. v. The Board of Supervisors of Chesterfield County 1999). The evidence
showed that there was an expectation on the part of the Board to receive cash proffers. However,
the trial court concluded that the evidence was not as "definitive" as it had been in the earlier
decision of Board ofSupervisors v. Reed's Landing Corp., 250 Va. 397, 463 S.E.2d 668 (1995).
Thus it was "fairly debatable" whether the Board's decision based on the lack of the appropriate
cash proffer amount or "the evidence of the proposed development's impact on health, safety,
and welfare" (James E Gregory, Sr., et al. v. The Board of Supervisors of Chesterfield County
1999). If a decision is deemed "fairly debatable" then the decision of the local government must
be upheld because the burden is upon the defendant to show the decision was "unreasonable". In
regard to the charges of the decision being arbitrary and capricious, the trial court held that they
had no foundation because there were two land uses reasonable for the parcel. The first was its
current agricultural use which was compatible with its neighbors. The second was the
opportunity for the parcel to be subdivided into two or three single family residential lots. The
second use was the proposed R- 12. Thus, the court affirmed the decision of the Board of
Supervisors and dismissed the case.
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The plaintiffs appealed the Circuit Court's decision to the Supreme Court of Virginia. On April
16, 1999, the justices affirmed the decision of the trial court. Justice Barbara Milano Keenan,
author of the court's opinion, wrote, "Based on this record, we conclude that Harriss failed to
meet his evidentiary burden of demonstrating that the present zoning classification of the
property was unreasonable, and that the merits of this rezoning application were fairly debatable.
Under these circumstances, the trial court was not at liberty to substitute its judgment for that of
the legislative body.... Thus, the trial court properly upheld the Board's legislative
determination" (James E. Gregory, Sr., et al. v. The Board of Supervisors of Chesterfield County
1999). In comparison with the Powhatan County case, the record in the Chesterfield case showed
evidence at each stage of the rezoning process where concerns were raised about the
development's impact and opposition was indicated. So although, the decision of denial in
Chesterfield was probably largely driven by the inadequate cash proffer amount per lot, there
was enough proof to show that it may not have been the deciding factor. For the Powhatan case,
there was no evidence of opposition from either the public or Planning Commission. So when the
Board denied the rezoning application, there was nothing for the County to fall back on as its
justification for the denial, other than the refusal by the applicant to proffer cash payments. Thus
a bright line test from the Chesterfield County case is that a rezoning decision will be upheld if
there is enough evidence in the application's record to show that multiple factors contributed to
the decision. A rezoning application must be decided on the merits of the rezoning not the
amount of the cash proffer involved.
CONCLUSION
In the 1970s and 1980s, the majority of the conditional zoning legislation could be classified as
at the behest and benefit of local governments. For the 1990s, it seems that jurisdictions switched
their legislative priorities to impact fee legislation. Thus the conditional zoning bills introduced
were slanted towards the interests of the development community. Through minor administrative
language changes, the more permissive conditional zoning statutes from 1973 and 1989 begin the
initial steps to becoming more restrictive in the vein of the 1978 statute. I would conclude that
the development community clearly won the battle of influence in the state legislature for the
1990s as evidenced by the conditional zoning legislation discussion above and the complete
legislative failure of all bills to expand impact fee eligibility or available impact fee types. The
one positive sign for local governments in this decade was the rebalancing of the judicial scales
on rulings to a more balanced position between local governments and the development
community.
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CHAPTER 8
The legislative activity of the 2000s returned to the levels of the 1980s. A series of enacted bills
made fundamental changes to the conditional zoning statutes. However, the fate of the bill that
would have the most significant effect on conditional zoning authority since it was enacted in
1973 remains unclear at the end of this analysis. More than thirty years after their unintentional
authorization, the first bill to abolish cash proffers was introduced. With the results from the
2000 Census released in 2001, the number of jurisdictions eligible for conditional zoning with
cash proffers stood at 254 localities (81 counties, 34 cities, and 139 towns). The just over
doubling of local governments from 1989 to 2001 was not the only increase in eligibility
expansion for this time period. At the end of this analysis, the number stands at 281 localities (88
counties, 36 cities, and 157 towns). Large eligibility numbers might give the impression that
conditional zoning with cash proffers had finally achieved a level of legitimacy. The flexibility
inherent in conditional zoning, however, was a life-threatening feature of the statutes. At this
point in time, the development community emphasized certainty and standardization from its
dealings with local governments. The legislation supported by the development community tried
to force the conditional zoning statutes into a "one-size-fits-all" approach. To deal with their
growth issues properly localities needed a toolbox full of a wide complement of tools not just a
sledgehammer. Meanwhile, local governments still faced legal challenges to the local
government decisions involving the use of conditional zoning with rezoning applications.
ISSUE CONTEXT AND EMERGENCE
From the 1970s through the 1990s, the issue context centered on the experiences of one
particular locality, for example Fairfax or Chesterfield County. The 2000s break this pattern.
According to a survey conducted in July of 1999 by the Virginia Chapter of the American
Planning Association (VAPA), there were 17 counties and 5 cities that actively used the
conditional zoning statutes which authorized cash proffers.42 In comparison, none of the four
counties and five cities enabled to have impact fees for roads used the tool.43 While localities
may not have used their impact fee authority, some local governments designed their conditional
zoning systems so that their administration of cash proffers mimicked impact fees. There were
suggested maximum cash proffer amounts per dwelling unit with annual increases in the amount
voted on by Board of Supervisors or City Council. These amounts were purely suggestive, but
42 The counties were Loudoun, Spotsylvania, Powhatan, Stafford, Hanover, James City, Frederick, Prince William,
Culpeper, Chesterfield, King William, Isle of Wight, Albemarle, Fairfax, Fauquier, Shenandoah, and Roanoke. The
cities were Chesapeake, Manassas, Suffolk, Virginia Beach, and Hampton. (VAPA 1999: 41-43).
43 The counties enabled for impact fees were Loudoun, Prince William, Fairfax, and Arlington. The list of cities was
Manassas Park, Manassas, Alexandria, Falls Church, and Fairfax. (VAPA 1999: 41-43).
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they created an impression among the development community that voluntary no longer really
meant "voluntary". The authors of House Joint Resolution 170 (HJR 170) in 2004 pointed out
this change in the use of conditional zoning. It read:
"WHEREAS, the purpose of conditional zoning is to provide more
flexible and adaptable zoning methods to facilitate the orderly development of
land and permit differing land uses and at the same time recognize the effects of
change; and
WHEREAS, conditional zoning has evolved in many localities across
the state into the development of local guidelines or policies that create an
implied expectation of the volunteering of substantial conditions or the payment
of cash proffers in conjunction with zoning or rezoning applications;"
(Virginia House of Delegates 2004, JR 170)
Representatives from organizations like the Home Builders Association of Virginia (HBAV) or
the Home Building Association of Richmond (HBAR) made appearances at local government
meetings, released press releases, and conducted mail flyer campaigns to protest the increases in
the suggested cash proffer amounts.
What has built up over time was a clash in conceptions without either side wanting to lose
ground. Local governments make up one side. Their aim is to protect the limited tools that they
have while fighting to gain additional ones. Localities had two separate, but related issues. The
first was a need to an increase in the number of state authorized tools to deal with growth
matters. Second, local governments needed revenue sources to pay for public infrastructure
concerns other than property tax revenues. The other side has the development community, who
has historically been able to avoid paying for the infrastructure created by new development
because it was funded by tax revenues or bonds, but public opinion has shifted and developers
are looked upon to start paying more. Further, there has been a strong tradition of property rights
protection in the state, so the development community has been able to operate in a less
restrictive or regulated environment. In their annual legislative priorities for "land use/growth
management tools", VACo has consistently maintained the position:
"Authority to plan and regulate land use should remain with local governing
bodies, and VACo opposes any legislation to weaken that authority. Furthermore,
the General Assembly should grant localities the tools necessary to adequately meet
citizens' increasing transportation, education, public safety and other vital public
infrastructure needs that are driven by rapid residential development. Such tools
may include impact fees, statewide conditional zoning and transferable development
rights, adequate public facilities provisions in subdivision ordinances, state funds for
the purchase of development rights, and real estate transfer charges" (VACo 2006: 3).
Meanwhile, the development industry chafed under the notion that they should be held directly
responsible for funding all of the infrastructure needs associated with new residential
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development. In separate press releases over 2006 in regard to proposed cash proffer increases in
the counties of Hanover, Powhatan, Goochland, and Lousia, the HBAR consistently stated:
"[W]e maintain our objections to the cash proffer system in general. Public
infrastructure improvements benefit the entire community, and as a result,
they should be funded through broad-based revenue sources such as real and
personal property taxes as opposed to expecting one sector of the economy to
pay for public infrastructure" (HBAR 2006: 1).
While in other states, this clash would be settled at the local level because Virginia strictly
follows Dillon's Rule, it is elevated to the state level. I argue the development community is very
protective of this part of Virginia's political structure. It allows them to be more influential in the
political process than they might otherwise be. On their own website, HBAV has a statement
about the significance of Dillon's Rule to their activities:
"It is vitally important for the home building industry in Virginia to have an
effective voice in the halls of the State Capitol in Richmond because Virginia is
a "Dillon Rule" state, which limits the powers of local governments to those
powers expressly authorized by the state legislature. Consequently, local
governments cannot impose new fees or taxes on the home building industry or
impose overly burdensome new provisions in their local land use ordinances unless
they have been approved by the state legislature and signed into law by the governor".44
Local governments aspire for an environment where they will be able to use impact fees to
finance the infrastructure needs of growth that occurs from by-right development and cash
proffers to finance those that result from rezonings. This is not something shared by the
development community and they can use the presence of Dillon's Rule to delay or even kill the
aspirations of local government.
Additional pressure was being asserted on this clash by the statewide expansion in the use of
cash proffers. When the active users of cash proffers were restricted to a geographic area, the
development community could more easily monitor and exert some control on the situation.
Statewide expansion, however, meant there was the potential for more flare-ups over cash
proffer use than the development community had the time or resources to put out. The
development industry wanted the state to assert more control over what was going in the
localities. Thus there was a push for monitoring by the state of local government cash proffer
activities, as well as, state mandated standardization in cash proffer practices.
The statewide expansion in the use of cash proffers also raised the financial stakes in the debate
between local governments and the development community. Millions of dollars are involved
44 Home Builders Association of Virginia. "About HBAV" Last accessed May 30, 2012,
httD://www.hbav.com/about-hbav.shtml.
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from both sides. The amount of revenue collected statewide from cash proffers rose over this
time period. As displayed in Figure 8.1, revenues rose from just over 21 million dollars to a high
of roughly 71 million before settling back in the 60 million dollar range. While the revenues in
individual localities vary from a few thousand dollars to the millions, these numbers only apply
to rezoning activity and come from less than twenty percent of eligible local governments. One
can only imagine how much additional revenue that localities would collect if cash proffers
could apply to by-right development and there were no restrictions on eligible. That is the
scenario that the development industry hopes will never happen which is why they have used
their financial resources to influence the political process. Figure 8.2 shows that the total
contribution by the Real Estate/Construction Industry4 5 to candidates for the House of Delegates
or the state Senate has grown over time to the point where it is now at least one million dollars.
From 1996 to 2008, HBAV's statewide Political Action Committee (PAC) alone gave out over
1.3 million dollars. Given the amount of money that each side has invested, the ability to achieve
your side's desired outcome from the political process becomes even more critical.
4 The Real Estate/Construction Industry is composed of the following: General Contractors, Homebuilders,
Architectural Services/Surveyors, Building Materials/Supplies, Cement/Concrete/Asphalt, Engineers/Engineering
Firms, Manufactured Housing/Sales, Heavy Equipment Sales/Leasing, Building Trades/Subcontractors, Excavation
Contractors, Real Estate Developers, Highway Contractors, Rental/Property Management, Realtors,
Appraisers/Auctioneers, Title Companies/Settlement Agencies, Commercial Real Estate, Mortgage Lenders,
Miscellaneous Construction, and Land-Use Attorney/Consultants.
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Figure 8.1. Total Statewide Cash Proffer Revenue Collected by
Millions)
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Figure 8.2 Contributions to Candidates for House of Delegates or Senate by Real
Estate/Construction Industry Donors by Year ($ in Millions)
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AGENDA SETTING/ ALTERNATIVE SELECTION/ ENACTMENT
The level of conditional zoning related legislative activity was at its highest from 2000 to 2008
compared to prior decades. Besides the high number of bills introduced, there was a greater
variety of proposed changes to the conditional zoning statutes. These changes are illustrated in
the five bills whose legislative history I delve into later in this subsection. HB 2476 (2001) and
HB 2456 (2005) are important because they added new sections to the statutes which had not
undergone a substantive change since 1989. One of these sections (15.2-2303.2) ushered in state
monitoring of localities' implementation of conditional zoning with cash proffers. HB 1506
(2006) and HB 2500 (2007) impacted the eligibility and use of conditional zoning statutes. Some
of the four bills benefited local governments, while others were enacted in the interests of the
development community. More significantly, local governments were put in the position by
development industry sponsored legislation to have to choose cash proffers or impact fees, but
not the authority for both. As a result, SB 768 in 2008 had the potential for being considered the
biggest legislative turning point in the conditional zoning history.
Twenty-five bills were introduced on conditional zoning during the nine years. Sixteen bills
aimed to amend at least one of the existing statutes. Nine bills either proposed the addition of
new sections to the statutes or amendments to those newly added sections. Figure 8.3 shows the
number of bills introduced for each legislative session. Except for 2002, there was at least one
conditional zoning-related bill introduced every year. The high level of legislative activity could
have meant a low passage rate, but that was not the case here. Fifteen out of the twenty-five bills
were enacted into law which translates into a sixty percent success rate. Figure 8.4 displays the
number of bills that passed and failed for each legislative session.
As in prior time periods, the tactic of carrying bills over to the next legislative session was put
into practice, but to a lesser extent than in years past. Two bills were carried over from the 2000
legislative session to the 2001 session. In addition, there was one bill (SB 768) in 2008 which
was carried over to the 2009 legislative session, so any legislative decision on it is outside of my
analysis. As a result, the numbers for each legislative session between Figure 8.3 and Figure 8.4
do not match. Although they are included in the passage numbers in Figure 8.4, two enacted bills
(HB 2694 in 2003 and HB 128 in 2006) did not actually amend the conditional zoning statutes.
The bills as introduced in their respective legislative sessions did propose actual language
changes to the statutes, but in the course of the legislative process, they were amended and all
references to the conditional zoning statutes were removed. Since they started out as conditional
zoning bills, the numbers in Figures 8.3 and 8.4 reflect their presence.
198
Figure 8.3 Total Number of Conditional Zoning Bills Introduced by Legislative Session
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Figure 8.4 Conditional Zoning Bills by Legislative Outcome and Session
10
9
8
7
6
55
4
3
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
MPassed UFailed
Source: Author's calculations based on Journal of the House of Delegates and Journal of the Senate.
199
In a series of three tables (Table 8.1, Table 8.2, and Table 8.3), the "true" conditional zoning-
related bills are presented. First, Table 8.1 contains the bills that were enacted without any
amendments. There are four in total. The remaining nine enacted conditional zoning bills can be
found in Table 8.2. Because all of these bills were amended, their original or introduced statutory
language is displayed, as well as, the enacted language. A comparison of the two columns shows
how in course of the legislative process, all it takes is the substitution or amendment of one word
in one bill to achieve passage while for other bills, whole sections need to be deleted to added.
Finally, Table 8.3 lays out the nine bills that were legislative failures. Coincidentally, none of
these bills were subject to any amendments and they all died while still in the committee stage of
the legislative process. One bill (HB 1520 in 2006) was in a way legislatively reincarnated
because it was incorporated into another bill while in committee (HB 1506) and that bill was
enacted into law.
In my analysis of the 1990s, I made comparisons on the legislative activity between conditional
zoning and impact fees. The argument was made that a possible explanation for the decline in
conditional zoning bills was the distraction of the effort to expand the eligibility criteria and
types of impact fee authority available. Given the increase in conditional zoning legislation for
this time period, there might be the expectation of a decline in impact fees-related bills. In
actuality, the number was even higher. There were more than twenty bills introduced over the
nine years here that dealt with impact fees. Every legislative session had at least one impact fees
bill introduced. Over this time span, twelve bills became chapters that amended the impact fees
section of the state code. While the number ofjurisdictions eligible for impact fees did slightly
expand, impact fees were still restricted to road improvements. The hope for any real expansion
of impact fee authority in the state became intertwined with the future of cash proffers in the
2008 legislative session with the introduction of SB 768 which I will discuss in further detail
later in this subsection.
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Table 8.1. Conditional Zoning Legislation Enacted as Introduced for the 2000s
Bill Number Original and Enacted Legislative Language(Legislative Session)
House Bill 417 § 15.2-2300. Same; records.
(2004) - Chapter No. The zoning map shall show by an appropriate symbol on the map the existence of
531 conditions attaching to the zoning on the map. The zoning administrator shall keep
in his office and make available for public inspection a Conditional Zoning Index.
The Index shall provide ready access to the ordinance creating conditions in addition
to the regulations provided for in a particular zoning district or zone. The Index shall
also provide ready access to all proffered cash payments and expenditures
disclosure reports prepared by the local governing body pursuant to § 15.2-2303.2.
The zoning administrator shall update the Index annually and no later than
November 30 of each year.
House Bill 1073
(2006) - Chapter No.
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15.2-2297. Same; conditions as part of a rezoning or amendment to zoning map.
A. A zoning ordinance may include and provide for the voluntary proffering in
writing, by the owner, of reasonable conditions, prior to a public hearing before the
governing body, in addition to the regulations provided for the zoning district or
zone by the ordinance, as a part of a rezoning or amendment to a zoning map;
provided that (i) the rezoning itself must give rise for the need for the conditions; (ii)
the conditions shall have a reasonable relation to the rezoning; (iii) the conditions
shall not include a cash contribution to the locality; (iv) the conditions shall not
include mandatory dedication of real or personal property for open space, parks,
schools, fire departments or other public facilities not otherwise provided for in §
15.2-2241; (v) the conditions shall not include a requirement that the applicant
create a property owners' association under Chapter 26 (§ 55-508 et seq.) of Title 55
which includes an express further condition that members of a property owners'
association pay an assessment for the maintenance of public facilities owned in fee
by a public entity, including open space, parks, schools, fire departments and other
public facilities not otherwise provided for in § 15.2-2241; however, such facilities
shall not include sidewalks, special street signs or markers, or special street lighting
in public rights-of-way not maintained by the Department of Transportation; (vi) the
conditions shall not include payment for or construction of off-site improvements
except those provided for in § 15.2-2241; (vii) no condition shall be proffered that is
not related to the physical development or physical operation of the property; and
(viii) all such conditions shall be in conformity with the comprehensive plan as
defined in § 15.2-2223. The governing body may also accept amended proffers once
the public hearing has begun if the amended proffers do not materially affect the
overall proposal. Once proffered and accepted as part of an amendment to the
zoning ordinance, the conditions shall continue in effect until a subsequent
amendment changes the zoning on the property covered by the conditions. However,
the conditions shall continue if the subsequent amendment is part of a
comprehensive implementation of a new or substantially revised zoning ordinance.
§ 15.2-2298. Same; additional conditions as a part of rezoning or zoning map
amendment in certain high-growth localities.
A. Except for those localities to which § 15.2-2303 is applicable, this section shall
apply to (i) any locality which has had population growth of ten percent or more
from the next-to-latest to latest decennial census year, based on population reported
by the United States Bureau of the Census; (ii) any city adjoining such city or
county; (iii) any towns located within such county; and (iv) any county contiguous
with at least three such counties, and any town located in that county.
In any such locality, notwithstanding any contrary provisions of § 15.2-2297, a
zoning ordinance may include and provide for the voluntary proffering in writing, by
the owner, of reasonable conditions, prior to a public hearing before the governing
body, in addition to the regulations provided for the zoning district or zone by the
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ordinance, as a part of a rezoning or amendment to a zoning map, provided that (i)
the rezoning itself gives rise to the need for the conditions; (ii) the conditions have a
reasonable relation to the rezoning; and (iii) all conditions are in conformity with the
comprehensive plan as defined in § 15.2-2223. Reasonable conditions shall not
include, however, conditions that impose upon the applicant the requirement to
create a property owners' association under Chapter 26 (§ 55-508 et seq.) of Title 55
which includes an express further condition that members of a property association
pay an assessment for the maintenance of public facilities owned in fee by a public
entity, including open space, parks, schools, fire departments, and other public
facilities not otherwise provided for in § 15.2-2241; however, such facilities shall
not include sidewalks, special street signs or markers, or special street lighting in
public rights-of-way not maintained by the Department of Transportation. The
governing body may also accept amended proffers once the public hearing has
begun if the amended proffers do not materially affect the overall proposal. Once
proffered and accepted as part of an amendment to the zoning ordinance, the
conditions shall continue in effect until a subsequent amendment changes the zoning
on the property covered by the conditions; however, the conditions shall continue if
the subsequent amendment is part of a comprehensive implementation of a new or
substantially revised zoning ordinance.
§ 15.2-2303. Conditional zoning in certain localities.
A. A zoning ordinance may include reasonable regulations and provisions for
conditional zoning as defined in § 15.2-2201 and for the adoption, in counties, or
towns therein which have planning commissions, wherein the urban county
executive form of government is in effect, or in a city adjacent to or completely
surrounded by such a county, or in a county contiguous to any such county, or in a
city adjacent to or completely surrounded by such a contiguous county, or in any
town within such contiguous county, and in the counties east of the Chesapeake Bay
as a part of an amendment to the zoning map of reasonable conditions, in addition to
the regulations provided for the zoning district by the ordinance, when such
conditions shall have been proffered in writing, in advance of the public hearing
before the governing body required by § 15.2-2285 by the owner of the property
which is the subject of the proposed zoning map amendment. Reasonable conditions
shall not include, however, conditions that impose upon the applicant the
requirement to create a property owners' association under Chapter 26 (§ 55-508 et
seq.) of Title 55 which includes an express further condition that members of a
property owners' association pay an assessment for the maintenance of public
facilities owned in fee by a public entity, including open space, parks, schools, fire
departments, and other public facilities not otherwise provided for in § 15.2-2241;
however, such facilities shall not include sidewalks, special street signs or markers,
or special street lighting in public rights-of-way not maintained by the Department
of Transportation. The governing body may also accept amended proffers once the
public hearing has begun ifthe amended proffers do not materially affect the overall
proposal Once proffered and accepted as part of an amendment to the zoning
ordinance, such conditions shall continue in effect until a subsequent amendment
changes the zoning on the property covered by such conditions. However, such
conditions shall continue if the subsequent amendment is part of a comprehensive
implementation of a new or substantially revised zoning ordinance.
House Bill 2500 § 15.2-2298. Same; additional conditions as a part of rezoning or zoning map
(2007) - Chapter No. amendment in certain high-growth localities.
324 A. Except for those localities to which § 15.2-2303 is applicable, this section shall
apply to (i) any locality which has had population growth of 5% or more from the
next-to-latest to latest decennial census year, based on population reported by the
United States Bureau of the Census; (ii) any city adjoining such city or county; (iii)
any towns located within such county; and (iv) any county contiguous with at least
three such counties, and any town located in that county. However, any such locality
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may by ordinance choose to utilize the conditional zoning authority granted under §
15.2-2303 rather than this section.
House Bill 2380
(2007) - Chapter No.
321
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§ 15.2-2303.2. Proffered cash payments and expenditures.
C. Regardless of the date of rezoning approval, unless prohibited by the proffer
agreement accepted by the governing body of a locality pursuant to § 15.2-2298,
15.2-2303, or 15.2-2303.1, a locality may utilize any cash payments proffered for
any road improvement or any transportation improvement that is incorporated into
the capital improvements program as its matching contribution under § 33.1-23.05.
For purposes of this section, "road improvement" includes construction of new roads
or improvement or expansion of existing roads as required by applicable
construction standards of the Virginia Department of Transportation to meet
increased demand attributable to new development. For purposes of this section,
"transportation improvement" means any real or personal property acquired,
constructed, improved, or used for constructing, improving, or operating any (i)
public mass transit system or (ii) highway, or portion or interchange thereof,
including parking facilities located within a district created pursuant to this title.
Such improvements shall include, without limitation, public mass transit systems,
public highways, and all buildings, structures, approaches, and facilities thereof and
appurtenances thereto, rights-of-way, bridges, tunnels, stations, terminals, and all
related equipment and fixtures.
Regardless of the date of rezoning approval, unless prohibited by the proffer
agreement accepted by the governing body of a locality pursuant to § 15.2-2298,
15.2-2303, or 15.2-2303.1, a locality may utilize any cash payments proffered for
capital improvements for alternative improvements of the same category within the
locality in the vicinity of the improvements for which the cash payments were
originally made. Prior to utilization of such cash payments for the alternative
improvements, the governing body of the locality shall give at least 30 days' written
notice of the proposed alternative improvements to the entity who paid such cash
payment mailed to the last known address of such entity, or if proffer payment
records no longer exist, then to the original zoning applicant, and conduct a public
hearing on such proposal advertised as provided in subsection F of § 15.2-1427. The
governing body of the locality prior to the use of such cash payments for alternative
improvements shall, following such public hearing, find: (i) the improvements for
which the cash payments were proffered cannot occur in a timely manner; (ii) the
alternative improvements are within the vicinity of the proposed improvements for
which the cash payments were proffered; and (iii) the alternative improvements are
in the public interest. Notwithstanding the provisions of the Virginia Public
Procurement Act, the governing body may negotiate and award a contract without
competition to an entity that is constructing road improvements pursuant to a
proffered zoning condition or special exception condition in order to expand the
scope of the road improvements by utilizing cash proffers of others or other
available locally generated funds. The local governing body shall adopt a resolution
stating the basis for awarding the construction contract to extend the scope of the
road improvements. All road improvements to be included in the state primary or
secondary system of highways must conform to the adopted standards of the
Virginia Department of Transportation.
Table 8.2. Conditional Zoning Bills Amended and Enacted in the 2000s
Bill Number
(Legislative Original Legislative Language Enacted Language Outcome
Session)
House Bill
2476 (2001)
-- Chapter
No. 282
§ 15.2-2303.2. Disclosure ofproffered cash payments and
expenditures.
A. The governing body of any locality accepting a cash payment
voluntarily proffered pursuant to §§ 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303 or
15.2-2303.1 shall by September 30, 2001, report to the
Commission on Local Government the following information for
the preceding ten fiscal years:
1. The aggregate amount ofproffered cash payments collected by
the locality prior to the start of the preceding fiscal year, and the
sources of all such payments;
2. The aggregate amount ofproffered cash payments pledged to
but not collected by the locality prior to the start of the preceding
fiscal year, and the sources of all such pledges; and
3. The aggregate amount ofproffered cash payments expended by
the locality prior to the start of the preceding fiscal year, and all
public improvements on which such money was expended.
B. The governing body of any locality that did not accept any
proffered cash payments pursuant to §§ 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303 or
15.2-2303.1 during the preceding ten fiscal years shall by
September 30, 2001, so notify the Commission on Local
Government.
C. The governing body of any locality accepting a cash payment
voluntarily proffered pursuant to §§ 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303 or
15.2-2303.1 shall within three months of the close of each fiscal
year, beginning in fiscal year 2000 andfor each fiscal year
thereafter, report to the Commission on Local Government the
following information for the preceding fiscal year:
1. The aggregate amount ofproffered cash payments collected by
the locality during the preceding fiscal year, and the source of all
such payments;
2. The aggregate amount ofproffered cash payments pledged to
but not collected by the locality during the preceding fiscal year,
and the source of all such pledges; and
3. The aggregate amount ofproffered cash payments expended by
the locality during the preceding fiscal year, and all public
improvements on which such money was expended
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§ 15.2-2303.2. Disclosure ofproffered cash payments and
expenditures.
A. The governing body of any locality accepting a cash payment
voluntarily proffered pursuant to §§ 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303 or § 15.2-
2303.1 shall by September 30, 2001, report to the Commission on
Local Government the following information for the preceding two
fiscal years, concluding with fiscal year 2001:
1. The aggregate amount ofproffered cash payments collected by the
locality;
2. The aggregate amount ofproffered cash payments that have been
pledged to but not collected by the locality and which pledges are not
conditioned on any event other than time; and
3. The aggregate amount ofproffered cash payments expended by the
locality, and an aggregate list of all public improvements on which
such money was expended
B. The governing body of any locality eligible to accept any proffered
cash payments pursuant to §§ 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303 or § 15.2-2303.1
but that did not accept any proffered cash payments during the
preceding two fiscal years shall by September 30, 2001, so notify the
Commission on Local Government.
C. The governing body of any locality accepting a cash payment
voluntarily proffered pursuant to §§ 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303 or § 15.2-
2303.1 shall within three months of the close of each fiscal year,
beginning in fiscal year 2002 and for each fiscal year thereafter,
report to the Commission on Local Government the following
information for the preceding fiscal year:
1. The aggregate amount ofproffered cash payments collected by the
locality;
2. The aggregate amount ofproffered cash payments that have been
pledged to but not collected by the locality and which pledges are not
conditioned on any event other than time; and
3. The aggregate amount ofproffered cash payments expended by the
locality, and an aggregate list of all public improvements on which
such money was expended
D. The governing body of any locality eligible to accept any proffered
cash payments pursuant to §§ 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303 or § 15.2-2303.1
.
D. The governing body of any locality that did not accept any
proffered cash payments pursuant to §§ 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303 or
15.2-2303.1 during the preceding fiscal year shall within three
months of the close of each fiscal year, beginning in 2001 and for
each fiscal year thereafter, so notify the Commission on Local
Government.
E. The Commission on Local Government shall, by November 30,
2001, prepare and make available to the public and the chairmen
of the Senate Local Government Committee and the House
Counties, Cities and Towns Committee a report containing the
information made available to it pursuant to subsections A and B.
F. The Commission on Local Government shall by November 30,
2001, and by November 30 ofeach fiscal year thereafter, prepare
and make available to the public and the chairmen of the Senate
Local Government Committee and the House Counties, Cities and
Towns Committee an annual report containing the information
made available to it pursuant to subsections C and D.
15.2-2297
A. A zoning ordinance may include and provide for the voluntary
proffering in writing, by the owner, of reasonable conditions, prior
to a public hearing before the governing body, in addition to the
regulations provided for the zoning district or zone by the
ordinance, as a part of a rezoning or amendment to a zoning map;
provided that (i) the rezoning itself must give rise for the need for
the conditions; (ii) the conditions shall have a reasonable relation
to the rezoning; (iii) the conditions shall not include a cash
contribution to the locality; (iv) the conditions shall not include
mandatory dedication of real or personal property for open space,
parks, schools, fire departments or other public facilities not
otherwise provided for in § 15.2-2241; (v) the conditions shall not
include a requirement that the applicant create a property owners'
association under Chapter 26 (§ 55-508 et seq.) of Title 55, with a
further condition that members of a property owners' association
pay an assessment for publicly owned public facilities, including
open space, parks, schools, fire departments and other public
facilities not otherwise provided for in § 15.2-2241; (vi) the
conditions shall not include payment for or construction of off-site
improvements except those provided for in § 15.2-2241; (vi)(vii)
no condition shall be proffered that is not related to the physical
development or physical operation of the property; and (vii)(viii)
but that did not accept any proffered cash payments during the
preceding fiscal year shall within three months of the close of each
fiscal year, beginning in 2001 andfor each fiscal year thereafter, so
notify the Commission on Local Government.
E. The Commission on Local Government shall, by November 30,
2001, prepare and make available to the public and the chairmen of
the Senate Local Government Committee and the House Counties,
Cities and Towns Committee a report containing the information
made available to it pursuant to subsections A and B.
F. The Commission on Local Government shall by November 30,
2001, and by November 30 of each fiscal year thereafter, prepare and
make available to the public and the chairmen of the Senate Local
Government Committee and the House Counties, Cities and Towns
Committee an annual report containing the information made
available to it pursuant to subsections C and D.
15.2-2297
A. A zoning ordinance may include and provide for the voluntary
proffering in writing, by the owner, of reasonable conditions, prior to
a public hearing before the governing body, in addition to the
regulations provided for the zoning district or zone by the ordinance,
as a part of a rezoning or amendment to a zoning map; provided that
(i) the rezoning itself must give rise for the need for the conditions;
(ii) the conditions shall have a reasonable relation to the rezoning;
(iii) the conditions shall not include a cash contribution to the locality;
(iv) the conditions shall not include mandatory dedication of real or
personal property for open space, parks, schools, fire departments or
other public facilities not otherwise provided for in § 15.2-2241; (v)
the conditions shall not include a requirement that the applicant
create a property owners' association under Chapter 26 (§ 55-508 et
seq.) of Title 55 which includes an express further condition that
members of a property owners' association pay an assessment for the
maintenance ofpublic facilities owned infee by a public entity,
including open space, parks, schools, fire departments and other
public facilities not otherwise providedfor in § 15.2-2241; however,
suchfacilities shall not include sidewalks, special street signs or
markers, or special street lighting in public rights-of-way not
maintained by the Department of Transportation; (vi) the conditions
shall not include payment for or construction of off-site
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Senate Bill
874 (2001) --
Chapter No.
703
all such conditions shall be in conformity with the comprehensive
plan as defined in § 15.2-2223.
15.2-2298
A. Except for those localities to which § 15.2-2303 is applicable,
this section shall apply to (i) any locality which has had population
growth of ten percent or more from the next-to-latest to latest
decennial census year, based on population reported by the United
States Bureau of the Census; (ii) any city adjoining such city or
county; (iii) any towns located within such county; and (iv) any
county contiguous with at least three such counties, and any town
located in that county. In any such locality, notwithstanding any
contrary provisions of § 15.2-2297, a zoning ordinance may
include and provide for the voluntary proffering in writing, by the
owner, of reasonable conditions, prior to a public hearing before
the governing body, in addition to the regulations provided for the
zoning district or zone by the ordinance, as a part of a rezoning or
amendment to a zoning map, provided that (i) the rezoning itself
gives rise to the need for the conditions; (ii) the conditions have a
reasonable relation to the rezoning; and (iii) all conditions are in
conformity with the comprehensive plan as defined in § 15.2-
2223. Reasonable conditions shall not include, however,
conditions that impose upon the applicant the requirement to
create a property owners' association under Chapter 26 (§ 55-508
et seq.) of Title 55, with afurther condition that members of a
property association pay an assessment for publicly owned public
facilities, including open space, parks, schools, fire departments,
and other public facilities not otherwise provided for in § 15.2-
2241.
15.2-2303
A. A zoning ordinance may include reasonable regulations and
provisions for conditional zoning as defined in § 15.2-2201 and
for the adoption, in counties, or towns therein which have
planning commissions, wherein the urban county executive form
of government is in effect, or in a city adjacent to or completely
surrounded by such a county, or in a county contiguous to any
such county, or in a city adjacent to or completely surrounded by
such a contiguous county, or in any town within such contiguous
county, and in the counties east of the Chesapeake Bay as a part of
improvements except those provided for in § 15.2-2241; (Vi) (vii) no
condition shall be proffered that is not related to the physical
development or physical operation of the property; and (vii) (viii) all
such conditions shall be in conformity with the comprehensive plan as
defined in § 15.2-2223.
15.2-2298
A. Except for those localities to which § 15.2-2303 is applicable, this
section shall apply to (i) any locality which has had population
growth of ten percent or more from the next-to-latest to latest
decennial census year, based on population reported by the United
States Bureau of the Census; (ii) any city adjoining such city or
county; (iii) any towns located within such county; and (iv) any
county contiguous with at least three such counties, and any town
located in that county. In any such locality, notwithstanding any
contrary provisions of § 15.2-2297, a zoning ordinance may include
and provide for the voluntary proffering in writing, by the owner, of
reasonable conditions, prior to a public hearing before the governing
body, in addition to the regulations provided for the zoning district or
zone by the ordinance, as a part of a rezoning or amendment to a
zoning map, provided that (i) the rezoning itself gives rise to the need
for the conditions; (ii) the conditions have a reasonable relation to the
rezoning; and (iii) all conditions are in conformity with the
comprehensive plan as defined in § 15.2-2223. Reasonable conditions
shall not include, however, conditions that impose upon the applicant
the requirement to create a property owners' association under
Chapter 26 (§ 55-508 et seq.) of Title 55 which includes an express
further condition that members of a property association pay an
assessment for the maintenance ofpublic facilities owned in fee by a
public entity, including open space, parks, schools, fire departments,
and other public facilities not otherwise provided for in § 15.2-2241;
however, such facilities shall not include sidewalks, special street
signs or markers, or special street lighting in public rights-of-way not
maintained by the Department of Transportation.
15.2-2303
A. A zoning ordinance may include reasonable regulations and
provisions for conditional zoning as defined in § 15.2-2201 and for
the adoption, in counties, or towns therein which have planning
commissions, wherein the urban county executive form of
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an amendment to the zoning map of reasonable conditions, in
addition to the regulations provided for the zoning district by the
ordinance, when such conditions shall have been proffered in
writing, in advance of the public hearing before the governing
body required by § 15.2-2285 by the owner of the property which
is the subject of the proposed zoning map amendment. Reasonable
conditions shall not include, however, conditions that impose upon
the applicant the requirement to create a property owners'
association under Chapter 26 (§ 55-508 et seq.) of Title 55, with a
further condition that members of a property owners' association
pay an assessment for publicly owned public facilities, including
open space, parks, schools, fire departments, and other public
facilities not otherwise provided for in § 15.2-224 1.
§ 15.2-2303.2. Disclosure of proffered cash payments and
expenditures.
C. The governing body of any locality with a population in excess
of 3,500 persons accepting a cash payment voluntarily proffered
pursuant to §§ 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303 or § 15.2-2303.1 shall within
three months of the close of each fiscal year, beginning in fiscal
year 2002 and for each fiscal year thereafter, report to the
Commission on Local Government the following information for
the preceding fiscal year:
1. The aggregate dollar amount of proffered cash payments
collected by the locality;
2. The aggregate dollar amount of proffered cash payments that
have been pledged to but not collected by the locality-and-whieh
pledges are not conditioned on any event other than ti; and
3. The aggregate-total dollar amount of proffered cash payments
expended by the locality, and an aggregae list of all public
imp ments on which such money was expended.the aggregate
dollar amount expended in each of the following categories:
Schools $
government is in effect, or in a city adjacent to or completely
surrounded by such a county, or in a county contiguous to any such
county, or in a city adjacent to or completely surrounded by such a
contiguous county, or in any town within such contiguous county, and
in the counties east of the Chesapeake Bay as a part of an amendment
to the zoning map of reasonable conditions, in addition to the
regulations provided for the zoning district by the ordinance, when
such conditions shall have been proffered in writing, in advance of the
public hearing before the governing body required by § 15.2-2285 by
the owner of the property which is the subject of the proposed zoning
map amendment. Reasonable conditions shall not include, however,
conditions that impose upon the applicant the requirement to create a
property owners' association under Chapter 26 (§ 55-508 et seq.) of
Title 55 which includes an express further condition that members of
a property owners' association pay an assessment for the
maintenance ofpublic facilities owned in fee by a public entity,
including open space, parks, schools, fire departments, and other
public facilities not otherwise provided for in § 15.2-2241; however,
such facilities shall not include sidewalks, special street signs or
markers, or special street lighting in public rights-of-way not
maintained by the Department of Transportation.
§ 15.2-2303.2. Disclosure of proffered cash payments and
expenditures.
C. The governing body of any locality with a population in excess of
3,500 persons accepting a cash payment voluntarily proffered
pursuant to §§ 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303 or § 15.2-2303.1 shall within
three months of the close of each fiscal year, beginning in fiscal year
2002 and for each fiscal year thereafter, report to the Commission on
Local Government the following information for the preceding fiscal
year:
1. The aggregate dollar amount of proffered cash payments collected
by the locality;
2. The estimated aggregate dollar amount of proffered cash payments
that have been pledged to but not eellected by the locality and which
pledges are not conditioned on any event other than time; and
3. The aggregate-total dollar amount of proffered cash payments
expended by the locality, and an aggregate list of all publi
improvements on which such money was expended. the aggregate
dollar amount expended in each of the following categories:
Schools
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House Bill
2600 (2003) -
Chapter No.
522
Off-site road improvements $
Fire and Rescue/Public Safety $_
Libraries $_
Parks, Recreation, and Open Space $
Water and Sewer Service Extension $_
Community Centers $_
Stormwater Management $_
Special Needs Housing $
Miscellaneous $
Total dollar amount expended $_
D. The governing body of any locality with a population in excess
of 3,500 persons eligible to accept any proffered cash payments
pursuant to §§ 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303 or § 15.2-2303.1 but that did
not accept any proffered cash payments during the preceding fiscal
year shall within three months of the close of each fiscal year,
beginning in 2001 and for each fiscal year thereafter, so notify the
Commission on Local Government.
Road and other Transportation Improvements
$___
Fire and Rescue/Public Safety
$___
Libraries
$___
Parks, Recreation, and Open Space
Water and Sewer Service Extension
$___
Community Centers
$___
Stormwater Management
Special Needs Housing
Affordable Housing
Miscellaneous
12
Total dollar amount expended
D. The governing body of any locality with a population in excess of
3,500 persons eligible to accept any proffered cash payments pursuant
to §§ 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303 or § 15.2-2303.1 but that did not accept
any proffered cash payments during the preceding fiscal year shall
within three months of the close of each fiscal year, beginning in
2001 and for each fiscal year thereafter, so notify the Commission on
Local Government.
House Bill § 15.2-2303.2. Proffered cash payments and expenditures. § 15.2-2303.2. Proffered cash payments and expenditures.
2888 (2005) - A. The governing body of any locality accepting a cash payment A. The governing body of any locality accepting a-cash payment
Chapter No. voluntarily proffered on or after July 1, 2005, pursuant to §§ 15.2- payments voluntarily proffered on or after July 1, 2005, pursuant to
855 2298, 15.2-2303 or §-15.2-2303.1 shall by September- 30, 2001, § 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303 or *-15.2-2303.1 shall,-by-September3,
report to the Commsio o '_-n Local Government the following 2001, reportto the Commission on Local Governmnent the following
information for the preceding two fiscal years, concluding with information for the preceding two fiscal years, concluding with fsa
fiscal year- 200 1; yea- 20O4--
!. The aggregate amount of proffered cash payments collected-by 1. The aggregate amount of proffered coash payments Collected byth
the leeat- locality,-
_______2. The aggregate amount of proffered cash-payents that have 2.The agf~gt a~ of prffere eah mnt that hav bee
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h~en rie'i"e1 t'~ hilt n~t c~IIct~TY1 by th~ I~cflI1tv rn1 wfllcfl
pledges are not conditioned on any event other than time; and
3. The aggregate amount of proffered cash payments expendedb
the locality, and an aggregate list of all public improvements onl
which such money ws e nded within five years ofreceiving
such payment, begin construction, or cause construction to begin,
of the improvements for which the cash payment was proffered.
Unless prohibited by the proffer agreement between the owner and
the locality, a locality may utilize any proffered funds in excess of
funds needed for the proffered purpose in order to construct other
improvements within the locality similar to and in the vicinity of
those for which the cash payment was proffered. A locality that
does not begin construction ofthe improvements for which the
cash payment was proffered within five years of receipt of the
proffered cash payment shall pay the amount of that proffered
cash payment to the State Treasurer for deposit in the Literary
Fund, such amount to be expended from the Literary Fund in the
planning district, as defined in § 15.2-4202, in which the proffered
cash payment was collected.
B. The governing body of any locality eligible to accept any
proffered cash payments pursuant to §4 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303 or 4
15.2-2303.1 but that did not accept any proffered cash payments
during the preceding two fiscal years shall by September 30, 2001,
so notify the Commission on Local Gove ,men at the end of
each fiscal year beginning with the fiscal year 2005, (i) amend its
capital improvement program created pursuant to § 15.2-2239 to
include the amount of all proffered cash payments received during
such fiscal year, and (ii) include the amount ofproffered cash
payments received for capital improvements in the locality's
capital budget.
C. The governing body of any locality with a population in excess
of 3,500 persons accepting a cash payment voluntarily proffered
pursuant to § 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303 or *-15.2-2303.1 shall within
three months of the close of each fiscal year, beginning in fiscal
year 2002 and for each fiscal year thereafter, report to the
Commission on Local Government the following information for
the preceding fiscal year:
1. The aggregate dollar amount of proffered cash payments
collected by the locality;
2. The estimated aggregate dollar amount of proffered cash
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pledged to but not coollected by the locality and whicah pledges are net
conditioned on any event other than time; and
3. The aggregate amount of proff-ered cash parnents expended by h
locality, and an aggregate list of all public. improvements on which
such money was expe within seven years ofreceiving full
payment of all cash proffered pursuant to an approved rezoning
application, begin, or cause to begin (i) construction, (ii) site work,
(iii) engineering, (iv) right-of-way acquisition, (v) surveying, or (vi)
utility relocation on the improvements for which the cash payments
were proffered. A locality that does not comply with the above
requirement, or does not begin alternative improvements as provided
for in subsection C, shall forward the amount of the proffered cash
payments to the Commonwealth Transportation Board no later than
December 31 following the fiscal year in which such forfeiture
occurred for direct allocation to the secondary system construction
program or the urban system construction program for the locality in
which the proffered cash payments were collected. The funds to which
any locality may be entitled under the provisions of Title 33.1 for
construction, improvement, or maintenance ofprimary, secondary, or
urban roads shall not be diminished by reason of anyfunds remitted
pursuant to this subsection by such locality, regardless ofwhether
such contributions are matched by state or federal funds.
B. The governing body of any locality eligible to accept any proffered
cash payments pursuant to §§ 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303 or *-15.2-2303.1
but that did not accept any proffered cash payments during the
preceding two fiscal years shall by September 30, 2001, so notify the
Commission on Local Goverment, for each fiscal year beginning
with the fiscal year 2007, (i) include in its capital improvement
program created pursuant to § 15.2-2239, or as an appendix thereto,
the amount of all proffered cash payments received during the most
recentfiscalyearfor which a report has been filed pursuant to
subsection D, and (ii) include in its annual capital budget the amount
ofproffered cash payments projected to be usedfor expenditures or
appropriatedfor capital improvements in the ensuing year.
C. Regardless ofthe date ofrezoning approval, unless prohibited by
the proffer agreement accepted by the governing body of a locality
pursuant to § 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303.1 or 15.2-2304, a locality may
utilize any cash payments profferedfor capital improvementsfor
alternative improvements of the same category within the locality in
the vicinity of the improvements for which the cash payments were
Counties, Cities and Towns Committee a report containing the
information mnade available to it pursuant to subsections A andB
R-The Commission on Local Government shall by November 30,
2001, and by November 30 of each fiscal year thereafter, prepare
and make available to the public and the chairmen of the Senate
Local Government Committee and the House Counties, Cities and
Towns Committee an annual report containing the information
made available to it pursuant to subsections C and D.
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payments that have been pledged to the locality and which pledges
are not conditioned on any event other than time; and
3. The total dollar amount of proffered cash payments expended
by the locality, and the aggregate dollar amount expended in each
of the following categories:
Schools $
Road and other Transportation
Improvements $_
F ire and Rescue/Public Safety $_
Libraries $_
Parks, Recreation, and Open Space $ ___
Water and Sewer Service Extension $________
Community Centers $_
Stormwater Management $
Special Needs Housing $_
Af fordable Housing $_
Miscellaneous $_
Total dollar amount expended $_
D. The governing body of any locality with a population in excess
of 3,500 persons eligible to accept any proffered cash payments
pursuant to §§ 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303 or § 15.2-2303.1 but that did
not accept any proffered cash payments during the preceding fiscal
year shall within three months of the close of each fiscal year,
beginning in 2001 and for each fiscal year thereafter, so notify the
Commission on Local Government.
E. The Commission on Local Goverment shall, by No'ember 30,
originally made. Prior to utilization ofsuch cash paymentsfor the
alternative improvements, the governing body of the locality shall
give at least 30 days' written notice of the proposed alternative
improvements to the entity who paid such cash payment mailed to the
last known address of such entity, or ifproffer payment records no
longer exist, then to the original zoning applicant, and conduct a
public hearing on such proposal advertised as provided in subsection
F off 15.2-142 7. The governing body of the locality prior to the use
of such cash payments for alternative improvements shall, following
such public hearing, find: (i) the improvements for which the cash
payments were proffered cannot occur in a timely manner; (ii) the
alternative improvements are within the vicinity of the proposed
improvements for which the cash payments were proffered; and (iii)
the alternative improvements are in the public interest.
D. The governing body of any locality with a population in excess of
3,500 persons accepting a cash payment voluntarily proffered
pursuant to § 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303 or *-15.2-2303.1 shall within
three months of the close of each fiscal year, beginning in fiscal year
2002 and for each fiscal year thereafter, report to the Commission on
Local Government the following information for the preceding fiscal
year:
1. The aggregate dollar amount of proffered cash payments collected
by the locality;
2. The estimated aggregate dollar amount of proffered cash payments
that have been pledged to the locality and which pledges are not
conditioned on any event other than time; and
3. The total dollar amount of proffered cash payments expended by
the locality, and the aggregate dollar amount expended in each of the
following categories
Schools $
Road and other
Transportation Improvements $
Fire and Rescue/Public Safety $
Libraries $
Parks, Recreation, and Open Space $
Water and Sewer Service Extension $
Community Centers $
Stormwater Management $
Special Needs Housing $
Affordable Housing $
House Bill
2456(2005)-
Chapter No.
552
§ 15.2-2303.3. Cash proffers requested or accepted by a locality.
A. No locality shall seek or accept payment of a cash proffer prior
to payment of anyfees for the issuance of a building permit for
construction on the property that is the subject of the rezoning or
development agreement.
B. No locality shall either request or accept a cash proffer whose
amount is scheduled to increase annually, from the time ofproffer
until tender ofpayment, by a percentage greater than the annual
rate of inflation, as calculated by referring to the Consumer Price
Index published by the United States Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Miscellaneous $
Total dollar amount expended $
D E. The governing body of any locality with a population in excess
of 3,500 persons eligible to accept any proffered cash payments
pursuant to § 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303 or §-15.2-2303.1 but that did not
accept any proffered cash payments during the preceding fiscal year
shall within three months of the close of each fiscal year, beginning in
2001 and for each fiscal year thereafter, so notify the Commission on
Local Government.
E. The Commission on Local Goverment shall, by November 30,
200 1, prepare and make available to the public, and the chairmeno
the Senate Local Government Committee and the House Counties,
F. The Commission on Local Government shall by November 30,
2001, and by November 30 of each fiscal year thereafter, prepare and
make available to the public and the chairmen of the Senate Local
Government Committee and the House Counties, Cities and Towns
Committee an annual report containing the information made
available to it pursuant to subsections-G-and D and E.
§ 15.2-2303.3. Cash proffers requested or accepted by a locality.
A. No locality may require payment of a cash proffer prior to payment
of any fees for the issuance of a building permit for construction on
property that is the subject of a rezoning. However, a landowner
petitioning for a zoning change may voluntarily agree to an earlier
payment, pursuant to §§ 15.2-2298 and 15.2-2303. If the petitioner
voluntarily agrees to an earlier payment, the proffered condition may
be enforced as to the petitioner and any successor in interest
according to its terms as part of an approved rezoning.
B. No locality shall either request or accept a cash proffer whose
amount is scheduled to increase annually, from the time ofproffer
until tender ofpayment, by a percentage greater than the annual rate
of inflation, as calculated by referring to the Consumer Price Index
for all urban consumers (CPI-U), 1982-1984= 100 (not seasonally
adjusted) as reported by the United States Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics or the Marshall and Swift Building Cost
Index.
2. That the provisions of subsection B of this act shall not apply to
any rezoning application filed prior to July 1, 2005.
3. That the provisions of subsection A are declarative of existing law.
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House Bill
1506 (2006) -
Chapter No.
882
§ 15.2-2298. Same; additional conditions as a part of rezoning or
zoning map amendment in certain high-growth localities.
A. Except for those localities to which § 15.2-2303 is applicable,
this section shall apply to (i) any locality which has had population
growth of-ten-percent 5% or more from the next-to-latest to latest
decennial census year, based on population reported by the United
States Bureau of the Census; (ii) any city adjoining such city or
county; (iii) any towns located within such county; and (iv) any
county contiguous with at least three such counties, and any town
located in that county.
In any such locality, notwithstanding any contrary provisions of §
15.2-2297, a zoning ordinance may include and provide for the
voluntary proffering in writing, by the owner, of reasonable
conditions, prior to a public hearing before the governing body, in
addition to the regulations provided for the zoning district or zone
by the ordinance, as a part of a rezoning or amendment to a zoning
map, provided that (i) the rezoning itself gives rise to the need for
the conditions; (ii) the conditions have a reasonable relation to the
rezoning; and (iii) all conditions are in conformity with the
comprehensive plan as defined in § 15.2-2223. Reasonable
conditions shall include the payment of cash for any off-site road
improvement, as defined in § 15.2-2318, or any off-site
transportation improvement, as defined in § 33.1-430, that is
adopted as an amendment to the required comprehensive plan and
incorporated into the capital improvements program. Reasonable
conditions shall not include, however, conditions that impose upon
the applicant the requirement to create a property owners'
association under Chapter 26 (§ 55-508 et seq.) of Title 55 which
includes an express further condition that members of a property
association pay an assessment for the maintenance of public
facilities owned in fee by a public entity, including open space,
parks, schools, fire departments, and other public facilities not
otherwise provided for in § 15.2-2241; however, such facilities
shall not include sidewalks, special street signs or markers, or
special street lighting in public rights-of-way not maintained by
the Department of Transportation. Once proffered and accepted as
part of an amendment to the zoning ordinance, the conditions shall
continue in effect until a subsequent amendment changes the
zoning on the property covered by the conditions; however, the
conditions shall continue if the subsequent amendment is part of a
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§ 15.2-2298. Same; additional conditions as a part of rezoning or
zoning map amendment in certain high-growth localities.
A. Except for those localities to which § 15.2-2303 is applicable, this
section shall apply to (i) any locality which has had population
growth of-ten-pereent 5% or more from the next-to-latest to latest
decennial census year, based on population reported by the United
States Bureau of the Census; (ii) any city adjoining such city or
county; (iii) any towns located within such county; and (iv) any
county contiguous with at least three such counties, and any town
located in that county.
In any such locality, notwithstanding any contrary provisions of §
15.2-2297, a zoning ordinance may include and provide for the
voluntary proffering in writing, by the owner, of reasonable
conditions, prior to a public hearing before the governing body, in
addition to the regulations provided for the zoning district or zone by
the ordinance, as a part of a rezoning or amendment to a zoning map,
provided that (i) the rezoning itself gives rise to the need for the
conditions; (ii) the conditions have a reasonable relation to the
rezoning; and (iii) all conditions are in conformity with the
comprehensive plan as defined in § 15.2-2223.
Reasonable conditions may include the payment of cash for any off-
site road improvement or any off-site transportation improvement that
is adopted as an amendment to the required comprehensive plan and
incorporated into the capital improvements program, provided that
nothing herein shall prevent a locality from accepting proffered
conditions which are not normally included in a capital improvement
program. For purposes ofthis section, "road improvement" includes
construction ofnew roads or improvement or expansion of existing
roads as required by applicable construction standards of the
Virginia Department of Transportation to meet increased demand
attributable to new development. For purposes of this section,
"transportation improvement" means any real or personal property
acquired, constructed, improved, or usedfor constructing, improving,
or operating any (i) public mass transit system or (ii) highway, or
portion or interchange thereof including parkingfacilities located
within a district created pursuant to this title. Such improvements
shall include, without limitation, public mass transit systems, public
highways, and all buildings, structures, approaches, andfacilities
thereof and appurtenances thereto, rights-of-way, bridges, tunnels,
stations, terminals, and all related equipment and fixtures.
comprehensive implementation of a new or substantially revised
zoning ordinance.
§ 15.2-2303.2. Proffered cash payments and expenditures.
C. Regardless ofthe date ofrezoning approval, unless prohibited
by the proffer agreement accepted by the governing body of a
locality pursuant to § 15.2-2298, a locality may utilize any cash
payments proffered for any road improvement, as defined in §
15.2-2318, or any transportation improvement, as defined in §
33.1-430, that is incorporated into the capital improvements
program as its matching contribution under § 33.1-75.1.
§ 15.2-2303.2. Proffered cash payments and expenditures.
C. Regardless of the date of rezoning approval, unless prohibited
by the proffer agreement accepted by the governing body of a
locality pursuant to § 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303.1 or 15.2-2304, a
locality may utilize any cash payments proffered for capital
improvements for alternative improvements of the same category
within the locality in the vicinity of the improvements for which
the cash payments were originally made. Prior to utilization of
such cash payments for the alternative improvements, the
governing body of the locality shall give at least 30 days' written
notice of the proposed alternative improvements to the entity who
§ 15.2-2303.2. Proffered cash payments and expenditures.
C. Regardless ofthe date ofrezoning approval, unless prohibited by
the proffer agreement accepted by the governing body of a locality
pursuant to § 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303 or 15.2-2303.1, a locality may
utilize any cash payments proffered for any road improvement or any
transportation improvement that is incorporated into the capital
improvements program as its matching contribution under § 33.1-
23.05. For purposes ofthis section, "road improvement" includes
construction of new roads or improvement or expansion of existing
roads as required by applicable construction standards of the
Virginia Department of Transportation to meet increased demand
attributable to new development. For purposes of this section,
"transportation improvement" means any real or personal property
acquired, constructed, improved, or used for constructing, improving,
or operating any (i) public mass transit system or (ii) highway, or
portion or interchange thereof including parking facilities located
within a district created pursuant to this title. Such improvements
shall include, without limitation, public mass transit systems, public
highways, and all buildings, structures, approaches, and facilities
thereof and appurtenances thereto, rights-of-way, bridges, tunnels,
stations, terminals, and all related equipment and fixtures.
Regardless of the date of rezoning approval, unless prohibited by the
proffer agreement accepted by the governing body of a locality
pursuant to § 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303 or 15.2-2303.1-er-1-5-2-2304, a
locality may utilize any cash payments proffered for capital
improvements for alternative improvements of the same category
within the locality in the vicinity of the improvements for which the
cash payments were originally made.
§ 15.2-2303.2. Proffered cash payments and expenditures.
C. Regardless of the date of rezoning approval, unless prohibited by
the proffer agreement accepted by the governing body of a locality
pursuant to § 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303 or 15.2-2303.1 er-1-5-2-2304, a
locality may utilize any cash payments proffered for capital
improvements for alternative improvements of the same category
within the locality in the vicinity of the improvements for which the
cash payments were originally made. Prior to utilization of such cash
payments for the alternative improvements, the governing body of the
locality shall give at least 30 days' written notice of the proposed
alternative improvements to the entity who paid such cash payment
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House Bill
1192 (2006)
Chapter No.
872
'I
§ 15.2-2303.2. Proffered cash payments and expenditures.
C. Regardless of the date of rezoning approval, unless prohibited
by the proffer agreement accepted by the governing body of a
locality pursuant to § 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303.1 or 15.2-2304, a
locality may utilize any cash payments proffered for capital
improvements for alternative improvements of the same category
within the locality in the vicinity of the improvements for which
the cash payments were originally made. Prior to utilization of
such cash payments for the alternative improvements, the
governing body of the locality shall give at least 30 days' written
notice of the proposed alternative improvements to the entity who
paid such cash payment mailed to the last known address of such
entity, or if proffer payment records no longer exist, then to the
original zoning applicant, and conduct a public hearing on such
proposal advertised as provided in subsection F of § 15.2-1427.
The governing body of the locality prior to the use of such cash
payments for alternative improvements shall, following such
public hearing, find: (i) the improvements for which the cash
payments were proffered cannot occur in a timely manner; (ii) the I
I
§ 15.2-2303.2. Proffered cash payments and expenditures.
C. Regardless of the date of rezoning approval, unless prohibited by
the proffer agreement accepted by the governing body of a locality
pursuant to § 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303, or 15.2-2303.1-er-1-5.2-2394, a
locality may utilize any cash payments proffered for capital
improvements for alternative improvements of the same category
within the locality in the vicinity of the improvements for which the
cash payments were originally made. Prior to utilization of such cash
payments for the alternative improvements, the governing body of the
locality shall give at least 30 days' written notice of the proposed
alternative improvements to the entity who paid such cash payment
mailed to the last known address of such entity, or if proffer payment
records no longer exist, then to the original zoning applicant, and
conduct a public hearing on such proposal advertised as provided in
subsection F of § 15.2-1427. The governing body of the locality prior
to the use of such cash payments for alternative improvements shall,
following such public hearing, find: (i) the improvements for which
the cash payments were proffered cannot occur in a timely manner;
(ii) the alternative improvements are within the vicinity of the
214
Senate Bill
681 (2006)-
Chapter No.
583
paid such cash payment mailed to the last known address of such
entity, or if proffer payment records no longer exist, then to the
original zoning applicant, and conduct a public hearing on such
proposal advertised as provided in subsection F of § 15.2-1427.
The governing body of the locality prior to the use of such cash
payments for alternative improvements shall, following such
public hearing, find: (i) the improvements for which the cash
payments were proffered cannot occur in a timely manner; (ii) the
alternative improvements are within the vicinity of the proposed
improvements for which the cash payments were proffered; and
(iii) the alternative improvements are in the public interest.
Notwithstanding any other provisions of law to the contrary, the
governing body may award a contract to an entity that is
providing cash proffers, that is already mobilized in the area, and
that is willing to construct a more extensive road improvement
utilizing cash proffers of others as well as other available funds,
upon a written determination by the governing body stating the
basis for awarding one construction contract to extend the limits
of the road improvement.
'
mailed to the last known address of such entity, or if proffer payment
records no longer exist, then to the original zoning applicant, and
conduct a public hearing on such proposal advertised as provided in
subsection F of § 15.2-1427. The governing body of the locality prior
to the use of such cash payments for alternative improvements shall,
following such public hearing, find: (i) the improvements for which
the cash payments were proffered cannot occur in a timely manner;
(ii) the alternative improvements are within the vicinity of the
proposed improvements for which the cash payments were proffered;
and (iii) the alternative improvements are in the public interest.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the Virginia Public Procurement
Act, the governing body may negotiate and award a contract without
competition to an entity that is constructing road improvements
pursuant to a proffered zoning condition in order to expand the scope
of the road improvements by utilizing cash proffers of others or other
available locally generated funds. The local governing body shall
adopt a resolution stating the basis for awarding the construction
contract to extend the scope of the road improvements. All road
improvements to be included in the state primary or secondary system
of highways must conform to the adopted standards of the Virginia
Department of Transportation.
alternative improvements are within the vicinity of the proposed
improvements for which the cash payments were proffered; and
(iii) the alternative improvements are in the public interest.
Notwithstanding any other provisions of law to the contrary, the
governing body may award a contract to an entity that is
providing cash proffers, that is already mobilized in the area, and
that is willing to construct a more extensive road improvement
utilizing cash proffers of others as well as other available funds,
upon a written determination by the governing body stating the
basis for awarding one construction contract to extend the limits
of the road improvement.
proposed improvements for which the cash payments were proffered;
and (iii) the alternative improvements are in the public interest.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the Virginia Public Procurement
Act, the governing body may negotiate and award a contract without
competition to an entity that is constructing road improvements
pursuant to a proffered zoning condition in order to expand the scope
of the road improvements by utilizing cash proffers of others or other
available locally generated funds. The local governing body shall
adopt a resolution stating the basis for awarding the construction
contract to extend the scope of the road improvements. All road
improvements to be included in the state primary or secondary system
of highways must conform to the adopted standards of the Virginia
Department of Transportation.
House Bill § 15.2-2303. Conditional zoning in certain localities. § 15.2-2303. Conditional zoning in certain localities.
1084 (2008) - F. In any instance in which a locality has accepted proffered F. In any instance in which a locality has accepted proffered
Chapter No. conditions that include pedestrian improvements in a "transit conditions that include pedestrian improvements, and the Virginia
7333 station area," as defined by a locality's comprehensive plan or Department of Transportation has reviewed and not objected to the
zoning ordinance, the Virginia Department of Transportation may proposed pedestrian improvements during the processing of the
review such improvements, but any final approval of the rezoning, the Virginia Department of Transportation shall allow the
improvements shall rest with the governing body. proffered improvements to be constructed, except when such
improvements will violate local, state, or federal laws, regulations, or
mandated engineering and safety standards.
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Table 8.3. Conditional Zoning Bills Failed Legislation for 2000s (None were amended)
Bill Number Legislative
(Legislative Patron(s) Legislative Language Outcome
Session) Outcome
Cranwell, Bryant Jr.,
Diamonstein,
Hamilton, Jones,
Suit, and Watts
House Bill
1129 (2000)
§ 15.2-2297. Same; conditions as part of a rezoning or amendment to zoning map.
A. A zoning ordinance may include and provide for the voluntary proffering in writing, by the
owner, of reasonable conditions, prior to a public hearing before the governing body, in addition
to the regulations provided for the zoning district or zone by the ordinance, as a part of a
rezoning or amendment to a zoning map; provided that (i) the rezoning itself must give rise for
the need for the conditions; (ii) the conditions shall have a reasonable relation to the rezoning;
(iii) the conditions shall not include a cash contribution to the locality; (iv) the conditions shall
not include mandatory dedication of real or personal property for open space, parks, schools, fire
departments or other public facilities not otherwise provided for in § 15.2-2241; (v) the
conditions shall not include a requirement that the applicant create a property owners'
association under Chapter 26 (§ 55-508 et seq.) of Title 55, with afurther condition that
members of a property owners' association pay an assessment for open space, parks, schools,
fire departments or other public facilities not otherwise provided for in § 15.2-2241; (vi) the
conditions shall not include payment for or construction of off-site improvements except those
provided for in § 15.2-2241; (vi)(vii) no condition shall be proffered that is not related to the
physical development or physical operation of the property; and (vii)(viii) all such conditions
shall be in conformity with the comprehensive plan as defined in § 15.2-2223. Once proffered
and accepted as part of an amendment to the zoning ordinance, the conditions shall continue in
effect until a subsequent amendment changes the zoning on the property covered by the
conditions. However, the conditions shall continue if the subsequent amendment is part of a
comprehensive implementation of a new or substantially revised zoning ordinance.
§ 15.2-2298. Same; additional conditions as a part of rezoning or zoning map amendment in
certain high-growth localities.
A. Except for those localities to which § 15.2-2303 is applicable, this section shall apply to (i)
any locality which has had population growth of ten percent or more from the next-to-latest to
latest decennial census year, based on population reported by the United States Bureau of the
Census; (ii) any city adjoining such city or county; (iii) any towns located within such county;
and (iv) any county contiguous with at least three such counties, and any town located in that
county.
In any such locality, notwithstanding any contrary provisions of § 15.2-2297, a zoning ordinance
may include and provide for the voluntary proffering in writing, by the owner, of reasonable
conditions, prior to a public hearing before the governing body, in addition to the regulations
provided for the zoning district or zone by the ordinance, as a part of a rezoning or amendment to
a zoning map, provided that (i) the rezoning itself gives rise to the need for the conditions; (ii)
the conditions have a reasonable relation to the rezoning; and (iii) all conditions are in
Continued to
2001 Session;
Stricken at
request of
Patron
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I
conformity with the comprehensive plan as defined in § 15.2-2223. Reasonable conditions shall
not include, however, conditions that impose upon the applicant the requirement to create a
property owners' association under Chapter 26 (§ 55-508 et seq.) of Title 55, with afurther
condition that members of a property owners' association pay an assessment for open space,
parks, schools, fire departments or other public facilities not otherwise provided for in § 15.2-
2241. Once proffered and accepted as part of an amendment to the zoning ordinance, the
conditions shall continue in effect until a subsequent amendment changes the zoning on the
property covered by the conditions; however, the conditions shall continue if the subsequent
amendment is part of a comprehensive implementation of a new or substantially revised zoning
ordinance.
§ 15.2-2303. Conditional zoning in certain localities.
A. A zoning ordinance may include reasonable regulations and provisions for conditional zoning
as defined in § 15.2-2201 and for the adoption, in counties, or towns therein which have planning
commissions, wherein the urban county executive form of government is in effect, or in a city
adjacent to or completely surrounded by such a county, or in a county contiguous to any such
county, or in a city adjacent to or completely surrounded by such a contiguous county, or in any
town within such contiguous county, and in the counties east of the Chesapeake Bay as a part of
an amendment to the zoning map of reasonable conditions, in addition to the regulations
provided for the zoning district by the ordinance, when such conditions shall have been proffered
in writing, in advance of the public hearing before the governing body required by § 15.2-2285
by the owner of the property which is the subject of the proposed zoning map amendment.
Reasonable conditions shall not include, however, conditions that impose upon the applicant the
requirement to create a property owners' association under Chapter 26 (§ 55-508 et seq.) of
Title 55, with afurther condition that members of a property owners' association pay an
assessment for open space, parks, schools, fire departments or other public facilities not
otherwise providedfor in § 15.2-2241. Once proffered and accepted as part of an amendment to
the zoning ordinance, such conditions shall continue in effect until a subsequent amendment
changes the zoning on the property covered by such conditions. However, such conditions shall
continue if the subsequent amendment is part of a comprehensive implementation of a new or
substantially revised zoning ordinance.
Senate Bill Watkins, Hanger Jr., § 15.2-2297. Same; conditions as part of a rezoning or amendment to zoning map. Continued to
714 (2000) Martin, Newman, A. A zoning ordinance may include and provide for the voluntary proffering in writing, by the 2001 Session;
Schrock, and owner, of reasonable conditions, prior to a public hearing before the governing body, in addition Failed to report
Williams to the regulations provided for the zoning district or zone by the ordinance, as a part of a out of
rezoning or amendment to a zoning map; provided that (i) the rezoning itself must give rise for committee
the need for the conditions; (ii) the conditions shall have a reasonable relation to the rezoning;
(iii) the conditions shall not include a cash contribution to the locality; (iv) the conditions shall
not include mandatory dedication of real or personal property for open space, parks, schools, fire
departments or other public facilities not otherwise provided for in § 15.2-2241; (v) the
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conditions shall not include a requirement that the applicant create a property owners'
association under Chapter 26 (§ 55-508 et seq.) of Title 55, with afurther condition that
members of a property owners' association pay an assessment for open space, parks, schools,
fire departments or other public facilities not otherwise provided for in § 15.2-224 1; (vi) the
conditions shall not include payment for or construction of off-site improvements except those
provided for in § 15.2-2241; (vi)(vii) no condition shall be proffered that is not related to the
physical development or physical operation of the property; and (vii)(viii) all such conditions
shall be in conformity with the comprehensive plan as defined in § 15.2-2223. Once proffered
and accepted as part of an amendment to the zoning ordinance, the conditions shall continue in
effect until a subsequent amendment changes the zoning on the property covered by the
conditions. However, the conditions shall continue if the subsequent amendment is part of a
comprehensive implementation of a new or substantially revised zoning ordinance.
§ 15.2-2298. Same; additional conditions as a part of rezoning or zoning map amendment in
certain high-growth localities.
A. Except for those localities to which § 15.2-2303 is applicable, this section shall apply to (i)
any locality which has had population growth of ten percent or more from the next-to-latest to
latest decennial census year, based on population reported by the United States Bureau of the
Census; (ii) any city adjoining such city or county; (iii) any towns located within such county;
and (iv) any county contiguous with at least three such counties, and any town located in that
county.
In any such locality, notwithstanding any contrary provisions of § 15.2-2297, a zoning ordinance
may include and provide for the voluntary proffering in writing, by the owner, of reasonable
conditions, prior to a public hearing before the governing body, in addition to the regulations
provided for the zoning district or zone by the ordinance, as a part of a rezoning or amendment to
a zoning map, provided that (i) the rezoning itself gives rise to the need for the conditions; (ii)
the conditions have a reasonable relation to the rezoning; and (iii) all conditions are in
conformity with the comprehensive plan as defined in § 15.2-2223. Reasonable conditions shall
not include, however, conditions that impose upon the applicant the requirement to create a
property owners' association under Chapter 26 (§ 55-508 et seq.) of Title 55, with afurther
condition that members of a property owners' association pay an assessment for open space,
parks, schools, fire departments or other public facilities not otherwise provided for in § 15.2-
2241. Once proffered and accepted as part of an amendment to the zoning ordinance, the
conditions shall continue in effect until a subsequent amendment changes the zoning on the
property covered by the conditions; however, the conditions shall continue if the subsequent
amendment is part of a comprehensive implementation of a new or substantially revised zoning
ordinance.
§ 15.2-2303. Conditional zoning in certain localities.
A. A zoning ordinance may include reasonable regulations and provisions for conditional zoning
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as defined in § 15.2-2201 and for the adoption, in counties, or towns therein which have planning
commissions, wherein the urban county executive form of government is in effect, or in a city
adjacent to or completely surrounded by such a county, or in a county contiguous to any such
county, or in a city adjacent to or completely surrounded by such a contiguous county, or in any
town within such contiguous county, and in the counties east of the Chesapeake Bay as a part of
an amendment to the zoning map of reasonable conditions, in addition to the regulations
provided for the zoning district by the ordinance, when such conditions shall have been proffered
in writing, in advance of the public hearing before the governing body required by § 15.2-2285
by the owner of the property which is the subject of the proposed zoning map amendment.
Reasonable conditions shall not include, however, conditions that impose upon the applicant the
requirement to create a property owners' association under Chapter 26 (§ 55-508 et seq.) of
Title 55, with afurther condition that members of a property owners' association pay an
assessment for open space, parks, schools, fire departments or other public facilities not
otherwise providedfor in § 15.2-2241. Once proffered and accepted as part of an amendment to
the zoning ordinance, such conditions shall continue in effect until a subsequent amendment
changes the zoning on the property covered by such conditions. However, such conditions shall
continue if the subsequent amendment is part of a comprehensive implementation of a new or
substantially revised zoning ordinance.
House Bill May and Athey Jr. § 15.2-2298. Same; additional conditions as a part of rezoning or zoning map amendment in Tabled in
2479 (2005) certain high-growth localities. committee
F. In addition to other powers granted by this section, cash proffers accepted for transportation
purposes may be usedfor alternative transportation purposes that are in reasonable proximity to
the development. Prior to the transfer offunds, the governing body shall conduct a public
hearing and make a determination that (i) the cash proffers cannot be used in a timely manner
for their original purpose, and (ii) the transfer offunds will improve transportation conditions
within reasonable proximity to the development.
§ 15.2-2303. Conditional zoning in certain localities.
G. In addition to other powers granted by this section, cash proffers acceptedfor transportation
purposes may be usedfor alternative transportation purposes that are in reasonable proximity to
the development. Prior to the transfer offunds, the governing body shall conduct a public
hearing and make a determination that (i) the cash proffers cannot be used in a timely manner
for their original purpose, and (ii) the transfer offunds will improve transportation conditions
within reasonable proximity to the development.
House Bill Marshall § 15.2-2298. Same; additional conditions as a part of rezoning or zoning map amendment in Incorporated by
1520 (2006) certain high-growth localities. committee into
A. Except for those localities to which § 15.2-2303 is applicable, this section shall apply to (i) another bill (HB
any locality which has had population growth of-ten-pereent 5% or more from the next-to-latest 1506)
to latest decennial census year, based on population reported by the United States Bureau of the
Census; (ii) any city adjoining such city or county; (iii) any towns located within such county;
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and (iv) any county contiguous with at least three such counties, and any town located in that
county.
In any such locality, notwithstanding any contrary provisions of § 15.2-2297, a zoning ordinance
may include and provide for the voluntary proffering in writing, by the owner, of reasonable
conditions, prior to a public hearing before the governing body, in addition to the regulations
provided for the zoning district or zone by the ordinance, as a part of a rezoning or amendment to
a zoning map, provided that (i) the rezoning itself gives rise to the need for the conditions; (ii)
the conditions have a reasonable relation to the rezoning; and (iii) all conditions are in
conformity with the comprehensive plan as defined in § 15.2-2223. Reasonable conditions shall
include the payment of cash for any off-site road improvement, as defined in § 15.2-2318, or any
off-site transportation improvement, as defined in § 33.1-430, that is adopted as an amendment
to the required comprehensive plan and incorporated into the capital improvements program.
Reasonable conditions shall not include, however, conditions that impose upon the applicant the
requirement to create a property owners' association under Chapter 26 (§ 55-508 et seq.) of Title
55 which includes an express further condition that members of a property association pay an
assessment for the maintenance of public facilities owned in fee by a public entity, including
open space, parks, schools, fire departments, and other public facilities not otherwise provided
for in § 15.2-2241; however, such facilities shall not include sidewalks, special street signs or
markers, or special street lighting in public rights-of-way not maintained by the Department of
Transportation. Once proffered and accepted as part of an amendment to the zoning ordinance,
the conditions shall continue in effect until a subsequent amendment changes the zoning on the
property covered by the conditions; however, the conditions shall continue if the subsequent
amendment is part of a comprehensive implementation of a new or substantially revised zoning
ordinance.
§ 15.2-2303.2. Proffered cash payments and expenditures.
C. Regardless of the date ofrezoning approval, unless prohibited by the proffer agreement
accepted by the governing body of a locality pursuant to § 15.2-2298, a locality may utilize any
cash payments proffered for any road improvement, as defined in § 15.2-2318, or any
transportation improvement, as defined in § 33.1-430, that is incorporated into the capital
improvements program as its matching contribution under § 33.1-75.1.
House Bill Lingamfelter and § 15.2-2303.2. Proffered cash payments and expenditures. Left in
5048 (2006 Frederick A. The governing body of any locality accepting cash payments voluntarily proffered on or after committee
ssl) July 1, 2005, pursuant to § 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303 or 15.2-2303.1 shall, within seven years of
receiving full payment of all cash proffered pursuant to an approved rezoning application, begin,
or cause to begin (i) construction, (ii) site work, (iii) engineering, (iv) right-of-way acquisition,
(v) surveying, or (vi) utility relocation on the improvements for which the cash payments were
proffered. A locality that does not comply with the above ient, or does not begin
alternative improevements as provided for in subsection C, shanll forward the amout of -the
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following the fiseal year in which such forfeiture eraruffed for direct alloceation to the secondar~y
system construction program or the urban system construction proegram for the locality in whicsh
the proffred cash payents were collected. The funds to which any locality may be entitled
under the provisions of Title 33-.1 for conB.strucjtion, improvement, or maintenancse of pr-imary"'
sec~ondary, or urban roads shall not be dimninished by reason of any funds remitted pursuant to
this subsection by such locality, regardless of whether such contributions are matched by state or
federal funde.
C. Regardless of the date of rezoning approval, unless prohibited by the proffer agreement
accepted by the governing body of a locality pursuant to § 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303, or 15.2-2303.1,
a locality may utilize any cash payments proffered for any road improvement or any
transportation improvement that is incorporated into the capital improvements program as its
matching contribution under § 33.1-23.05. For purposes of this section, "road improvement"
includes construction of new roads or improvement or expansion of existing roads as required by
applicable construction standards of the Virginia Department of Transportation to meet increased
demand attributable to new development. For purposes of this section, "transportation
improvement" means any real or personal property acquired, constructed, improved, or used for
constructing, improving, or operating any (i) public mass transit system or (ii) highway, or
portion or interchange thereof, including parking facilities located within a district created
pursuant to this title. Such improvements shall include, without limitation, public mass transit
systems, public highways, and all buildings, structures, approaches, and facilities thereof and
appurtenances thereto, rights-of-way, bridges, tunnels, stations, terminals, and all related
equipment and fixtures.
Regardless of the date of rezoning approval, unless prohibited by the proffer agreement accepted
by the governing body of a locality pursuant to § 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303, or 15.2-2303.1, a
locality may utilize any cash payments proffered for capital improvements for alternative
improvements of the same category within the locality in the vicinity of the improvements for
which the cash payments were originally made. Prior to utilization of such cash payments for the
alternative improvements, the governing body of the locality shall give at least 30 days' written
notice of the proposed alternative improvements to the entity who paid such cash payment
mailed to the last known address of such entity, or if proffer payment records no longer exist,
then to the original zoning applicant, and conduct a public hearing on such proposal advertised
as provided in subsection F of § 15.2-1427. The governing body of the locality prior to the use of
such cash payments for alternative improvements shall, following such public hearing, find: (i)
the improvements for which the cash payments were proffered cannot occur in a timely manner;
(ii) the alternative improvements are within the vicinity of the proposed improvements for which
the cash payments were proffered; and (iii) the alternative improvements are in the public
interest. Notwithstanding the provisions of the Virginia Public Procurement Act, the governing
body may negotiate and award a contract without competition to an entity that is constructing
road improvements pursuant to a proffered zoning condition in order to expand the scope of the
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road improvements by utilizing cash proffers of others or other available locally generated funds.
The local governing body shall adopt a resolution stating the basis for awarding the construction
contract to extend the scope of the road improvements. All road improvements to be included in
the state primary or a county's secondary highway system-of highways must conform to the
adopted standards of the Virginia Department of Transportation.
Ingram and HallHouse Bill
2986 (2007)
____________ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ , IV_____~2c: z ~~ 2z:r:: 1 '
Tabled in
committee
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§ 15.2-2296. Conditional zoning; declaration of legislative policy and findings; purpose.
It is the general policy of the Commonwealth in accordance with the provisions of § 15.2-2283
to provide for the orderly development of land, for all purposes, through zoning and other land
development legislation. Frequently, where competing and incompatible uses conflict, traditional
zoning methods and procedures are inadequate. In these cases, more flexible and adaptable
zoning methods are needed to permit differing land uses and the same time to recognize effects
of change. It is the purpose of § § 15.2 2296 through 15.2 2300 conditional zoning to provide a
more flexible and adaptable zoning method to cope with situations found in such zones-through
conditional-zoning, whereby a zoning reclassification may be-allowed-subjeet subjected to
certain conditions proffered by the zoning applicant for the protection of the community that are
not generally applicable to land similarly zoned. The exercise of authority granted pursuant to §§
15.2-2296 through 15.2-2302 shall not be construed to limit or restrict powers otherwise granted
to any locality, nor to affect the validity of any ordinance adopted by any such locality which
would be valid without regard to this section. The provisions of this section and the following-si*
nine sections shall not be used for the purpose of discrimination in housing.
§ 15.2-2297. Same; conditions as part of a rezoning or amendment to zoning map.
A. A zoning ordinance in any locality may include and provide for the voluntary proffering in
writing, by the owner, of reasonable conditions, prior to a public hearing before the governing
body, in addition to or modification ofthe regulations provided for the zoning district or zone by
the ordinance, as a part of a rezoning or amendment to a zoning map; provided that (i) the
rezoning itself must give rise for the need for the conditions; (ii) the conditions shall have a
reasonable relation to the rezoning; (iii) the-such conditions shall not include a cash contribution
to the locality; (iv) the conditions shall not include mandatory dedication of real or persona
property for open space, parks, schools, fire departments or other public facilities not otherwise
provided for in § 15.2 2211; (v) and (iv) the conditions shall not include a requirement that the
applicant create a property owners' association under Chapter 26 (§ 55-508 et seq.) of Title 55
which includes an express further condition that members of a property owners' association pay
an assessment for the maintenance of public facilities owned in fee by a public entity, including
open space, parks, schools, fire departments and other public facilities not otherwise provided for
in § 15.2-2241; however, such facilities shall not include sidewalks, special street signs or
markers, or special street lighting in public rights-of-way not maintained by the Department of
Transportation; (vi) the conditions shall not include payment for or Wonstruction of off site
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such cenditions shall be in coonformity with the csomprehensive plan as defined in § 15.2 2223.
The governing body may also accept amended proffers once the public hearing has begun if the
amended proffers do not materially affect the overall proposal. Once proffered and accepted as
part of an amendment to the zoning ordinance, the conditions shall continue in effect until a
subsequent amendment changes the zoning on the property covered by the conditions. However,
the conditions shall continue if the subsequent amendment is part of a comprehensive
implementation of a new or substantially revised zoning ordinance. There shall be no
amendment or variation of conditions created pursuant to provisions hereof until after a public
hearing before the governing body advertised pursuant to the provisions of§ 15.2-2204.
B. In the event proffered conditions include-fegirement-fe the dedication of real property of
substantial value or construction of substantial public improvements, the need for which is not
generated solely by the rezoning itself, then no amendments to the zoning map for the property
subject to such conditions, nor the conditions themselves, nor any amendments to the text of the
zoning ordinance with respect to the zoning district applicable thereto initiated by the governing
body, which eliminate, or materially restrict, reduce, or modify the uses, the floor area ratio, or
the density of use permitted in the zoning district applicable to such property, shall be effective
with respect to such property unless there has been mistake, fraud, or a change in circumstances
substantially affecting the public health, safety, or welfare.
E. In addition to the powers granted by the preceding subsections, a zoning ordinance may
include reasonable provisions to implement, in whole or in part, the provisions hereof
§ 15.2-2300. Same; records.
The zoning map shall show by an appropriate symbol on the map the existence of conditions
attaching to the zoning on the map. The zoning administrator shall keep in his office and make
available for public inspection a Conditional Zoning Index. The Index shall provide ready access
to the ordinance creating conditions in addition to the regulations provided for in a particular
zoning district or zone. The Index shall also provide ready access to all proffered cash payments
and-expenditres revenue and expenditure disclosure reports prepared by the local governing
body pursuant to § 15.2-2303.2. The zoning administrator shall update the Index annually and no
later than November 30 of each year.
§ 15.2-2303.2. Cash payments and expenditures.
A. The governing body of any locality accepting cash payments voluntarily proffered on or after
July 1, 2005, pursuant to § 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303 or 15.2-2303.1 or as part of a development
agreement pursuant to § 15.2-2303.1 shall, within seven years of receiving full payment of all
such cash proffered pursuant to an approved rezoning application, begin, or cause to begin (i)
construction, (ii) site work, (iii) engineering, (iv) right-of-way acquisition, (v) surveying, or (vi)
utility relocation on the improvements for which the cash payments were proffered. A locality
that does not comply with the above requirement, or does not begin alternative improvements as
provided for in subsection C, shall forward the amount of the proffered cash payments to the
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Commonwealth Transportation Board no later than December 31 following the fiscal year in
which such forfeiture occurred for direct allocation to the secondary system construction
program or the urban system construction program for the locality in which the proffered cash
payments were collected. The funds to which any locality may be entitled under the provisions
of Title 33.1 for construction, improvement, or maintenance of primary, secondary, or urban
roads shall not be diminished by reason of any funds remitted pursuant to this subsection by such
locality, regardless of whether such contributions are matched by state or federal funds.
B. The governing body of any locality eligible to accept any proffered cash payments pursuant to
§ 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303 or 15.2-2303.1 shall, for each fiscal year beginning with the fiscal year
2007, (i) include in its capital improvement program created pursuant to § 15.2-2239, or as an
appendix thereto, the amount of all proffered cash payments received during the most recent
fiscal year for which a report has been filed pursuant to subsection D, and (ii) include in its
annual capital budget the amount of proffered cash payments projected to be used for
expenditures or appropriated for capital improvements in the ensuing year. All proffered cash
payments shall be reported regardless ofwhether such payment is only to be made upon the
occurrence of a future condition, such as, but not limited to, the issuance of a building permit.
D. The governing body of any locality with a population in excess of 3,500 persons accepting a
cash payment voluntarily proffered pursuant to § 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303 or 15.2-2303.1, or
pursuant to a development agreement, shall within three months of the close of each fiscal year,
beginning in fiscal year 2002 and for each fiscal year thereafter, report to the Commission on
Local Government the following information for the preceding fiscal year:
1. The aggregate dollar amount of-proffer-ed cash payments collected by the locality;
2. The estimated aggregate dollar amount of-pfoffered cash payments that have been pledged to
the locality and which pledges are not conditioned on any event other than time; and
3. The total dollar amount of-pfoffered cash payments expended by the locality, and the
aggregate dollar amount expended in each of the following categories:
Schools $
Road and other Transportation Improvements $
Fire and Rescue/Public Safety $-
Libraries $
Parks, Recreation, and Open Space $
Water and Sewer Service Extension $
Community Centers $
Stormwater Management $
Special Needs Housing $
Affordable Housing $
Miscellaneous $
Total dollar amount expended $
E. The governing body of any locality with a population in excess of 3,500 persons eligible to
accept any proffered cash payments pursuant to § 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303 or 15.2-2303.1, or I
payments pursuant to a development agreement, but that did not accept any-preffered-eash such
payments during the preceding fiscal year shall within three months of the close of each fiscal
year, beginning in 2001 and for each fiscal year thereafter, so notify the Commission on Local
Government.
House Bill Phillips § 15.2-2303.2. Proffered cash payments and expenditures. Stricken from
2888(2007) C. Regardless of the date of rezoning approval, unless prohibited by the proffer agreement docket
accepted by the governing body of a locality pursuant to § 15.2 2298, 15.2 2303, or 15.2 2303.1 ,
a locality may utilize any cash payments proffered for any road improvement or any
tanspretation improvement that is incorporated into the capital improvements program as its
matching contribution under § 33.1 23.05. For i purposes of this setion, "road improvement"
inludes ra stmtion of new roads or improvement or expansion of existing roeads as requir3ed dby
appliceable onstetion standards of the Virginia Department of Transpohtation to meet increased
demand atthibutable to new development. For puroses of this section, "trnosporton
ip o ment" means any real or personal property aquired, ronstrcted, improved, or used fo
constructing, improving, ooperating any (i) public mass transit system or (ii) highway, or
portion or interchange thereof, including parbking faoilities loated within a district create
pursuant to this title. Sara i mprovements shall include, without limitation, public mass tfansit
systems, public highways, and all buildings, stfmtues, approeaches, and facilities thereof and
appurtenances thereto, rights of way, bridges, tunnels, stations, tenninals, and all relad
equipment;4 and fixtures.
Regardless of the date of rezoning approval, unless prohibited by the proffer agreement accepted
by the governing body of a locality pursuant to § 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303, or 15.2-2303. 1, a
locality may utilize any cash payments proffered for capital improvements for alternative
improvements of the same category within the locality in the vicinity of the improvements for
which the cash payments were originally made. Prior to utilization of such cash payments for the
alternative improvements, the governing body of the locality shall give at least 30 days' written
notice of the proposed alternative improvements to the entity who paid such cash payment
mailed to the last known address of such entity, or if proffer payment records no longer exist,
then to the original zoning applicant, and conduct a public hearing on such proposal advertised
as provided in subsection F of § 15.2-1427. The governing body of the locality prior to the use of
such cash payments for alternative improvements shall, following such public hearing, find: (i)
the improvements for which the cash payments were proffered cannot occur in a timely manner;
(ii) the alternative improvements are within the vicinity of the proposed improvements for which
the cash payments were proffered; and (iii) the alternative improvements are in the public
interest. Notwithstanding the provisions of the Virginia Public Procurement Act, the governing
body may negotiate and award a contract without competition to an entity that is constructing
road improvements pursuant to a proffered zoning condition in order to expand the scope of the
road improvements by utilizing cash proffers of others or other available locally generated funds.
The local governing body shall adopt a resolution stating the basis for awarding the construction
contract to extend the scope of the road improvements. All road improvements to be included in
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the state primary or secondary system of highways must conform to the adopted standards of the
Virginia Department of Transportation.
Scott, Athey Jr.,
Cole, Gilbert,
Lingamfelter,
Miller, and
Sherwood
House Bill
954 (2008)
Left in
committee
House Bill Scott 15.2-2303. Conditional zoning in certain localities. Stricken from
726 (2008) A. A zoning ordinance may include reasonable regulations and provisions for conditional zoning docket
as defined in § 15.2-2201 and for the adoption, in counties, or towns therein which have planning
commissions, wherein the urban county executive form of government is in effect, or in a city
adjacent to or completely surrounded by such a county, or in a county contiguous to any such
county, or in a city adjacent to or completely surrounded by such a contiguous county, or in any
town within such contiguous county, and in the counties east of the Chesapeake Bay as a part of
an amendment to the zoning map of reasonable conditions, in addition to the regulations
provided for the zoning district by the ordinance, when such conditions shall have been proffered
in writing, in advance of the public hearing before the governing body required by § 15.2-2285
by the owner of the property which is the subject of the proposed zoning map amendment.
Reasonable conditions may include the acceptance of cash proffers for the purchase of
226
§ 15.2-2303. Conditional zoning in certain localities.
A. A zoning ordinance may include reasonable regulations and provisions for conditional zoning
as defined in § 15.2-2201 and for the adoption, in counties, or towns therein which have planning
commissions, wherein the urban county executive form of government is in effect, or in a city
adjacent to or completely surrounded by such a county, or in a county contiguous to any such
county, or in a city adjacent to or completely surrounded by such a contiguous county, or in any
town within such contiguous county, and in the counties east of the Chesapeake Bay as a part of
an amendment to the zoning map of reasonable conditions, in addition to the regulations
provided for the zoning district by the ordinance, when such conditions shall have been proffered
in writing, in advance of the public hearing before the governing body required by § 15.2-2285
by the owner of the property which is the subject of the proposed zoning map amendment.
Reasonable conditions may include the acceptance of cash proffers for the purchase of
development rights to preserve farmland or open space. Reasonable conditions shall not include,
however, conditions that impose upon the applicant the requirement to create a property owners'
association under Chapter 26 (§ 55-508 et seq.) of Title 55 which includes an express further
condition that members of a property owners' association pay an assessment for the maintenance
of public facilities owned in fee by a public entity, including open space, parks, schools, fire
departments, and other public facilities not otherwise provided for in § 15.2-2241; however, such
facilities shall not include sidewalks, special street signs or markers, or special street lighting in
public rights-of-way not maintained by the Department of Transportation. The governing body
may also accept amended proffers once the public hearing has begun if the amended proffers do
not materially affect the overall proposal. Once proffered and accepted as part of an amendment
to the zoning ordinance, such conditions shall continue in effect until a subsequent amendment
changes the zoning on the property covered by such conditions. However, such conditions shall
continue if the subsequent amendment is part of a comprehensive implementation of a new or
substantially revised zoning ordinance.
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development rights to preserve open space. Reasonable conditions shall not include, however,
conditions that impose upon the applicant the requirement to create a property owners'
association under Chapter 26 (§ 55-508 et seq.) of Title 55 which includes an express further
condition that members of a property owners' association pay an assessment for the maintenance
of public facilities owned in fee by a public entity, including open space, parks, schools, fire
departments, and other public facilities not otherwise provided for in § 15.2-2241; however, such
facilities shall not include sidewalks, special street signs or markers, or special street lighting in
public rights-of-way not maintained by the Department of Transportation. The governing body
may also accept amended proffers once the public hearing has begun if the amended proffers do
not materially affect the overall proposal. Once proffered and accepted as part of an amendment
to the zoning ordinance, such conditions shall continue in effect until a subsequent amendment
changes the zoning on the property covered by such conditions. However, such conditions shall
continue if the subsequent amendment is part of a comprehensive implementation of a new or
substantially revised zoning ordinance.
While the state legislature since the 1970s had held hearings on the issues related to conditional
zoning, the 2001 legislative session was the first time that the idea of state monitoring was
proposed. Labeled as "Proffer Accountability" legislation, HB 2476 required localities to begin
disclosing to the Commission on Local Government their proffered cash payments and
expenditures. The impetus for the legislation was that the use of cash proffers had become more
expansive than legislators ever imagined. In the legislative draft file for HB 2600 which amends
HB 2476 in 2003, Delegate Franklin P. Hall (D) wrote of his rationale behind the 2001
legislation,
"The measure was introduced as a result of the evolution in the proffer system
in Virginia over the past twenty years. At the time of enactment, no one
envisioned that the cash proffer legislation, introduced to foster commercial
development in Northern Virginia, would evolve into a system that would result in
the publishing of cash proffer guidelines by localities in many regions of the state.
This system essentially requires a payment to the locality for the construction of
almost every new home in a new housing development that has been the subject of
a rezoning, or that the voluntary (required) payments would exceed $20,000 for each
new home constructed. Yet, that is exactly what the proffer system has evolved into
over the past two decades, and, of course, the additional cost is passed on to the new
homebuyer" (Virginia General Assembly 2002: 2).
Besides the history that results in the bill being introduced, Hall admitted that the bill was
spurred on by the development community. He wrote of their involvement, "The housing
industry, which makes the proffered cash payments to the localities, believed the evolution of the
proffer system dictated that such a proffer disclosure requirement to be imposed to ensure a
reasonable level of accountability. Simply put, the measure was designed to determine how
much localities were collecting through the proffer system and to determine what they were
doing with the proceeds" (Virginia General Assembly 2002: 2). While Hall was the chief patron
of the bill, 15 other delegates and nine senators signed on as patrons when the bill was
introduced on January 10, 2001.
Despite the unusually large number of patrons, HB 2476 was not safe from being amended
during the legislative process. The changes to HB 2476 may have stemmed from the Fiscal
Impact Statement that was done on the bill by the State's Department of Planning and Budget.
While the bill was found not to have any fiscal impact on the state budget, the Statement did note
that there were fiscal implications for the Commission, as well as, local governments. The start-
up costs were estimated to be roughly $7,000 and thereafter $4,500 annually.
The Fiscal Impact Statement did not estimate the costs for local governments, but it raised
concerns over two issues. The first was that the legislation asked for data from the previous ten
fiscal years which the Statement advised "may be expensive, depending on how the data is to be
collected and reported" (Virginia Department of Planning and Budget 2001 a: 1). The second
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issue focused on the use of language in regard to the data being reported. They wrote, "[t]here is
some concern that the definition of 'cash proffers' may be to broad and include things such as
developer installed sidewalks and other similar public facilities for which there is limited
accounting information in any year" (Virginia Department of Planning and Budget 2001 a: 1).
Possibly, motivated by the concerns of the State Department of Planning and Budget, the
Committee on Counties, Cities and Towns came up with a substitute version of the bill that
asked for data on the previous two fiscal years rather than ten; only localities eligible to accept
cash proffers had to let the Commission know of the lack of cash proffer activity in their
jurisdictions as opposed to all localities regardless of eligibility status; and the requested type of
data was refined, for example "The aggregate amount of proffered cash payments collected by
the locality prior to the start of the preceding fiscal year, and the sources of all such payments"
became "The aggregate amount of proffered cash payments collected by the locality."
The full list of changes between the versions can be seen in Table 8.2. The substitute bill went
through another round of fiscal impact analysis. While all the changes were looked upon
approvingly, the analysis pointed out that "[t]he substitute may reduce slightly the fiscal impact
on this the Commission[J" however, "[t]hese changes will not significantly reduce the fiscal
impact estimates provided previously by the Commission" (Virginia Department of Planning and
Budget 2001b: 2). HB 2476 (15.2-2303.2) in its substitute version passed both legislative bodies
and was approved by the Governor on March 15, 2001. Localities were required to disclose their
data by September 30, 2001 with the first summary report on jurisdictions due to the public and
General Assembly by November 30, 2001.
After two years of reports, Delegate Hall proposed more changes to 15.2-2303.2 under the
heading of "Proffer Accountability Simplification Act". There were three things that HB 2600
introduced in the 2003 legislative session hoped to accomplish. First, the initial reports showed
that with the existing language inconsistencies showed up among the localities in how they
interpreted the language. HB 2600 would attempt to correct those inconsistencies with
clarifications that removed any ambiguity in what the localities were supposed to report to the
Commission. Second, the number of localities surveyed would be reduced, so that efforts would
concentrate on those localities who had a proffer ordinance or had a high probability of adopting
one in the future. As a result, HB 2600 proposed to eliminate any jurisdiction with a population
of less than 3500 from the requirement of having to report any cash proffer activity. Although
worded as "any jurisdiction," it was meant for towns. Finally, in an effort to gather more useful
data rather than having the localities continue to check boxes next to the different public facility
categories for which cash proffer revenues had been expended for, respondents would have to
report the aggregate dollar amount expended for each category.
Hall envisioned that with these three key changes, "[t]he proposed legislation would make the
2001 Proffer Accountability legislation much more valuable to analysts, state legislators, local
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elected officials and the public in their effort to comprehend the positive or negative impacts of
the proffer system on community development and housing in Virginia" (Virginia General
Assembly 2002: 2). HB 2600 passed both legislative bodies without a single "No" vote and its
changes to 15.2-2303.2 went enacted into law on March 16, 2003. Since the Commission
released two reports (FYl 999-00 and FY2000-0 1) in November of 2001, there has been an
annual report with a response rate of 100 percent of jurisdictions. While the reports do not
provide any evidence to address questions of cash proffer abuse or how the different localities
implement their systems, the legislature now has a reliable statewide source on the level of
revenues coming into a locality from cash proffers and how much is being spent and generally,
on what.
The second key enacted piece of conditional zoning legislation was HB 2456 in 2005 which
added 15.2-2303.3 Cash proffers requested or accepted by a locality to the existing conditional
zoning statutes. The bill's patron was Delegate Terri L. Suit (R) who represented the Virginia
Beach area. HB 2456 was drafted at the behest of the development community. Suit was a
member of the Commission on Growth and Economic Development. This Commission was
originally set up in 2000 by HJR 671 and then continued over the years through an additional
series of joint resolutions like HJR 170 in 2004. One of the Commission's tasks in 2004 "was
review of conditional zoning to determine its effect on residential development patterns, the
availability and cost of housing in the Commonwealth, and the construction and improvements
of public infrastructure" (HJR 170). The reason that the Commission examined conditional
zoning in the first place was because according to an October 22, 2004 newsletter from the
Virginia Municipal League (VML), "at the urging of the Home Builders Association of Virginia"
(VML 2004: 1). At the October 13, 2004, meeting of the Commission which featured
presentations from Chesterfield, Stafford, and Prince William counties on the operating of their
conditional zoning systems, Delegate Hall made the statement that there would be legislation
which altered the "rules for cash proffers" introduced during the 2005 General Assembly Session
(VML 2004: 2). Hall's statement was followed by a representative from a home builders
association who "identified two specific areas the organization would like to see changed: the
time of the payment-moving the payment to the time building permits are issued; and indexing
issues.... The home builders maintain that some localities use non-standard criteria for indexing
increases in the cash proffers that result in unfair increases in the actual amount to be paid in the
future" (VML 2004: 2). These are the exact two issues that HB 2456 proposed to address
through the addition of 15.2-2303.3 to the State Code.
Despite having the support of the development community behind it, HB 2456's path to
enactment was not a swift one. Its legislative history had 42 entries which was significantly
above the usual level. Perhaps a sign of its tortured path came in a December 6, 2004 letter from
Prince William County to the Commission in response to questions raised about the use of cash
proffers in the county. At the end of the letter, there was the statement, "Any changes in the
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enabling legislation that restrict the County's ability to set and collect cash proffer contributions
will have a negative impact upon the Board's ability to address the infrastructure demands of a
growing community" (Fenton 2004: 4). The bill's original language and enacted language can be
compared in Table 8.2. In between the original and the final, there was one amendment from the
Committee for Counties, Cities and Towns, two separate amendments from the floor of the house
(one of which was rejected), a substitute bill from the Senate's Committee on Local Government
(which was rejected), and finally, a substitute bill from the floor of the Senate. HB 2456 almost
never made it out of the House because the vote to engross the bill after the series of House
amendments ended in a tie of 45 to 45. Only after some parliamentary maneuvers did the
amended bill pass the House in a vote of 61 to 35. The final vote in the House on the Senate's
amended version was closer, but still not unanimous -85 to 12. If HB 2456 was drafted at the
instigation of the development community, the enacted statute did give local governments a little
bit of leeway that did not exist in the original version, so they may have exerted some influence
during the process. For example, they have a choice of two indices to use rather than just one. At
the same time, HB 2456 represented another step by the development community in the push
towards standardization of cash proffers across the state through the state legislature. It is as if
the development community wants to remove any local variation from the administration of cash
proffers, so that it becomes a quasi-state program run by the state legislature. Thus the only role
for local governments is to make a decision on the rezoning applications and then collect any
cash proffers revenue and spend them on the designated project.
Given the documented difficulties that prior bills that proposed eligibility expansion faced in the
legislative history of conditional zoning, the ease with which HB 1506 was enacted into law in
2006 was quite surprising. Although the bill was reported from the Committee on Counties,
Cities and Towns in a substitute version and the Governor had recommendations for the bill's
language after its passage, the language in regard to eligibility expansion was never changed
from its introductory version. HB 1506 sought to lower the population growth rate that classified
jurisdictions as "high growth" and determined their eligibility to accept cash proffers under 15.2-
2298 from the ten percent set in 1989 to five percent. By lowering this value, twenty-seven
additional jurisdictions would become eligible to accept cash proffers on July 1, 2006. The bill
passed the House in a block vote of 100-0 where it was passed with numerous other bills all at
once. The Senate voted 33-4 to pass HB 1506. After the Governor's recommendations were
made, the House vote was very supportive at 97-1 while the Senate was not unanimous at 38-0.
It is unclear why this eligibility expansion bill's vote for passage was so much easier than others.
Compared to previous bills which usually had one patron, HB 1506 had twenty patrons, so there
were more legislators invested in seeing it succeed and could be used to muster support for the
bill's passage. Second, HB 1506 was not just an eligibility expansion bill. It also contained
language specifying the rules under which cash payments for off-site road improvements and
off-site transportation improvements could be used as a condition in a rezoning application.
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There was also wording on the use of cash proffers as a matching revenue source for highway
revenue-sharing programs. Any amendments to the original bill were made in regard to these
transportation funding issues. Perhaps, this additional language attracted attention away from the
change in the growth rate. Finally, HB 1506's ease of passage may be due to the fact that the
eligibility expansion was for the 1989 statute as opposed to the 1973 statute. The 1989 statute
(15.2-2298) is a much more restricted system, so the legislators may have been more comfortable
with its expansion and there was no outcry from the development community.
The passage of HB 1506 seemed to signify the beginnings of new attitude by the General
Assembly in regard to eligibility expansion of conditional zoning. This conjecture is based on the
fact that in the 2007 legislative session HB 2500 passed even easier than HB 1506 and HB 2500
opened up the 1973 conditional zoning statute (15.2-2303) to any locality eligible under the 1989
statute (15.2-2298). No longer was the more permissive 1973 statute restricted to the Northern
Virginia Region and the counties on the Eastern Shore. In order to take advantage of the 1973
statute, a locality would just have to pass an ordinance changing the statutory authority under
which its conditional zoning system operated. The bill was sponsored by Delegate Robert D.
Orrock, Sr. (R) of Spotsylvania County. HB 2500 reported out of the Committee on Counties,
Cities and Towns on a unanimous vote of 22-0 and passed the House on in block vote 99-0. Its
passage through the Senate was also on a series of unanimous votes. The question arises why not
just take the eligibility language of HB 2500 and apply it to the 1973 statute and then in the same
bill or a separate one retract the 1989 statute. Because as it stands with the passage of HB 2500,
why would any local government choose to continue to operate under the 1989 statute when a
more flexible option is available.
Before the 2007 legislative session, there were three distinct conditional zoning statutes with
their own eligibility criteria. Certain local governments could choose among two combinations.
The first combination was the 1973 or 1978 statue and the second was 1989 or 1978 statute.
Some local governments were only eligible for 1978. At the end of the 2007 legislative session, a
third combination was available to select local governments - 1973 or 1989 or 1978 statute. HB
2500 was not an eligibility expansion bill in the traditional sense of increasing the number of
localities authorized to accept cash proffers, but it did allow more local governments to have
greater flexibility in the structure of their conditional zoning system.
The introduction of SB 768 in 2008 was a complete shock to local governments. The passage of
HB 1506 in 2006 and HB 2500 in 2007 gave the appearance that conditional zoning and cash
proffers had finally gained acceptance in the development community and state legislature. As
proposed, SB 768 granted localities the authority to impose impact fees for a range of public
facilities, but in return, they had to give up the ability to accept cash proffers and off-site proffers
as conditions to a rezoning application on and after January 1, 2009. While local governments
determined the type of impact fees and the applicable geographic area, the state legislature
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through statutes established the formula for how to determine the appropriate impact fee amount
and set maximum levels for those amounts. I argue that the introduced version of SB 768 was
evidence of the lack of trust that the development community had towards local governments on
land use matters. Developers were willing to subject themselves to impact fees which are
applicable to new development not just rezonings and imposed by a local government rather than
voluntarily offered, but only if the role of the locality in determining those fee amounts was
minimized by the state legislature. Their experience with how local governments implemented
cash proffer policies created a sense of distrust among the development community in whether
localities could fairly implement an impact fee system. The way to deal with this distrust and
address impact fee authority was to draft legislation in such a way that state statutes were put in
place that minimized the opportunities for and amount of local government discretion and
variation. SB 768 was a bill clearly written in the interests of the development community and
this was reflected in its path through the 2008 General Assembly legislative session.
The first hint of an overhaul to the conditional zoning system came through the news media in
December 2007. An article in the The Virginian-Pilot indicated that the Home Builders
Association of Virginia (HBAV) had disseminated a position paper that proposed to eliminate
cash proffers and off-site proffers with an impact fee on new homes, as well as, a new tax on
existing home sales (Walker 2007). The rationale behind their proposal was that "cash proffers
have become 'an unbridled tax on new housing in virtually every modest growth area of the
Commonwealth'.... [and adoption of their] proposal would increase affordable housing options
by spreading infrastructure costs among more property transactions" (Walker 2007). According
to the article, the proposal was short on details, but sides were already being drawn in the debate.
Ted McCormack, the Director of Governmental Affairs for the Virginia Association of Counties
(VACo), response was that "We'd be reluctant to give up cash proffers unless we feel like the
impact fee system would offer flexibility. . . . A one-size-fits-all approach is probably not
something that's going to work across 95 counties" (Walker 2007).
While realtors could normally be counted on to support the interests of the homebuilders, the
proposal as it stood at the end of 2007 was troublesome for the real estate industry. The article
reported that "The Virginia Association of Realtors supports an overhaul of the cash proffer
system but not a new tax on home sales. 'Given the market, right now is not a good time to be
asking sellers of residential or commercial real estate to come up with more money,' said Martin
Johnson, director of governmental relations for the Realtors group" (Walker 2007). For
legislators, they were surprised that home builders were in support of impact fees considering
that they had adamantly opposed the issue in prior sessions. Senator Harry Blevins (R) who
represented the City of Chesapeake was quoted, "It's interesting to hear they're advocating what
they have been opposed to.... Through the process we could very easily come up with a better
situation than we have" (Walker 2007). When the 2008 Session of the General Assembly
convened on January 9 th, Legislative Services did not have any record of a bill being prefiled.
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VACo's legislative bulletin, Capitol Contact, for January 10th alluded that a bill was in the works
with VACo monitoring the situation because it possibly contained two of their legislative
priorities - expansion of impact fee authority and preservation of current land use tools (VACo
2008a). The deadline to introduce bills for the 2008 session was January 18th
Whether it was a form of stagecraft or a sign of the difficulty in the drafting and gathering of
support for the bill, SB 768 was not introduced until January 18, 2008. Senator John C. Watkins
(R) of Powhatan County who previously served in the House of Delegates was the chief patron
of the bill along with Delegate Franklin P. Hall (D) of the city of Richmond and Delegate Robert
D. Hull (D) of city of Falls Church in Fairfax County as patrons. The hand of the development
community was actively involved in the introduced version of SB 768. HBAV's Legislative
Bulletin for January 18 stated, "[t]he measure was crafted by a Special Subcommittee of the
HBAV Legislative Committee that was chaired by HBAV 2 nd Vice President Michael Newsome
of the Tidewater Builders Association. It was approved for introduction to the state legislature by
the full HBAV Legislative Committee that is chaired by Charlottesville homebuilder Jamie
Spence" (HBAV 2008a: 1). The president of HBAV, Henry Stephens, made the following
statement at a press conference for the bill's introduction:
"The time has come for Virginia to abandon its very unique cash proffer system
that is out of control, lacks accountability and is impacting the ability of many
Virginians to own a home of their own. It is time to adopt a more predictable and
more structured system for the private sector to contribute to public infrastructure
costs created by growth. It is time to establish a system that will allow all builders
and all developers, not just those that have been the subject of recent rezoning, to
contribute to local growth costs. It is also time for new residents who purchase
homes in existing neighborhoods that have long-term capital improvement debt
attached to neighborhood schools, to also help pay their fair share for growth costs.
I am very pleased that HBAV took on the challenge this past summer to gain
statewide support from residential land developers and home builders for this
alternative. Let it be clear that we are 'stepping up to the plate,' and not 'running
from our responsibility,' by our support for the measure" (HBAV 2008a: 1).
At the same press conference, Senator Watkins made a statement about SB768 which was
labeled "Alternative Local Infrastructure Funding Legislation" or the "Watkins Proffer Reform
Bill" by HBAV. In his statement, Watkins highlighted the significance of the development
community's involvement with SB 768. He said, "I am pleased to announce, that after three
decades of opposition to impact fee legislation, the measure is supported by the Home Builders
Association of Virginia.... In the past, by-right residential and by-right commercial developers
were exempt from having to make contributions for public infrastructure created, in part, by their
development projects. I commend the Association for its support of the bill" (Watkins 2008: 1).
There were four major facets to SB 768:
(1) "Eliminate cash from the current Proffer System in Virginia";
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(2) "Retain, but reform, the non-cash Proffer System";
(3) "Enact an Impact Fee Statute in Virginia for Public Roads, public School
Buildings and Public Safety Buildings (fire, rescue and police)"; and
(4) "Require high-growth localities, located outside the Northern Virginia
Transportation Authority and located outside the Hampton Roads Transportation
Authority, that enact an impact fee ordinance to impose a Real Property Tax
Relief Fee" (HBAV 2008a: 2).
As the list above shows, the introduced version of SB 768 was composed of multiple
controversial parts which were put together in effort to create revenue sources that at a minimum
would offset the loss of revenues from the elimination of cash proffers.
The path of SB 768 through the legislative process attracted attention from the development
community and local governments, as well as, interest groups new to the legislative history of
conditional zoning. Lobbyists in Virginia file disclosure reports to the Office of the Secretary of
the Commonwealth which indicate the specific bills that they lobbied to have pass or fail. For SB
768, there were six groups that disclosed they had sought to influence the outcome of the bill in
2008. Three were local governments - Fairfax County, Frederick County, and Stafford County.
Two were the state chapters of national membership association - the Sierra Club and the
American Planning Association. The final group was a private construction and real estate
development firm located in Rockville, Maryland - Ellis Denning Construction and
Development. Stafford County, which employed one lobbyist, reported expenses of $7,382
which covered entertainment ($1,808), communications ($432), compensation ($3,792), and
other ($1,350). The reported expenses for Ellis Denning Construction and Development totaled
$3,600 -- $3,550 in compensation and $50 in registration. The Virginia Chapter of the American
Planning Association which had two registered lobbyists spent $1,666 in compensation and $100
in registration for total of $1,766. The other three groups tracked other legislation during the
session, so it is not possible to determine how much money they spent on lobbying activities in
regard to SB 768.
Although they were not registered as lobbyists to track SB 768, the Piedmont Environmental
Council (PEC), Coalition for Smarter Growth, Virginia League of Conservation Voters, Virginia
Conservation Network, and the Virginia Chapter of the Sierra Club came together in opposition
to SB 768. This was the first example of interest groups involved in the fight over conditional
zoning issues extending outside of local governments and the development community. The mix
of regional and statewide environmental and smart growth advocates also represented new and
old interest groups in the state. PEC was organized in 1972 while the Coalition for Smarter
Growth did not form until 1997 and the Virginia League of Conservation Voters was started in
2000.
Besides lobbying legislators in person at the Capital, interest groups had their members and other
interested individuals use other means of communication to show their support for either side of
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the bill. PEC set up a webpage on their website where individuals could add their personal
information to an email message which PEC would then send to the appropriate state senator.
The email's subject heading was "Don't Raise My Taxes - Oppose SB768" and it read:
"Dear [Decision Maker],
As a taxpayer in the Commonwealth of Virginia I am writing to urge you to
oppose SB768 which would result in property tax increases in our community.
As you know, this legislative scheme is being strongly backed by the home
building industry. If approved, this legislation would:
* End the proffer system by which developers make contributions for
rezonings, replacing it with very low impact fees. The impact fees will be capped
at $5000 for most of Virginia and $8000 in Northern Virginia.
* The impact fees would not be paid until building permits are issued,
requiring taxpayers to spend tax dollars upfront in order to prepare the necessary
infrastructure.
This legislation further transfers the burden of new residential development from
the builder onto the taxpayer. It is unfair to homeowners and business owners and
should be defeated immediately.
Vote no on higher property taxes. Say no to what can only be termed as 'welfare
for the developer.
Sincerely,
[Your name]
[Your address]"
In their weekly legislative bulletins, HBAV issued "Action Alerts" which urged members to
either email or call their state legislators. They would provide the names of the legislators along
with their contact information. Members were told to leave their name and address, so that
legislators would know that it was a constituent who had expressed support for SB 768. HBAV
gave its members four talking points to stress in their messages:
"(1) benefit local governments with a more consistent source of revenue for
local schools, local roads and local public safety facilities from the private
sector (residential and commercial developers); (2) will create more
predictability of those costs and certainty for home builders and their buyers;
(3) will benefit existing residents, since local governments will have a new
consistent source of revenue for growth-related local public infrastructure; and
(4) will help make housing more affordable for hard-working Virginians" (HBAV
2008b: 1).
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The first test in the legislative process for SB 768 was whether the bill made it out of committee
and in what form. When the bill was introduced on January 18th, it was referred to the Senate's
Committee on Local Government. On January 2 9 th, the committee made two moves that
surprised the bill's supporters. First, they crafted a substitute version of the bill which removed
the "Real Property Tax Relief Fee" section as known as the grantors tax from the bill. This first
part of the section read:
"A. Any locality not enumerated in 15.2-4831 or 33.1-391.7 that adopts an impact
fee ordinance under the provisions ofArticle 8 (15.2-2317 et seq.) of Chapter 22
of Title 15.2 shall impose afee, delineated as the 'Real Property Tax Relief Fee' on
each deed, instrument, or writing by which lands, tenements, or other realty
located in any county or city is sold and granted, assigned, transferred, or
otherwise conveyed to or vested in the purchaser or any person, by purchaser's
direction. The rate of the fee, when the consideration or value ofthe interest,
whichever is greater, equals or exceeds $100, shall be $0.20 for each $100 or
ftaction thereof exclusive of the value of any lien or encumbrance remaining
thereon at the time of the sale, whether such lien is assumed or the reality is
sold subject to such lien or encumbrance. The fee imposed by this section shall be
paid by the grantor, or other person who signs on behalf of the grantor, of any deed,
instrument, or writing subject to the fee imposed by this section...."
The grantors tax section was put in the bill as a source of revenue to assist impact fees in
offsetting the loss of revenues from the abolishment of cash proffers. Its inclusion also allowed
the impact fees to be capped at levels lower than would normally occur if impact fees were the
lone source of revenue. The removal of the grantors tax section was evidence that a more
influential agent than the home builders was involved in the legislative process. The Virginia
Association of Realtors (VAR) opposed the grantors tax on the grounds according to its lobbyist,
John G. Dicks III who used to be a member of the House of Delegates, "Sellers are consumers,
too, and sometimes sellers are turned upside down, as they are in this market. A seller would
have to bring more money to the table" (Schapiro 2008). Since they had the support of the
realtors, the Committee on Local Government felt comfortable enough to have removed the
grantors tax section from SB 768. They made this decision over the objections of the bill's chief
patron, Senator Watkins who indicated that because of its removal, the home builders may have
him eliminate the bill from the legislative calendar. The news media characterized the debate as
"pit[ting] two influential lobbying organizations against each other: the Virginia Association of
Realtors and the Home Builders Association of Virginia. Caught in the crossfire are local
governments looking for ways to bankroll services, the demand for which is driven by
development" (Schapiro 2008). Those who testified in opposition to SB 768 at the committee
hearing were the Virginia Municipal League (VML), Coalition of High Growth Communities,
VACo, and some individual counties. Their opposition was summarized as "while local
governments support broad impact fee authority, the proposed legislation was a major policy
change that required further study" (VACo 2008b). The Committee on Local Government passed
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the substitute version of SB 768 by a vote of 10-3-2, but its second surprise move was to refer
the bill to the Committee on Finance of which Watkins was a member rather than send it directly
to the Senate floor.
Although there was early organized opposition to SB 768 from multiple groups, I argue there
was still a sense that the bill would not progress far in the legislative process. First, because of
how revolutionary it was in its changes. Second, the state legislature historically has shown a
reluctance to embrace large-scale change. The fact that SB 768 successfully reported out of the
Committee on Local Government was a signal to local governments that the bill could actually
be enacted into law. Thus in the days prior to SB 768's hearing before the Senate Committee on
Finance, the news media had a series of articles on the implications of the bill's passage for
individual local governments where the governing bodies of these localities expressed their
opposition to the bill. On February 1st, the Board of Supervisors of Chesterfield County voted
unanimously to oppose SB 768 (Hester 2008). This vote was evidence of the fact that state
legislators did not always propose legislation that was supported by the local governments of the
jurisdictions they represented. Part of Watkins' senatorial district included Chesterfield County.
Further, it was Watkins during his time in the House of Delegates who led a failed legislative
effort to gain impact fee authority for Chesterfield. Chesterfield's maximum cash proffer amount
per dwelling unit at the time was $15,600. Under SB 768, an impact fee in Chesterfield would be
capped at $5,000 per residence. Chesterfield had estimated that for roads alone, it would need an
impact fee of $5,820 (Hester 2008). Further, the property tax rate would have to be raised by
$0.50 to offset the loss in cash proffer revenues from its level at the time of $0.97 per $100 of
assessed value (Hester 2008). Supervisors also lamented the loss of flexibility if the bill was
enacted.
The reactions to SB 768 from local governments in the Northern Virginia region were much
more inflammatory. On February 5th, Loudoun County's Board of Supervisors voted
unanimously to oppose SB 768. At the meeting, one supervisor, Jim Burton (I) of the county's
Blue Ridge district, warned members of the Northern Virginia Building Industry Association
(NVBIA) that there would be consequences for them if the bill was enacted. He said, "I can
ensure you that if this bill passes, the NVBIA will never see another residential rezoning in this
county.... NVIB is going to rue the day this bill passes" (Loudoun Times-Mirror 2008). The
suggested cash proffer amount per single family home in Loudoun at the time was $47,000, but
tended to be negotiated lower. Under SB 768, the maximum impact fee per single family
residential unit was capped at $8,000 for select localities in the Northern Virginia region. Fairfax
County echoed Loudoun's warning of a halt to development if SB 768 was enacted. The
Washington Post reported, "supervisors and administrators said that if the county were unable to
use proffers to negotiate with developers for public improvements, they would be forced to
sharply curtail approval of rezonings .... County Executive Anthony H. Griffin ... suggested
sending a letter to lawmakers threatening a moratorium on rezonings if the Watkins bill passes"
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(Turque 2008). Fairfax's proffer level in early 2008 was approximately $15,000 per single-
family home. Prince William County shared the sentiments of Loudoun and Fairfax. The
Chairman of the Board of Supervisors in Prince William, Corey A. Stewart (R) cautioned the
development community, "Be careful what you wish for.... [SB 768] will shut down residential
development all over the county. I will make sure it shuts down residential development in
Prince William" (Hanley 2008). Prince William's proffer level was $38,000 per home at the
time.
The general message to legislators from the local governments was to take things slowly and
spend a year developing a more reasonable proposal because if not, localities would be forced to
take drastic measures. Passage of SB 768 would then bring the history of conditional zoning full
circle in a return to the contentious environment between local governments and the
development community that had preceded the passage of the first conditional zoning statute in
1973. This time, I argue, the environment would be even worse because it would not be
restricted to Fairfax County alone.
The Committee on Finance reported out SB 768 without any amendments to the substitute
version from the Committee on Local Government. Despite the vocal opposition of local
governments, the vote on February 6th was 12-2-2. A vote for passage by the full Senate was now
up against the legislature's crossover deadline which is the date by which each legislative body
must advance the bills that originate in their chamber to the other body for their consideration. If
a bill fails to advance to the other legislative body by this date, then it is effectively killed. The
2008 legislative session's deadline was February 12t. On February 1 1th, the substitute version of
SB 768 was rejected on the floor of the Senate. At the same time, Watkins offered a new
substitute which the full Senate agreed to consider. Final vote was set for February 1 2 h*.
Watkins made several key changes to his new version of SB 768 in an effort to gamer more
votes for its passage. Besides the addition of new subsections to existing sections, he amended
the language on three key provisions shown below in Table 8.4. Special exemption language was
added to the bill that specifically applied to Fairfax County and was done to gain votes from the
Fairfax County delegation. The language read, "That the provisions of his act amending 15.2-
2297, 15.2-2298, 15.2-2303, and 15.2-2303.1 of the Code of Virginia shall not apply to any
urban development area created prior to July 1, 2009, pursuant to 15.2-2223.1 of the Code of
Virginia by any county having the urban county executive form of government". Since local
governments appeared to be acting as a united front of opposition to SB 768, one strategy to
lessen their impact was to fragment them into smaller conflicting groups. The Washington Post
reported, "By exempting Tysons Corner and part of the Reston Town Center from the so-called
impact fees, the development industry was trying to placate Fairfax County, which opposes the
bill... .Tysons and Reston, which are slated for urban-style redevelopment projects, would remain
under the current system, which would allow county officials to negotiate contributions, called
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proffers, from developers" (Somashekhar and Kumar 2008). Unfortunately, Fairfax's
government leaders considered it a good move, but too late in the process to garner their support.
Gerald E. Connelly (D), Chairman of the Board of Supervisors, said, "That still leaves huge
swaths of land that wouldn't qualify.... While it was a respectful attempt to try to mollify our
concerns, it doesn't get there. Frankly, this underscores why this bill needs to be in a study for
the next year while we take a breath and look at it more closely" (Somashekhar and Kumar
2008).
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Table 8.4 Key Differences in the Substitute Versions of SB 768
Legislation Local Government Committee Substitute Watkins Substitute Version
Feature Version
Voluntary Proffer reasonable non-cash, on-site conditions (i) non-cash proffers for on-site conditions
of Conditions necessitated by and attributable to the new for the new development
shall be limited development resulting from the rezoning (ii) non-cash off-site proffers for a public
to: facility that is not subject of a public
facilities improvements plan pursuant to
15.2-2321, or any other proffered
condition that is necessitated by and
attributable to the new development, as a
condition for rezoning for residential
development or the residential portion of
any mixed-use development
(iii) conditions to implement incentive
zoning as defined in 15.2-2201
Applicability of Any city, any county enumerated in 15.2- Any city, any county enumerated in 15.2-
Public Safety 4831 or 33.1-391.7 and any town therein, 4831 or 33.1-391.7 and any town within
Impact Fees and any county that has adopted zoning such county, any county that had the
pursuant to Article 7 (15.2-2280 et seq.) of authority to accept proffers prior to July 1,
Chapter 22 of Title 15.2 and that (i) has a 2009, and to any county that has adopted
population of at least 20,000 and has a zoning pursuant to Article 7 (15.2-2280 et
population growth rate of least 5 percent or seq.) of Chapter 22 of Title 15.2 and that
(ii) has population growth of 15 percent or has a population growth rate of least 5
more, and to any town within such county. percent, and to any town within such
county.
Maximum impact In the localities enumerated in 15.2-4381 In the localities enumerated in 15.2-4381
fees to be and subject to this article pursuant to 15.2- and subject to this article pursuant to 15.2-
imposed by 2317, the maximum impact fee for public 2317, the maximum impact fee for public
localities on facility improvement shall be $8,000 per facility improvement shall be $12,500 per
residential single-family detached dwelling unit, two- single-family detached dwelling unit, two-
development thirds of such maximum per single-family thirds of such maximum per single-family
attached dwelling unit, and one-half of such attached dwelling unit, and one-half of
maximum per multifamily dwelling unit. such maximum per multifamily dwelling
unit.
In other localities subject to this article
pursuant to 15.2-2317, the maximum impact In other localities subject to this article
fee for public facility improvement shall be pursuant to 15.2-2317, the maximum
$5,000 per single-family detached dwelling impact fee for public facility improvement
unit, two-thirds of such maximum per shall be $7,500 per single-family detached
single-family attached dwelling unit, and dwelling unit, two-thirds of such
one-half of such maximum per multifamily maximum per single-family attached
dwelling unit. dwelling unit, and one-half of such
maximum per multifamily dwelling unit.
On the day of the final vote, floor amendments were proposed by different legislators as ways to
secure their vote for the bill's passage. Some efforts at horse-trading were more successful than
others. Senator Mark Herring (D) of Loudoun County, the leader of the opposition movement in
the Senate, made two unsuccessful attempts to attach an amendment to SB 768 which would
have removed Fairfax County's urban development area exemption and replaced it with an
exemption for the counties and cities of the Northern Virginia Transportation Authority and the
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Hampton Roads Transportation Authority.46 Loudoun was a member of the Northern Virginia
Transportation Authority. This effort failed because it would have exempted the very localities
that the home builders regarded as the biggest abusers of cash proffers. The next amendment was
by Senator Mary Margaret Whipple (D) of Arlington County. Her amendment would not apply
the changes to the conditional zoning statutes to "any development on sites containing five acres
or less, or five parcels or less." Whipple proposed this amendment because Arlington County
was the most urban and densest county in the state with few large-scale greenspace development
opportunities available. Approval of this amendment would essentially exempt the majority of
Arlington from the changes to the conditional zoning statutes. Watkins agreed to support the
amendment because of its applicability to urban development areas. Thus a new version of the
bill with Whipple's amendment was engrossed for final vote. Senator Herring made a last minute
motion to have the bill carried over to Committee on Local Government for reconsideration in
next year's legislative session. He argued that decisions on the bill kept being made under
pressure of a deadline. For example, the bill was introduced on the last possible day that bills for
the session could be introduced on. Further, its hearing before the Committee on Local
Government occurred at the committee's last meeting. He also had concerns that the "hand of
developer [was] around [the] scribner's pen of this bill." Watkins urged rejection of the motion
to recommit the bill to committee because if a legislator did not like the bill, then they should not
vote to pass the bill. In his words, it was "time for [the] Senate of Virginia to make a policy
decision." Herring's motion failed and SB 768 passed the Senate by a vote of 21 to 19. If the
vote had been tied 20-20, then Lieutenant Govemor Bill Bolling (R) who acts as President of the
Senate would have been called upon to cast the tie-breaking vote. In its weekly legislative
bulletin, HBAV stated that Bolling would have voted to kill the bill.
SB 768's Senate passage can be contributed to a successful division of the Fairfax Senate
delegation. Nine senators represented districts which contained at least a portion of Fairfax
County. Out of the nine senators, three voted in support of SB 768 - Howell (D), Saslaw (D),
and Whipple (D). Howell's district included Reston Town Center which was exempted from the
bill and Whipple's district as mentioned above included Arlington County. According to the
news media, Saslaw, who was the Senate Majority Leader, voted for the bill's passage because
of his ties to the development community. Based on data collected by the Virginia Public Access
Project, the real estate/construction industry contributed over $73,952 in 2008 to Saslaw. It was
the top contributing industry. These three senators were the only senators from the Northern
Virginia Region to vote for the passage of SB 768.
Opponents of SB 768 viewed the tight Senate vote as a sign of the difficult struggle that the bill
would have in its attempts to gain passage in the House. In a press release after the Senate's vote,
46 The Northern Virginia Transportation Authority is composed of Arlington County, Fairfax County, Loudoun
County, Prince William County, Alexandria, Fairfax City, Falls Church, Manassas, and Manassas Park. The
Hampton Roads Transportation Authority consists of Isle of Wight County, James City County, York County,
Chesapeake, Hampton, Newport News, Norfolk, Poquoson, Portsmouth, Suffolk, Virginia Beach, and Williamsburg.
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Lisa Guthrie, Executive Director of the Virginia League of Conservation Voters said, "The
significant division in the Senate vote on SB768 today demonstrates the serious problems with
this bill.... Had the bill not been filed at the last minute and had there been even a couple more
days for all legislators to realize the damaging fiscal impacts, this bill would not have passed".
There was evidence to support Guthrie's contention because HBAV spotlighted six senators who
voted in their committees to have the bill move to the Senate floor, but then voted against its
final passage. 47 Thus the development community got its desired outcome, SB 768 passage, but
its influence was not powerful enough to maintain all of its supporters' votes. Another indicator
of the bill's potential struggle in the House was the fact that it was assigned to the Committee on
Rules. Typically, issues involving local governments, particularly on land use, had been assigned
to the Committee on Counties, Cities and Towns. This was the committee that had dealt with
prior conditional zoning legislation over the years.
The assignment of SB 768 to Rules was a surprise to the development community and local
governments. It was an illustration of how one agent could take control of the legislative process
away from other agents who had previously been dominant. Speaker of the House, William J.
Howell (R) who represented the City of Fredericksburg and Stafford County, was head of the
Committee on Rules and he assigned SB 768 to this committee because it was where he placed
bills that held a particular interest to him. HBAV had some reservations about the assignment
because as they stated in their weekly bulletin, "[s]ome have advanced to the full 100 member
House and others have died at the hand of the House Speaker" (HBAV 2008c: 2). SB 768
entered the committee on February 14 th and the House had until March 3rd to come to a decision
on Senate bills. On February 2 8th, the committee by a unanimous voice vote decided to carry SB
768 over to the 2009 legislative session. During the time between the 14th and the 2 8th, there
were negotiations between the two sides on the development of compromise bill.
As part of the decision to carryover the bill, there was a "gentleman's agreement" made between
the development industry and local governments. First, home builders would halt their plans to
have the state legislature in the 2008 session put a "legislative cap" on cash proffers. In
exchange, local governments would allow the home builders to have legislation that would push
back the authority for localities to adopt road impact fees which had been authorized in 2007's
HB 3202. The one-year freeze on road impact fees adoption would begin on July 1st, 2008. The
freeze would be done through an amendment to HB 111. The Speaker of the House agreed to
draft a letter to be sent to representatives from both sides that encouraged them to continue their
negotiations in good faith. There was also the possibility that in the letter the Speaker would
request local governments not to amend their cash proffer policies while the negotiations were
on-going. In another surprise move to both sides, the Speaker ruled on March 5th the Senate
4 The senators were Ken T. Cuccinelli III (R) of Fairfax County, R. Edward Houck (D) of Spotsylvania County,
Mark D. Obenshain (R) of City of Harrisonburg, Linda T. Puller of Prince William County (D), Frederick M.
Quayle (R) of City of Suffolk, and Richard H. Stuart (R) of Stafford County.
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amendment that had the language on the impact fee adoption freeze was not germane to the
original purpose and subject of the bill that it amended. The Speaker's ruling was prompted by a
point of order question from another legislator. HB 111 had already passed the Senate with the
impact fee freeze amendment. As a result of the Speaker's actions, no impact fees freeze was
legislatively enacted.
After the end of the 2008 General Assembly session, the two sides began negotiations to come to
a final resolution. The interests of local governments were represented by VACo, VML,
Coalition of High Growth Communities, Chesterfield County, and Loudoun County. The
development community had representation from HBAV, VAR, and Commercial Builders.
Between March and mid-September 2008, the two sides held two meetings, but no agreed upon
bill resulted. At the first meeting, there was agreement between the parties that they needed to
start from a blank canvas. After the second meeting, Senator Watkins asked each side to draft
their own version of the ideal impact fee legislation keeping in mind three facets - general
authorization for development agreements; infrastructure impact fee; and general authorization
for commercial cash and non-cash proffers. Watkins wanted the two sides to have a finished
product by November 1st. There were no more meetings in 2008 and hence, no final piece of
legislation for the 2009 General Assembly session. SB 768 still resided in the Committee on
Rules.
The downturn in the housing market has killed any interest by the development community in
further pursuing impact fees. The issues raised in the debate over SB 768, however, are not ones
that will go away with time. Localities will continue to face growth pressure, most likely on a
smaller scale, and there will be a demand for new public infrastructure. Because of Dillon's
Rule, local governments are unable to create on their own the innovative tools necessary to deal
with their own individual growth issues. SB 768 was an attempt by the development industry to
apply a 'one-size fits all' approach to the problem. While this legislation would not have forced
localities to adopt impact fees, it granted the authority for one power by taking away another
power. Ideally, local governments should be given both powers as well as a variety of other land
use tools by the state legislature. That is what had been proposed in the first bill that asked for
conditional zoning authority along with other land use powers from the state back in 1968. Each
local government can then choose which tools best suit their needs, so localities that are looking
purely for a source of revenue would adopt an impact fee ordinance while jurisdictions seeking
flexibility would stick with conditional zoning.
IMPLEMENTATION
Legal challenges to the use of cash proffers as part of a local government's conditional zoning
system continued into this time period from the 1990s. There were two rulings that deserve
attention. The first is the 2000 decision in Patrick v. McHale from the Circuit Court of
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Chesterfield County. The second is the 2008 decision in David J. Sowers v. Powhatan County,
Virginia et al. out of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
Richmond Division. As in the first conditional zoning cases discussed in the 1990s section,
plaintiffs took their claims against local governments to both local and federal courts. The
rulings, however, in both cases reinforced the actions of local governments. In the eyes of the
court, localities are operating their conditional zoning systems in a reasonable manner.
In Patrick v. McHale, Chesterfield County Board of Supervisors voted to deny a rezoning
application that involved the use of cash proffers. McHale refers to Jack McHale, a member of
the Board of Supervisors. In October of 1996, the plaintiff filed a motion for a declaratory
judgment which is where the court decides "the rights of the parties to a dispute, but does not
order or coerce any performance relative to those rights" (Brann 1997: 123). Patrick sought to
have 48.5 acres rezoned from Agricultural to the residential use of R-9. He originally applied for
a rezoning in 1995, but later revised the application to seek R- 12 in 1996. Judge Herbert C. Gill,
Jr. examined the case from five different entry points to see if Patrick's challenge to the denial of
the rezoning application had any legal standing to be further pursued. Decisions on rezoning
applications are a legislative act of the Board of the Supervisors and therefore are assumed to be
reasonable, so Gill first had to determine whether the denial was an unreasonable action. If
reasonability was confirmed, then the focus shifted to a question of its debatable nature. The
burden was upon the plaintiff to provide evidence that the decision was not reasonable or fairly
debatable. Gill found that the county's decision could be upheld because all the land uses
involved in the case (Agricultural, R-9, and R-12) were appropriate for Patrick's property given
that they were all in use on surrounding and neighboring properties.
The third entry point for a claim against the county was Patrick's contention that the county
required from him either a cash proffer or a dedication of public facilities as a condition in order
to gain approval for the rezoning. Patrick, however, was unable to provide any evidence that
showed the county had actually mandated these conditions to him or that every county rezoning
approval involved cash proffers or a dedication. Thus Gill could not substantiate this claim. The
fourth entry point focused on whether the denial constituted a taking by the county. In order for
there to be a taking, Patrick needed to show that the rejection of the rezoning had deprived the
plaintiff of all economically viable use of his property. Gill found that the county's decision did
not constitute a taking because although Patrick could not develop the property as he had
planned, he could still build a residence on it by obtaining a variance or it could be used for
farming or timber cultivation. While a residential zoning would have brought him more money,
under the current agricultural zoning, the property still had value. The fifth and final entry point
by Patrick was under an equal protection claim where he contended that the county's decision
had been arbitrary and capricious and thus unconstitutional. Patrick asserted that he had been
treated differently from the other property owners who were all part of the county's Central Area
Plan. These property owners were allowed to have residential zoning while he was not. Because
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the Court was not able to substantiate Patrick's other claims, these provided evidence against the
violation of equal protection claim. Further, Gill found that the county did have a rational basis
to reject the rezoning on "health, safety, and welfare concerns" (Patrick v. McHale 2000). A
Lexis-Nexis search did not turn up any other cases associated with this decision, so the plaintiff
must have accepted the Circuit Court's decision rather than seeking out an appeal. For future
legal challenges, the judge in this case laid out a framework that plaintiffs need to meet if they
want to overturn a county's decision. This ruling provided further substantiation to how
Chesterfield County conducted its conditional zoning system. Combined with the cases from the
1990s that involved Chesterfield, every legal challenge to the county's conditional zoning system
has been upheld in favor of the county.
The second case, David J Sowers v. Powhatan County, Virginia, et al., was argued in Federal
court where rulings are limited to violations of the U.S. Constitution or a federal statute. Sowers
alleged three claims against the county such that there had been violations of the equal protection
clause (14t Amendment) and the due process clause (5 th Amendment). These claims were
related to two different sets of action. One set of actions was related to an application for
rezoning filed by Sowers. The second set of actions involved approvals for his development
plans for the tract that was being rezoned. The Court ruled that the plaintiff never presented
enough evidence to support his claims, so that no reasonable jury would be able to find in his
favor. I do not go through the court's rationale for its ruling because unlike prior cases, Sowers
never alleged any improper actions by the county involving cash proffers. I bring the case up
because its facts provide an illustration of a county's rezoning process involving proffers.
Sowers sought to rezone 250.9 acres in Powhatan County from A-I (Agricultural) to R-5
(Residential). At the time of his rezoning application in June 2004, Sowers actually proffered the
county's minimum suggested proffer amount of $3,530 per lot. Within weeks of the submission
of Sowers' application, the county raised the amount to $6,395 per lot. In meetings with citizens
who lived in the area that would be affected by the development, concerns were raised and
Sowers decided to address some of them through non-cash proffers. Suggestions were also made
to him that he should increase the amount of his cash proffers, but he never did. These
suggestions came from citizens, as well as, Planning Commission members in private meetings.
Before his public hearing with the Planning Commission, Sowers amended his noncash proffers,
but the county had a rule that required proffers to be submitted at least seven business days
before the public hearing on the application. Sowers' amended proffers violated this rule, but the
Planning Commission waived the rule and included the latest version of the proffers in the
evidence on which it based its recommendation. After the Planning Commission hearing where
the Commission recommended denial of the application and before the Board of Supervisors
hearing, Sowers revised his noncash proffers again. Powhatan's rule for the Board of Supervisors
hearing was that proffers had to be submitted at least 10 days before the hearing's date. Sowers
missed this deadline, too, and unlike the Planning Commission, the Board rejected Sowers'
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motion to waive the deadline and so the revised proffers were not considered as part of his
application. The Board of Supervisors ended up denying his rezoning application. Sowers took
the County to state court to overturn the actions of the Board. Before a decision in the case was
reached, Powhatan's County Attorney said Sowers would be allowed to refile his rezoning
application without any of the fees or associated deadlines. Sowers turned down the offer, but the
Board decided to reconsider his application after all. After another review by the Planning
Commission and the Board of Supervisors, the Board voted to grant the rezoning in May of
2006. Thus almost two years after the application was filed, Sowers gained approval for his
rezoning, but only after court proceedings began.
With cash proffers, conditional zoning became relabeled as a tool for infrastructure financing. In
this time period, localities questioned whether conditional zoning could be morphed to assume
an additional identity - enforcer of an adequate facilities policy. As in prior decades, localities
sought the legal opinion of Virginia's Attorney General on the feasibility. City Attorney for the
City of Chesapeake had asked the Attorney General "whether the City of Chesapeake may adopt
a proffer policy as part of the city's comprehensive plan to encourage rezoning applicants to
proffer to develop rezoning property only when public facilities are deemed adequate to support
the public needs that will be generated by the proposed development?" (Virginia Office of the
Attorney General 2002: 86). Chesapeake sent the Attorney General a copy of the proposed
policy, but he did not use it in his legal opinion because the Attorney General's Office has a
policy of restricting their opinion to federal or state laws, rules, and regulations. His answer to
Chesapeake's question was limited to whether the locality had statutory authority to adopt a
hypothetical policy. Relying on state statutes and Supreme Court cases, the Attorney General
came up with a list of criteria that a locality could use for reviewing rezoning applications in
regard to adequate public facilities:
"1. the impact of the proposed new development on public facilities;
2. the protection against undue density of population with respect to the public
facilities in existence to service the proposed new development;
3. the planning by the locality for the provision of public facilities consonant
with the efficient and economical use of public funds to service the proposed new
development; and
4. the locality's interpretation and application of its comprehensive plan
concerning the timing of the development as determined by reasonably objective
criteria" (Virginia Office of the Attorney General 2002: 89).
A local government could then adopt a proffer policy that included this criteria and the policy
could be part of its comprehensive plan.
In the 2002, the Attorney General made no mention of whether lack of adequate public facilities
alone was enough of a justification to deny a rezoning application. The absence of any language
on this triggered another letter to the Attorney General in 2003, but this time, it was from state
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Senator John C. Watkins (R). He asked, "whether statutory authority is required for a local
governing body to deny rezoning request solely on the basis of the lack of adequate public
facilities and services to meet the needs generated by development of rezoned property?"
(Opinion of Virginia Attorney General 03-109 2003: 42) In addition to the 2002 Opinion of the
Attorney General, Watkins' question was motivated by the fact that the General Assembly was
considering legislation on the authority of local governments to adopt adequate public facility
ordinances. Watkins saw a conflict between the opinion which appeared to him to indicate that
localities could require adequate public facilities in place before development was allowed and
state statutes which either did not make them a requirement or only allowed them to be one of
multiple facets considered in a decision. The Attorney General responded that "[t]here is ... no
express statutory authorization that expressly grants to localities an ability to specifically require
developers to provide adequate public facilities or to defer development until such services are
provided" (Virginia Office of the Attorney General 2003: 44). Since the authority did not
explicitly exist in the current statutes combined with Virginia's strict adherence to Dillon's Rule,
the Attorney Opinion concluded "[s]tatutory authorization [was] clearly required to permit a
local governing body to deny a rezoning request based solely on the lack of adequate public
facilities to serve any development of rezoned property" (Virginia Office of the Attorney
General 2003: 44). If local governments wanted the power to base rezoning decisions on
adequate public facilities alone, then they needed to lobby the General Assembly to pass the
necessary statute.
Together, the 2002 and 2003 Virginia Attorney General Opinions illustrate how the state's
political structure constrains attempts by local governments to innovate their land use
regulations. Conditional zoning can be a very flexible tool because of the wide range of potential
conditions available depending on the particular statute. These conditions, however, must be
voluntarily offered by the applicant or property owner. This defining feature of Virginia's
conditional zoning system limits its effectiveness. Certain applicants may be very open to an
adequate public facilities provision being a suggested condition to their rezoning application
while others might reject it outright. As the court cases involving proffers have shown just
because a property owner does not proffer all of the conditions that a local government may
think is appropriate that is not grounds to deny a rezoning.
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CONCLUSION
The conclusion might be drawn that the lack of a clear political outcome on SB 768 such as
passage/enactment or outright failure in 2008 was a signal that the influence of the development
community had waned. I would argue instead that local governments finally effectively
harnessed their influence combined with the assistance of new agents in the form of
environmental and smart growth interest groups. The development industry could have had
Watkins kill the bill after the grantors tax section was removed, but they continued to fight for
the bill. After being left out of the drafting of the bill, local governments earned themselves a
seat at the negotiating table for future versions. Without a resolution to the issues raised by SB
768, legislative activity related to conditional zoning will return to efforts by the development
community to make the statutes more restrictive in applicability and increase the level of
standardization and oversight. Given the downturn of the housing market and the economy that
occurred towards the end of 2008, concerns over growth management may have disappeared, but
the question of how to fund infrastructure needs remains. Further, Dillon's Rule will require
local governments still to seek out authority from the state legislature for tools to deal with this
new economic environment.
Now that the conditional zoning's legislative history has been laid out, the next two chapters will
delve into what its authorization has really meant for local governments. First, I will attempt to
understand why all of the counties eligible to accept cash proffers are not accepting them.
Chapter 9 will serve to provide insights into who adopts a conditional zoning ordinance and who
does not. Plus, I look at how counties are administering their cash proffer systems in terms of
approach and revenue collection. Chapter 10 will attempt to address the concerns raised by the
development community that cash proffers have a negative impact on the housing industry. My
analysis looks at their effect on the housing supply.
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CHAPTER 9
Over the past thirty years, a contentious political fight has been waged over the existence of
conditional zoning with cash proffers. Thus it is important to understand who is using this tool
and how it is being implemented. Interest groups like the Home Builders Association of Virginia
(HBVA) have repeatedly raised concerns about the lack of standardization in local cash proffer
authority implementation. In reality, not all of the eligible localities have taken even the step of
amending their zoning ordinance, yet alone, actually collecting cash proffer revenues. With this
setting in mind, this chapter has two aims. First, I seek to understand why there is a lack of cash
proffer acceptance and whether there is something distinctive about cash proffer accepting
localities that explains this occurrence. Second, I look at the implementation practices among the
cash proffer accepting localities to see if variation exists and to what extent. The dimensions
examined include administrative approach, rezoning activity, revenue collection, and expenditure
purpose. I attempt to answer these questions by shifting the focus in this chapter to the actual use
of cash proffers at the local level rather than the debate between interest groups at the state level.
I rely upon local level data from two main sources -survey results and government reports.
Regardless of whether a locality has actually collected cash proffer revenues, one would expect
to have all eligible localities at least have taken the step of amending their ordinance to allow for
the acceptance of cash proffers. Early adoption of the zoning amendment would indicate
foresight in being prepared for future development activity. The lack of adoption may stem from
perceptions of high administrative costs. Either way, I would expect the level of growth pressure
that a locality is under to be correlated with its decision to take the steps to accept cash proffers.
These expectations will be tested through the use of different measures of development activity
and administrative costs.
In regard to implementation, I do not have a set of priors to guide this descriptive analysis.
Localities are free to design their own administrative systems. State monitoring exists only in
terms of revenue and expenditure reporting. Further, Virginia is the only state that uses cash
proffers so I cannot look at administrative models in other states. Finally, the revenue amounts
and funded projects are subject to a locality's approved rezoning applications. Thus these can be
as varied as the development activity in a locality itself. Implementation will be explored through
the different elements of a cash proffer system from the amount proffered per building permit to
the purpose upon which the collected revenues are spent.
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METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION
This chapter's descriptive analysis is based on the use of survey data as well as annual fiscal year
reports that the state legislature requires all local governments to submit to the Commission on
Local Government (CLG). Counties are the unit of analysis. Cities, counties, and towns are
authorized to use conditional zoning and accept cash proffers. I have narrowed the analysis to
counties because their large land area presents developers with a choice of developing in
greenfields (fringe) or brownfields (infill). This dichotomy in land selection is at the heart of
growth management efforts which seek to redirect development away from the fringe. There are
ninety-five counties in Virginia of which eighty-eight have been enabled (i.e. eligible) to accept
cash proffers as of the fiscal year 2008.
For my acceptance and administration analysis, I rely on the results from a survey that I
conducted during the summer of 2008. While I will illustrate the survey findings with examples
from various counties, this chapter does not go into detail on the specific implementation policies
of every county that has accepted cash proffers. A survey of counties was necessary because
CLG only collects information on cash proffer revenue collections and expenditures. While their
data has become more detailed over time, their focus is solely on monies and their monitoring
did not begin until fiscal year 2000. My research did not reveal the existence of any
comprehensive source of information on the history and practices of counties across the state in
regard to cash proffers. This absence necessitated my conducting a statewide survey. I developed
two surveys. A county's eligibility status to accept cash proffers determined which version they
were asked to complete. The seven counties who were not eligible as of 2006-07 Fiscal Year to
accept cash proffers received one version of the survey which sought to determine whether they
would be interested in accepting cash proffers if eligible. The remaining eighty-eight counties
were given a version of the survey designed to distinguish those eligible counties who had
adopted cash proffers from those that did not.
Before the survey was put out into the field, the questions were pre-tested by a retired Planning
Director, the former head of one county's cash proffer program, and a representative from the
Virginia Association of Counties who had previously supervised the state's involvement in cash
proffers through the Local Government Committee. The survey was conducted through both
Internet and the mail. A survey was mailed to the respective head of the Planning, Zoning, or
Community Development departments of each county. If none of these departments existed in
the county, then the survey was sent to the attention of the county administrator. Each survey
was accompanied by a cover letter which gave a website address where the survey could be
accessed and completed online. The surveys were sent out in early May 2008 with a return date
of mid-June. Counties had roughly six weeks to fill-out the survey. Individual email reminders
were sent out to respondents. For those non-respondents, follow-ups were conducted in person,
over the phone, and via email. In total, there were ninety counties that officially submitted a
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survey questionnaire either by mail, email, or online. The discussion that follows will only focus
on a select number of the questions from either survey. Both survey instruments can be found in
the Appendix.
While my survey response rate was over ninety percent, the quality of these responses was quite
varied. Some counties answered every applicable question completely while others only filled-
out a select few. A major issue for respondents was the time span of the survey. Eligibility for
cash proffer acceptance began as early as 1973, so certain localities were required to look far
back into their archival records. This was a task easier for certain counties. The time and cost
involved in searches for dates, dollar values, permit numbers, and housing unit totals by local
government officials meant that these questions were the most likely to go unanswered. Further,
how researchers conceive of data being reported is not always how local governments,
themselves, collect the data. The quantitative data questions were designed to ask for things
which I believed were readily available, but the quality of answers suggests that this was not the
case. Perhaps, the information may have been more easily obtained through site visits to each
county, but given time and financial constraints, this method was not used. Of course, there was
no guarantee that the information could be gathered completely in one visit to each county.
While some respondents did admit that their lack of answers to certain questions stemmed from
their newness to the particular county, for the most part, the surveys were completed by
individuals who were in the best position to answer them. The position for the majority of
respondents was a county's Planning Director or Director of Planning. Other positions reported
by respondents included Zoning Administrator, County Administrator, Assistant County
Administrator, Proffer Administrator, Senior Planner, Principal Planner, Community
Development Director, Assistant Director of Budget and Management, and Finance Director.
Out of the ninety-five surveys, there were five counties that declined to participate for various
reasons. These non-respondents were not concentrated in one part of the state, so there does not
appear to be any geographic bias to the survey's results. All of these counties were enabled to
accept cash proffers through conditional zoning. Franklin and Rockingham counties became
eligible immediately with the 1989 legislation. Buckingham, Grayson, and Northumberland
counties achieved eligibility in 2001 when decennial population changes between 1990 and 2000
were calculated. Since the Commission on Local Government began tracking cash proffer
revenues and expenditures, only one of the five counties, Rockingham, reported any cash
proffer-related activity. Rockingham, however, has not yet officially collected any cash proffer
revenue nor expended any because its reported activity falls in the category of "Total Pledged
But Payment Conditioned Only On Time" for both the 2007 and 2008 Fiscal Years. While these
counties declined to answer the full survey, they did answer via email key questions on the
existence of cash proffer activity in the respective counties. Using the county websites, I tried to
answer the remaining survey questions.
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For my analysis of usage, I focus on the dollar amount and frequency of cash proffer revenues
collected by or pledged to counties. The sources of my data are the CLG reports on cash proffer
revenue collections and expenditures. CLG sends a survey annually to the chief administrative
officer of each locality that is required by state law to report its acceptance of cash proffers
asking for information in regard to the prior fiscal year's activity. 4 8 CLG works to ensure that
they have a final combined jurisdictional response rate of 100 percent. The final report is
required to be sent to the Chairmen of the Senate Committee on Local Government and the
House Committee on Counties, Cities and Towns by November 3 0 th each year. The time period
of my analysis is from fiscal years 1999-00 to 2007-08. 1 look at the general pattern of usage
across all eligible counties in the state.
WHO Is ACCEPTING CASH PROFFERS
The majority of counties in the state do not accept cash proffers. Based on 2008 survey results,
thirty-seven out of Virginia's ninety-five (38.9 percent) responded that they had amended their
zoning ordinance to allow for the acceptance of voluntary cash proffers under Virginia State
Code (§15.2-2303, § 15.2-2298, or §15.2-2303.1). This represents approximately 42 percent of
counties who were eligible as of 2007 Fiscal Year to accept cash proffers.
Socioeconomic Measures
On the surface, accepting counties appear to be distinctly different from non-accepting counties
along several socioeconomic and land use measures. As shown in Table 9.1 below, "Accepting"
counties exceed "Non-Accepting" counties for every feature except for the proportion of a
county's land acreage that is dedicated to farming. This would lead one to conclude that
accepting counties are wealthier, built more densely, have larger populations, less farmland, and
higher decennial growth rates. Not all of the numerical differences in the means for the variables
shown in Table 9.1, however, are statistically significant. Based on results from difference of
means t-tests between the two groups, I fail to reject the null hypothesis of no difference at a
confidence level of 95 percent for 1997 Proportion of Land Area (Acres) in Farms.49 So the
difference between "Non-Accepting" and "Accepting" counties in terms of their 1997 proportion
of farm land is not statistically significant. I would add, however, that several "Non-Accepting"
counties in their survey responses brought up the rural and agricultural nature of their localities
and that it was not an acceptable practice for this type of development. The test results were
48 Originally, all localities were required to report their activity but state statute was amended in 2003 so that
localities with a resident population of less than 3,500 are exempt from reporting.
49For 1997 Proportion ofLand Area (Acres) in Farms, the t-statistic 1.6605 for a test with equal variances and
1.6340 for unequal variances.
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mixed for the 2000 Total Population measure.50 When the means t-test is conducted under the
assumption of equal variances, there is a statistically significant difference between the two
county types for this indicator at a confidence level of 95 percent. With an assumption of
unequal variances, the difference in the means is not statistically significant at the 95 percent
level.
50For 2000 Total Population, the t-statistic was -2.0255 for a test with equal variances and -1.9423 for unequal
variances.
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Table 9.1 Socioeconomic Measure Comparison between Counties by Cash Proffer Acceptance
Status
Source: Author's calculations based on Survey Results and U.S. Census Bureau data.
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Building Activity
There are greater levels of building activity in accepting counties compared to other counties.
While cash proffers are only applicable in cases involving a rezoning, building permits may be a
proxy for the level of development pressure that a county is facing. Heightened development
pressure may lead a county to accept cash proffers to assist in the costs of proving public
services to the new development. For each fiscal year in Figure 9.1, the average number of
single-family building permits in "Accepting" counties is at least double the level of activity in
"Non-Accepting" counties. With an assumption of unequal variances, the t-test results on the
difference of means between the two groups were statistically significant at the 95 percent
confidence level for every fiscal year.5 1 Residential development regardless of whether it stems
from a rezoning is higher in the "Accepting" counties. Several "Non-Accepting" counties in their
survey responses justified their lack of adoption of a cash proffer acceptance amendment because
there was very limited growth activity to support its use.
Figure 9.1 Average Single-Family Building Permits by Acceptance Status, FY99-FY07
1000 -
900 - 858
800 ~ 694 692 699
700 - 639
600 - 531 487
500 -
400 259 297 313 294
300 _ 253 2452236 2966. .... ,245
200 -
100 -
0
--- Non-Accepting -- Accepting
Source: Author's calculations based on Survey Results and U.S. Census Bureau data.
5 Under the assumption of equal variances, the t-test results were not statistically significant at the 95 percent
confidence level for any fiscal year. At the 90 percent level, every fiscal year except for 1999-00 does show a
statistically significant difference in the means between the two groups.
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Geography
Geographic location distinguishes "Accepting" counties from all other counties. As seen in Map
9.1, the thirty-seven "Accepting" counties shown in purple are concentrated in the eastern half of
the state. "Accepting" counties form a geographic block that flows along the majority of the
eastern half of the state from the border with Washington, D.C. and Maryland to the North
Carolina border. While Arlington, Fairfax, and Loudoun Counties are shaded in green at the top
of the map based on their missing survey responses, they do accept cash proffers according to
CLG's reports. There are a few "Non-Accepting" counties in the eastern half of the state, but the
bulk of these counties are in the western half of the state. By default, the eligible counties that
lack a zoning ordinance (i.e. counties shaded brown on the map) could be considered "Non-
Accepting" since you need to have a zoning ordinance in order to accept cash proffers. Based on
their survey responses, some "Non-Accepting" counties look towards the actions of their
neighboring counties to determine whether they should accept cash proffers. In the words of one
county, "No localities in our area accept them; they are viewed as more trouble than they are
worth in many cases."
Map 9.1 Counties by Eligibility Status and Acceptance Status According to Survey Question 11
Accepting
Non-Accepting
Zoning and MissingAnswer
No Zoning and Missing Answer
Ineligible Counties
Cities
Source: Author's calculations based on Survey Results.
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Eligibility Timing
Currently "Accepting" counties typically became eligible to accept cash proffers under state law
at earlier points in time. Figure 9.2 below shows the majority of "Accepting" counties achieving
eligibility in 1989 compared to 2001 for "Non-Accepting" counties. Lack of acceptance for the
majority of "Non-Accepting" counties could be explained by their later arrival to eligibility.
Further, a large number of these counties achieved eligibility either through lower growth rate
standards or based on their geographic proximity to more rapidly growing localities. Table 9.2
displays the count of responding counties for each eligibility reason according to reports from
CLG by acceptance category. The counts for prior to the 2000 Census reinforce the information
depicted in Map 9.2 that more than half of the "Non-Accepting" counties achieved their
eligibility after the 2000 Census results were released. Second, more "Non-Accepting" counties
owe their eligibility to geographic proximity than "Accepting" counties. Third, it is only through
a relaxation of the required growth level in 2006 that allowed there to be more high-growth
"Non-Accepting" than "Accepting" counties. For the most part, this was a switch of counties
being eligible through geographic proximity to decennial population growth rate. Thus the
"Accepting" counties are likely high-growth counties as compared to "Non-Accepting" counties.
Figure 9.2 Survey Respondents by Acceptance Level and Eligibility Year
35 -
30 - 29
25 - 23
20 -
15 ~ 12
10 - 7
5
5
1 1
1976 1990 2001 2006
0 Accepting Counties 0 Non-Accepting Counties
Source: Author's calculations based on Survey Results and state statutes.
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Table 9.2 Reason for Cash Proffer Acceptance Eligibility by Cash Proffer Acceptance Status
Accepting Non-Accepting
Reason for Cash Proffer Acceptance Eligibility Counties Counties
(n=37) (n=41)
n % n %
Prior to 2000 Census
High Growth (10%) - 1980 to 1990 26 70% 7 17%
Contiguous to three High Growth Locality 3 8% 5 12%
County East of Chesapeake Bay 0 0% 1 2%
Urban County Executive (UCE) Form of Government 0 0% 0 0%
County Contiguous to UCE Locality 1 3% 0 0%
Ineligible 7 19% 28 68%
Post 2000 Census
High Growth (10%)- 1990 to 2000 31 84% 25 61%
Contiguous to three High Growth Locality 5 14% 10 24%
County East of Chesapeake Bay 0 0% 1 2%
Urban County Executive (UCE) Form of Government 0 0% 0 0%
County Contiguous to UCE Locality 1 3% 0 0%
Ineligible 0 0% 5 12%
Post 2006 Statutory Change
High Growth (5%)-1990 to 2000 33 89% 34 83%
Contiguous to three High Growth Locality 3 8% 6 15%
County East of Chesapeake Bay 0 0% 1 2%
Urban County Executive (UCE) Form of Government 0 0% 0 0%
County Contiguous to UCE Locality 1 3% 0 0%
Ineligible 0 0% 0 0%
Source: Author's calculations based on CLG Reports and Survey Results.
Readiness
Acceptance readiness is not a barrier preventing counties from taking the step of accepting cash
proffers. My key measures of readiness are whether a county has in place the administrative
regulations required by state statutes, as well as, experience with general conditional zoning.
Eligible counties must have adopted a zoning ordinance, comprehensive plan, and capital
improvement plan before they can accept cash proffers. Based on survey results, the majority of
the "Non-Accepting" counties are "ready" by these measures to accept cash proffers. All of them
have a zoning ordinance while only one county lacks a comprehensive plan. Just under half have
adopted a capital improvement plan. Further, more than half of "Non-Accepting" counties have
allowed for general conditional zoning in their zoning ordinances. Of these counties, the majority
have dealt with conditional zoning in at least 2 or more of their rezoning applications. The
"Non-Accepting" counties have a greater level of experience with general conditional zoning
than you would expect given their lack of accepting cash proffers. Outside of amending the
zoning ordinance to allow for the acceptance of cash proffers, less than half (49 percent) of
"Non-Accepting" counties have to complete at least one other step before being able to accept
cash proffers.
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Perception
"Accepting" and "Non-Accepting" counties share similar perceptions of cash proffers and other
growth management tools. Contrary to expectations, both groups of counties were almost split
fifty-fifty on their answers to the question of "Does your county view voluntary cash proffers as
a growth management tool?" Within the "Accepting" counties, there were seventeen "YES"s and
sixteen "NO"s compared to fifteen and fourteen, respectively, for the "Non-Accepting" counties.
In terms of other growth management tools, the majority of counties in both groups sought the
authority for impact fees.52 "Non-Accepting" counties saw impact fees as more beneficial for
two reasons. First, impact fees can be assessed on by-right development unlike cash proffers
which are tied solely to rezonings. Second, they are flexible so that counties could charge
different rates depending upon where development is located within its borders. While
"Accepting" counties would like to have the additional power of impact fees, they did not want
to lose their existing right to collect cash proffers. There was also shared interest regardless of
acceptance status in taking advantage of tools already enabled by the state such as Transferable
Development Rights (TDRs) and Purchase Development Rights (PDRs). The failure by "Non-
Accepting" counties to amend their zoning ordinances to allow for the acceptance of cash
proffers was clearly not done as a sign of distrust in land use tools given their appeals for the use
of other land use tools. These "Non-Accepting" counties would rather pass on cash proffers and
wait for a more optimal land use tool to address their perceived needs.
A county's decision to take the necessary steps to accept cash proffers is function of growth. To
deal with the ramifications of an increasing population, "Accepting" counties have responded by
amending their zoning ordinance to allow for the collection of cash proffers through conditional
zoning. While the process to accept cash proffers is not onerous, "Non-Accepting" counties
appear to prefer to wait until they have enough growth to justify taking action. The influence of
growth is seen in how "Accepting" counties are wealthier and densier than "Non-Accepting"
counties. There are growth differences between the two county types in terms of population and
residential construction. "Accepting" counties are higher for both measures. "Accepting"
counties are spatially concentrated in the "Golden Crescent" region of the state. This area has
become the driving force behind the state's economy.
Now that we know more about who is accepting cash proffers, I turn next to examining how
counties are administering their cash proffer programs and what the revenues are spent on. Cash
proffers are generated solely by approved rezoning applications and rezoning activity happens
with uncertain frequency. Thus an understanding of how counties administer and use cash
proffers is an important step in any analysis of whether the acceptance of cash proffers impacts
the rate of development/growth in an area.
52 Impact fees are the most popular form of exactions and represent the cash payment element of the exaction family.
Localities use them to fund new or expanded public facilities and services that directly arise from new development.
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How CASH PROFFERS ARE ADMINISTERED
There are two major approaches to how cash proffers are administered across the state. The first
is the "Case-by-Case" approach whereby every rezoning applicant can proffer whatever amount
they would like to the county on an individual basis. For example, some could proffer $1,000 per
housing unit while another is at $5,000. In addition, an applicant could proffer a lump sum
amount, for example, one million dollars for the entire rezoning. Either a portion or the full
proffered amount is payable to the county whenever the developer applies for any building
permits tied to the approved rezoning during the course of the construction. So if the cash proffer
amount was approved at $2,500 per housing unit and the developer applies for ten building
permits at one time, then they must pay the county $25,000 at that point in time. Based on the
survey results, thirteen out of the thirty-seven accepting counties (35 percent) follow a pure
"Case-by-Case" approach. The second approach is what is called "Policy-Based". With this
approach, the administration of a county's cash proffer program is more like an impact fee
program whereby the county sets up guidelines on what it is looking for in the typical cash
proffer amount. Chapter 7 described Chesterfield County's path toward the development of a
"Policy-Based" approach. Twenty-four counties identified their cash proffer program as a
"Policy-Based" approach.
Revenue Generation
At first glance, a "Policy-Based" approach appears to generate on average more cash proffer
revenue per housing unit than a "Case-by-Case" approach. For fourteen out of the seventeen
years shown in Table 9.3, the average cash proffer amount for the "Policy-Based" approach
exceeded that of the "Case-by-Case" approach. It would have most likely exceeded it in the other
years as well except for several outlier amounts in the "Case-by-Case" counties. This shows the
greater level of revenue variability with the "Case-by-Case" approach. However, for those years
where there were enough observations in each group to conduct a t-test on the difference in
means, none of the results showed any statistical significance at the 95 percent confidence
level.5 The lack of a true statistical difference in revenue generation between them raises a
question about the level of discretion in each approach. Inherently, I would argue each approach
has the same amount because cash proffers are statutorily a voluntary offering by the rezoning
applicant. So they are allowed to offer whatever amount they choose to and the locality cannot
base their rezoning approval decision on that dollar figure. The advantage to the "Policy-Based"
approach is that it tells the rezoning applicant how much the locality is looking to receive. Thus
they can then evaluate whether to offer the suggested amount or a different amount, typically
lower, which may lead to potentially costly negotiations with the locality. These costs could
range from work absences, legal fees to development delays.
53The fiscal years with test results are 2000-01 to 2006-07. These results apply to both assumptions about the
variances -- equal and unequal.
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Table 9.3 Average Cash Proffer Amount by Approach Type
Fiscal Policy-Based Approach
Year N Average I MIN I MAX Std Dev I N
1991-92 3 2,263 1,989 2,800 465 0
1992-93 3 2,040 1,920 2,200 1 0
1993-94 4 3,793 2,00 6,895 2,)137 1
for Accepting Counties, FY91-FY07
Case-by-Case Approach
Average MIN MAX Std Dev
3,295 3,295 3,295
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
4
4
3
4
6
7
6
7
7
10
2005-06 I 10
4,322
4,415
4,411
5,300
5,962
5,532
8,154
9,240
10,178
9,379
12,331
2,000 6,895
2,000 6,895
2,000 6,895
2,000 10,000
1,750 12,200
250 15,250
1,000 16,656
1,000 19,113
1,490 19,113
0 22,986
0 35,295
2,064
2,044
2,448
3,851
4,135
5,297
5,696
7,528
7,253
8,167
12,160
1
1
1
3
2
2
4
4
3,430
3,430
0
3,700
3,730
3,420
2,988
5,027
253,119
3,494
8 18,456
3,430
3,430
0
3,700
3,730
2,400
0
4,077
0
1,000
3,430
3,430
0
3,700
3,730
4,000
5,976
5,976
1,000,000
5,976
886
4,226
1,343
497,929
2,072
0 125,000 43,104
Source: Autnor's calculations based on survey Kesults.
Rezoning Activity
It is possible for a county to have very few rezoning applications (total or approved), but a large
number of approved housing units attributable to a single rezoning. Conversely, a county could
have a one-to-one ratio between total applications, approvals, and housing units, so that four
applications lead to four approvals and four houses. So counties with a "Case-by-Case" approach
may have a smaller number of applications and approvals than the "Policy-Based" approach, but
a greater volume of approved housing units. However, this is not the case. On the surface,
"Policy-Based" approach counties are localities with a greater amount of rezoning activity. One
possible explanation is that developers seek out localities that provide them a degree of certainty
in the development process. Thus, one might expect that counties who have laid out their
guidelines in a "Policy-Based" approach would attract more development. Looking at Table 9.4
below, "Policy-Based" counties exceeded the development activity (total number of rezoning
applications; total approved; and total housing units for those applications involving cash
proffers) of the "Case-by-Case" counties for each of the years displayed. While there may appear
to be differences between the two approaches, there were only three years where the difference
was statistically significant at the 95 confidence level with an assumption of unequal variance -
263
1998-99 (total rezoning applications), 2000-01 (total approved rezoning applications), and 2005-
06 (total rezoning applications and total approved rezoning applications).
Table 9.4 Summary of Rezoning Activity involving Cash Proffers by Approach Type for
Accepting Counties, FY99-FY07
Fiscal Policy-Based Approach Case-by-Case Approach
Year N Average MIN MAX Std Dev N AverageI MIN I MAX Std Dev
Total Rezoning Applications
Note: The discrepancies between the number of observations for the two groups results from a lack of corn]
information by survey respondents.
Source: Author's calculations based on Survey Results.
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Bid for More Certainty
Over time, counties have sought to bring more certainty to their administrative approaches. They
have moved towards a more "Policy-Based" approach away from the "Case-by-Case" approach.
There are also counties who have gone straight to a "Policy-Based" approach. These have
typically been more recent adopters, adopting in 2003 or later. Looking at the survey results, we
see evidence of this change in approach for counties where the year their zoning ordinance was
amended to allow for the acceptance of cash proffers does not match the year their "Policy-
Based" approach was adopted.
The switch in approaches could have resulted from a higher level of rezoning activity which
necessitated a more formal system to reduce the administrative burden on the county. Another
reason may be competition with neighboring localities. If as I discussed earlier, developers are
attracted to counties with more certainty and standardization in their approach, then a county
may be more likely to adopt a "Policy-Based" approach. This likelihood would increase if the
other localities in their region have already adopted a "Policy-Based" approach. The
development activity numbers in Table 9.4 provide evidence to support the need for a more
standardized approach to cash proffers. At this time, I cannot determine the causal relationship
between more certainty in a cash proffer system and the level of rezoning activity. Future
research could look into whether more certainty attracts more activity or vice versa.
Rise ofthe Maximum Cash Proffer Policy
"Maximum cash proffer policy" is the dominant policy taken by those counties who pursue a
"Policy-Based" approach. Three-quarters of the "Policy-Based" counties in the survey identified
themselves as following a "maximum cash proffer policy." While the amount of the cash proffer
according to state statute is voluntarily determined and offered by the rezoning applicant,
counties with a "maximum cash proffer policy" determine an upper bound to these payments
usually based on a formula that takes into consideration the public facilities and infrastructure
associated with new development like schools, roads, public safety, libraries, etc. Over time,
these "maximum cash proffer" amounts have become viewed as the suggested cash proffer
amount in a locality. Although some counties have a single amount recommended for all housing
types, over fifty percent have differing amounts by housing type. The most common breakdown
is to distinguish between single family and multi-family housing with a further a refinement
between detached and attached single family. There was no dominant pattern across the counties
as to whether the single family amount was more than multi-family or vice-versa. The use of a
"maximum cash proffer" is another effort by localities to remove potentially suspect discretion
from a cash proffer system. This raises a question of how much flexibility cash proffer systems
should have to deal with exceptions. The property tax reform effort in California which
culminated in Proposition 13 illustrates the unintended consequences when discretion is reduced.
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Revenue Variability
Revenue variability exists even with a defined policy. While some rezoning applicants may
perceive the maximum cash proffer amount as the suggested amount, Table 9.5 shows that the
actual amount the locality receives which is represented by the "average cash proffer amount"
columns is often less than the suggested cash proffer in the "maximum cash proffer amount"
columns despite differences in the number of responding counties. Rezoning applicants can
always proffer any amount that they want. At the same time, the minimum and maximum values
for the maximum cash proffer amount category show a wide difference across counties in these
suggested amounts. For example, the 2006-07 Fiscal Year has counties with maximum amounts
in the range of roughly $2,000 up to close to $30,000 per housing unit. This may reflect the wide
variation in the costs of capital improvement projects across localities.
Each locality has the ability to design the specific methodology behind their maximum amount.
When it amended its cash proffer policy in December 2005, Fauquier County, located in the
Washington, DC MSA, set a maximum of $28,503 for a single-family detached unit. This
amount was based on six types of public facilities that would be affected by an approved
rezoning. Schools were the largest component at $21,424 followed by emergency services
($3,003), parks and recreation ($2,260), libraries ($707), landfill ($641), and sheriff ($468).
Roads were left as an undetermined amount subject to traffic impact analysis and consistency
with the comprehensive plan. Roughly seven months later (July 2006), Goochland County,
located in the Richmond, VA MSA, adopted a cash proffer policy amount of $15,803." Like
Fauquier, schools are the largest component in their calculation at $10,849. However, Goochland
does calculate a dollar value for roads at $3,779. The other components of Goochland's cash
proffer calculation are fire/rescue ($269), libraries ($443), and parks ($463). The different
maximum amounts between the counties may be a reflection of differences in their public
facilities and services. Goochland with a population of 20,048 in 2006 and a land area of 281.42
square miles is smaller in size than Fauquier (pop: 64,261; land area: 647.45). So even though
the same type of public facilities and services are used in the cash proffer calculation, Goochland
provides them to fewer people and across a smaller distance. Thus it has a lower maximum
amount.
5 Fauquier County Board of Supervisors, Proffer Policy, Revision December 8, 2005, Last accessed March 8, 2007,
http://www.fauguiercounty.gov/documents/departments/commdev/pdt/ProfferPoIicy.pidf.
5 Goochland County Board of Supervisors, Goochland County Cash Proffers FY 2006-2007, Adopted July 5, 2006,
Last accessed March 10, 2007,
http://www.co.goochland.va.us/Departments/DepartmentsAF/BoardofSupervisors/tabid/70/ltemld/2 1/Default.aspx.
56 Population data is based on the "Final Population Estimates for 2001-2006, Virginia Cities & Counties" from the
Weldon Cooper Center for Public Service, Demographics & Workforce Group, Last accessed February 20, 2009,
httip://www.coopercenter.org/demographics/. Land area data is from the "State and County QuickFacts", U.S.
Census Bureau, Last accessed May 19, 2012, hup://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html.
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Finally, there has also been a clear pattern of increasing values for the maximum values in both
categories which reflects the increasing costs of the provision of public infrastructure and
facilities.
Table 9.5 Maximum Cash Proffer Amount v. Average Cash Proffer Amount for Accepting
Counties, FY91-FY07
Maximum Cash Proffer Amount Average Cash Proffer Amount
Fiscal
Year N Average MIN MAX Std N Average MIN MAX Std
Dev Dev
1991-92 2 2,493 1,986 3,000 717 3 2,263 1,989 2,800 465
1992-93 2 3,035 2,069 4,000 1,365 3 2,040 1,920 2,20 144
1993-94 3 4,655 2,028 6,895 2,457 5 3,693 2,000 6,895 1,864
1994-95 3 4,732 2,219 6,895 2,358 -5 3,705 2,000 6,895 1,861
1995-96 3 4,812 2,366 6,895 2,286 5 4,144 2,000 6,895 1,832
1996-97 3 5,115 3,276 6,895 1,810 5 4,218 2,00 6,95 1,824
1997-98 3 5,533 3,703 6,895 1,647 4 3,308 0 6,895 2,977
19989-99 3 5,800 4,304 6,895 1,341 5 490 200 10,000 3,1
1999-00 3 5,971 4,819 6,895 1,057 7 5,643 1,750 12,200 3,868
2O00-0 1 4 5,273 1,744 7,800 2,699 10 4,89 250 15,250 4,463
2001-02 5 5,060 2,316 7,800 2,280 8 6,862 0 16,656 5,607
2002-03 7 7,831 3,544 14,325 3,743 9 8,04 1,00 1,9,113 6,795
2003-04 8 8,044 1,490 14,730 4,305 11 98,520 0 1,000,000 299,057
2004-05 10 8,948 1,490 17,632 5,715 14 7,697 a 22,896 7!,417
2005-06 10 12,333 2,958 28,503 7,533 17 15,821 0 125,000 29,920
W0a n7 14 A 1 1 A2 1 "728 28,503 '7,8A5 23 1V4 51AA A , 3A76i
Source: Author's calculations based on Survey Results.
How CASH PROFFERS ARE USED
Great variation exists in the number of counties who report annual cash proffer revenues to the
state as well as their reported collected revenues. Since the first year of reporting in 1999-00, the
count has fluctuated from a low of fifteen (1999-00) to a high of 31 (2006-07) as seen in Table
9.6 below. There have only been fifteen counties in the state that have reported cash proffer
revenue collections to CLG for each year of its reporting to the General Assembly as of the
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2007-08 Fiscal Year.57 These fifteen counties were all eligible to accept cash proffer under the
1989 or earlier conditional zoning statutes. The average population growth in this group for 1980
to 1990 and 1990 to 2000 was 33 percent. 8 In comparison, the state's county population growth
average was 9.34 percent and 16.41 percent from 1980 to 1990 and 1990 to 2000, respectively.
These fifteen counties were driving population growth in the state.
There are large differences among the counties in their collected revenue dollar amounts from
the thousands to tens of millions. For example, Warren County collected $3,600 in cash proffers
for the 2001-02 Fiscal Year compared to over $8.6 million in Loudoun County. Across all
counties that have collected cash proffer revenues, the average amount of revenue generated has
stayed within the range of $1.4 million to $3.1 million.
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
2006-07
Note: According to CLG
17 36
19 23
20 25
21 26
22 27
24 30
31 35
29 33
1,532,590
1,501,654
1,796,574
2,271,482
3,085,036
2,689,514
1,)807,119
Reports, there were forty-seven elij
3,000 9,155,774 2,753,142
3,600 8,753,717 2,778,103
3,500 10,396,500 3,180,956
4,919 15,430,408 4 ,274,470
14,900 23,135,471 6,162,346
3,000 25,170,900 51,759,864
3,907 18,930,554 4,248,073
1,728 18,157,785 4,471,910
counties for the 2000 and 2001 Fiscal Years;
eighty-one eligible counties for the 2002 through 2006 Fiscal Years; and eighty-eight eligible counties for the 2007
and 2008 Fiscal Years.
Source: Author's calculations based on CLG Reports.
5 7 The fifteen counties are Albemarle (Charlottesville MSA), Caroline (Richmond MSA), Chesterfield (Richmond
MSA), Fairfax (Washington MSA), Fauquier (Washington MSA), Frederick (Winchester MSA), Hanover
(Richmond MSA), Isle of Wight (Virginia Beach MSA), King William (Richmond MSA), Loudoun (Washington
MSA), New Kent (Richmond MSA), Powhatan (Richmond MSA), Prince William (Washington MSA),
Spotsylvania (Washington MSA) and Stafford (Washington MSA).
58 The decennial population growth rates were calculated using "Historic Census Counts for Virginia Localities,
1790-2000" from U.S. Census of Population, 1790-2000 and prepared by Weldon Cooper Center for Public Service.
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Geography
Cash proffer revenue collections show a clear geographic concentration. From the top image to
the bottom image in Map 9.2, there has been an expansion of cash proffer revenue collection
westward and south over the years from the Northern Virginia region that has connected with the
Richmond region and started an eastern and southern expansion to the Virginia Beach region.59
The western half of the state has a clear absence of actual cash proffer activity. This geographic
concentration reflects a similar pattern to that of the "Accepting" counties discussed earlier. This
pattern, however, is not solely due to the counties following the actions of their neighboring
localities. The thirty-nine counties color shared purple or green in Map 9.2 were where the
overwhelming majority of residential construction from 1999 to 2008 took place in the state.
Together, these counties made up at least 72 percent of the state's single family building permits
each year over these ten years.6 0 Localities cannot collect cash proffer revenues without building
activity.
59 There are counties on Map 9.2 who show up as cash proffer revenue collectors, but identified themselves through
my survey results as "Non-Accepting" counties, so they show up on earlier maps as "Non-Accepting." This is the
case for three counties. One of these counties reported only pledged amounts rather than actual revenue collection.
Additionally, Map 9.1 shows three counties that were labeled as "Zoning, Missing Answer" on earlier maps because
they failed to answer the accepting/non-accepting question. Two of these counties have actually received cash
proffer revenues while the other county reported only pledged amount activity.
60 Single family building permits data is from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD)
State of the Cities Data System's Building Permits Database. Last accessed April 15, 2010,
httD://socds.huduser.org/Dermits/index.html.
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Map 9.2 Cash Proffer Revenue Collections over Time, 1999-00 to 2007-08
1999-00 CountIes with Cash Proffer Revenue Coflections
1999-00 to 2007-08 Counties with Cash Proffer Revenue Collections
Collected Cash Proffer Revenue
Total Pledged But Payment Conditioned Only on Tine
Cities
Source: Author's calculations based on CLG Reports.
Payment Timing
Timing represents additional source of variability to the true revenue generating capacity of cash
proffers. The issue of time manifests itself when you compare "total collected cash proffer
revenue" versus "total pledged but payment conditioned only on time." For example, Albemarle
County's collected cash proffers were $262,743 in the 2007-08 Fiscal Year compared to a
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pledged amount of $44,169,723. Localities have no guarantee that they will receive the entire
pledged amount or even an indication of how much they will receive each year because payment
is tied to the issuance of building permits which are largely determined by conditions in the
housing market. In their 2001-02 report, CLG did ask counties to report how much of that year's
pledged amount was actually not collected that same year.61 Hanover County reported
approximately $3.3 million in pledged cash proffers of which roughly $1.3 million was collected
(40 percent). In comparison, Spotsylvania had $73,741 pledged in cash proffers and did not
collect any of this amount that year.
For many counties, the pledged amount far exceeds the collected amount in a given fiscal year.
For example, Prince William County had a pledged amount of $29.2 million in 2000-01 with
roughly $5.2 million in collected revenues but then in 2004-05, its collected revenues increased
to slightly over $23.1 million. Unless, those actualized revenues were associated with different
rezoning approvals, a county could see a four year delay in the receipt of revenues as in the case
with Prince William or even longer as with Goochland where its 2001-02 conditioned payments
were still not fully collected as of 2007-08. As a result, some counties still have large dollar
values of pledged payments in the pipeline. Table 9.7 shows the imbalance that exists in counties
between their cumulative pledged and collected amounts. As of the 2007-08 report, Gloucester
County has built up roughly $6.4 million in pledged cash proffers while it has actually only
collected $19,000 in cash proffer revenues. However, it is not possible to determine from the
CLG data whether that $19,000 was actually part of any pledged amount. Counties like
Chesterfield and Frederick in the minority among cash proffer accepting counties because
according to the CLG reports, they have never had any pledged revenues. The pledged amounts
only reinforce the image of cash proffers as a variable and hence unreliable source of revenue.
61 The 2001-02 Fiscal Year report was the only year that CLG asked counties to report how much of the total
amount of cash proffers pledged in FY2001-02 and whose payment was conditioned only on time was not collected
in FY2001-02. This question was most likely not asked in subsequent reports because of the number of counties who
did not answer the question correctly. For example, King William reported $663,600 in pledged amounts but that
zero dollars were not collected in 2001-02. However, their reported collected cash proffer revenue was only $38,654
for the year.
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Table 9.7 Cumulative Pledged, Collected, and Expended Cash Proffer Revenue Amounts by
County, FY99-00 to FY07-08
Source: Author's
County
Accomack
Albemarle
Amelia
Arlington
Caroline
Charles City
Chesterfield
Clarke
Culpeper
Dinwiddie
Fairfax
Fauquier
Frederick
Gloucester
Goochland
Greene
Hanover
Henrico
Isle of Wight
James City
King & Queen
King George
King William
Louisa
Mdl4Isex
New Kent
Orange
Powhatan
Prince George
Prince William
Rockinghamn
Shenandoah
Southampton
Spotsylvania
StafFord
Warren
York
Total
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Total Pledged But Payment
Conditioned Only on Time
362,000
53,106,085
20,860
534,000
335,015
7,298,000
962,559
53,087,448
11,00
6,53,O00
57,552
3,009,240
19,030,913
250,000
693,405
5,776,752
3,120,818
1,643,8 18
8,878,729
628,974
2,616,343
39,363,162
1,201,700
649,327
658,57
1,075,076
7,320,991
1,861,392
219,349,536
calculations based on CLG Reports.
Total Cash Proffer
Revenue Collected
2,557,403
226,690
2,640,398
4,919
43,986,865
45,415
1,439,724
58,084,649
2,471,217
33,000
5,273,004
1,170,108
253,782
15,938,451
250,000
2,943,390
7,503,103
47,698
200,000
1,064,758
98,800
1,474,899
1,055,921
3,679,983
74,808
126,636,658
66,512
5,635
8,130,603
6,727,J06
549,078
403,260,817
Total Cash Proffer
Revenue Expended
2,672,650
631,408
4,919
35,768,199
64,000
50,886,226
279,571
3,130,311
375,157
51,282
16,270,575
2,542,355
7 503,103
200,000
153,72
76,080
702,785
689,266
3,877,735
99,583,480
5,534,807
3,500
288,498,547
The fluctuations in a county's collected cash proffer revenues is the result of its direct tie to
rezoning activity. While counties can set suggested cash proffer amount per housing unit (See
Table 9.5) at higher and higher levels, cash proffers are still supposed to be offered voluntarily
by the rezoning applicant at whatever amount he or she deems appropriate. Further, they are
shaped by the capital improvement needs and impacts of the new development which may range
from a new turning lane or a new fire truck or new school construction. Table 9.8 shows the total
cash proffer revenue collected by year for a selection of counties from across the state. This
yearly variability is important to understand for any influence that it may have when it comes to
examining whether cash proffer activity has any impact on the level of housing development in a
community.
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Table 9.8 Total Cash Proffer Revenue Collected by Fiscal Year for a Sample of Counties, Fiscal Year 2000 - 2008
County 1999-00 1 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08
5,523,415 6,620,812 4,204,831 6,761,874 7,815,029
Ablemnarle
Caroline
Fairfax
Gloucester
Goochland
Greene
Hanover
Henrico
303,997
5,180,942
12,208
38,654
8,623,863
283,600 284,759
5,455,536
2,234,215 1 ,933288 1,809,191
50,596
8,817,481
801,335
95,568
1 431,5641
Source: Author's calculations based on CLU Reports.
23,135,471
I 1,189,83
7,989,115
19,000
202,500
185,907
41,400
8,281,108
875,747
31,720
25,170,900
576,078
833,021
67,200
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13,446,612
26,520
18,930,554
719,969
1,422,124
51,282
181,64-1 fl
King
William
Loudoun
Louisa
Powhatan
Prince
William
Spotsylvania
Stafford
19,366
373,115
3,059,400
394,849
.. . ...................................................... 
262743
192,429
5,432,929
250,000
83,662
241,440
15,915,512
40,560
18,157,785
144,572
11403,386, 11,330,914 1
10,396 ,500 19,937 ,015
334,828
117,56472,430
Expenditures
Cash proffer revenues are expended on a timely basis and for a variety of purposes. Out of the
thirty-four counties with a least one year of cash proffer revenue collections through 2007-08,
nine have yet to spend their collected monies (see Table 9.7). There are instances where all of the
revenue collected in a fiscal year is expended that same year, but for the most part, the amount
spent in a fiscal year is smaller than the collected revenues. In Table 9.7, only three counties
(Charles City, James City, and King George) have managed to spend all of the cash proffer
revenues that they have accumulated over the study's time period.
Schools and transportation-related improvements are typically the top expenditure purposes out
of the eleven purposes tracked by CLG.62 In a fiscal year, a county may have all of its
expenditures directed to one purpose. Neighboring counties, Clarke and Frederick, expended
$20,000 and $665,701, respectively, all on schools in the 2007 Fiscal Year. The difference in the
dollar amounts illustrates how varied the impacts of rezoning may be on a locality. The more
typical pattern is a county expending funds across multiple categories in varying amounts. In
2005-06, Chesterfield County spent $3,125,800 (schools); $2,227,714 (roads); $303,500 (public
safety); $150,000 (library); and $703,900 (parks) for a total expenditure of $6,510,914. It cannot
be determined from the CLG data whether those expenditures were to take care of the impacts of
one large project or to address the needs of several different projects.
While the reliability of cash proffers as a source of funding for impacts of residential growth is
questionable, the impacts from an approved rezoning cannot be ignored and must be funded in
some way. Cash proffers as a source of revenue constitute approximately three percent of
Chesterfield County's FY2008 County CIP and Schools CIP. Without cash proffers, counties
like Chesterfield would be forced to turn to other revenue sources like the General Fund which is
largely comprised of local tax revenues or financing through debt in the form of bonds. These
substitute funding sources would be spreading the burden of paying for the impacts of the
rezonings from those who created them to the entire locality.
CONCLUSION
Only traditionally higher growth counties seem to accept cash proffers. "Accepting" counties are
wealthier and more populous than "Non-Accepting" counties. They have also seen their
population grow faster with more building activity. While there is no statistical difference
62 The purposes given as options to the counties for their expenditures are schools; road and other transportation
improvements; fire, rescue, and public safety; library; parks, recreation, and open space; water and sewer service
extension; community centers; stormwater management; special needs housing; affordable housing; and
miscellaneous.
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between the counties types in terms of farmland, "Accepting" counties do have a higher housing
density. More "Accepting" counties became eligible earlier than "Non-Accepting" counties to
amend their zoning ordinance to allow for cash proffer collection. "Accepting" counties are
geographically concentrated in the eastern half of the state. The acceptance of cash proffers
would appear to be positively correlated with the pressures of population growth. This pressure
can manifest itself through higher incomes, less farmland, newer housing, geographic spillovers,
and time. Future research may pinpoint what is the exact adoption trigger.
Administrative hurdles do not appear to be high in the "Non-Accepting" counties. There was a
lack of major differences between the groups for measures of readiness and perception. One
potential factor that could not be fully explored through my survey results is the role that local
politics plays in the adoption decision. There does seems to be a general sense among the "Non-
Accepting" counties that amending the zoning ordinance to allow the acceptance of cash proffers
when a county is not undergoing high growth rates would create more problems rather than give
the county an advantage in dealing with possible future land use issues.
There is a trend toward more policy-based approaches with suggested cash proffer amounts in
order to reduce uncertainty in administration. The voluntary nature of the tool does not allow for
the complete elimination of uncertainty. Counties with high levels of development activity have
moved towards the more complex and standardized approach.
The cash flow stream from cash proffers is highly variable. Suggested cash proffer amounts have
increased over the years to better maximize revenues. The disparities in the monies collected and
spent exist despite the geographic concentration of who actually collects them. This variability
gives anti-cash proffer groups more ammunition to use in their fight for the elimination of cash
proffer acceptance authority. An area for future research is whether any of the pledged cash
proffer amounts are ever renegotiated given the long time delays between when they were first
pledged and finally collected.
Over time the number of counties with actual cash proffer activity has increased along with the
amounts of revenue raised, so my analysis of cash proffers cannot be complete without an
examination of their impact on the rate of development/growth in an area. This is the focus of
next chapter.
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CHAPTER 10
In this chapter, I tackle the issue of how cash proffers affect housing development. I offer
insights to this question through a quantitative analysis of whether cash proffers affect the rate of
growth in a locality as measured by single family building permits. Drawing upon the work of
Mayer and Somerville (2000a) and Burge and Ihlanfeldt (2006), I use a short panel dataset to see
whether the use of cash proffers in the prior year are related to changes in the supply of single
family houses in the subsequent year. In other words, is it a tool that hinders or encourages
housing development?
An empirical evaluation of the relationship between growth, as measured by single family
building permits, and cash proffer activity is complicated. Recall some localities have been
eligible to accept cash payments through conditional zoning since 1973 while the majority of
Virginia's localities were not granted the authority until 1989. In addition, there has been a shift
in attitude among the development community in regards to cash proffers since the original
statutes were authorized and additional statutes enacted through the years which may reflect
changes in how the cash proffer system has been implemented over time.
Data collection on cash proffer levels and revenues was historically hindered by the haphazard
nature of the tool's creation. Since conditional zoning was never conceived as a tool for revenue-
raising, the early acceptance of cash proffers was not implemented in an organized manner
across the state, as one would expect with an impact fee system, for example.63 In some ways,
the lack of clear record-keeping on cash proffer revenues prior to the 2000 fiscal year is a
product of the voluntary nature of the tool, itself. Is it possible to standardize something which is
supposed to be voluntarily given? If the answer is yes, then it becomes a question of what should
be standardized. For example, there is an argument that the conditions, themselves, should be
exempt because they are supposed to be unique to each rezoning application. This is part of the
inherent difficulties of trying to describe cash proffers and complicates any data analysis of the
tool's effectiveness.
Depending on the circumstances, cash proffers could exert either a positive or negative influence
on growth. If they are used as a growth management tool, then they may result in a reduction in
growth. Conversely, cash proffers might facilitate growth by generating revenue to pay for the
infrastructure needs of that growth. Therefore eligible localities that accept cash proffers could
have a negative or positive association between measures of cash proffer activity and single
family building permits.
63 Impact fees are typically assessed on any by-right residential development in a locality. Thus they have a wider
based from which to draw revenue as opposed to cash proffers which are restricted to rezonings.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
While their placement among growth management tools is debatable, cash proffers are part of
the land use regulation family. They are ensured this place because they are one of the conditions
acceptable through conditional zoning. From a planner's perspective, land use regulations are
adopted for three major reasons: "maintaining residential property values, shaping a compact
urban form, and promoting efficient public service provision" (Carruthers 2002: 396). Land use
regulations have far-reaching impacts. For example, the decision to zone part of a community as
large-lot residential rather than high-density residential has ramifications on the environment and
its natural resources, public infrastructure and services, traffic flow patterns, community
demographics, as well as, economic growth. The impacts extend well beyond the borders of that
single jurisdiction because labor and capital can be footloose. A potential cost of regulation may
be to restrict housing supply and supply elasticity which may translate into higher housing prices
and more volatile housing markets (Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks 2005).
To look at the connection between cash proffers and residential development, there are two
relevant bodies of literature - effects of land use regulations on building activity and the
determinants of housing supply. Typically, one would examine the prior work done on cash
proffers as guidance, but there is a lack of significant research on cash proffers. The one peer-
viewed article on cash proffers is by Raymond E. Owens and Pierre-Daniel G. Sarte (2004),
economists at the Federal Reserve Bank in Richmond, Virginia. Owens and Sarte use Loudoun
County, VA as their case study for the examination of three responses to the costs of population
growth - "zoning, raising the tax rate on real property, and using unrestricted proffers" (Owens
and Sarte 2004: 35). Their aim is to see whether any or all of the policies are efficient "in an
economic sense" where efficiency is defined in terms of the distribution of individuals across an
area and the amount of housing services consumed by a person. The work is grounded in the
theory of agglomeration economics.
Owens and Sarte find that if the policies operate in isolation, i.e. community only has one policy
in effect, then "[u]sing a simple model of locational choice ... local officials could best balance
population and infrastructure through a lump-sum proffer fee on developers" (49). Changes in
real property tax rates can also be effective, but they introduce "distortions into individuals'
consumption decisions," so that they consume fewer housing services than under a lump-sum
proffer fee (Owens and Sarte 2004: 49). The authors acknowledge the role that politics and legal
statutes have played in handicapping the effectiveness of new tools like cash proffers. They
conclude, "[W]e find that legal and political restrictions on county officials' use of proffers and
real property taxes have led them to the use of zoning in practice.... [Z]oning remains an
inefficient means to address localities' infrastructure and population issues. A more efficient
solution would be to lessen restrictions on localities' use of proffers and their ability to raise
revenue more generally" (Owens and Sarte 2004: 49). Given this gap in the literature and the
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efforts made by localities to fashion their cash proffer programs like impact fees, as well as, the
legislative proposal to replace cash proffer authority with impact fee authority, the body of
empirical literature on impact fees will be used to shape my analysis.
Since impact fees are viewed as a growth management tool, it is important to see whether they
have an effect upon the level of growth, i.e. residential development, itself. Skidmore and Peddle
use the 29 municipalities in DuPage County, IL to answer the question-do development impact
fees reduce the rate of residential development (Skidmore and Peddle 1998)? Skidmore and
Peddle (1998) estimate a fixed effects model where residential development rates (number of
new homes built in a municipality in a year) are a function of impact fee use, per household
municipal revenues, per household property tax revenues, per household sales tax revenues, and
average assessed value of property. They also control for regional demand and supply factors.
The authors found that over their 16-year time period, impact fees reduced the rate of residential
development by more than 25 percent (Skidmore and Peddle 1998). While this study has not
been replicated on other municipalities that use impact fees, it does "suggest that the traditional
cost-sharing methods of infrastructure finance have led to excessive residential growth rates, and
that impact fees only reduce development rates to a more efficient growth path" (Skidmore and
Peddle 1998: 394).
Mayer and Somerville (2000a) and Burge and Ihlanfeldt (2006) are the most current pieces of
empirical literature out of the impact fee field that are relevant to this dissertation's research
questions. The paper by Mayer and Somerville (2000a) examines the relationship between land
use regulation and new housing construction in forty-four metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs)
in the United States between 1985 and 1996. Impact fees or "development fees" as the authors
refer to them are included as one of the growth management techniques bundled together as an
explanatory variable, as well as, by itself as a categorical or dummy variable indicating the use of
development fees. The dependent variable is the log of single family permits. The important
facet of Mayer and Somerville's model is the inclusion of housing price changes as an
explanatory variable which acknowledges the role that demand has on the supply-side of the
market. Additionally, they recognize that the housing market is not a static entity, but one that
changes over time, so dynamic effects of the regulations are estimated.
Mayer and Somerville also address the issues of endogeneity that are inherent in dealing with
land use regulations and construction. Sometimes it is difficult to determine which came first the
change in building permits or the land use regulation or who caused whom, i.e. land use
regulations were implemented because of changes in building permits or vice versa. The authors
try to correct for any endogeneity issues by using instrumental variables in place of the land use
regulation variables in a two-stage regression estimation. Their instrumental variables are "the
number of jurisdictions with land use control ... , Reagan's share of the MSAs 1984 U.S.
presidential vote, an index of traffic congestion, MSA 1975 per capita income, the percentage of
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adult population with only high school degrees, 1980 population, and whether the state has
citizen referendums" (Mayer and Somerville 2000a: 654). With the endogeneity corrections, the
authors still find that "the negative effect of regulation on housing starts is not an artifact of
endogeneity but of a real impact on builder behavior" (Mayer and Somerville 2000a: 654).
As they predicted, Mayer and Somerville do find that the number of months to receive
subdivision approval, number of growth management techniques in use, and the use of
development fees have a negative relationship with the construction of new housing. Despite
having a negative impact on the supply of new housing, the coefficient on the impact fees
dummy variable was not statistically different from zero, so it is not statistically significant and
thus cannot reject the hypothesis that impact fees have no affect on building permits. The authors
do state that it may be a case of measurement error since they were using a categorical variable
which equaled one if cities in the MSA assessed impact fees rather than the amount of the actual
fee. One aim of the estimation of the empirical models for this dissertation is to provide further
evidence either to support or refute this claim by using the cash proffer levels.
Burge and Ihlanfeldt (2006) build on the work of Skidmore and Peddle (1998) and Mayer and
Somerville (2000a) by using the actual amount of the impact fee as the key explanatory variable
in their models as opposed to the categorical variable found in the other papers. They focus on
the use of impact fees in the counties of Florida over a ten year period (1993-2003), so it is a
panel dataset. Although there are sixty-seven counties in Florida, their sample includes only
those counties who have ever used impact fees and do not have missing data for other variables
which leaves them with forty-one counties. In their model, they also make a distinction between
uses that the impact fees will be applied to - sewer/water fees versus non-sewer/water fees which
may mean funds going towards schools, funds, etc. Another difference from earlier papers is the
use of annual completions rather than building permits as the dependent variable. Completions
may be a more accurate measure of housing supply because the number is derived from the
property tax rolls of each county which indicates when a house was built while building permits
may be filed in one year and the work is finished in the next or never completed. The availability
of data can determine which is used in a study. Burge and Ihlanfeldt are also interested in
whether the effect of impact fees on new single family houses varies by geographic location
(inner suburbs v. outer suburbs) and the size of the house (small, medium, and large) where the
size breakdowns are 600-1500 square feet, 1501-2000 square feet, and 2201-5000 square feet,
respectively. Unlike Mayer and Somerville (2000a), housing prices are not an explicit part of the
model rather prices are embedded in a construction cost and land cost variables, but these are
used as indices for assessing within-area changes for the supply side models.
In terms of results, Burge and Ihlanfeldt find a positive relationship between non-water/sewer
impact fees (levels and changes) and the completion of new single family homes in the inner
suburb counties while the results are more mixed for the outer suburban counties. The positive
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relationship holds for the small and medium sized house types in the inner suburbs while a mix
of positive and negative results appear for the large houses in the inner suburbs and across all
house sizes in the outer suburbs. The results are mixed regardless of geographic location or
housing size for the water/sewer impact fees. For the majority of the models, the regression
coefficients on the level of non-water/sewer impact fee variables are statistically significant.
Burge and Ihlanfeldt explain their findings by stating, "that impact fees, in addition to increasing
the total fees that developer must pay, also increase the demand for housing, reduce project
approval costs, and increase the percentage of projects that annually receive approval from local
government" (305). They view impact fees as a tool against exclusionary housing policies in
suburban areas because "impact fees decrease the fiscal deficit imposed on existing residents by
new development, allowing more affordable homes to be built within suburban areas" (305).
This paper offers up a new perspective that impact fees do not slow down growth, but reallocate
it by shifting families who could only afford a new home on the outer edges of suburbia, i.e.
sprawl, back into the inner suburban areas.
Local governments do not operate inside a bubble, so it is important to consider whether spatial
interactions play a role in how land use regulations may influence growth. A locality could adopt
a certain land use regulation because all of its neighboring localities are adoptees or it could
decide to go against the tide and not adopt the regulation. The locality may want to be the
receptor for the residential growth that other localities are turning away. The spatial
econometrics literature provides a framework for how to handle spatial interactions in the data.
Brueckner (1998) uses a spatial error and a spatial lag model to look at whether evidence of
policy interdependence exists among cities in California in their adoption of growth control
measures. The coefficients from spatial lag model indicate how a responsive a city is to the
stringency of the growth controls in nearby localities. Brueckner's sample consists of 173 cities
who were surveyed in 1988 about the types of growth controls that they had in place at the time.
A series of city characteristics from 1990 are then used as explanatory variables to understand
the growth control decisions over the 1980s. Brueckner uses three different distance weighting
schemes (50, 100, and 150 miles) to gauge the influence of neighboring localities. The factors
that are positively associated with a city's decision to adopt controls include population,
education and skills level, liberal political stance, and house prices. Density, income, and one-
person households are negatively associated with the adoption of controls. While Brueckner
finds evidence of strategic interaction, however, he points out that it cannot be determined with
his model whether the reason a city's growth controls looks like its neighbors is because of a
strategic decision on the part of city officials.
MODEL
The question examined in this chapter is whether cash proffers influence the development
activity in a county. I begin with the framework of the Mayer and Somerville (2000a) model in
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which new housing construction, i.e. changes in housing supply, is a function of changes in
house prices, as well as, changes in housing costs, specifically, cost of capital and construction.
Land use regulations are then incorporated as an additional input to this function. So I have:
AHSit = f (AHDit,AHCit, LUREGit)
where AHS it is the supply of new housing, AHD it is the change in demand for housing, AHC it is
the change in housing costs, and LUREG it is any land use regulations in locality (i) at time (t)
which is expected to influence the responsiveness of new housing supply to changes in demand.
The time period for housing price and cost changes is a reflection of how far back in time that
you think past economic conditions and the length of the negotiation process for building
approvals and subdivision permitting takes. This means that the measures of housing price and
cost changes could reflect current (t) as well as past changes (t- 1).64
In my models, the new housing supply is represented by building permits per acre (b); change in
demand for housing is composed of MSA house price changes (HPchngt.i) and land use
regulations are replaced by the amount of actual collected cash proffer revenue per building
permit (P). My basic model also includes an indicator of whether the county is eligible to accept
cash proffers (E). Eligibility without any cash proffer activity may be enough of a signal to the
development community about how that county will respond to the future development. Change
in housing costs is captured by time fixed effects. The change in the prime rate has been used in
the literature as one of the measures of changes in housing costs. The prime rate is measured at
the national level, so it varies over time, but not by geography. So any national variation will be
absorbed by the dummy variables for each period. Other measures of construction costs like
material indices have been shown to not produce statistically significant or robust coefficients
when included in the models (Mayer and Somerville: 2000a). The basic model conception for
county i at time t is:
bit = f0 + fl1HPchngi(t_1) + i2 t + Wi3Ett + fl4 Y + + fl10 Y + Eit
In moving from this basic equation to more specific equations that test whether cash proffers
positively or negatively affect the level of residential development in a locality, there are two
overarching modeling issues that must be addressed: endogeneity and omitted variable bias.
Endogeneity stems from concern over whether variables are mutually determined, i.e. the
chicken-egg issue. More specifically, it is important that all of the explanatory variables are
uncorrelated with the error term. If one or more explanatory variables is not, then these measures
are now endogenous rather than the preferred exogenous. Typically, endogeneity arises from
omitted variables, measurement error, or simultaneity. The major concern with my model is
6 For additional information on the appropriate number of lags, see Mayer, Christopher J. and C. Tsuriel
Somerville, (2000b), "Residential Construction: Using the Urban Growth Model to Estimate Housing Supply"
Journal of Urban Economics, 48, 85-109.
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whether the measures of cash proffer activity are truly exogenous. A developer pays the
approved rezoning's cash proffer amounts when they apply to the locality for a building permit.
Given the size of the proposed housing development approved through the rezoning, this may
mean a developer applies for a single permit or multiple permits in a year which affects the
amount of cash proffer revenues collected in a year. So any cash proffer revenues collected in a
year are directly linked to that year's approved building permits. In addition, cash proffer activity
in a particular period may actually be determined by the level of development activity in a
locality rather than the reverse. The more residential development there is in a county, the more
likely government officials may be to decide to adopt a cash proffer policy or increase the
suggested cash proffer level in order to help them manage the repercussions of residential
growth. This is a case of simultaneity.
My proposed solution to deal with endogeneity resulting from simultaneity is the use of lags on
the right-hand side of the model. There is obvious endogeneity between cash proffer revenue
collections and single family building permits. Therefore cash proffer activity variable will have
a lag of one year (t - 1) from the dependent variable's time (t). The lag on cash proffer activity
puts the focus on a locality's past cash proffer revenue collections as a proxy for the county's use
of the cash proffer system. The new specification of the model for county i at time t is:
bit = fi0 + flHPchngi(t_1 ) + fiPi(t-l) + Wi3Ett + fl4 Y2 + -- + fi1 0 Y + Ett
Omitted variable bias is an issue with the model because of its potential to affect my main
variable of interest - cash proffer activity. By not including certain variables in the model, the
effect would be a biased coefficient which would lessen the accuracy of my results by either
understating or overstating the effect of prior cash proffer activity on future development
activity, if an effect exists. The difficulty is that it is not always clear which variables have been
left out of the model. In addition, there is the temptation to just keep adding variables to the
model in order to address the problem but this may only create additional issues of
multicollinearity, etc. I think any omitted variables primarily stem from a lack of complete and
measurable data on the development process and activity in a locality.
My proposed solution to deal with the omitted variable bias is to estimate the model using
county- and time-specific effects. This is especially useful because house price changes are
measured at the MSA level representing a common factor over, usually, several counties. This
solution uses the variation found within each county from year-to-year to cancel out the effects
of many omitted variables that might be fixed over time, but specific to a county. I make the
assumption that the county dummy variables will pick up the relative characteristics of the
counties like population level and other land use regulations that are relatively invariant over
time. The inclusion of the county and year dummy variables through a fixed effects model must
be done in awareness of some of the issues that this type of model generates. First, there is a
balance between the number of dummy variables added to the model and the loss of degrees of
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freedom from the addition of too many. Second, a lot of dummy variables also increases the
likelihood for multicollinearity with larger standard errors as a result. Third, the assumption of
normally distributed and homogenous residuals could be violated with county-specific
heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation related to time effects. The new specification of the model
for county i at time t is:
bit = 00 + flHPchngi(t1_) + l2 Pi(t-l) + Wi3Ete
+ P 4 C2 + ---+ # 5 C8 2 + f 8 6 Y2 + "-+ fl 9 2 Y8 + Eit
where Ci is a dummy variable for county i (i = 2 to 82) and Y, is a dummy variable for year t (t =
2 to 8).
The incorporation of spatial dependence is another modification that I make to the basic model.
From the history of cash proffers detailed in earlier chapters, there was evidence of how counties
who were not eligible to accept cash proffers lobbied to be granted the power that other counties
had. They wanted the same powers of their neighboring counties. At the same time, the
development community wanted to see standardization in cash proffer policies across counties.
For example, the suggested maximum cash proffer amount per building permit should be the
same in neighboring counties A and B. This historical background suggests that there may be
spatial dependence component to the impact of cash proffer activity on housing development. If
cash proffers are a deterrent to further growth because they raise the costs of development, then I
would expect to see differences in the impact of an increase in cash proffers in a given county
based on the cash proffer activity of their neighboring counties. The impact should decline as the
number of active cash proffer-using neighboring counties increases.
My model deals with spatial dependence in two ways. First, I include a spatial lag of the
dependent variable on the right hand side of the model. This new variable measures the direct
effect that the level of building permit activity in neighboring counties has on building permits in
the subject county. I define neighboring counties as those counties who directly touch the border
of the subject county. For my dataset, the number of neighbors that a county has ranges from one
to eight. So this variable is a function of how many neighbors a county has as well as the level of
development activity in those counties. Second, I allow for spatial dependence in the error term.
The error term is split into two components. One of which is spatially uncorrelated while the
other is spatially weighted. The inclusion of a spatially lagged dependent variable model with the
spatial error model is known as a spatial-autoregressive model with spatial-autoregressive
disturbance (SARAR). I estimate this model using maximum likelihood (ML) estimator. The
final model specification for county i at time t is:
bit = f00 + fl1HPchngi(t 1 ) + f 2 Pi(t-1) + [iEtt
+ f 4 C2 + ---+ f 8 5 C8 2 + f38 6 Y2 + '---+ 9 2 Y8 + A;jwi jbjt + Eit
Eit = jiWi;Eit + it
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where X is the spatial autoregressive coefficient for the spatial lag, w is an element of the spatial-
weighting matrix which reflects the connectivity between county i and countyj, and p is the
spatial autoregressive coefficient for the error term.
DATASET
Building the Dataset
Construction of the dataset began with the ninety-five counties in Virginia. This follows the unit
of analysis that I used in Chapter 9. Although cities and towns are also eligible to accept cash
proffers, I focus on counties because their large land area presents developers with a choice of
developing in greenfields (fringe) or brownfields (infill). This dichotomy in land selection is at
the heart of growth management efforts which seek to redirect development away from the
fringe. The possibility of cash proffers as a condition to the rezoning of a greenfield area may
deter its development. However, the final dataset consists of fewer counties because of data
limitations. The first requirement in order to be in the dataset was that the county had to be
located in a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). 65 There are eleven MSAs that contain at least
one Virginia county. Location in a MSA was critical because the Housing Price Index (HPI) is
collected at the MSA level. As a result, every county in the same MSA has the same value for
their measure of the HPI. Fifty-one counties out of the ninety-five are part of a MSA.
Thirty-one counties were added to the dataset based on their proximity to MSAs. Given how
close these counties were to existing MSAs, the assumption was made that they were most likely
in the same real estate market as the MSA counties and thus could receive the same value for the
housing demand variable. Although these counties are not part of a MSA directly, they were
assigned to a MSA if they shared a border with a county in an MSA. Those counties who share a
border with two or more MSAs were assigned to the MSA with the larger population. The table
below shows the breakdown of the number of counties by MSA for the dataset.
65 A metropolitan statistical area (MSA) as defined by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) consists of a
"core urban area of 50,000 or more population" as well as "one or more counties and includes the counties
containing the core urban area, as well as any adjacent counties that have a high degree of social and economic
integration (as measured by commuting to work) with the urban core." Last accessed April 14, 2012,
httD://www.census.gov/Donulation/metro/.
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Table 10.1 MSA County Count by Assignment Status
MSA Defined Assigned Total
Counties Counties
Blacksburg-Christiansburg-Radford, VA 3 3 6
Charlottesville, VA 4 2 6
Danville, VA 1 0 1
Harrisonburg, VA 1 0 1
Kingsport-Bristol-Bristol, TN-VA 2 5 7
Lynchburg, VA 4 2 6
Richmond, VA 16 6 22
Roanoke, VA 4 5 9
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC 6 2 8
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 9 6 15
Winchester, VA-WV 1 0 1
Total 51 31 82
Source: Author's calculations.
The final dataset consists of eighty-two counties. In the map below, the counties shown with a
striped pattern make up the final dataset. 66 The sample is composed of counties from all regions
of the state.
Map 10.1 Composition of Final County Dataset
Sample Counties
( ]Nonsample Counties
Cities
Source: Author's calculations.
66 The independent cities of Virginia are shown in yellow on the map.
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Time Period
The time period of the dataset shaped by the key variables - building permits, housing price
changes, and cash proffer activity. In the case of building permits, annual data is available
beginning with 1984 for all of the counties. Housing price changes based on the Office of
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO)'s Housing Price Index is measured on a
quarterly basis, so additional data is not necessary for calculating annual or fiscal year changes. 67
For the eleven MSAs where the 82 counties are located or have been assigned to, the quarterly
data is available across all MSAs beginning with first quarter of 1992. When I ignore measures
of cash proffer activity and focused on housing supply and demand variables, then an annual
dataset can start with 1992.
I had hoped to obtain through my survey accurate measures of cash proffer activity such as a
county's maximum cash proffer amount per single family housing unit for a fiscal year or the
average amount. Unfortunately, I was not able to obtain this information for all eligible counties
in the dataset. The Local Government Commission for the Commonwealth of Virginia began
requiring localities to report their cash proffer activity to the state with 2000 Fiscal Year. These
reports provide the data that is used to construct measures of cash proffer activity. Although the
information is submitted in terms of fiscal years, I use it as calendar year based on the second
year of the fiscal time period. 68 For example, the 1999-00 Fiscal Year is represented as the 2000
calendar year.
The resulting time period based on all three key variables is measured at the calendar year level
beginning with 2000. The last year of the time period is 2008 which corresponds to the last year
of the qualitative analysis conducted in earlier chapters. So there are nine years of data for each
county. Because of the desire to include lagged variables in the regression analysis, only eight
years of data will be used. For example, current year variables will cover 2001 to 2008 while
lagged variables range from 2000 to 2007. It is important to note that the tail end of my time
period includes the beginning of the Great Recession which saw a significant downturn in new
residential development as well as housing prices across the country. 69
The Final Dataset
The final dataset consists of eighty-two counties followed over eight calendar years for a total of
656 observations. I treat the data as a pooled cross-sectional dataset.
67 In July 2008, OFHEO became part of the newly formed Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) which arose
from the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008.
68 A fiscal year runs from July 1 st of a year to June 3 Whof the following year or the third quarter of one year through
the second quarter of the second year.
69 According to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the peak of the most recent recession was in
December 2007. Last accessed April 13, 2012, http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html.
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Variables
The dependent variable is total number of single family building permits per acre at the end of
the year from 2001 to 2008 for eighty-two counties in the Commonwealth of Virginia. This
variable represents the (expected) change to housing supply. The data on single family building
permits is from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) State of the
Cities Data System's Building Permits Database. Each year of permits was divided by the
approximate land area of the county as measured in acres as of 1997. The land area measure
comes from the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) 1997 Census ofAgriculture. This
calculation was made in an attempt to account for the intensity of development activity given
differences in the size of the counties. For example, county A may have 100 permits per year
while county B has 1,000 permits per year. This may seem like a huge difference between them
but if county A is 10,000 acres in size and county B is 100,000 acres in size, then the number of
permits per acre is 0.01 for both counties.
In the regressions, I use the natural log form of the dependent variable:
BPper ACRE (ln) = natural log of the total number of single family building permits
per acre, 2001-2008
The mean value across all counties and eight years is -7.15 as shown in Table 10.2. The highest
number of single family building permits occurred in Loudoun County in 2003 with 5,678. The
lowest number of permits across the sample also occurred in 2003 with Grayson County
reporting zero single family building permits. 70 When the land area of the county is taken into
consideration, the highest proportion of permits to acres took place in 2004 in Prince William
County at 0.025. The smallest was in Sussex County in 2003 at 0.00003.
The key explanatory variable of interest is total amount of cash proffer revenues collected per
single family building permit from 2000 to 2007. This variable represents cash proffer activity.
The data on cash proffer revenue collections is from the Commonwealth of Virginia's
Commission on Local Government's Report on Proffered Cash Payments and Expenditures by
Virginia Counties, Cities, and Towns for the fiscal years 1999-00 to 2007-08. Each year of
revenue collections was divided by that year's number of single family building permits. This
calculation was conducted because cash proffer amounts are typically paid at the time of
issuance of building permit. Ideally, I would like to have had a county's maximum cash proffer
amount per single family housing unit for a fiscal year or the average amount proffered. This
70 In order to keep Grayson in the sample for estimation, its 2003 value for single family building permits per acre
was imputed to 1 which generated a value of 0 when the natural log was taken rather than a missing value without
imputation.
7' Technically, the smallest value was actually in Grayson County since it did not have any single family building
permit activity in 2003.
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would provide me with figures similar to how impact fee levels are modeled in the impact fee
literature. However, my survey results did not provide this data for all of the counties in my
dataset, so I am using this alternative measure. In the regressions, this variable is:
CPR per BP (lagged) = total amount of cash proffer revenues collected per single family
building permit, 2000-2007
There are a couple of issues with this measure. First, the denominator is larger than the number
of building permits resulting from rezoning for all counties because it includes building permits
that involve cash proffers and those that do not. So the resulting value is not a measure of actual
cash proffer revenue per building permit that results from a rezoning, but rather a measure of
total cash proffer revenue relative to all building permits. Second, cash proffer revenues
collected in a fiscal year may not represent the full amount of cash proffer revenue promised for
an entire development. One new development may take multiple years to have its houses built
while another may be completed within a year. My measure only reflects the cash proffer
revenue collected for the number of houses authorized via approved building permits in a given
year. Third, there are counties who have never collected any actual cash proffer revenues, but
they may actually have established a suggested cash proffer amount policy. This effect - that of
the potential to collect cash proffers - is partially captured by a dummy variable for eligibility.
The sample's mean value for collected cash proffer revenue per single family building permit is
$316.75 (see Table 10.2). The average value for counties with positive cash proffer collections is
higher at $1,229.52. Slightly over 74 percent of the sample has a value of zero for this variable.
The remaining values range from a low of $4.95 in Culpeper County in 2004 to a high of
$8,370.77 in Prince William County in 2007.72 Illustrating the first issue that I raised about this
measure (i.e. resulting value being actually smaller than it normally would be), the 2007 average
(i.e. typical) cash proffer amount per single-family housing unit for an approved rezoning with
cash proffers attached was $37,719 in Prince William County. In comparison, fifteen counties in
Maryland for the 2007 fiscal year had development impact fees that ranged from a low of $3,671
(Dorchester) to a high of $19,361 (Prince George's) per single family detached dwelling. 73
72 These values are actually for 2003 and 2006, respectively, because I am using one-year lags in the regressions the
values are reported for 2004 and 2007.
73 The fifteen counties are Anne Arundel, Calvert, Caroline, Carroll, Charles, Dorchester, Frederick, Harford,
Montgomery, Prince George's, Queen Anne's, St. Mary's, Talbot, Washington, and Wicomico. See Division of
Legislative Services, 2008, Managing Growth: The Use of Development Impact Fees and Building Exercise Taxes
in Maryland: 2008 Supplement, Annapolis, MD: Office of Policy Analysis, December. Last accessed April 13,
2012,
http://dls.state.md.us/data/polanasubare/polanasubare intmatnpubadm/polanasubare intmatnpubadm annrep/Impact
-Fees-Report-2008.pdf.
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Changes in housing demand are represented in the model by the annual rate of change in housing
price index from 2000 to 2007. It is lagged by one year from the dependent variable's time
period. In the regressions, this variable is:
HPI CHNG (lagged) =percentage change in house prices, 2000-2007
It is calculated by taking the fourth quarter index value for one year and dividing it by the fourth
quarter index value for the preceding year then subtracting the resulting value from 1 and
multiplying by 100 for ease of interpretation. This variable is measured at the MSA level, so
every county in the same MSA has the same value for a particular year. The data comes from the
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight's (OFHEO) House Price Index (HPI).
The average annual growth in house prices across all counties and eight years is 8.62 percent as
shown in Table 10.2. The largest lagged growth in prices (23.4 percent) occurred in the
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV MSA and is reported in 2006, representing
growth from 2004 to 2005. Fifteen counties share this value. The lowest lagged growth rate
occurred in the Winchester, VA-WV MSA for 2008 where prices actually declined by slightly
over 5 percent. Only one county from this dataset is included in this MSA. While price growth
rates did decline over this time period, there is only one other point in time where a negative
lagged growth rate is observed. This occurred in the Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-
MD-WV MSA for 2008 at -3.7 percent.
The final explanatory variable in the model is the eligibility status of a county to accept cash
proffers over the time period, 2001 to 2008. This dummy variable measures any effect that
eligibility status has on development activity. The cash proffer acceptance eligibility variable is:
ELIGIBLE =1 If a county is eligible to acceptance cash proffers in a given year,
otherwise 0
The data was obtained from the Commonwealth of Virginia's Commission on Local
Government's Report on Proffered Cash Payments and Expenditures by Virginia Counties,
Cities, and Towns for the fiscal years 1999-00 to 2007-08 which has an annual listing of eligible
localities. From 2001 to 2005, there were nine counties out of the eighty-two (11 percent) in the
sample that were ineligible. Number of ineligibles dropped to three counties (4 percent) for 2006
to 2008. In the more fully specified models, this variable acts in more of a control capacity
because of the very little variation that exists in it.
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Table 10.2. Descriptive Analysis of the outcome variable (BP per ACRE (ln)) and possible
predictors (CPR per BP (lagged), HPI CHNG (lagged), ELIGIBLE, dummy variables for county
and year). (N=82 counties in 11 MS'As across 8 years, 2001 to 2008)
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
BP per ACRE (In) 656 -7.15 1.27 -10.46 0.00
CPR per BP (lagged) 656 $316.75 $917.41 $0.00 $8370.77
HIV4 CHNG (lagged) 656 8.62% 5.55% -5.01% 23.36%
ELIGIBLE 656 0.92 0.28 0.00 1.00
County Dummy 656 0.01 0.11 0.00 LO
Year Dummy 656 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00
Source: Author's calculations.
While the regression results discussed in the next section will attempt to ascertain whether there
is a causal relationship between past cash proffer activity and future housing development,
looking at the correlations between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables
provides an early indication of such relationships. All three explanatory variables are moderately
correlated with the dependent variable in a statistically significant and positive manner. This
finding suggests that lagged cash proffer revenues are positively related to development activity
in a county. The one issue of concern in the correlation results presented in Table 10.3 is the
finding that the cash proffer eligibility variable is slightly correlated at a statistically significant
level with the other two explanatory variables. This finding suggests that there is the potential for
multicollinearity with the model, so the appropriate tests need to be conducted.
Table 10.3. Correlation Analysis ofthe outcome variable (BP per ACRE (ln)) and possible
predictors (CPR per BP (lagged), HPI CHNG (lagged), ELIGIBLE)
Natural Log Lag of Collected Lag of House Eligible to
of Building Cash Proffer Price Index Accept Cash
Permit per Revenues per Change Proffer
Acre Building Permit Dummy
BP per ACRE (In) 1.00
CPR per BP (lagged) 0.39 * 1.00
HPI CHNG (lagged) 0.33 * 0.04 1.00
ELIGIBLE 0.31 *** 0.10 ** 0.18 * 1.00
Key: -p<0.10; *p<0.0 5 ; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Source: Author's calculations.
In the time period construction section, I mentioned that the beginning of the most recent
economic recession occurred in the tail end of my time period. A characteristic of this recession
unlike past recessions has been the downturn in the housing market in particular a slowdown in
new construction and a decline in housing prices. Figure 10.1 shows the average cash proffer
revenue collected per building permit and the average change in house price index for my sample
from 2000 to 2008. While both data series were on an upward trajectory, the cash proffer
revenue series is the only one that continued to increase through the last year of observation. The
sharp drop in house price index after 2005 and its continual decline suggests there may actually
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be two distinct time windows - 2000 to 2005 and 2006 to 2008 - influencing whether past cash
proffer activity affects future housing development. This phenomenon can be explored by
running the final model specification separately for the two time periods. Because of the lagged
variables in my dataset, the two time periods would be 2001-2005 and 2006-2008. It is unclear
what drove the continual increase in cash proffer revenues per building permit. There could have
been relatively more rezonings as the housing cycle progressed or an increase in the amount of
financial payment proffered per rezoning building permit.
Figure 10.1 Average Cash Proffer Revenue Collection per Building Permit and House Price
Change by Year (N=82 counties)
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Source: Author's calculations.
REGRESSION RESULTS
Five separate specifications were estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) with time fixed
effects, OLS with time and county fixed effects and spatial-autoregressive model with spatial-
autoregressive disturbances and fixed effects via maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). The
dependent variable in each of these equations is the natural log of the number of single family
building permits per acre. Regressions 1-3 were estimated on a dataset composed of eighty-two
counties in Virginia from 2001 to 2008 for a total of 656 observations. Regression 4 was limited
to observations from 2001 to 2005 (n=4 10) while Regression 5 covered 2006 to 2008 (n=246).
The results from the five specifications are shown in Table 10.4.
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The three major explanatory variables (CPR per BP (lagged), HPI CHNG (lagged), ELIGIBLE)
were each tested for multicollinearity and the results showed that their individual's variances
were at least 95 percent independent of each other. So multicollinearity should not affect any of
the regression results. All three equations were estimated with a relaxation of the independent-
errors assumption, so that I could obtain robust standard error estimates given the presence of
county clusters in the data.
Diagnostic tests were conducted on the residuals from the two non-spatial OLS fixed effects
specifications to assess for the presence of spatial dependence and whether it arises from spatial
lag, spatial error or both. The results from the two Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests for spatial lag
(k) allow us to reject the null hypothesis that ) = 0. The results for spatial error (p) also present a
clear picture of spatial dependence. The value for the Moran's I is 1.74 which is statistically
significant at the 10 percent level and marginally rejects the null hypothesis of no spatial
dependence. The two LM tests for spatial error lead to a more definitive conclusion on the
presence of spatial dependence in the error term via lower significant levels (0.1 percent and 5
percent). Altogether, these diagnostic test results show that a non-spatial OLS model will
produce inaccurate coefficient estimates especially for any variable that spatially groups. I err on
the side of caution by specifying both spatial lag and error in Regression 3. The presence of
spatial dependence suggests that Regression 3 may provide the best insight into how past cash
proffer activity influences new housing construction.
Regression 1 is an OLS specification with fixed effects around time. The inclusion of the dummy
variables for time allows for the omission of a prime rate variable that would have varied by
time, but not by county. The coefficients on all of the explanatory variables were found to be
positive and highly significant. However, their power of magnitude is small in size. A one
percent increase in house prices in the prior year results in a 0.10 percent increase in new single
family housing construction in the next year. Unsurprisingly, a county's eligibility status
distinguishes among counties with higher growth since a county's decennial population growth is
an eligibility determination factor. At the same time, eligibility could be capturing something
else in the model given the overwhelming number of observations in the dataset that are cash
proffer eligible (over 80 percent).
The results from Regression 1 show that the prior year's amount of cash proffer revenue
collected per single family building permit is positively associated with the following year's
single family housing construction. A one standard deviation increase in the amount of cash
proffer revenues collected per single family building permit in the previous year results is
associated with a 46 percent increase in a county's single family building permits for the next
year. Thus the presence of cash proffer activity in a county appears positively related to
development activity in a county controlling for changes in house prices, eligibility to collect
cash proffers, and within year variation, but little else. This confirms the positive and significant
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correlation found between the dependent variable and the cash proffer activity variable (see
Table 10.3).
Regression 2 addresses the concern about bias in Regression 1's results due to omitted variables.
When individual county characteristics are taken into consideration, the overall R2 improved
from 36 percent to 90 percent. House price changes are still statistically significant but now by
themselves lead to only a 0.02 percent increase in new single family housing construction in the
next year when there is a one percent increase in house prices in the prior year. A county's
current year eligibility status remained positive, but no longer statistically significant. This is an
expected result given that only a few counties obtain eligibility during the sample's timeframe.
The coefficient on a prior year's amount of cash proffer revenue collected per single family
building permit in the fixed effects model is negative and smaller in magnitude. A one standard
deviation increase in the amount of cash proffer revenues collected per single family building
permit in the previous year results is associated with a 7 percent decline in a county's single
family building permits for the next year. This result suggests that after controlling for a variety
of county invariant characteristics, a greater level of cash proffer activity is negatively related to
growth.
One drawback to this approach is that the county dummies may actually be picking up on the
lumpiness of the cash proffer activity measure. Cash proffer revenues are derived from building
permits tied to an approved rezoning project. While rezoning building permits are typically not
the largest share of a county's annual total building permits, there may be a year in a county's
development history where they constitute a larger share and as a result, the county collects more
cash proffer revenue that year and has an abnormal increase in building permits. This may occur
in the early years of a new housing development as it attracts home buyers. Then in subsequent
years, the county might see fewer building permits if there are not subsequent rezonings
approved. The lumpiness of rezonings could induce the negative correlation between lagged cash
proffer revenue collected per building permit and current building permits.74
The inclusion of the dependent variable spatial lag in Regression 3 means that the coefficients
cannot be interpreted as easily as with the OLS and fixed effects models since they are
determined simultaneously. The values shown in Regression 3 of Table 10.4 can be interpreted
as the impact of increases in the explanatory variables on the dependent variable prior to the
implementation of spatial dynamics. So these are the direct effects. At this time, the calculation
of the indirect effect, i.e. how a county's building permits are affected by its neighbors, has not
been determined. In comparison to Regression 2, the coefficients have identical signs, but are
slightly larger in size as well as statistical significance. The repeated presence of the negative
74 To verify whether this inducement could be true, the lag of building permits per acre was regressed on building
permits per acre. The results show a positive association between the two variables which is expected if rezonings
are not a major component of total building activity. Therefore, it is more likely that an upward swing in building
permits is directing the cash proffer activity results.
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sign on the coefficient of the cash proffer activity variable provides more support for the
contention that cash proffers are a negative influence on growth.
In the spatial model, the estimated ) is negative and statistically significant which indicates
moderate spatial-autoregressive dependence in the number of building permits per acre. This
means that new single family housing construction in a given county is negatively related to the
contemporaneous development activity in neighboring counties. Except for a directional
difference, the measure of spatial-autoregressive dependence in the error term (p) closely
approximates the spatial lag. It is moderately positive and statistically significant. So an
unexpected and independent event, i.e. a shock, in one county will positively impact the
residential construction in neighboring counties.
In light of the sharp drop in the housing price changes variable after 2005, I estimated the spatial
specification for two separate time periods. Regression 4 and Regression 5 cover 2001 to 2005
and 2006 to 2008, respectively. The eligibility variable was dropped from both specifications
since none of the counties changed their eligibility status in the new time periods. Their time
invariant eligibility status is picked up by the county dummy variables. Regressions 4 and 5 are
best viewed as robustness checks for the results found in Regression 3.
The results for Regressions 4 and 5 in Table 10.4 show distinct differences between the two time
periods. The measures of spatial dependence in both specifications are no longer statistically
significant. Although the coefficient on cash proffer activity is not statistically significant during
either time period, there is a difference in the sign and magnitude. Regression 4's value is -
0.0001 compared to 0.00003 in Regression 5.
The sign and value for Regression 4 matches exactly what was estimated in Regression 3. These
results suggest that the 2001-2005 time period is driving the results for the full 2001-2008 time
period in Regression 3. One might expect that the negative sign would actually come from the
later time period under the rationale that high values for suggested cash proffer amounts in a
county's proffer policy might slow down development faster in a downturn. The rezoning
process already has an element of risk to it because it is subject to county approval combining
the inherent risk with an economic downturn and potential high cash proffers would make it even
more risky and costly. A future step would be to extend the last time period to cover the 2010
fiscal year, so that there would be an equal number of years in each time span as well as adding
more years that were affected by the recession. If the coefficient's sign in the later time period
changes to negative, then this reinforces the finding that cash proffer activity is negatively
associated with growth. If the positive sign is upheld, then there was something distinctive
happening in the cash proffer collecting counties during these two time periods that leads to a
negative association for 2001-2005 and a positive association for 2006-2008 (or 2006-2010). A
future qualitative study may be able to better determine what was occurring in the counties.
295
Table 10.4. Regression Results for the outcome variable (BP per ACRE (ln)) and possible predictors (CPR per BP (lagged), HPI
CHNG (lagged), ELIGIBLE, dummy variables for county and year). (N=82 counties in 1] MSAs across 8 years,
Regression 1
OLS with Time
Fixed Effects,
01-08
Intercept
HPI CHNG (lagged)
CPR per BP (lagged)
ELIGIBLE
Year2002
Year2003
Year2004
Year2005
Year 2006
Year 2007
Year 2008
Moran's I (p)
Lagrange Multiplier (p)
Robust Lagrange Multiplier (p)
Lagrange Multiplier (k)
Robust Lagrange Multiplier (k)
AIC
k
p
R2R2
-8.72
0.10
0.0005
1.02
-0.14
0.02
-0.07
-0.53
-1.12
-0.63
-0.49
1.74
76.15
3.94
121.02
48.81
*
Regression 2
OLS with Time
and County Fixed
Effects, 01-08
-7.03
0.02
-0.0001
0.15
-0.01
0.11
0.15
0.09
-0.08
-0.10
-0.35
0.58
0.05
0.78
0.01
0.74
*
*
**
Regression 3
Spatial AR Lag
and Error (MLE)
with County and
Time Fixed
Efects, 01-08
-9.82 ***
0.03 *
-0.0001 **
0.24
-0.004
0.16
0.22 *
0.15
-0.07
-0.14
-0.54 ***
876.36
-0.38
0.36
0.16
0.36
Regression 4
Spatial AR Lag
and Error (MLE)
with County and
Time Fixed
Effects, 01-05
-4.56 **
0.02
-0.0001
2001 to 2008)
Regression 5
Spatial AR Lag
and Error (MLE)
with County and
Time Fixed
Effects, 06-08
-6.14 **
0.02 **
0.00003
-0.004
0.08
0.11
0.07
0.28
0.24
656.60
0.32
-0.40
0.18
*
*
*
16.18
0.16
0.17
0.03
0.90
N 656 656 656 410 246
Note: The coefficient-estimates for the county dummies are suppressed to conserve space. The spatial lags are generated with a binary contiguity weighting
matrix. All the spatial weights matrices are row-standardized. Key: -p<0. 10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
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ALTERNATE LEVEL OF ANALYSIS
This chapter has focused on investigating whether there is any connection between cash proffers
activity and housing development at the county level. The regression results from the previous
section showed a negative association between cash proffers activity and housing development
across counties. While county-level data was the best data available, this level of aggregation
may actually not reflect where cash proffers have their biggest impact - within counties. This
impact would be reflected in the shape of development patterns within counties rather than
across counties.
I see three major ways in which this proposed impact could be assessed. The three are the
location of a cash proffer rezoning, the requested zoning change, and the approved project, itself.
In this speculative alternate investigation, the focus would be at the parcel level in a county.
Within this dissertation, I am unable to prove any of my speculations, so the purpose of this
discussion is to bring awareness to these possibilities. Using data gathered from an earlier
research project, I can provide some examples to illustrate potential impacts.
In looking at the locations of cash proffer rezonings, I would start with where all approved
rezonings are located in the locality. Do we see them distributed evenly across the locality or
concentrated in certain areas? How close are these new developments to existing public facilities
such as fire stations and schools? I would then categorize the rezonings by those with cash
proffers and those without. This leads to question of are there locational differences between
rezonings with cash proffers and those without them. One might think that the approved
rezonings with cash proffers are more likely to be situated further away from existing public
infrastructure than those without cash proffers since the developer is contributing to the cost of
new or expanded public services. There is also a question of whether the locational pattern of
cash proffer rezonings has changed over time. Have the number of rezonings with cash proffers
declined or are they concentrated in different parts of the county compared to a number of years
ago? This pattern change might or might not reflect the cash proffer influence. For example, the
changing pattern might be a function of increasing infrastructure costs or homebuyer location
preferences or a locality's attitude.
Map 10.1 serves as a preliminary example of how the location analysis could be started. It
displays the location of the 135 approved rezoning cases with cash proffers attached to them in
Chesterfield County from January 24, 1990 to June 18, 2003. Cash proffer cases of varying sizes
can be found in all five of the County's supervisor/magisterial districts. Matoaca District which
is largely rural has primarily large rezoning cases while Clover Hill and Dale are more urbanized
areas with small sized cases. The map shows that at least for this time period that there were very
few cash proffer cases in the "deferred" growth area. This observation might lead one to
conclude that Chesterfield had successfully directed growth away from this area. However, such
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a conclusion cannot be made without mapping the location of cases not involving cash proffers.
This comparison allows one to see whether cash proffers may be used to influence the location of
development projects within a county. Alternatively, the county may, for example, have a
general policy that limits all development in the deferred growth areas, so there was nothing
strategic about the placement of the cash proffer cases.
Map 10.1. Cash Proffer Cases by Growth Areas in Chesterfield County, 1990-2003
OTHIAN
CLOVER
HLL4
ALE
BERMUDA
County Line
4 c Magisterial District
Cash Proffer Cases
Growth Areas
Deferred Growth
Planned Growth
Infill Growth
Source: Chesterfield County, Department of Planning, 2004.
The second facet to examining the influence of cash proffers on the shape of a locality's
development patterns is the land that is being rezoned. Are cash proffers primarily attached to
rezoning cases that involve changing a parcel's zoning from agricultural use to residential use?
Or do we see them increasing the allowable density in previously zoned residential parcels?
Using the Chesterfield data again, I show in Table 10.5 the zoning changes for the cash proffer
cases displayed in Map 10.1. The majority of cases (65.9 percent) involved land that was
originally zoned for agricultural use. Over 75 percent of the cases are rezoned to residential use
with R-12 (minimum lot area of 12,000 square feet) as the most popular option. The next step
would be to see the distribution of zoning changes that did not involve cash proffers. Comparing
the cases with and without cash proffers would allow conclusions to be drawn about whether
cash proffers may be used to influence the initial type of land that is being rezoned.
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Table 10.5. Zoning Codes Involved in Rezoning Cases in Chesterfield County, 1990-2003,
(n=135)
Number of Cases | Percentage of Cases
Rezoning To:
R-9 Only 13 .o
R-12 Only 43 3 1.9%
R- 15 Only 16 11.i9%
R-25 Only 14 10.4%
R-400Ony107
R-88 Only 5 3.7%
R-TH Only 322
R-MF Only 7 5.2%
Others 33 24.4%
Source: Author's calculations based on data from Chesterfield County, Department of Planning, 2004.
The final proposed aspect in looking at the shape of development patterns is the approved
development project. Are there commonalities between all cash proffer projects excluding
location and the cash proffer? Furthermore, are cash proffer developments distinctly different
from non-cash proffer developments? For example, two projects are built at the same time and
adjacent to each other, but one involved cash proffers and the other did not. Are there obvious
differences in the design of the development because one project had to pay cash proffers? The
differences could be in the size of the development, house types, amenities, etc.
The sole purpose of cash proffers is supposed to be revenue generation. Thus it would be very
interesting to see whether the speculation about its influence on development patterns in a
locality bear out. The importance of this finding would increase in significance if the pattern of
influence is found in different localities across the state. A new conception of cash proffers
would be needed that accounts for all of its impacts.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I present a simple framework to examine the relationship between a particular
land use tool, cash proffers, and new housing development and provide empirical estimates using
annual data on a panel of 82 counties in Virginia from 2001 to 2008. The most basic model
specification shows that past cash proffer activity is positively associated with new single family
building permits, however, this result does not hold once changes are made to the model to
account for omitted variable bias and spatial dependence. As a result, increases in cash proffer
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revenue collection per building permit are more likely negatively associated with new
development activity. Without taking into account the indirect effect of neighboring counties, the
direct effect may be as large as a 7 percent decline. Prior house price changes have a consistent
statistically significant positive effect upon future single family building permits. Being eligible
to accept cash proffers in a given year acts as expected in distinguishing among counties with
higher growth. The small number of counties who became eligible during the course of the
study, however, reduces the role of eligibility status to that of a control variable in later
specifications. Finally, development activity in a given county is negatively affected by the new
housing construction in its border counties and at the same time, an exogenous shock in one
county will positively impact housing development in the neighboring counties.
The finding of a negative association between cash proffer activity and housing development
does not mean that counties who want to deter growth should go out and implement a cash
proffer system right away. Or that the home building industry should take this as evidence to
advocate to the state legislators for the repeal of the state statutes that allow for the acceptance of
cash proffers. While the later model specifications did try to address the concerns about
endogeneity and omitted variable bias, they are most likely still present.
At their core, cash proffers are a way for localities to share the financial burden of the demand
for public services like roads, libraries, schools, fire and police from unplanned growth with
those who created the growth (i.e. housing developers). Even though localities may no longer see
the high rates of new residential construction that characterized the 1990s and 2000s due in part
to the most recent economic recession and foreclosure crisis, they will still need additional
sources of revenue to cover the provision of public services. If a locality faced what its true level
of development activity would be without the deterrence influence of cash proffers, residents
may see higher property tax rates or a decline in the quality of public services or a reduction in
provided services in order to finance the capital needs of the growth. This suggests another issue
which is when development does not have to pay for itself, localities may experience more
growth than they can handle. So we need further study to understand how revenues were used.
These results lay a foundation upon which future research can build. Future efforts should start
by gathering more accurate data on measures of cash proffer activity. This may help address the
issue of lumpiness that came with the fixed effects model specification. With better data, a more
complete picture of the relationship between cash proffers and new housing development could
be determined. This research can also be extended to the demand side of housing, i.e. prices, and
what is the association between housing affordability and cash proffers. There is a question of
whether the cost of paying for the cash proffer is shifted away from the housing developer on to
the consumer in the price of the new house and what impact this has on the taxes and price of
houses outside of the rezoning housing development.
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CHAPTER 11
This dissertation examined cash proffers from their origination to local implementation to
association with housing development. I utilized a framework of interest group politics at the
state level, and considered land use regulations implementation at the local level. Despite a
contentious legislative history, localities have been able to use cash proffers to bring in revenue
for the financing of the public infrastructure needs of unplanned growth. However, interest
groups have fashioned cash proffers into a tool that is far from ideal for covering the capital costs
of development.
I answered three key questions in this dissertation. First, how and why did the cash proffer tool
come into existence? Through tracing the history of cash proffers in Chapters 5 through 8, I
showed that cash proffers were an unintended practice resulting from the implementation of
state-approved conditional zoning at the local level of the political process. The action of a
developer offering money to go towards school construction during a rezoning hearing in the
early 1970s and Fairfax County officials later approving the rezoning was one of the early
precedent-setting cases of cash proffers. At that one point in time, a local government held the
edge in the power balance between localities and the development community over growth.
Subsequent legislative battles have pitted the two sides against each other in a fight over
eligibility expansion and potential proffer categories. The courts and the state's Office of the
Attorney General have been used to gain clarity on how localities may implement their cash
proffer systems, as well as, providing an arena for opponents to get the system overturned.
While cash proffers may have arisen from a spur of the moment decision, their continued use
was not because of a lack of knowledge about other growth management tools. By1989 when the
use of cash proffers expanded based on decennial growth rates, localities wanted to keep using
them to raise revenue despite the availability of other tools within the land use regulatory
universe. The development industry interest group very effectively used their power in the
political process to tie together the fates of cash proffers and any substitute tool like impact fees.
As a result, localities were pitted against one another on whether to do a one for one substitution
of the tools or fight to have all possible tools available. In the end, localities were able to get both
tools but the statute behind impact fees constructed them in such a way that they were limited in
functionality, revenue capability and onerous to administer. Alas, this was a design that favored
the interests of the development community over local governments.
Currently, Dillon's Rule still matters in Virginia. It would appear that the development
community as an interest group prefers state oversight and standardization rather than the local
government discretion. Recent rhetoric suggests they would be willing to substitute impact fees
for cash proffers but only if the design of impact fees is strongly directed by the state legislature.
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To answer the question of how cash proffers are implemented, I first had to consider who had
actually taken the step to allow for their acceptance. Despite the political furor, the fact is few
local governments at the time of my survey had taken the minimum step of amending their
zoning ordinance to allow for the potential acceptance of cash proffers. I had expected that local
governments would proactively adopt the zoning ordinance amendment to allow for cash
proffers before growth pressures emerged. In actuality, localities were already dealing with high
levels of growth when they adopted their cash proffer zoning ordinance amendment. My analysis
in Chapter 9 showed that the counties who accept cash proffers are different from non-accepting
eligible counterparts. They have higher rates of growth, larger populations, and wealthier, denser
localities. The pattern of actual cash proffer revenue collections is a function of growth.
In terms of implementation, I found that there are two major cash proffer approaches - case-by-
case and policy-based. While there was a lack of statistical differences between counties using
these two approaches, the trend among accepting counties has been away from case-by-case
towards a more policy-based approach. This shift may be an attempt by localities to bring more
funding certainty to how they implement their cash proffer system. Policy-based approaches also
have the potential to reduce developer concerns about abuse of discretion in a case-by-case
approach.
Finally, at least among counties, I found negative association between cash proffer activity and
future housing development. My regression results suggest that an increase in the amount of the
cash proffer revenues collected in a year may lead to a decline in the volume of building permits
in the following year. This would be evidence to support the contention that cash proffers are a
growth management tool because they have the potential to control the amount of development
in a locality. If a locality's policy to control growth is through a reduction in its amount, then
cash proffers may be a method to do this.
In regard to the replication of a cash proffer system in other states, I think cash proffers are a
byproduct of a certain time and place. In an atmosphere that is very friendly to property rights
and hesitant about expansion of powers to local governments, cash proffers have been made to
work through conditional zoning. If a state already has impact fees, I do not see what cash
proffers would gain them in terms of revenue raising. If a state is seeking a way to bring
flexibility to zoning and ensure certain promises are followed through on, then I would suggest
they consider the adoption of conditional zoning. Depending on whether it is a Dillon Rule state,
the state legislature or local governing body could determine exactly what they would allow as
potential conditions to a rezoning.
Unlike the federal government, local governments are not allowed to run budget deficits. They
have to find a way to balance their budget each year or take the risk of declaring bankruptcy. At
the same time, they presumably cannot have high tax rates and fees which would discourage
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individuals and families from moving to or remaining in their locality. The provision of new or
expanded public services and infrastructure that arises from residential growth is an expensive
enterprise. Federal and state funding sources have become more limited. The recent economic
recession has left the financial sector more cautious in dealing with any new bond issuances by
local governments. In addition, localities are now facing having to figure out how to pay for the
replacement of aging infrastructure. A tool like cash proffers which shifts part or all of the cost
for new or expanded public facilities that service new development to the private sector would
free up a portion of public sector revenues that could be redirected to other capital improvement
projects in the locality.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
My analysis has demonstrated the role that political compromise at the state level played in the
shape of current cash proffer statutes and their implementation on the ground. The result has
been a solution that does not completely satisfy either developers or local governments. To
understand the full potential of cash proffers, it is important to examine the tool without concern
for what is politically feasible. The first step is to be clear on the problem for which we are
seeking a solution. I would argue that the problem in Virginia has evolved away from
enforcement of rezoning conditions and timely review of zoning applications to a question of
how to pay for new or expanded public facilities needed to serve new residential development.
Any policy solution for the latter problem should be considered separately from the power to use
conditional zoning whose goal is to interject flexibility into the existing zoning ordinance.
In evaluating policy solutions to this revenue problem, I suggest there are five objectives upon
which to conduct the evaluation: expediency, equity, economic efficiency, ease of
administration, and political acceptability (National Association of Home Builders 2008). Setting
aside political acceptability for the moment, I focus on the first four areas. In Chapter 2, I gave a
brief history of infrastructure financing in the United States with its reliance on the conventional
tools of municipal bonds, tax revenues and assessments. Rather than conduct a comparison of
cash proffers in relation to all of the existing infrastructure tools, I will focus on cash proffers
and impact fees. These revenue-related solutions both operate under the assumption that new
residential development compared to local government should fund a greater share if not all of
the cost for the new or expanded public facilities that they give rise to.
Expediency is the ability of the local government to provide the new or expanded public
facilities prior to or concurrent with new development. With the correct timing, a local
government can avoid having new demand crowd existing facilities and infrastructure. This
means that the local government would want a policy solution that brings in revenue streams
before or concurrent with construction. The timing of when cash proffers and impact fees are
paid by the developer is flexible. This flexibility may hinder the expediency of either tool.
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Currently, cash proffers are paid when a building permit is applied for which may be too late to
have the new or expanded infrastructure finished. As a result, new demand may start to stress
existing public facilities. However, there is nothing which would preclude a developer from
paying the cash proffer prior to the building permit stage. Impact fees are also typically paid at
the time of applying for a building permit. The recent movement to push the payment time to
later in the development process, for example, applying for certificate of occupancy, would make
either tool less expedient.
In looking at efficient infrastructure financing tools, there are two components. First, expansion
of public facilities should occur up to the point where marginal cost equals the service price.
Ideally, you want to stop expansion when the costs to construct/provide the additional
facilities/infrastructure/services cannot be covered by the price that an additional new user would
pay to access the expansion. Second, any tool should also aim to support an efficient housing
market and development pattern. Building on the assumption that the residential housing market
is competitively produced, infrastructure financing should not lead to large-scale distortions in
the houses that individuals buy or developers construct. In regard to development pattern, the
efficient solution is that new development should be located as close as possible to existing
public facilities, so that the cost of service expansion is minimized. This is the preferred pattern
if locating close to existing development offers the same housing stock and amenities as farther
out locations. Exurban development becomes efficient if the person who wants to live away from
existing development is willing to pay for the additional cost of being provided with public
facilities and services and is properly billed for it.
Cash proffers and impact fees do possess some elements of efficiency. On the one hand, both
tools have those who are directly causing the need for new or expanded infrastructure or
benefiting the most from it paying a price in the form of the impact fee or cash proffer. They
differ in that cash proffers are applicable to rezonings, i.e. unplanned growth. Impact fees are
assessed on all growth. Inefficiencies can arise in how that price is determined. For example, a
locality could decide to set a standard impact fee or suggested cash proffer amount. There may
be instances where this predetermined dollar amount does not reflect the actual cost of providing
the new or expanded public services to the new development. As a result, the local government is
making it easier for development to take place further away from existing public infrastructure.
Alternatively, cash proffers and impact fees can be designed so that the dollar amount increases
the farther a project is sited from existing infrastructure. The higher dollar amounts in these
growth sensitive areas may redirect developers to areas closer to existing infrastructure or where
no new infrastructure is needed.
At least with impact fees, two new housing developments adjacent to each other would both be
paying impact fees towards new or expanded public facilities. The voluntary nature of cash
proffers, however, means that only one of those two new neighboring developments may be
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making cash payments to the locality even though both developments are contributing to the
increased demand on existing services. While cash proffers are typically determined per housing
unit, impact fees have been known to be designed around elements of a housing unit, for
example, the number of bedrooms. In an effort to minimize the amount of the impact fees that
must be paid, developers could react by changing the style of the houses they construct. So rather
than let the consumers determine what they want in a house, the developer is letting the impact
fee dictate.
Equity refers to the balance between who pays for a public service and who uses it. Under the
benefits principle, everyone who uses a service should pay for its cost. This rationale works best
for those public services that are not a basic need, as well as, those which are in limited supply.
Further, the cost for these services can be directly charged to the user. The alternative principle is
to assess individuals based on their ability to pay. This framework is used for services that are a
basic need, as well as, those where it is not possible to charge the user directly. Typically, it
operates through a progressive charge system in which those who have a higher income pay
more for the service than individuals with lower incomes. Then there are some services like
public education which could charge tuition to families with enrolled students rather than
spreading the cost across all property owners in a locality through their property taxes.
To some extent, the voluntary nature of cash proffers does make it more equitable than impact
fees. If a rezoning applicant does not want to proffer cash payments with their rezoning
application, then there is nothing the locality can do to force the applicant to volunteer them. The
lack of cash proffers may be an inability to afford them. A rezoning application cannot be denied
on the basis of failure to offer cash proffers. If the rezoning is approved, then the locality must
either deal with oversubscribed public services or fund the needed new or expanded facilities
with another revenue source. Impact fees cannot be avoided and are applicable to all
development. There are no allowances made for the income levels of the residents in the new
development. This most likely means that homeowners with lower incomes will pay a greater
share of their income towards the impact fee than a wealthier household would for the use of the
same public facilities. But you can also see how cash proffers can be less equitable if one
developer pays and another (who can afford to pay) simply refuses to do so.
The public administration of an infrastructure financing tool is affected by decisions made about
the other goals of the tool. A local government could have a tool that meets the goals of being
expedient, economically efficient, equitable and politically acceptable, but it may be such a
burden to administer that it becomes impractical. At the same time, another tool could be an ease
to implement, but it sacrifices other elements like equity and efficiency.
Either tool could be designed to be complicated or easy to administer. While it would certainly
be fine for a locality to bring in consultants to help them develop their cash proffer or impact fee
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system, however, after the initial implementation, the system should have been designed in such
a way that the locality can make changes to the system over time without having to bring the
consultants back in every time. Further, given the turnover in staff at the local level, it should be
simple enough that a new staffer could hit the ground running in the administration of the
system. Simplicity also allows for greater transparency so that the development community and
residents can see where the collected revenues are going. Because it affects all development,
impact fees may have a heavier administrative burden of tracking payments, etc.
Any solution should seek to minimize the transaction costs on the private actors in the system.
With the "case-by-case" approach to cash proffers, the likelihood exists for each rezoning to
have its own unique (optimal) solution, but the private bargaining that may be required to
achieve this outcome may be too costly. Alternatively, a more systematic process to make these
decisions like a schedule of maximum cash proffer amounts or impact fees may result in a
tradeoff between the costs of negotiation and the total surplus achieved from the project. At the
same time, one must recognize that the importance or potential impact of different transactions
costs varies across places, so different institutional arrangements will be more "efficient" in
different places because each locality has its own specific set of issues to consider. The
development landscape can be a place of uncertainty, so any solution that reduces uncertainty
and allows for planning is appreciated.
Based on the elements discussed above, neither cash proffers nor impact fees are without their
faults. If given a choice between the two, I would argue for impact fees over cash proffers
because of their greater revenue generating capacity. Localities could expand the potential base
of cash proffers by taking the step of downzoning all undeveloped land in the locality regardless
of location, so any more intensive use would be subject to a cash proffer amount and generate
revenue. This strategy, however, would most likely subject the locality to an onslaught of
lawsuits from irate property owners. The inherent features of cash proffers like voluntary
offering and applicable to only a rezoning handicap its revenue raising capacity. For those
current local government users of impact fees, I see no reason to switch to a cash proffer system.
If a local government is looking to shift some of the burden for financing new public facilities to
the private sector but does not want to go the full distance of impact fees then cash proffer
system may be a way for them to get their feet wet. Later, the cash proffer system could be
transitioned into an impact fee system with a similar structure but wider base.
FUTURE RESEARCH
This dissertation has laid a foundation upon which additional cash proffer research may be built.
While I have presented preliminary evidence about the association between cash proffer activity
and future housing development, there is still room for additional confirmation of the results.
This may involve different measures of cash proffer activity, as well as, model specifications.
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While I have largely focused on the revenue side of cash proffers as well as their impact on the
level of development, there still remains the question of their impact on the development pattern
in a locality. Do we see different development patterns, for example, more land preservation in
their presence? Are there differences in the scale and location of development in approved
rezoning applications which include cash proffers versus those that do not? This exploration
would expand the growth management assessment of cash proffers into two key facets - type
and location of development.
Another arena for examination is the extent of negotiation between developers and local
governments over cash proffers. While a cash proffer is supposed to be a voluntary offering by
the rezoning applicant, the development community has actually called them, "about as
voluntary as Don Corleone's horse-head negotiations." 75 There is a question of whether the use
of "voluntary" in the statutory language actually creates a false expectation about their avoidance
among the development community. Local governments are looking for revenue to fund new
infrastructure, so they will try to obtain cash proffers whenever possible. Thus, it is worthwhile
to gain a better understanding of how much negotiation actually exists within the cash proffer
system. Does a rezoning applicant end up proffering more money per building permit in the
approved application compared to what was originally proposed? Or is it less? Are other
conditions attached? Has this pattern changed over time? Are there certain localities which
appear to be more developer-friendly in their final form of the proffers? This investigation would
have relevance for other tools in the planning arena like development agreements which involve
the use of negotiation between the two parties. The ability to renegotiate and how much is
changed during periods of economic downturn may be even more important to understand given
the post-recession struggling housing market that we have today.
Future research could extend to the impact of cash proffers on the composition of the
development community. In my analysis of the origins of cash proffers, the development
community was seen as one almost homogenous interest group. It would be interesting to see
whether the presence of cash proffers has had any influence on who are the developers in the
counties which actively use them. Given that they are only found in Virginia, does this
uniqueness deter regional or national developers who are not familiar with the phenomenon of
cash proffers and might be hesitant to expend resources learning about them? As a result, do we
see evidence of local developers held captive by cash proffers because they do not have the
resources to develop in a different locality.
In Chapter 3, I discussed how Fairfax County developed its first zoning ordinance in the early
1940s without the guidance of a comprehensive plan which set the county up for a decades long
75 Cummings, Jeanne. 1989. "Cranwell May Revive 'Conditional Zoning' Bill." Richmond Times Dispatch.
February 15.
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struggle over the level and type of development occurring in the county. The zoning ordinance at
the time was not flexible enough to deal with the new suburban development model that the
housing industry was constructing in response to consumer demand. The innovation of
conditional zoning brought a level of flexibility to the zoning ordinance. This flexibility came in
the form of conditions to accompany the change in rezoning. Conditional zoning and cash
proffers are now more than thirty years old. There are still counties in Virginia without basic
zoning but their lack of adoption has more to do with local attitudes towards the relationship
between government and property rights.
Since the 1970s enactment of conditional zoning in Fairfax County, other land use regulatory
tools around flexibility in zoning have been developed in communities across the U.S. While
conditional zoning deals with rezoning, tools like overlay districts, floating zones, and flexible
zoning districts try to bring flexibility to by-right development. This flexibility typically occurs
through the relaxation of underlying zoning restrictions. The relaxation may take the form of
higher densities, different design standards as well as permitted uses. All of these tools from
conditional zoning to flexible zoning districts share the common trait of trying to work within the
historic Euclidean zoning framework.
Within the last few years, a counter movement to Euclidean zoning has arisen that calls into
question the longevity of land use regulatory tools like conditional zoning and its cash proffer
byproduct. If a community no longer has a zoning ordinance, then how can it raise revenues with
cash proffers through rezoning? Communities across the U.S. have been experimenting with
eliminating zoning and replacing it with a form-based code system. Traditionally, zoning
regulations have focused on how a piece of land is used, i.e. residential or commercial, and have
tried to keep certain land uses that could be considered nuisances to other property owners like
industrial to residential away from each other. Form-based codes are a departure from zoning
because their emphasis is on design rather than use. For example, a form-based code system
would layout through illustrations how an apartment building or grocery store should look in
terms of various exterior design elements. Zoning tries to convey a sense of place by regulating
what land uses may occur next to each other. Form-based codes have the same aim but through
the use of aesthetics. Different areas of a community may be subject to different design elements.
Despite the attention that form-based codes have received, their implementation hinges upon
local governments giving up the power to regulate land use. Under a form-based code system,
developers would work through the marketplace to determine what uses would occur on which
pieces of property in a community. The local government's input would then come in the form of
the design of those uses. Given the limited tools that Virginia's localities have to control
development within their borders, as well as, the influence of Dillon's Law in the state, I cannot
see localities willingly trading away their zoning ordinances for a form-based code system. It is
still an open question of which is more important to the development industry - the power to
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dictate land uses versus the power to control aesthetics. I would argue that no matter which
direction land use regulations move at this point there is still going to be this inherent battle
between local governments and the development industry over flexibility and exceptions to the
rule.
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LOCALITY SURVEY:
Implementation of Conditional Zoning and Voluntary Cash Proffers
This survey is being conducted as part of my doctoral dissertation research. It is designed to
capture information related to the adoption, planning, and use of conditional zoning and
voluntary cash proffers in counties across the Commonwealth of Virginia. The questions being
asked in this survey instrument are directed towards those counties that are eligible to accept
voluntary cash proffers as of or prior to FY2007 according to the Commission on Local
Government's annual Report on Proffered Cash Payments and Expenditures by Virginia's
Counties, Cities and Towns.
Participation in this survey is voluntary. A respondent may decline to answer any or all
questions. Additionally, a respondent may decline further participation, at any time, without
adverse consequences. Confidentiality and/or anonymity of a respondent outside of locality
name will be assured.
Respondent Information: (person completing this form)
Name:
Last Name First Name
Title:
Email Address:
Phone Number: (_)
If necessary, would you be willing to participate in a follow-
up telephone interview (lasting less than 15 minutes) for
purposes of clarification?
O Yes 0 No
Please update the address below if incorrect:
Please return completed survey by June 16, 2008 to: If you have any questions, please contact:
Attention: Shannon A. McKay Shannon A. McKay
1736 Flank Road Phone: (804) 586-5111
Petersburg, VA 23805 Email: mckay(mit.edu
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KEY DEFINITIONS AND STATE CODE REFERENCES
Key Definitions
"[Conditional zoning]: as part of classifying land within a locality into areas and districts by legislative
action, the allowing of reasonable conditions governing the use of such property, such conditions being in
addition to, or modification of the regulations provided for a particular zoning district or zone by the
overall zoning ordinance. (Code 1950, § 15-961.3; 1962, c. 407, § 15.1-430; 1964, c. 547; 1966, c. 344;
1975, c. 641; 1976, c. 642; 1977, c. 566; 1978, c. 320; 1987, c. 8; 1989, c. 384; 1990, c. 685; 1993, c. 770;
1995, c. 603; 1997, c. 587.)",76
"[Cash Profferl: (i) any money voluntary proffered in a writing signed by the owner of property subject to
rezoning, submitted as part of a rezoning application and accepted by a locality pursuant to the authority
granted by Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-2303, or § 15.2-2298, or (ii) any payment of money made pursuant to a
development agreement entered into under authority granted by Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-2303.1.
Cash Proffer Revenue Collected [§ 15.2-2303.2(D)(1), Code of Virginia]: Total dollar amount of revenue
collected from cash proffers in the specified fiscal year regardless of the fiscal year in which the cash
proffer was accepted. Unaudited figures are acceptable.""
Single-Family Housing: "All new privately-owned attached and detached single-family houses. Include
attached single-family houses known commonly as townhouses or row houses where (1) each unit is
separated from adjoining units by a wall that extends from ground to roof, (2) no unit is above or below
another unit, and (3) each unit has separate heating and separate utility meters."78
State Code References
§ 15.2-2297. Same; conditions as part of a rezoning or amendment to zoning map.
A. A zoning ordinance may include and provide for the voluntary proffering in writing, by the owner, of reasonable
conditions, prior to a public hearing before the governing body, in addition to the regulations provided for the
zoning district or zone by the ordinance, as a part of a rezoning or amendment to a zoning map; provided that (i) the
rezoning itself must give rise for the need for the conditions; (ii) the conditions shall have a reasonable relation to
the rezoning; (iii) the conditions shall not include a cash contribution to the locality; (iv) the conditions shall not
include mandatory dedication of real or personal property for open space, parks, schools, fire departments or other
public facilities not otherwise provided for in § 15.2-2241; (v) the conditions shall not include a requirement that the
applicant create a property owners' association under Chapter 26 (§ 55-508 et seq.) of Title 55 which includes an
express further condition that members of a property owners' association pay an assessment for the maintenance of
public facilities owned in fee by a public entity, including open space, parks, schools, fire departments and other
public facilities not otherwise provided for in § 15.2-2241; however, such facilities shall not include sidewalks,
special street signs or markers, or special street lighting in public rights-of-way not maintained by the Department of
Transportation; (vi) the conditions shall not include payment for or construction of off-site improvements except
those provided for in § 15.2-2241; (vii) no condition shall be proffered that is not related to the physical
development or physical operation of the property; and (viii) all such conditions shall be in conformity with the
comprehensive plan as defined in § 15.2-2223. The governing body may also accept amended proffers once the
public hearing has begun if the amended proffers do not materially affect the overall proposal. Once proffered and
76 Virginia State Code (§15.2-2201)
77 Commission on Local Government (2007). Report on Proffered Cash Payments and Expenditures by Virginia
Counties, Cities and Towns, Richmond, VA: Commonwealth of Virginia, November, p. 21.
78 U.S. Census Bureau (2007). Form C-404, Report ofNew Privately-Owned Residential Building or Zoning Permits
Issued, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, April 11, p. 2.
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accepted as part of an amendment to the zoning ordinance, the conditions shall continue in effect until a subsequent
amendment changes the zoning on the property covered by the conditions. However, the conditions shall continue if
the subsequent amendment is part of a comprehensive implementation of a new or substantially revised zoning
ordinance. (1978, c. 320, § 15.1-491.2; 1982, c. 293; 1990, c. 868; 1997, c. 587; 2001, c. 703; 2006, c. 450.)
§ 15.2-2303. Conditional zoning in certain localities.
A. A zoning ordinance may include reasonable regulations and provisions for conditional zoning as defined in §
15.2-2201 and for the adoption, in counties, or towns therein which have planning commissions, wherein the urban
county executive form of government is in effect, or in a city adjacent to or completely surrounded by such a county,
or in a county contiguous to any such county, or in a city adjacent to or completely surrounded by such a contiguous
county, or in any town within such contiguous county, and in the counties east of the Chesapeake Bay as a part of an
amendment to the zoning map of reasonable conditions, in addition to the regulations provided for the zoning
district by the ordinance, when such conditions shall have been proffered in writing, in advance of the public hearing
before the governing body required by § 15.2-2285 by the owner of the property which is the subject of the proposed
zoning map amendment. Reasonable conditions shall not include, however, conditions that impose upon the
applicant the requirement to create a property owners' association under Chapter 26 (§ 55-508 et seq.) of Title 55
which includes an express further condition that members of a property owners' association pay an assessment for
the maintenance of public facilities owned in fee by a public entity, including open space, parks, schools, fire
departments, and other public facilities not otherwise provided for in § 15.2-2241; however, such facilities shall not
include sidewalks, special street signs or markers, or special street lighting in public rights-of-way not maintained by
the Department of Transportation. The governing body may also accept amended proffers once the public hearing
has begun if the amended proffers do not materially affect the overall proposal. Once proffered and accepted as part
of an amendment to the zoning ordinance, such conditions shall continue in effect until a subsequent amendment
changes the zoning on the property covered by such conditions. However, such conditions shall continue if the
subsequent amendment is part of a comprehensive implementation of a new or substantially revised zoning
ordinance. (Code 1950, § 15-968.5; 1962, c. 407, § 15.1-491; 1964, c. 564; 1966, c. 455; 1968, cc. 543, 595; 1973,
c. 286; 1974, c. 547; 1975, cc. 99, 575, 579, 582, 641; 1976, cc. 71, 409, 470, 683; 1977, c. 177; 1978, c. 543; 1979,
c. 182; 1982, c. 44; 1983, c. 392; 1984, c. 238; 1987, c. 8; 1988, cc. 481, 856; 1989, cc. 359, 384; 1990, cc. 672,
868; 1992, c. 380; 1993, c. 672; 1994, c. 802; 1995, cc. 351, 475, 584, 603; 1996, c. 451; 1997, c. 587; 2001, c. 703;
2006, c. 450.)
§ 15.2-2303.1. Development agreements in certain counties.
A. In order to promote the public health, safety and welfare and to encourage economic development consistent with
careful planning, New Kent County may include in its zoning ordinance provisions for the governing body to enter
into binding development agreements with any persons owning legal or equitable interests in real property in the
county if the property to be developed contains at least one thousand acres. (1997, c. 738, § 15.1-491.001; 2007, c.
813.)
§ 15.2-2298. Same; additional conditions as a part of rezoning or zoning map amendment in certain high-
growth localities.
A. Except for those localities to which § 15.2-2303 is applicable, this section shall apply to (i) any locality which has
had population growth of 5% or more from the next-to-latest to latest decennial census year, based on population
reported by the United States Bureau of the Census; (ii) any city adjoining such city or county; (iii) any towns
located within such county; and (iv) any county contiguous with at least three such counties, and any town located in
that county. However, any such locality may by ordinance choose to utilize the conditional zoning authority granted
under § 15.2-2303 rather than this section. (1989, c. 697, § 15.1-492.2:1; 1990, c. 868; 1991, c. 233; 1997, c. 587;
2001, c. 703; 2006, cc. 450, 882; 2007, c. 324.)
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BACKGROUND
The series of questions that follow in this section are concerned with the overall regulations of
planning and zoning in your locality.
1. Does your locality have a comprehensive land use plan?
YES (Answer Question 2)
(Go to Question 3)0 NO
2. What year was the comprehensive land use plan last updated? (year)
3. Has your locality adopted a capital improvement plan (CIP)?
0 YES (Answer Question 4)
0 NO (Go to Question 5)
4. What year was the CIP first adopted? (year)
5. Does your locality have a zoning ordinance?
0 YES (Answer Question 6)
(Go to Question 25)0 NO
6. What year was the zoning ordinance last updated? , (year)
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0
CONDITIONAL ZONING IN GENERAL
Attention: Skip this section if there is no county zoning ordinance - Go to Question 25
7. Has your locality amended its zoning ordinance to allow conditional zoning under
Virginia State Code (§15.2-2297)? (i.e. non cash proffers)
0 YES (Answer Question 8)
0 NO (Go to Question 11)
8. What year was the zoning ordinance amended to allow conditional zoning under
Virginia State Code (§15.2-2297)? (year)
9. Estimate the fraction of rezoning applications that involve conditional zoning in your
county on an annual basis. (i.e. non cash proffers)
0 All (Answer Question 10)
0 More than % of rezoning applications (Answer Question 10)
0 About 2 of rezoning applications (Answer Question 10)
0 Less than /4 of rezoning applications (Answer Question 10)
0 None (Go to Question 11)
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10. What is typically proffered by an applicant? (i.e. non cash proffers)
CASH PROFFER ADOPTION
Attention: Skip this section ifthere is no county zoning ordinance - Go to Question 25
11. Has your locality amended its zoning ordinance to allow the acceptance of voluntary
cash proffers under Virginia State Code (§15.2-2303, §15.2-2298, or §15.2-2303.1)?
0 YES
0 NO
(Answer Question 12)
(Go to Question 13)
12. What year was the zoning ordinance amended to allow the acceptance of voluntary cash
proffers? [Go to Question 14 after answering] (year)
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13. Given your eligibility under Virginia State Code (§15.2-2303, §15.2-2298, or §15.2-
2303.1), why has the locality not amended its zoning ordinance to accept voluntary cash
proffers? Please explain below. [Skip to Question 25 after answering]
CASH PROFFER PROGRAMS
Attention: Skip this section if there is no county zoning ordinance - Go to Question 25
14. How would you characterize your county's cash proffer program?
"Case-by-Case" Approach
"Policy-Based" Approach
(Answer Question 15)
(Answer Question 15)
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0
0
15. How does your county determine the suggested amount of a voluntary cash proffer? Be
as specific as possible.
Attention: Skip Questions 16-20 if the county does not use a "Policy-Based" Approach for its
voluntary cash proffer program - Go to Question 22
16. What year was the "Policy-Based" Approach established? (year)
17. What type of "Policy-Based" Approach does your county's cash proffer program use?
Maximum Cash Proffer Policy
Other
(Go to Question 19)
(Answer Question 18)
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0
0
18. Please explain the structure of the "Other" policy below. [Skip to Question 22 after
answering]
19. Does your county have separate policy established maximum cash proffer amounts for
different housing types? (i.e. single-family, age-restricted, multifamily, etc.)
o YES
0 NO
(Answer Question 20)
(Go to Question 21)
20. Please list below the housing types that have their own policy established maximum
cash proffer amounts and how they relate to each other in terms of dollar value. (i.e. single-
family $ > age-restricted $ > multi-family $)
338
Attention: Skip this question if there is no county "Maximum Cash Proffer" policy - Go to
Question 22
21. Starting with the first year that your county enacted its "Maximum Cash Proffer"
policy, complete the line next to each fiscal year with the policy established maximum cash
proffer amount per single-family housing unit for a given fiscal year.
1972-73 1990-91
1973-74 1991-92
1974-75 1992-93
1975-76 1993-94
1976-77 1994-95
1977-78 1995-96
1978-79 1996-97
1979-80 1997-98
1980-81 1998-99
1981-82 1999-00
1982-83 2000-01
1983-84 2001-02
1984-85 2002-03
1985-86 2003-04
1986-87 2004-05
1987-88 2005-06
1988-89 2006-07
1989-90
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22. Starting with the first year that your county accepted cash proffers, complete the line
next to each fiscal year with the average (i.e. typical) cash proffer amount per single-family
housing unit for a given fiscal year's approved rezonings.
1972-73 1990-91
1973-74 1991-92
1974-75 1992-93
1975-76 1993-94
1976-77 1994-95
1977-78 1995-96
1978-79 1996-97
1979-80 1997-98
1980-81 1998-99
1981-82 1999-00
1982-83 2000-01
1983-84 2001-02
1984-85 2002-03
1985-86 2003-04
1986-87 2004-05
1987-88 2005-06
1988-89 2006-07
1989-90
340
CASH PROFFER IMPLEMENTATION
Attention: Skip this section if there is no county zoning ordinance - Go to Question 25
23. Did your county begin collecting cash proffer revenues prior to the 1999-00 fiscal year?
o YES
o NO
(Answer Question 24)
(Go to Question 25)
24. Beginning with the first fiscal year that your county accepted cash proffers, provide the
total amount of cash proffer revenues collected annually for each fiscal year listed below.
1972-73
1973-74
1974-75
1975-76
1976-77
1977-78
1978-79
1979-80
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
1985-86
1986-87
1987-88
1988-89
1989-90
1990-91
1991-92
1992-93
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
341
GROWTH ENVIRONMENT
This section will help us to understand the development context in your locality.
25. Does your county view cash proffers as a growth management tool?
YES (Answer Question 26)
(Answer Question 26)0 NO
26. Is there another tool or power that you would like to see your locality have to deal with
the ramifications of growth? [Indicate for example, whether this tool/power is already
enabled by state statutes, but has not been adopted by the local governing body.]
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O0
Attention: Skip Questions 27 and 28 ifthere is no county zoning ordinance - Go to Question 29
27. For the most recent housing cycle (1999-2007), fill in the blank spaces beside each fiscal
year with the requested information. For all questions, please only count applications or
units with single-family housing as a proposed use(s), for each year. [Ifthe locality has never
accepted a cash proffer, leave the last three columns blank]
All Rezoning Applications Rezoning Applications with Cash Proffers
Total Number of
Approved Housing Units
Approved
Total
Applications
Total Number of
Approved Housing
Units
Approved
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
28. Who is the best person to contact in you
interview on the institutional history of cas
accepted a cash proffer, skip to Question 29.]
r office or another county department for an
i proffers in the county? [Ifthe locality has never
343
Year Total
Applications
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
2006-07
29. Please use the space below for any answer clarifications or general feedback on the
survey questions.
**** Thank you for your assistance! ****
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LOCALITY SURVEY:
Implementation of Conditional Zoning and Voluntary Cash Proffers
This survey is being conducted as part of my doctoral dissertation research. It is designed to
capture information related to the adoption, planning, and use of conditional zoning and
voluntary cash proffers in counties across the Commonwealth of Virginia. The questions being
asked in this survey instrument are directed towards those counties that are ineligible to accept
voluntary cash proffers as of FY2007 according to the Commission on Local Government's
annual Report on Proffered Cash Payments and Expenditures by Virginia's Counties, Cities and
Towns.
Participation in this survey is voluntary. A respondent may decline to answer any or all
questions. Additionally, a respondent may decline further participation, at any time, without
adverse consequences. Confidentiality and/or anonymity of a respondent outside of locality
name will be assured.
Respondent Information: (person completing this form)
Name:
Last Name First Name
Title:
Email Address:
Phone Number: ( )
If necessary, would you be willing to participate in a follow-up
telephone interview (lasting less than 15 minutes) for purposes of
clarification?
0 Yes 0 No
Please update the address below if incorrect:
Please return completed survey by June 16, 2008 to: If you have any questions, please contact:
Attention: Shannon A. McKay Shannon A. McKay
1736 Flank Road Phone: (804) 586-5111
Petersburg, VA 23805 Email: mckay(dmit.edu
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KEY DEFINITIONS AND STATE CODE REFERENCES
Key Definitions
"[Conditional zoning]: as part of classifying land within a locality into areas and districts by legislative
action, the allowing of reasonable conditions governing the use of such property, such conditions being in
addition to, or modification of the regulations provided for a particular zoning district or zone by the
overall zoning ordinance. (Code 1950, § 15-961.3; 1962, c. 407, § 15.1-430; 1964, c. 547; 1966, c. 344;
1975, c. 641; 1976, c. 642; 1977, c. 566; 1978, c. 320; 1987, c. 8; 1989, c. 384; 1990, c. 685; 1993, c. 770;
1995, c. 603; 1997, c.587.)"79
"[Cash Proffer]: (i) any money voluntary proffered in a writing signed by the owner of property subject to
rezoning, submitted as part of a rezoning application and accepted by a locality pursuant to the authority
granted by Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-2303, or § 15.2-2298, or (ii) any payment of money made pursuant to a
development agreement entered into under authority granted by Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-2303.1 ".
Single-Family Housing: "All new privately-owned attached and detached single-family houses. Include
attached single-family houses known commonly as townhouses or row houses where (1) each unit is
separated from adjoining units by a wall that extends from ground to roof, (2) no unit is above or below
another unit, and (3) each unit has separate heating and separate utility meters."8 1
State Code References
@ 15.2-2297. Same; conditions as part of a rezoning or amendment to zoning map.
A. A zoning ordinance may include and provide for the voluntary proffering in writing, by the owner, of reasonable
conditions, prior to a public hearing before the governing body, in addition to the regulations provided for the
zoning district or zone by the ordinance, as a part of a rezoning or amendment to a zoning map; provided that (i) the
rezoning itself must give rise for the need for the conditions; (ii) the conditions shall have a reasonable relation to
the rezoning; (iii) the conditions shall not include a cash contribution to the locality; (iv) the conditions shall not
include mandatory dedication of real or personal property for open space, parks, schools, fire departments or other
public facilities not otherwise provided for in § 15.2-2241; (v) the conditions shall not include a requirement that the
applicant create a property owners' association under Chapter 26 (§ 55-508 et seq.) of Title 55 which includes an
express further condition that members of a property owners' association pay an assessment for the maintenance of
public facilities owned in fee by a public entity, including open space, parks, schools, fire departments and other
public facilities not otherwise provided for in § 15.2-2241; however, such facilities shall not include sidewalks,
special street signs or markers, or special street lighting in public rights-of-way not maintained by the Department of
Transportation; (vi) the conditions shall not include payment for or construction of off-site improvements except
those provided for in § 15.2-2241; (vii) no condition shall be proffered that is not related to the physical
development or physical operation of the property; and (viii) all such conditions shall be in conformity with the
comprehensive plan as defined in § 15.2-2223. The governing body may also accept amended proffers once the
public hearing has begun if the amended proffers do not materially affect the overall proposal. Once proffered and
accepted as part of an amendment to the zoning ordinance, the conditions shall continue in effect until a subsequent
amendment changes the zoning on the property covered by the conditions. However, the conditions shall continue if
the subsequent amendment is part of a comprehensive implementation of a new or substantially revised zoning
ordinance. (1978, c. 320, § 15.1-491.2; 1982, c. 293; 1990, c. 868; 1997, c. 587; 2001, c. 703; 2006, c. 450.)
79 Virginia State Code (§15.2-2201)
80 Commission on Local Government (2007). Report on Proffered Cash Payments and Expenditures by Virginia
Counties, Cities and Towns, Richmond, VA: Commonwealth of Virginia, November, p. 21.
8 U.S. Census Bureau (2007). Form C-404, Report of New Privately-Owned Residential Building or Zoning Permits
Issued, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, April 11, p. 2.
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BACKGROUND
The series of questions that follow in this section are concerned with the overall regulations of
planning and zoning in your locality.
1. Does your locality have a comprehensive land use plan?
0 YES
o NO
(Answer Question 2)
(Go to Question 3)
2. What year was the comprehensive land use plan last updated? (year)
3. Has your locality adopted a capital improvement plan (CIP)?
0 YES (Answer Question 4)
0 NO (Go to Question 5)
4. What year was the CIP first adopted? (year)
5. Does your locality have a zoning ordinance?
0 YES (Answer Question 6)
0 NO (Go to Question 11)
6. What year was the zoning ordinance last updated? (year)
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CONDITIONAL ZONING IN GENERAL
Attention: Skip this section if there is no county zoning ordinance - Go to Question 1]
7. Has your locality amended its zoning ordinance to allow conditional zoning under
Virginia State Code (§15.2-2297)? (i.e. non cash proffers)
o YES (Answer Question 8)
o NO (Go to Question 11)
8. What year was the zoning ordinance amended to allow conditional zoning under
Virginia State Code (§15.2-2297)? , (year)
9. Estimate the fraction of rezoning applications that involve conditional zoning in your
county on an annual basis. (i.e. non cash proffers)
0 All (Answer Question 10)
o More than % of rezoning applications (Answer Question 10)
0 About 2 of rezoning applications (Answer Question 10)
o Less than % of rezoning applications (Answer Question 10)
0 None (Go to Question 11)
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10. What is typically proffered by an applicant? (i.e. non cash proffers)
VOLUNTARY CASH PROFFER ELIGIBILITY
11. Would your locality benefit from being eligible to accept voluntary cash proffers?
YES (Answer Question 12)
(Answer Question 12)0 NO
12. Please state the reason(s) for your answer to the prior question.
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O0
GROWTH ENVIRONMENT
These questions will help us to understand the development context in your locality.
13. Does your county view voluntary cash proffers as a growth management tool?
0 YES
0 NO
(Answer Question 14)
(Answer Question 14)
14. Is there another tool or power that you would like to see your locality have to deal with
the ramifications of growth? [Indicate for example, whether this tool/power is already
enabled by state statutes, but has not been adopted by the local governing body.]
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Attention: Skip Question 15 ifthere is no county zoning ordinance - Go to Question 16
15. For the most recent housing cycle (1999-2007), fill in the blank spaces beside each fiscal
year with the requested information. For all questions, please only count applications or
units with single-family housing as a proposed use(s), for each year.
All Rezoning Applications
Year
Total Applications Total Approved Number of Housing
Units Approved
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
2006-07
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
16. Please use the space below for any answer clarifications or general feedback on the
survey questions.
**** Thank you for your assistance! ****
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